

The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires

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The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires

*Central Eurasian International Relations during the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*

By

Jin Noda



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Jin Noda

Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Tokyo

November 2015

Notes on Transliteration and Sources

Within this book, transliteration of Cyrillic sources is based on the Library of Congress system (only *ñ* is transliterated to “i”). Russian archival documents are cited according to the following order: Abbreviated archive, f. (*fond*), op. (*opis'*), d. (*delo*), l. (*list*). For example, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 400, ll. 3–4.

The *pinyin* system is used for Chinese terms, personal names, and place-names. Manchu terms and personal names are given according to the Möllendorff system, however proper nouns are written with a capital letter at the beginning of the word.

Chinese and Manchu documents (mainly *Lufu zouzhe*) held in the First Historical Archives in Beijing are detailed as follows: bundle number – document package number / microfiche reel number – microfiche frame number (as in “655–39/46–1547”). If a document is reproduced in *Qingdai xinjiang manwen dang'an huibian* (XMD), I include the appropriate reference after the original information. In the case of *Yuezhe dang*, the microfiche frame number has been omitted because document pagination corresponds to the frame number.

Turkic and other languages written in Arabic texts are transliterated according to the Janos Eckmann system,¹ except that “c” is here written “j.” The modern Cyrillicized Kazakh language is given in accordance with the system found in the Japanese *Cyclopedia of Central Eurasia*.²

The following abbreviations are used for languages: Ch. = Chinese, Ma. = Manchu, Ru. = Russian, Mo. = Mongol, Tu. = Turkic, Ka. = Kazakh.

The date in footnotes is given according to the Russian Julian calendar (as in “10.24.1800”). When dates based on the Chinese calendar are required, they are supplied with the abbreviated rulers of the Qing dynasty (as in “QL22/2/2”). The rulers listed are: YZ = Yongzheng, QL = Qianlong, JQ = Jiaqing, DG = Daoguang, and XF = Xianfeng.

1 J. Eckmann, *Chagatay Manual* (Bloomington: Indiana University; The Hague: Mouton, 1966).

2 H. Komatsu et al. eds., *Chūō yūrashia o shiru jiten* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005).

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List of Abbreviations

AN	<i>Name-ii 'alamara-ii Nadiri</i>
FI	<i>Firdaws al-iqbāl</i>
GES	<i>Gugong ewen shiliao</i>
GZSL	<i>Daqing lichao gaozong huangdi shilu</i>
IAOO	Istoricheskii arkhiv omskoi oblasti
IKRI	<i>Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikakh XIV–XX vekov</i>
JHLZ	<i>Junjichu hanwen lufu zouzhe</i>
JJD	<i>Junjichu-dang</i>
JMLZ	<i>Junjichu manwen lufu zouzhe</i>
JMYD	<i>Junjichu manwen yuezhe dang</i>
JN	<i>Jahānguṣā-yi Nadirī</i>
KRO	<i>Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia</i>
MIKSSR	<i>Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (1785–1828 gg.)</i>
MIPSK	<i>Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana.</i>
MOTsA	<i>Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii</i>
NGDK	<i>Neige daku dang'an</i>
PDZFL	<i>Qinding pingding zhunga'er fanglüe</i>
QMJD	<i>Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian</i>
QTQD	<i>Qazaqstan tarikhī turalī Qıtay derektemelerī</i>
QZEG	<i>Qingdai zhong'e guanxi dang'an shiliao xuanbian</i>
QZHG	<i>Qingdai zhongha guanxi dang'an huibian</i>
RDO	<i>Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia</i>
RGVIA	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv
RKO	<i>Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia</i>
RKO XIX	<i>Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XIX veke</i>
RZSL	<i>Daqing lichao renzong huangdi shilu</i>
THS	<i>Tavāriḥ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī</i>
TsGA RK	Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan
TsIKKh	<i>Tsinskaia imperiia i Kazakhskie khanstva</i>
VPR	<i>Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka</i>
XMD	<i>Qingdai xinjiang manwen dang'an huibian</i>
XZSL	<i>Daqing lichao xuanzong huangdi shilu</i>

List of Chinese Characters

Abulai	阿布賚
Abulebisi	阿布勒比斯
Agui	阿桂
Aibileda	愛必勒達
Aletanshala	阿勒坦沙喇
Along'a	阿隆阿
Anjiyan	案(安)集廷
Annan	安南
Ba'erpin (Ma. Barpin)	巴爾品
bahan zhun	巴罕準
Baihua	白花
Bandi	班第
banshi dachen	辦事大臣
Baoning (Ma. Booning)	保寧
banhuahongxian	半花紅線
batu'er dachen	巴圖爾大臣
Beijing	北京
Bopu	蒲普/博普
bu	部
Bulute	布魯特
Buyantai	布彥太
caisang	宰桑
canzan dachen	參贊大臣
Changling	長齡
chaohe	朝賀
Chengde	承德
Chenggunzhabu	成袞扎布
chenpu	臣僕
chouduan	綢緞
<i>Daqing lichao shilu</i>	大清歷朝實錄
<i>Daqing huidian shili</i>	大清會典事例
<i>Daqing yitong yutu</i>	大清一統輿圖
Daoguang	道光
<i>Daoguang chongding huijiang ji</i>	道光重訂回疆記
<i>da toumu</i>	大頭目
Deling	德齡
Dexin	德新

Deyinga (Ma. Deingga)	德英阿
dianshu qingli si	典屬清吏司
dingbian dajiangjun	定邊大將軍
dingbian you fujiangjun	定邊右副將軍
dingbian zuo fujiangjun	定邊左副將軍
dingdai	頂戴
duan(zi)	緞(子)
duomuda zhun	多木達準
Eluosi dang	俄羅斯檔
erpin	二品
etuo'er	鄂圖爾
etuoke	鄂托克
fanbu	藩部
Fan Jianfeng	范建豐
fanli	藩籬
fanshu	藩屬
Fu chang'an (Ma. Fucangga)	福長安
Fujun	富俊
Fupeng	福彭
gong	公
Gong Zizhen	龔自珍
guifu	歸附
Hadasu	哈達蘇
Hamuba'er	哈木巴爾
han	汗
Hasake	哈薩克
Hazamu	哈咱木
Heshuo shuncheng qinwang	和碩順承親王
hualing	花翎
<i>Huangqing zhigong tu</i>	皇清職貢圖
Hua-Yi	華夷
Huazhuang	霍卓
hudaida	胡岱達/呼岱達
huibu	回布
Huiling	惠齡
huiyi	回語
Huiyuan	惠遠
huizi	回字
huizi difang	回子地方
hushi	互市

Jiaqing	嘉慶
jiangjun	將軍
Ji'erkang'a	吉爾抗阿
jimi	羈縻
Jinchang	晉昌
Jing'eli	旌額理
jiqike yuzi	奇齊克玉茲
jixin	寄信
jiwen	祭文
Junjichu	軍機處
kalun	卡倫
kawai jienei	卡外界內
Laiyuan qinglisi	徠遠清吏司
Leshan (Ma. Lešan)	樂善
li	里
liang xiang chu	糧餉處
Libu	禮部
Lifanyuan	理藩院
lingdui dachen	領隊大臣
lishi tongzhi	理事同知
lunzi	綸子
maimaicheng	買賣城
maitingzi	買廳子
Mantai	滿泰
maoyi ting	貿易亭
miji	密寄
mingyi fanbu	名義藩部
neidi	內地
neifu	內附
Neiwufu	內務府
nianban	年班
Nusan	努三
pingfan	屏藩
qijuzhu	起居注
Qiqiyusi-bu	齋奇玉斯部
Qiqiyuzi	奇齋玉茲
Qianlong	乾隆
<i>Qinding daqing huidian</i>	欽定大清會典
<i>Qinding huangyu xiyu tuzhi</i>	欽定皇與西域圖志
<i>Qinding xinjiang zhilue</i>	欽定新疆識略

qinwang	親王
Qing	清
Qinggui	慶桂
Qingshang	慶祥
Rehe	熱河
rujin	入覲
sanbu	三部
sangui jiukou	三跪九叩
Sayinga	薩迎阿
sha	紗
shangtou	商頭
shangyu	上諭
shengjiao	聲教
shilang	侍郎
shilu	實錄
shiwei	侍衛
Shuangchong chenfu	雙重臣服
Shuhede (Ma. Šuhede)	舒赫德
Shundene (Ma. Šundene)	順德訥
shuguo	屬國
Songyun (Ma. Sungyun)	松筠
suerdan	蘇爾坦
Suwanhuli	蘇完胡里
Tacheng	塔城
Ta'erbahatai	塔爾巴哈臺
Taihe	太和
taiji	臺吉
Tangnu Wulianghai	唐努烏梁海
Teyishunbao (Ma. Teišumboo)	特依順保
tiben	題本
Tianshan	天山
Tieseke	鐵色克
tubao	土堡
Tulibai	圖里拜
Tuoshi	托時
waifan	外藩
waiyi	外夷
waiyi	外裔
wang	王
Wei Yuan	魏源

wulake yuzi	烏拉克玉茲
wulayuzi	烏拉玉茲
Xianfeng	咸豐
Xi hasake	西哈薩克
Xibao	錫保
Xibo	錫伯
Xibotu	錫伯圖
Xibu	西部
<i>Xichui yaolie</i>	西陲要略
<i>Xichui zongtong shiliie</i>	西陲總統事略
<i>Xiyu shuidaoji</i>	西域水道記
<i>Xiyu tuzhi</i>	西域圖志
xiebang	協辦
Xinjiang	新疆
<i>Xinjiang tuzhi</i>	新疆圖志
xunbian	巡邊
xuzi	繡子
yichang	翼長
yifu	議覆
yihe	議和
yike zhun	伊克準
Yiletu (Ma. Iletu)	伊勒圖
Yili	伊犁
Yinfang	印房
Yingwu chu	營務處
Yishan (Ma. Išan)	亦山
Youbu	右部
Yongbao (Ma. Yungboo)	永保
Yongchang	永常
Yonggui (Ma. Yunggui)	永貴
Yongzheng	雍正
Yulin	玉麟
yuanbao	元寶
yuezhedang	月摺檔
Yue Zhongqi	岳鍾琪
Zhasake	札薩克
Zhaohui (Ma. Jaohūi)	兆惠
zhiqian	紙錢
zhuanli youmu	專理游牧
Zhunggaer	準噶爾

Zhuolan (Ma. Jolan)	卓蘭
zongguan	總管
zongguan yili dengchu jiangjun	總管伊犁等處將軍
<i>Zongtong yili shiyi</i>	總統伊犁事宜
zouzhe	奏摺
Zuobu	左部
zuoling	佐領

The Kazakh Khanates' Place within the Central Eurasian World

1 The History of the Kazakh Steppe and the Kazakh Khanates

The purpose of this book is to reassess the international order of Central Eurasia¹ during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Specifically, this will be accomplished by examining the relationships between two imperial powers, the Russian Empire and Qing China, and the power located directly between them, the Kazakh Khanates. While it may hardly seem necessary to add anything to the literature on either Russia or Qing China, this is not the case regarding the Kazakhs. Certainly, little is known about the Kazakh Khanates and it would serve our purposes well to begin with a description of its geography and history.

The steppe region stretching northwest from the modern day Republic of Kazakhstan (located in the center of the Eurasian landmass) through southern Russia and into the Ukraine was from ancient times the site of wanderings by various nomadic peoples. As demonstrated by the fact that it was invaded during the time of the Mongol Empire, the steppe is also adjacent in the east to the Mongolian Plateau. Earlier, during the eleventh century, the area had been known as “Dasht-i Qipchaq” (the Qipchaq Steppe) due to the presence there of the Qipchaq tribes. However, the eastern half of the steppe came into the possession of the nomadic Qazāq people during the reorganization of the area while under the rule of the Golden Horde and these tribes are considered to be the ancestors of the modern Kazakhs.

The Qazāq were led by commanders descended through the dynastic line of the Jochid. In other words, they were descendants of Chinggis khan. These commanders eventually used the title khan (*ḥān*) but the first known instances of such usage were by Janibeg and Kerei during the fifteenth century, from which point the Qazāq went on to develop their own unique form of nomadic government.² Records from this era refer to the Qazāq regime in various ways,

1 “Central Eurasia” here is covering Volga-Ural region and Western Siberia of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Xinjiang of China, while smaller “Central Asia” covers the five countries of the former Soviet Union and Xinjiang.

2 For the history of its formation and the base of its dynastic lineage, Nagamine considered its origin as Oros khan's rule over the Left wing of the ulus of Jochi analyzing Qādir ‘Alī Jalairī's

but in modern times “Kazakh Khanates” have become the standard method of reference. I will refer to this common usage below and use “Kazakh” in place of “Qazāq.” Furthermore, the eastern region of the Qipchaq Steppe which served as the base of operations for the Kazakh people will be referred to as the “Kazakh Steppe.”

The dissolution of the Mongol Empire was followed by the establishment of the Timurid and, subsequent to that, Shibanid dynasties. These nomadic coalitions were in turn supplanted in the history of Central Eurasia by the growing power of states whose prosperity was accompanied by urban growth located in the southern oasis region such as the Khanate of Khiva (1512–1920) and the Khanate of Bukhara (1500–1756). To the north, the move toward city-based societies failed to take hold and the Kazakh Khanates, even while repeatedly struggling against the southern Uzbeks and other neighbors, managed to preserve a nomadic independence.

However, from the mid-seventeenth century the Kazakh Khanates began to feel pressure from the militarily strong Jungar nomads. This led in the eighteenth century to the Kazakh Khanates sending missions and even rendering homage to both the Russian Empire in the west and, once the Qing had defeated the Jungars, the Qing Dynasty in the east.³ One particularly important turning point in the Kazakh relationship with the Qing was the dispatch of a mission by Ablai in 1757.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Kazakh Steppe fell largely under the control of the Russian Empire and the Khanates began a process of dissolution. By the latter half of the century, all of the previously nomadic steppe area had been annexed into the Russian Empire except for one area that remained part of Qing territory. Opposition to the expansion of Russian control spread within Kazakh society throughout the nineteenth century. Among these efforts, the rebellion led by Kenesari Kasimov (1837–1847) is particularly famous, but all these movements failed in the end. The Kazakh territory taken over by Russia was eventually inherited by the Soviet Union and organized into a socialist republic in 1936. Finally, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the modern day Republic of Kazakhstan was created in 1991.

Jāmi' al-Tavārīḥ, see H. Nagamine, “‘Kazaku=han koku’ keisei shi no saikō: jochi=urusu sayoku kara ‘kazaku hankoku’ e,” *Tōyō gaku* 90 (4) (2009): 441–466. See also J. Noda, “Kazafu hankoku to torukisutan: yūbokumin no kunshu maisō to bobyōsūhai karano kōsatsu,” *Isuramu sekai* 68 (2007): 1–24.

3 For the overview of this “bi-lateral” relations of the Kazakhs, see J. Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku: Surutan to shinchō no kankei wo chūshin ni,” *Tōyō gaku* 87 (2) (2005): 29–59; chapter 2 of this book.

The origin of Kazakhstan's current eastern borders can be traced to the Tarbagatai Treaty between the Russian Empire and the Qing in 1864. A subsequent addition to the treaty settled the border between the Russia Empire and Qing and these borders eventually became the basis for those between China and the Soviet Union as well as between China and present Kazakhstan. As map 2 below shows, the border as interpreted by the Qing Empire before 1864 extended much further west and well into the nomadic territory of the Kazakhs.

It would be beneficial to now turn our attention to fig. 1, which outlines the royal lineage of the Kazakh khans. Among the lineages of the three *jüz*, the line of the Great *Jüz* is the least clear and is therefore not included here. Details, however, will be given in chapter 4 below.




FIGURE 1 Abbreviated lineage of the household of Kazakh khans⁴

The fact that it developed as an offshoot from the Mongol Empire is one of the major characteristics of the Kazakh Khanates. This is most clearly manifested by the Kazakh monarchy's particular blood link to Chinggis khan and the symbolic meaning inherent in the use of the term "khan". The khan lineage traditionally asserted their authority with the titles "*sultan*" or "*tore*."

Mention should also be made regarding the organizational makeup of the Kazakh Khanates. The nomadic society of the Kazakhs was divided into three clan confederations, or *jüz*,⁵ known as the Great *Jüz* (*üli жүз*), the Middle *Jüz*

4 Reference was made in preparation of this graph to the work of Akasaka, see T. Akasaka, *Juchiei shoseikenshi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kazama shobō, 2005).

5 *Jüz* is the Kazakh word. It was cited as "*orda*" which means a tent in the Russian documents since the eighteenth century. We have many views on what kind of structure was under the three *Jüz*. As Sneath has argued, from the anthropological viewpoint, even the structural understanding on the Kazakh kinship society can be criticized, see D. Sneath. *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). However, in the historical context, especially before

(*orta jüz*), and the Small *Jüz* (*kíshí jüz*). Each *jüz* (hereafter *Juz*) contained between ten and twenty clans (*ru*). After the death of Tauke khan in 1718, the period of the Kazakh Khanates' rule by a single khan ended. From the first half of the eighteenth century, the authority of multiple khans was limited to their own *Juz* and a tendency for individual action by each *Juz* appeared.⁶ Research into the history of the Kazakh Khanates therefore requires an overall understanding of *Juz* behavior. Also, Russian intervention into Khanate election processes began from the eighteenth century, and during the 1820s, in fact, the very position of khan was eliminated from both the Small *Juz* and the Middle *Juz*. In other words, by this time, the Kazakh dynastic aristocrats surely had the ties with one another, although the separation of *Juz* became gradually distinct.

The Qing historically referred to the “*Juz*” (as opposed to the Kazakhs in general) by using the Chinese term “*bu*,” which is a character used to delineate a part from a whole. The term employed by the Qing to refer to the Kazakh clans (*ru*) was “*otok* (Ch. *etuo*ke),” a phrase originally used with reference to groups of Mongol nomads. Chapter 4 will deal with the structure and meaning of Kazakh units smaller than the *Juz* as well as touch more on Qing perceptions of the Kazakhs as evidenced by the usage of terms like *bu*.

2 Themes to be Addressed

The “Kazakh Khanates” were the longest surviving nomadic power in Central Eurasia, an area that saw the rise and fall of many such societies. The number of Kazakh households still in existence at the beginning of the nineteenth century has been estimated at just fewer than 40,000 (See chapter 4 below). Research focused on the Kazakh Khanates can therefore provide a valuable vantage point from which to reassess the historical events of Central Eurasia which, particularly from the post-Mongol Empire period, have largely been told from the perspective of the oasis region settlements.

Because our present purpose is not to simply reconstruct the national history of Kazakhstan, and due to the fact that the Kazakhs themselves rarely left

the modern era, what is significance is that Kazakh nomads at that period really indentified their belonging to a *Juz* and its segmented sub-divisions, which entirely seemed the stratum structure. Here, I will refer to the *ru* simply as “clans.” The detail will be shown in the chapter 4.

6 As far as we refer to the Russian literatures, we can find the relations between the *juz* and the authority of khans. For details, I will discuss later in the chapter 1.

behind historical documents, a reassessment of the region's international scene during this period naturally becomes one of the prime objectives of the current work. The Kazakh nomads who travelled the vast breadth of the Central Eurasian steppe came to serve, especially after the eighteenth century, as a node connecting the Russian and Qing empires of western and eastern Eurasia. Records of dealings with the Kazakh people left behind by these larger empires can go far in illuminating the details of Kazakh history left unclear by their own lack of historical documentation.

For these reasons, the first topic of the current work will be to outline the history of the Kazakh Khanates' international relations – particularly during the dynamic period between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Aside from narrations provided by scholars like Toru Saguchi and Takahiro Onuma, whose efforts to describe the Kazakhs from the Qing perspective will be touched on below, this area of study is largely untouched at least within Japanese academia.

A body of research on the Kazakh Khanates has accumulated abroad during the period after the Russian Empire. However, a perusal of this research quickly demonstrates its marked bias on the Kazakh-Russian connection as opposed to the Kazakh-Qing connection which has never been an important theme. This issue will be discussed more below, but even a quick glance at map 2 shown in this introduction will serve to emphasize the importance of the Kazakh-Qing relationship. Among the three Kazakh *Juz*, the Middle and Great *Juz* both share borders with the Qing in their eastern regions. The influence of the Qing on Kazakh history should not be understated.

Among the few treatments of the Kazakh-Qing relationship that do exist, Saguchi Toru's work detailing the "double tributary status" of the Kazakhs toward both the Russian and Qing empires serves as one useful model.⁷ However, the topic is treated as a history of the Qing frontier and not enough attention is paid to underlying Russian-Qing relations. Also, important work in recent years by Takahiro Onuma seeks to show how Central Asia fell within the sphere of Qing influence and control, but the Russian factor is again unaccounted for.⁸ Various Soviet and Kazakhstani works also touch on the

7 See T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963); idem, "The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 26 (1965): 47–114; idem *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986).

8 For those related to Kazakhs, see T. Onuma, "Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the 'ejen-albatu Relationship' in Central Asia," and "Kazakh Missions to the Qing Court" in J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo: Dep. of Islamic

Kazakh-Qing connection, but, due to a lack of understanding regarding the points of view of both the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty, these interpretations tend to be one-sided.⁹ One nineteenth century statement by A. Levshin to the effect that the Kazakh position toward both the Russians and the Qing was “two-faced” (Ru. *dvusmyslennyi*) had a long-lasting effect on scholarship well into the Soviet era.¹⁰ However, this interpretation can hardly be considered fair due to its matter-of-fact assumption of Kazakh vassalage (or subjection) to Russia and one-sided reliance on Russian source materials.¹¹

Within China itself, new work on these issues is starting to be pursued. One example is the analysis of both Russian language sources and Qing documents carried out by Altan-ochir.¹² However, it must be noted that the general trend of research into Kazakh-Qing relations has never been that of analysis based on an integrated comparison of Kazakh-Russian and Kazakh-Qing documents. In other words, both the source documents themselves as well as research emphases have never broken free of original Imperial Russian and Qing China

Area Studies, The University of Tokyo, 2010). Also his recent monograph, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014). His research is highly evaluated in terms of his consideration on the Qing-Kazakh relations with comparison with those of surrounding powers such as Khoqand and Kirghiz. See also Onuma et al, “An Encounter between the Qing Dynasty and Khoqand in 1759–1760: Central Asia in the Mid-Eighteenth Century,” *Frontiers of History in China* 9(3) (2014): 384–408.

- 9 Suleimenov and Moiseev well reviewed the research of the Soviet era on the Kazakhs of the eighteenth century, see R.B. Suleimenov & V.A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka: o vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Abilaia* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1988). Gurevich, though investigated the broader international relations around Kazakhs, mainly discussed the relations between Russia and Kazakhs, and didn't pay attention to the Russo-Qing negotiations via Kazakhs, see B.P. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983). In turn, Khafizova, putting emphasis on the Kazakhs' relations with China, couldn't catch the influence of their relations with Russia, see K.Sh. Khafizova, *Kitaiskaia diplomatiia v Tsentral'noi Azii (XIV–XIX vv.)* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1995). For the earlier triangle relations among Russia, Jungars, and the Qing, see F.W. Bergholz, *The Partition of the Steppe: the struggle of the Russians, Manchus, and the Zunghar Mongols for empire in Central Asia, 1619–1758: a study in power politics* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).
- 10 A. Levshin, *Opisanie Kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili Kirgiz-kaisatskikh ord i stepei* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996): 236.
- 11 For example, Suleimenov & Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka*: 161–162.
- 12 Altan-Ochir, “Issledovanie daty smerti Ablai-khana,” in *Mirovye tsivilizatsii i Kazakhstana*, chast' 1 (Almaty: Qaynar universiteti, 2007): 156–160.

frameworks and are still largely dictated by the classifications subsequently imposed by the Soviets and Chinese.

As mentioned above, the history of the Kazakh Khanates' international relations serves as the first focal point of this work. However, considering the general trend of research to date and the specific points of Kazakh history into which research is still required, the second focus of the current work naturally becomes the nature of Kazakh-Qing relations specifically. Such an investigation must naturally begin by laying out how the Kazakh-Qing connection has been variously interpreted within the overall Kazakh-Russian-Qing relationship. This will be the topic of chapter 1.

Another point that must be addressed is the Russian-Qing dynamic as it played out in the overall scheme of Kazakh-Russian-Qing relations. Regarding this point, special mention must be made of Kin'ichi Yoshida's excellent outline.¹³

In the chapters to follow, both Russia and Qing China are referred to as "empires." This is done purposefully in order to emphasize the two powers' control over multiple foreign ethnicities and to reassess the international order of Central Eurasia during this period.¹⁴

On the west side of the Kazakh Khanates, Russia's development began with the Muscovy, and the nation gained its enormous territory following expansion into Siberia during the end of the sixteenth century. The actual establishment of the Russian Empire can be said to have taken place when Peter the Great (reigned 1682–1725) received the title of Emperor. During this same period diplomatic affairs were arranged according to the Western European model and, after the Northern Wars, the existing Foreign Chancellery (*Posol'skii prikaz*) were reorganized (in 1720) as part of the College of Foreign Affairs to serve as government offices for the conduct of diplomacy – mainly with European countries.¹⁵

To the Kazakh Khanates' east, China was also expanding during this period. Following the initial declaration of the dynasty by the Manchu Aisin Gioro

13 K. Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi* (Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1974). Although with almost omitting the Central Asian affairs, the introduction in the following collection can outline the Russo-Qing relations of that time and research trends on them, see RKO (*Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVIII veke*) 4: 24.

14 For the empire's multiethnic characters, see A. Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: a multi-ethnic history*, transl. by Alfred Clayton (Harlow: Longman, 2001); K. Matsuzato, "Introduction: Empire Studies in Japan," in K. Matsuzato ed., *Comparative Imperiology* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2010): 5–20.

15 V.P. Potemkin ed., *Istoriia diplomatii* (Moscow: Gos. sotsial'no-ekonomichaskoe izd-vo, 1941): 271.

clan in 1616 (The Latter Jin Country/Ch. *Hou-jin guo*), the Qing Dynasty was established in 1644. The previous Ming dynasty was ousted by a new dynasty of Manchu leaders that eventually went on to establish a huge empire that included such areas as Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

The Qing maintained the legitimacy as an imperial China and conducted foreign policy in a traditional manner partly within the Chinese sphere of influence.¹⁶ It has generally been thought that Russia was treated as a “tributary state” regarding which the *Lifanyuan* (Court of the Colonial Affairs) would have had jurisdiction. However, it must be noted that the Russians and Qing actually engaged in a very European-like diplomacy that included the sending of envoys, negotiations, and the establishment of treaties.¹⁷ Also, while one-sided, the Russians had a delegation of Russian Orthodox missionaries in the Qing capital of Beijing which also performed a somewhat representative role.¹⁸

Due to the sudden rise of the Qing and Russian expansion into Siberia, the two empires came into regular contact during the seventeenth century. From this time their relationship was regulated by the establishment of two treaties: Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) dealt with border issues in the Amur River (*Heilongjiang*) area while the Treaty of Kyakhta (ratified in 1728) dealt with trade issues between the two powers.

As this broad outline suggests, in spite of the long border they shared, the issues brought up in Russian-Qing research so far have focused on Far Eastern/East Siberian problems, or what could be called the “Eastern side of Russian-Qing relations.” However, as Saguchi Toru has shown, Imperial Russia considered making an advance into India by way of Central Asia after its expansion into Siberia and as part of its efforts to manage the eastern territories¹⁹. The Qing were also clearly seeking to establish their influence in Central

16 See T. Motegi, *Hen'yō suru kindai higashi ajia no kokusai chitsujo* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1997).

17 Notably, Russia was not included within the category of “tributary states” in *Daqing huidian* (QL edition). In terms of trades, Russia was considered to conduct *hushi* trades with the Qing (see chapter 6). Also see Liao Minshu, “Shindai no tsūshō chitsujo to goshi: shinsho kara ryōji ahen sensō e,” in T. Okamoto & S. Kawashima eds., *Chūgoku kindai gaikō no taidō* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2009): 26–27. For the related regulations, see *Daqing huidian* (QL edition), vol. 52: 53, and *Daqing huidian shi li* (JQ edition), vol. 746: 3.

18 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 209.

19 T. Saguchi, *Roshia to ajia sōgen* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1966): 90–94. His work still seems to provide room to discuss how the Russo-Qing diplomatic relations regarding Central Asia had effects on trades. It is true that there were scarce materials in his time, but his book keeps silent on the Russian role in Central Asian trades after the half of eighteenth century. Malikov recently regards the purpose of the Russian rule over the

Asia, even going as far as to subjugate Eastern Turkestan (the modern area of Xinjiang) as part of the Jungar expedition. Despite this history, most analysis of the Russian-Qing connection in Central Asia and Western Siberia deals with events after the 1851 establishment of the Treaty of Kulja.²⁰ It is not an exaggeration to say that the 150 years of history regarding the “Western side of Russian-Qing relations” prior to this event have been neglected by historians.

3 Methodology and Significance

Some mention should be made regarding both the methods that will be employed to fill in the historical gaps stated above and the significance of such an endeavor.


Research into the history of the Kazakh Khanates has long been subject to the aims and intents of the neighboring great powers (particularly the Soviets and Chinese) resulting in fundamentally biased approaches. This is a reflection of the general influence wielded by such powers during the modern era and this topic will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1. Suffice it to say here that one major aim of the current work will be to avoid treating the history of the Kazakh Khanates as a history of the Chinese or Russian frontiers. To the contrary, the goal will be to clarify how perceptions of its relationships to both empires changes once the narrative is squarely focused on the Kazakh Khanates themselves. For this reason, Russian and Qing source materials will be contrasted and compared as much as possible.

Furthermore, subjecting the various aspects of the Kazakh-Qing connection to close inspection will lead to a greater appreciation of how that relationship is interwoven with the Kazakh-Russian connection as it has been documented by researchers to date. Map 1 illustrates the general nature of this scheme to make sense of the Kazakh Khanates' foreign relations. In other words, I try to de-construct the imperial perspectives.

By focusing not only on the arrows marked A and B but also on the place occupied by Kazakh issues within Russian-Qing diplomacy regarding Central Eurasia (represented by arrow C and discussed below in chapters three and seven) we can expect to better understand the nature of the three-cornered, or tripartite relationship between these countries as it developed after 1757

Kazakhs as the security of Siberia and foreign trading relations, see Y. Malikov, *Tsars, Cosacks, and nomads: the formation of a borderland culture in Northern Kazakhstan in the 18th and 19th centuries* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2011): 184.

20 For the process to this point, see chapters six and seven.



MAP 1 *Graph depicting the relationships between the Kazakh Khanates and the Russian and Qing Empires (Note that borders depicted are modern).*

(QL 22). It goes without saying that each part of the triangle affects the others, but special attention should be paid to the effect Russian issues had on Kazakh-Qing relations.

Attention to fluctuations in the relationships between each axis can also shed light on topics beyond the history of the Kazakh Steppe. For example, much can be learned about the processes behind the Russian Empire's expansion into Central Eurasia. In addition, such attention clarifies how the rule of Xinjiang by the Qing Dynasty had been transformed. Finally, because negotiations between the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty took place both within their respective centers of government and within particular local areas like Western Siberia and Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan), an analysis of this two-layered approach to diplomacy can also lead to new perspectives.

Regarding the significance of this study, attention must first be called to the way it analyzes the history of this area and period without limiting consideration to modern boundaries. As mentioned above, each member of the triangle influences the other members. Therefore, the effects of the Kazakh Khanates both on the Russian Empire and the Qing (implied by arrows A and B) can best be defined within the overall context – as can the opposite influence wielded on the Kazakh Khanates by each of the two empires. As map 1 shows, the three

areas that naturally become the narrative focus for such purposes are eastern Kazakhstan, Russia's territory in Western Siberia, and Chinese Xinjiang.

The current work will also help to identify the place of the Kazakh Khanates' history within the larger framework of imperial Russian expansionism, the changing contexts of Central Asian developments, and the fluctuations of Russian-Qing relations. Each chapter will seek to clarify the Central Eurasian international order by describing the situation of the Kazakh Khanates, located as it was between two great powers during the dynamic modernizing period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For this reason the current work will be of interest from a world history perspective as well.

Thirdly, this book will shed light on issues of "empire studies" that have been much researched in recent years. Regarding the Qing Dynasty, the research of Kiyohiko Sugiyama and others has been particularly fruitful.²¹ The Manchu sources I have used for my own research are based on the *zouzhe* system of direct submission of reports (or so-called "memorials") to the Emperor by Manchu and Mongol bannermen.²² These sources therefore shed much light on the Manchu nature of the Qing Dynasty. Arguments put forth in this book will illuminate imperial aspects of Qing rule such as its policies regarding the rule of foreign populations and the control of frontier areas. Additionally, the issue of the payment of tributes is an often debated element of imperial ruling mechanisms. With regards to this topic as well, my analysis of the Qing's conception of Central Eurasia can add new perspective. The same can be said regarding the Russian Empire, about which policies regarding non-Russian ethnic groups as well as the relationship between central and local government entities must be touched on.²³ Along these lines, it is necessary to always keep in mind the two-direction nature of the Kazakh Khanates' relationships

21 Sugiyama positions the Kazakh Khanates within the ruling structure of the Qing empire, see K. Sugiyama, "The Qing Empire in the Central Eurasian Context: Its Structure of Rule as Seen from the Eight Banner System," in K. Matsuzato ed., *Comparative Imperiology* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2010): 98. See also his latest monograph, K. Sugiyama, *Daishin teikoku no keisei to hakkisei* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2015). Although it is unclear whether the Qing viewed the Kazakhs as a single state, the Qing court certainly regarded Kazakh nomads as an element of the empire for a time.

22 For the Qing official documents, see M. Elliott, "The Manchu-Language Archives of the Qing Dynasty and the Origins of the Palace Memorial System," *Late Imperial China* 22 (1) (2001): 1–70.

23 See K. Matsuzato, "Introduction: Empire Studies in Japan," in Matsuzato ed., *Comparative Imperiology*: 5–20.

with the empires surrounding it: Kazakh activities and attempts at control over Kazakhs by the empires.

Finally, the present work will be interesting purely from the standpoint of the history of international relations due to the description of negotiations and diplomacy between the Soviets and the Chinese regarding borders they inherited from the earlier regimes. Within the Central Asian borders originally established by the Russian and Qing empires there have been numerous migrations by various groups of people. These migrations of people and goods continue to draw attention even in the present day and in spite of the fact that the area itself has been divided among Kazakhstan, China, and Russia.

4 Outline of Content

This book is divided into three parts that are further divided into nine chapters (including this introduction and the epilogue). These parts and chapters can be described as follows.

The goal of Part 1 is to reassess the nature of the Kazakh-Russia-Qing relationship.

Following this introduction, chapter 1 will begin with the most recent period dealt with in this book. Chapter 1 will reexamine how the Kazakh Steppe was partitioned by the Russian and Qing empires after the dissolution of the Kazakh Khanates. In other words, as part of my reassessment of the Kazakh-Russia-Qing relationship in general, an overview of research performed from the eighteenth century to the present will be undertaken with an eye to clarifying and understanding the causes of biases that have appeared in Kazakh research. In order to compare the nature of Russian and Qing source materials, attention will be given to an account contained in the Tatar language source "*Tavārīḥ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī*" (hereafter the THS).

Chapter 2 will focus on the Kazakh-Russian connection. Particular attention will be given to imperial Russian perceptions of both the Kazakh Khanates themselves and Russian control over the Kazakh Steppe. The chapter will begin with an analysis of Abulkhair khan's "Petition for subject status" of 1730.²⁴ This episode is one of the turning points in Kazakh-Russian relations and the events detailed in the present narrative begin from around this period.

24 Here, "subject status" (someone prefer to "subjecthood") corresponds to Russian "*poddanstvo*." Generally speaking, Russian perceptions of subjection were rather based on a territorial interpretation, especially since the beginning of the nineteenth century – those who lived within the confines of the emperor were considered its subjects. The Qing, on

In Part 2, we will turn our attention to the eastern Kazakh-Qing connection. The origins of this relationship will be examined along with Qing perceptions of the Kazakh Khanates and various institutions that played a foundational role. This section will help to clarify the position of the Kazakh Khanates sandwiched as it was between the Russian Empire and the Qing.

Chapter 3 describes the commencement of relations with the Qing in 1757 as well as Russian reactions to this development and resultant shifts in Russian-Qing diplomacy. Chapters four and five will focus on the unique position of the Kazakh Khanates within Russian-Qing relations while presenting perceptions of the Khanates from both sides. Chapter 4 will also seek to illuminate aspects of Kazakh ethnic history by describing Qing understanding of what they referred to as the “sections” (Ch. *bu*) of Kazakh society. Chapter 5 will also comment on the much-discussed nature of the system of bestowal of titles which served as the basis of the tributary relationship between the Khanates and the Qing. In order to reconsider these issues, attention will be given to a specific example of rank succession from the year 1824.

Part 3 will describe the process by which the Kazakh Khanates' diplomacy in the east became progressively limited while also comparing the nature of Russian and Qing involvement in Central Asia from the first half of the nineteenth century.

The introduction of new legislation in 1822 led to the extension of Russian administrative systems to the migratory territory of the Middle *Juz*. From this time, Russian control gradually increased even while Qing influence over the Kazakh Khanates waned. Chapter 6 will describe trade issues and the economic framework of Central Eurasia and the neighboring Russian and Qing empires while paying special attention to the unique role played within this framework by the nomadic Kazakhs. In chapter 7 we will examine the transformation of territory and border perceptions among the two empires as well as the Kazakh reaction to the changing international order of Central Eurasia.

In conclusion, recognizing 1851 as a major turning point in both political and economic issues, the various chapters of this book can be characterized as a description of the process of dissolution experienced by the Kazakh Khanates in the years leading up to the mid-nineteenth century.

the other hand, defined subjection in a personal level – those who were Qing subjects were subjects in whatever area they subsequently lived in. See also chapter 7.

5 Description of Historical Sources

Mention must be made regarding the nature of the historical sources utilized in this research. In particular, it is important to remember that the Kazakhs left virtually no written records and certainly nothing on the scale of an official Khanate historical chronicle would have been possible.²⁵ Accordingly, researchers have no choice but to rely on the accounts of neighboring powers. In spite of the limitations of both sources, Russian and Qing documents have been opened to the public and every effort must be made to gather and organize these basic source materials.

Among Russian official documents, administrative documents from the various government offices are of obvious worth, but Turkic language petitions and reports sent from the khans are also of undeniable importance. While studying in Kazakhstan, I was able to investigate the materials available in the State Central Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereafter, TsGA RK), including items related to the administration of Omsk province and other local government offices. I was also able to complete a survey of materials originally produced by the Governor-Generalship of Western Siberia currently housed in the Historical Archive of Omsk Region (IAOO).²⁶ Many documents in this Archive consist of correspondence between central and local government offices.

With regards to central Russian government offices, I was able to utilize sources housed in the Archive of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), which possesses a collection of documents pertaining to the College of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Ministry. I was also able to spend a short time researching the documents related with the Ministry of Army at the State Archive of Military History (RGVIA). Unfortunately, I have still not had the opportunity to search through materials at the State Historical Archive (RGIA) which houses the most extensive collection of all.

Some of the materials available in the facilities mentioned above have been published. Examples include “Kazakh Russian Relations” (KRO), “Russian Foreign Policy” (VPR), “International Relations in Central Asia” (MOTsA), “Qing Empire and Kazakh Khanates” (TsIKKh),²⁷ and “Russian Jungar Relations”

25 H. Sakai, “Eiyūjōjishi ga tsutaeru ‘kenesaru hanran,’” *Isuramu sekai* 44 (1994): 20. See also Sakai, “Jōjishi ni miru Abulai=han no keifu to oitachi,” *Chiba daigaku yūrashia gengo bunka ronshū* 4 (2001): 121–140.

26 When I conducted research in this Archive (2008), it was prohibited to read documents regarding the Russo-Qing borders issue.

27 It contains the Russian translation of *Daqing lichao shilu*, and reproduction of Russian imperial documents held in Moscow and Omsk.

(RDO). In addition, as a part of general efforts in Kazakhstan to reprint historical documents, publication of items from the collection of the TsGA RK are also underway, of which the "History of Kazakhstan in the Russian Sources" (IKRI) series is a prime example.

However, the list of un-published sources is extensive and much research is still required. Until recently the field has suffered from a bias toward using Russian sources. Future research must certainly focus on the unfiltered local accounts contained in Turkic (Tatar, Chagatai, etc.) language documents.²⁸ Within this book as well, much effort has been made to not only present translated documents into Russian but also original correspondence in Turkic languages sent directly from the Kazakh sultans.

The majority of Qing documents used for the current research originates in collections housed in the First Historical Archives in Beijing. Of particular importance are Manchu and Chinese language *Junjichu lufu zouzhe*,²⁹ duplicates of reports to the throne, and (mainly Manchu) excerpts from reports to the throne that were gathered monthly into the *Yuezhe dang*. The importance of these documents stems from the fact that they are largely made up of direct reports (memorials) from local officials in Xinjiang and also include some correspondence from the Kazakh Khanates to the Qing Dynasty³⁰. In contrast to Russian sources which are comprised of correspondence between varying levels of both central and local government, the most extensively preserved Qing sources derive from reports to the Qing emperor. As a result, there is some difference in the amount of detail presented by Russian and Qing sources and it can be said that the Qing sources sometimes lack the type of local detail found in Russian sources.

28 For the example of considering such Turkic documents, see V. Martin, "Using Turki-Language Qazaq Letters to Reconstruct Local Political History in the 1820s–30s," in P. Sartori ed., *Explorations in the Social History of Modern Central Asia* (19th–Early 20th Century) (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013): 207–245.

29 As a catalogue of Manchu documents related with Xinjiang, *Qingdai bianjiang manwen dang'an mulu* was published (Wu Yuanfeng et al. comp., Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999). For the explanation of these documents, see Wu Yuanfeng (Trans. by N. Murakami & Y. Kusunoki), "Manbun gesshōhō to shindai henkyō manbun tōan moku-roku," *Manzokushi kenkyū tsūshin* 9 (2000): 7–16. I had tried to show the flow of Qing documents regarding Kazakhs, see Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 8.

30 Our study (Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents*) was a trial to conduct research on this type of document (in Oyrat or in Turkic). For another publication of documents and their translations, see QTQD.




FIGURE 2 *Genealogy of the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans*

Many of the Kazakh-related documents to be found in the First Historical Archives have begun to be published as the “*Qingdai zhongha guanxi dang'an huibian*.”³¹ However, as I have discussed in other papers,³² the selection of materials for publication tends to be very arbitrary and most of what truly requires attention has yet to be published. On the other hand, the number of such materials is vast. Even in the present work, I have only been able to utilize such documents (from the 1750s) in chapters three and four, as well as within the discussion of title succession found in chapter 5. More research must be conducted in the future. It has to be noted that very recently the photocopy of these Manchu documents is published (XMD). Though it also edited arbitrarily, I can use it to help the detailed discussion. *Jixin dang* (record book of court letters) of the Qianlong era (*Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian*, QMJD) was also recently published so that we can be informed of the Qing court's policy.

It should also be noted that the author has yet to examine Kazakh-related materials from Bukhara or Khoqand despite the fact that they do contain some information pertaining to the Kazakh Khanates as demonstrated by research into the Kazakh-Bukharan connection by Tulibaeva.³³ One reason for this inability to examine the Bukharan and Khoqandi sources is the fact that they largely exist only as manuscript copies.

In review, the main document sources used in this book comprise of already published Russian and Qing documents supplemented by materials gained during my own investigations of public archives located in previously-Soviet nations as well as Qing *dang'an* documents housed within the First Historical Archives. Of particular interest is the Turkic correspondence from the Kazakh side. This is due to the wealth of information they contain to illuminate the internal workings of Kazakh society (I believe that they are reflected in the relationships between the Kazakh Khanates and the Russian and Qing Empires) as well as the insight they provide into the diplomatic/international scene of the time. While the product of a later period, as much use as possible

31 This series (QZHG vols. 1 and 2) has photocopies of the original documents. Kazakh translations of documents reproduced in it are under publication, see B. Ejenkhanūli, *Qazaq khandighi men Tsin patshalighining sauda qatınastarı turalı Qıtay müraghat qızhattarı*, 1 t. (Almaty: Daik-press, 2009); idem et al. ed., *Qazaq khandighi men Tsin patshalighining saiasi-diplomatiialıq qatınastarı turalı Qıtay müraghat qızhattarı* 1 t. (Almaty: Daik-press, 2009).


32 See J. Noda “Shindai tō'an shiryō to chū'ō ajia shi kenkyū: *Qingdai zhongha guanxi dang'an huibian* no shuppan ni yosete,” *Manzokushi kenkyū* 6 (2007): 162–173.

33 Zh.M. Tulibaeva, *Kazakhstan i Bukharskoe khanstvo v XVIII–pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2001).

will also be made of Muslim writings (mainly in Turkic) from Central Asia including the Kazakh Steppe.

Finally, while the history of the Kirghiz nomads also demands at least as much attention as the history of the Kazakhs, within this book the focus will be limited to issues directly bearing on the Kazakhs.³⁴

34 As Di Cosmo noted, much similarity is found on the relations of these two ethnic groups with the Qing, see N. Di Cosmo, "Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift-Exchange?" in N. Di Cosmo, & D. Wyatt eds., *Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries and Human Geographies in Chinese History* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003): 351–372. With further comparison, the same could be found on the relations with Russia. For the process of the construction of the relations between Kirghiz and Russia, see T. Akiyama, "Kuru-guzu yūbokushakai niokeru roshiatōchi no seiritsu: buzokushidōsha "manapu"no dōkō o tegakaritoshite," *Shigaku zasshi* 119–8 (2010): 1–35; T. Akiyama, "Nomads Negotiating the Establishment of Russian Central Asia: Focusing on the Activities of the Kyrgyz Tribal Chieftains," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 71 (2013): 141–160.



MAP 2

Kazakh Khanates during eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. This map is based on one in the following, J. Noda, Roshin teikoku to kazafu hankoku (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011): vi. In the map, the border depicted is modern. The broken lines correspond to the approximate border of the three Juz. The dot-dashed line is the border claimed by the Qing Empire

PART 1

*The 'Kazakh Khanates' and the History of the
International Relations in Central Asia*



Reexamining the Kazakh Khanates' "Foreign Relations in the East"

Introduction

As indicated in the introduction, this book strives to shed light on the foreign relations of the Kazakh Khanates – particularly its dealings with the Qing Dynasty. One of the most effective ways to approach this issue is to analyze how the Kazakh-Qing connection is reflected in the larger framework of the tripartite relationship between the Kazakh Khanates, the Qing Dynasty, and the Russian Empire. This chapter will attempt to reassess what place within historical research enquiry into the nature of the Kazakh Khanates' eastern connections has occupied to date. The purpose of this reassessment is not merely to outline the history of such research, but to show how research trends themselves reflect the unique position that was occupied by the Kazakhs – sandwiched as they were between the large Russian (Soviet) and Qing (Chinese) nations.

In order to establish a fresher research perspective, attention will be turned later in the chapter to showing how the contents and points of view of various literature produced early in the twentieth century has influenced both recent trends in Kazakh Khanate research and this book itself.

1 A History of Research Regarding the Kazakh Khanates

It goes without saying that research regarding the Kazakh Khanates, including studies of the Kazakh nomads themselves as well as their political trends in general, began in Imperial Russia. The earliest body of research is comprised of topographical studies carried out by individuals working for the Imperial Russian military such as P. Rychkov (in the eighteenth century) and I. Andreev (who will be described further below). A second generation of work includes *Description of the Kirgiz-Kazakh, or the Kirgiz-Kasak Hordes and the Steppes* by A. Levshin (1797–1879).¹ Written by Levshin while working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this work featured a wide range of historical materials and is

¹ A. Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili kirgiz-kaisatskikh ord i stepei* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996).

famous for providing impetus within the field of Russian oriental history for further work on the Kazakhs. Due to the extensive source materials regarding the Kazakh Khanates that he draws his arguments from, Levshin's work merits attention. In view of the current disorganized state of documents regarding Imperial Russia, such Tsarist era works, including the disquisitions of the Kazakh Khanates native Ch. Valikhanov, retain unchanged value today due to their being compilations of historical materials themselves.

One study to come out during the post-Russian Revolution era was M. Tynyshpaev's *Materials on the History of the Kirgiz-Kazak People* in 1925. Tynyshpaev's narrative, however, ends in the 1750s. During the Soviet era, E. Bekmakhanov was certainly the greatest contributor to research on Kazakh history. Bekmakhanov's wide-ranging work included both the social and economic aspects of Kazakh history, and his most well-known book is 1947's *Kazakhstan between 20s and 40s of the nineteenth century*. Because he positively appraised the 1837–1847 uprising against the Tsarist regime led by Kenesari, a member of the Kazakh khan lineage, Bekmakhanov's work went on to be criticized for its nationalistic tendencies.² In those years, much attention was paid to other examples of national liberation movements as well. One example is M. Viatkin, who wrote about the Sirim batir's uprising that occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century in the far-western area of the steppe occupied by the Small Juz. Another example is N. Apollova, who conducted research into the economic relationship between the Kazakhs and Russia, while others like V. Basin and T. Shoinbaev focused on the political aspects of the relationship. One major issue all of these works had to deal with was how to interpret Russia's annexation of the Kazakh Khanates.³

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the creation of an independent Republic of Kazakhstan, a new history written from the perspective of the Kazakh people themselves began to appear. The third volume of the *History of Kazakhstan* (five volumes, ed. by M. Kozybaev et al.) is particularly relevant to the period of time I will be focusing on in this book and the introductory review it provides of the history of Kazakh historical research is especially useful.

2 For a consideration of the national-liberation movement which was disputed among the Soviet historians, see Y. Tateishi, *Kokumin tōgō to rekishigaku: Sutālinki soren ni okeru "kokuminshi" ronsō* (Tokyo: Gakujutsu shuppankai, 2011).

3 For the justification in the Soviet era of the annexation of the Kazakh Steppe by Russia, see T. Uyama, "Kyū sorenchiiki ni okeru "minzoku shi" no sōzō: sono tokushu sei, kindai sei, fuhēn sei," in K. Sakai & A. Usuki eds., *Isurāmu chūiki no kokka to nashonarizumu* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2005): 64. See also the next section.

In contrast to the above, Russian researchers like A. Bykov and E. Bezvionnaia have begun to focus on the history of the Kazakh Steppe from the perspective of Russian imperial history. Furthermore, recent research trends⁴ include treating oral traditions of epic poetry and genealogy as historical materials themselves. Finally, much attention is now being paid to biographical research into the lives of major historical figures⁵ as well as the reprinting/consolidation of various materials.⁶ It must be noted in conclusion that a clear strain of Kazakh nationalistic feeling, leading to strong interpretations regarding the framework of Kazakh-Russian national relations as well as spatial and ethnic issues, has imprinted itself on much research done post-independence.

2 A History of Research Regarding the Kazakh-Qing Connection

This section will outline the history of research into the Kazakh-Qing connection in a detailed effort to reveal the problems inherent in its various forms. In order to clarify and compare each characteristic I will divide what follows into three parts: first, a consideration of Tsarist era Russian materials regarding Kazakh-Qing relations; second, a look at research tendencies seen during the Soviet era as well as within modern Kazakhstan; and finally, a consideration of Chinese research on the Kazakh-Qing connection.

2.1 *Imperial Russian Documents Concerning the Kazakh Khanates' 'Eastern' Relations*

As mentioned in the introduction, in order to fully understand the history of the Kazakh Khanates we must first grasp the nature of its relationship to the Qing Dynasty. However, an analysis of how research has been conducted on the 'eastern' relations of the Kazakh Khanates clearly reveals a bias to treat it as merely one aspect of the process of change from imperial Russian subject to member of the Soviet Union to independent Republic of Kazakhstan. In other

4 M.K. Kozybaev et al. eds., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Almaty: Atamūra, 2000): 62–76.

5 For example, as research on Abulkhair khan of the first part of the eighteenth century, I. Erofeeva, *Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel' i politik* (Almaty: Sanat, 1999). Kasymbaev focused on the some members of the khan aristocrats in 18–19 centuries, Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Gosudarstvennye deiateli kazakhskikh khanstv (xviii vek)*, t. 1–4 (Almaty: Bilim, 1999–2001).

6 For example, the collection of the materials on the Bokei Orda was published, see B.T. Zhanaev et al. eds., *Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, 1801–1852 gg.: sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2002). IKRI (*Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikakh*) is a multi-volume collection of Russian language sources on the history of Kazakhstan.

words, due to issues like geographic location, there has long been a strong tendency to view the history of the Kazakh Khanates from the perspective of Kazakh-Russian history.

As one example of this tendency, let us turn our attention to the dispatching of a tributary mission to the Qing by Ablai sultan, an influential Chinggisid sultan of the Kazakh Middle Juz, in 1757.⁷ This episode will be examined in greater detail in chapter 3, but a short evaluation of how the event has been treated to date can serve as a symbol to illustrate overall research trends. The reason for this is that while the dispatching of missions by the Kazakhs provided an opportunity for the establishment of an 'official' relationship with the Qing Dynasty,⁸ the Russians, aware of Kazakh-Qing developments still maintained their own relationship with the Kazakhs as well. Naturally, that acceptance took a variety of forms, so analyzing and clarifying the Russian understanding of Kazakh-Qing relations will be the purpose of this section. Analysis of the Qing understanding of that relationship, as one of the concerned parties itself, will be saved for chapter 4 below.

Aside from the documentary resources (*arkhiv* in Russian) themselves, the first person to address the Kazakh-Qing relationship in earnest seems to have been Andreev (born 1743). However, in the works he produced between 1785 and 1790, Andreev makes no specific mention of Ablai's mission. In contrast, Andreev does focus on the actions of the household of another sultan from the Middle Juz named Abulfeiz. One reason for this is that Andreev's military service was centered in Semipalatinsk and he spent time directly exploring the nomadic pasturelands and village (*aul*) of Abulfeiz. In particular, Andreev describes in detail the official delegates sent by the Qing during the change of power from Abulfeiz to his son Khankhoja.⁹ It seems that Andreev's writings served as the basis for much of the information used by Russian military

7 One of sultans (Kazakh khan aristocrats) in the Middle Juz. In the process of the subjugation of Jungars by the Qing Empire, he dispatched a mission to the Qing court in 1757 to "surrender" and to become a subject of the dynasty, see T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 269–271. On the surrender document of Ablai, see T. Onuma, "Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the 'ejen-albatu Relationship' in Central Asia," in J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo, 2010): 86–125. Later, he was conferred by the Qing the title of *han*, and was admitted as well to be the khan of the Middle Juz by the Russian Empire.

8 The imperial Qing interpretation of this fact as symbolic of Ablai and the Kazakhs having become a tributary of the Qing Dynasty should be kept in mind.

9 I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998): 43–44. See also chapter 5 of this book.

bureaucrats in Siberia as evidenced by the fact that Andreev was quoted in the nineteenth century *The Sibirskii vestnik* ("Siberian Report"), edited by G. Spasskii (1784–1864), as well as in the work of G. Bronevskii (1786–1858),¹⁰ who served as the chief of the Omsk province from 1827 to 1835.

Later on, during the early part of the nineteenth century, the works of Levshin do mention that "Ablai" received an imperial edict in the form of a document from the Qing Dynasty as part of the Qing campaign against the Jungars. However, while recognizing the formal nature of the edict, Levshin makes no indication that it was sought after by the Kazakhs.¹¹ While it is certain that Levshin is commenting on the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Qing, it could be that he is actually describing, in line with Andreev, Abulfeiz's vassalage¹² to the Qing and the Qing delegation sent during the change of power as mentioned above.¹³

Levshin also writes as follows:

The government of the Qing Emperor (Bogdykhan) ... claimed that the pasturelands of the entire Middle Juz were part of Qing territory and that Ablai was a Qing noble ... When the Qing saw Wali yielding to the Russians, they became anxious to replace him with another person in order to protect their imperial status.

Levshin is clearly describing a weak relationship between Ablai's son Wali and the Qing, but, as we will see in chapter 2, this is factually incorrect. Furthermore, regarding the other children of Ablai, Levshin writes that they "considered themselves to be subjects of the Qing Dynasty" but fails to provide any details to support the claim.¹⁴ It could be that this is actually a reference to the sultans of the Great Juz on their nomadic lands in the farthest areas from Russia.

10 Bronevskii describes the conversation between Khankhoja and the dispatched Qing commandant by referring to the same text as that cited by Andreev, G.M. Bronevskii, "Zapiski o Kirgiz-kaisakakh Srednei ordy," *Otechestvennye zapiski*, ch. 41–43 (1830): 209.

11 He wrote that the Qing side dispatched the envoy to Kazakhs, Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh*: 235–236.

12 This is described by the Russian word "*poddannyi*." However, it is clear that he adopted the order within the Russian Empire ignoring the ruling system of the Qing Dynasty. The "vassalage" or the subjection to the Qing has to be distinguished with the Russian "subject status" (examined in detail in chapter 2).

13 Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh*: 257. There are misunderstandings in his text, such as comments regarding Abulfeiz's succession to the "khan" title.

14 Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh*: 257–258.

Other research exists from this period on the nature of the Russian-Qing relationship (rather than on Kazakh history itself). Bantysh-Kamenskii's research into historical materials, which contains examination of letters exchanged between Russia and the Qing from the beginning of the seventeenth century until 1792, is particularly noteworthy. However, because the main focus is on Russia, all that can be read from these correspondences is that the Russian and Qing Empires were both claiming jurisdiction over the Kazakhs independently from the Kazakhs' own goals.¹⁵

Later in 1864, border demarcation negotiations between Russia and the Qing resulted in the dividing up of nomadic lands in the eastern Kazakh region. One individual involved in the negotiations was a civilian employed by the Russian military official in Western Siberia named I. Babkov (1827–1905). Babkov was probably influenced by Bantysh-Kamenskii when he wrote that:

Although the Qing insisted that Ablai voluntarily became their vassal, this is completely false. The Qing sent military forces into the Kazakh Steppe in order to punish the Kazakhs under Ablai. ... In spite of having already sworn allegiance to Russia, Ablai made the decision to become a vassal of the Qing. This was a forced decision, not a voluntary one.

Babkov's analysis denies the existence of Kazakh autonomy.¹⁶ Based on his own experience, Babkov's work also contains much information on the history of the nomadic Kazakhs in the area of the Russian-Qing border, particularly regarding the period spanning the 1840s to the 1860s.

As will be reexamined in chapter 3, both Qing and Russian documentary sources record the dispatching of the mission by Ablai in 1757. There is no reason not to accept this as a historical fact, but it is also clear that there has been a lack of not only comprehensive examination into all related source materials but also of any attempt to recognize the various positions of the involved parties: the Russian, Qing, and Kazakhs.

15 For example, a document from the Qing Lifanyuan to the Russian Senate dated 1758 states that "the Qing emperor merely gives titles and favors to Kazakhs who became his subjects," N.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del mezhdru rossiiskim i kitaiskim gosudarstvami, s 1619 po 1792-i god* (Kazan', 1882): 285. For the standpoint of Kazakhs in the Russo-Qing negotiations, I will consider in the chapter 3.

16 I.F. Babkov, *Vospominaniia o moei sluzhbe v Zapadnoi Sibiri (1859–1875 gg.)* (SPb, 1912): 151–152. Babkov regards that the Kazakhs between the two empires "were in the ambiguous position" (*neopredelennoe polozenie*).

It can be said that the following statement by V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov (1830–1904) represents a certain peak in imperial Russian research up to the latter half of the nineteenth century.

All of Jungaria came under the influence of the Qing in 1758, and the threat presented by the Jungars never reappeared. By this time, the relationship between Ablai and the Qing Dynasty had already been established. Ablai had already declared himself to be a vassal of *Bogdykhan* [the Qing Emperor] in 1756. However, this in no way prevented Ablai from being subject to Russia as well. With bowed head, Ablai submitted to both great nations and gained rewards and peace in return.¹⁷

Like this recognition by Vel'iaminov-Zernov of the twin Kazakh relationships with both Russia and the Qing Dynasty, there is much analysis from the Tsarist period that is generally based on fact. On the other hand, a certain limit in imperial Russian Oriental studies seems evident in the fact that scarce account is taken of Qing sources and no consideration is made regarding the Qing perspective on the issues.

In a disquisition entitled "The Altishahr in 1858–1859: The Condition of Southern Xinjiang ("Little Bukharia") of China," even Choqan Valikhanov (1835–1865), a great-grandchild of Ablai who made personal examinations into Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan) wrote that "Ablai considered himself a vassal of the Bogdykhan in 1766 and was bestowed an aristocratic title."¹⁸ Failing to mention Ablai's sending of the mission to the Qing Dynasty, Valikhanov reveals a lack of understanding. In another disquisition, "Draft Regarding the Old Imperial Rescript," Valikhanov analyzes a Qing imperial edict brought back by Devletkerei sultan, who had been sent to Beijing in 1762. Valikhanov maintains that "immediately following the Qing subjugation of Jungaria, Ablai entered into a relationship with the Qing and received a calendar¹⁹ in 1756 as a sign of his vassalage (*vassal'stvo*)."²⁰ If this is a reference to Ablai's mission of 1757,

17 V.V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov, *Istoricheskie svedeniia o kirgiz-kaisakakh i snosheniakh Rossii so Srednei Aziei so vremeni konchiny Abul-khair khana*, t. 1 (Ufa, 1853): 202.

18 Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, "O sostoianii Altyshara ili shesti vostochnykh gorodov Kitaiskoi provintsii Nan-Lu (Maloi Bukharii) v 1858–1859 godakh," in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 136. This work was partially published in 1861.

19 Receiving the calendar from the Emperor was a symbol of tributary status.

20 Ch. Valikhanov, "Chernovoi nabrosok o drevnikh gramotakh," in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 303. The

there is no corresponding reference to the Kazakh receiving a calendar within other historical records and the dates must be wrong.

In a rare case, N. Aristov (born 1843), a man who had worked in Russian-occupied Ili (Ghulja), quoted from the *"Gazetteer of the Western Regions of the imperial domain"* (*Xiyu tuzhi*) in reference to the relationship between the Qing Dynasty and the Kazakhs. In this passage, Aristov both recounts the history of the Kazakh Khanates from Ishim khan and Jangir khan, and records the content of Ablai's written petition for vassalage to the Qing. A statement that "Ablai sent a mission to the Emperor in the fall [of 1757]" indicates that Aristov had a grasp of reliable information from Qing sources.²¹ However, perhaps due to the rarity of Aristov's book, it doesn't seem to have had much effect on subsequent research.

One of the most important examples of Tsarist era research is that of N. Konshin (1864–1937),²² who lived in Semipalatinsk, the entrance to northern Xinjiang. As part of his work with the statistical committee, Konshin paid careful attention to the Kazakh-Qing relationship²³ in an effort to understand it in light of Russia's governing of her own frontier areas. Konshin's attempt to understand the connections between the various cities on the Irtysh fortified line of Western Siberia and the Tarbagatai (Chughuchaq), Ili (Kulja/Ghulja), and Kashgar areas of Xinjiang is closely related to the work by a Tatar mullah Qurbān 'Alī, entitled *Tavārīḥ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī* (1910), which will be examined in detail in the next section. However, it is important to realize that, due to his reliance on nineteenth century historical documents, Konshin's understand-

article titled "Ablai" by the same author contains similar information, see Valikhanov, "Ablai," in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 4 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 114.

21 N.A. Aristov, *Usuni i kyrgyzy ili kara-kyrgyzy: ocherki istorii i byta naseleniia zapadnogo Tian'-Shania i issledovaniia po ego istoricheskoi geografii* (Bishkek: Fond "Soros-Kyrgyzstan", 2001): 435. His original work was published in 1893 in St. Petersburg. Aristov also seems to refer to such literature as work by Bantysh-Kamenskii and Iakin' Bichurin. The texts cited by him here are based on the translation by Imbault-Huart who edited Chinese sources such as "*Daoguang chongding huijiang ji*" and "*Xiyu tuzhi*," see C. Imbault-Huart, *Recueil de documents sur l'Asie central* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1881).

22 According to Turova, he was a secretary of Semipalatinsk provincial statistical committee since 1890s, see L.P. Turova, "Nikolai Iakovlevich Konshin (1864–1937)," in *Naselenie Vostochnogo Kazakhstana v ego trudakh* (Ust' Kamenogorsk: Vostochno-Kazakhstanskii oblastnoi akimat, 2002): 35–40.

23 While the famous orientalist Bartol'd paid much attention to Konshin's research, only quite few referred to his works in the Soviet era. See V.V. Bartol'd, "Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii," in *Sochineniia*, t. 9 (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi literatury, 1977): 431.

ing regarding eighteenth century events like Ablai's mission to the Qing is not always accurate.

About the same time as Qurbān 'Alī, the Kazakh intellectual Shakarim Qudaiberdiuli wrote a book dealing with Kazakh genealogy. Although he pays almost no attention to the nineteenth century relationship between the Kazakhs and the Qing, Shakarim did write that "In 1757 Ablai khan and ... Abulfeiz khan [sic] visited the khan in the Chinese city of Beijing, submitted to the Chinese, and, becoming known as kings (*vān*), ... were able to continue their nomadism." The statement is vague in meaning but clearly refers to the mission sent by the Kazakhs.²⁴

V. Bartol'd (1869–1930), a scholar who was to have a great impact on Central Asian research, wrote in *History of Semirech'e* that "after the fall of the Jungar regime, the Kazakhs and Kirghiz returned to Semirech'e and lived there for a time as subjects of the Qing albeit in name only. Until recognizing the authority of Russia, the Kazakhs and Kirghiz were for all purposes completely autonomous."²⁵ The above quote fails to emphasize a relationship with the Qing, but in *History of the Study of the Orient in Europe and Russia* (1911), Bartol'd presents the Qing as demanding both allegiance and tribute from the Kazakhs although no particular proof is offered.²⁶

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Kazakh language newspapers began to be published widely within the Russian Empire. Examples of two Kazakh newspapers are the *Ay qap* (1911–1915) and the *Qazaq* (1913–1918).²⁷ The *Ay qap*, which was published in Troitsk, contained very few articles on historical themes, but those to be found are strongly influenced by Russian ideas of oriental history. There are articles written by correspondents in Xinjiang and it is clear that attention was being paid to the Kazakh population of what was already the Republic of China. Even so, it is important to note that overall perceptions are limited by such modern constructs as the 1864 treaty defining the borders between Russia and China.

With the appearance of Kazakh intellectuals like M. Tynyshpaev (1879–1937), attention finally began to be paid to eighteenth century Kazakh history including the period between the trouble with the Jungars known as the *Aqtaban shubirindi* (the bare-footed flight) and leading up to Ablai khan's time. This can be seen as related to the later work of other Russian orientalists like

24 Q. Shākārim, *Türk, qırghız-qazaq hām khandar shejiresi* (Almaty: Qazaqstan; Sana, 1991): 31–32.

25 V.V. Bartol'd, *Ocherk istorii Semirech'ia* (Frunze: Kirgizgosizdat, 1943): 88.

26 Bartol'd, "Istoriia izucheniiia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii": 409.

27 Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*: 81.

Levshin. Finally, it is interesting to note that after the fall of the Jungars in the 1750s, Tynyshpaev merely notes, without any mention of Qing factors, that the Kazakhs moved east and occupied a great expanse of land.²⁸

2.2 *Research Trends of the Soviet Era and Modern Kazakhstan*

As has already been noted, an important and unique place is occupied within the field of Soviet era studies on Kazakhstan by E. Bekmakhanov.²⁹ However, since much of his work focuses on the nineteenth century, here we will simply make mention of the emphasis he placed on the oppression of the Great Juz (especially in the south) by the Qing Dynasty.³⁰

Next, it is necessary to touch upon the compilation of histories regarding the various Soviet republics.³¹ Regarding the Republic of Kazakhstan in particular, mention must be made of the following four works.

The first history to require attention is volume one of the *Outline of the History of the Kazakh SSR*. Within this volume, Ablai's 1757 mission to the Qing is described as follows: "Ablai became a vassal to both of the great empires [Russia and the Qing] simultaneously." The lack of economic merit to be gained from entering into a relationship with the Qing, as well as the fact that Ablai's son Wali also served in a "dual-subjection" (*dvoinoie poddanstvo*) state is mentioned,³² clearly demonstrating that the Kazakh-Qing relationship was taken into consideration by the writers.

28 M. Tynyshpaev, *Istoriia kazakhskogo naroda* (Almaty: Sanat, 1998): 166.

29 For the criticism taken by Bekmakhanov, see L. Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet historians on the non-Russian nationalities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

30 He wrote that the Qing government tried to prevent Russian advances into the Great Juz and supported the pro-Qing Kazakh sultans (ex. Ghubaidulla, Altinsari). He also mentioned that, while the Kazakhs of the Great Juz who suffered from double suppression by Khoqand and the Qing, wanted to be Russian subjects, the Russian Empire paid no attention to them, out of consideration for its relations with the Qing Empire, E. Bekmakhanov, *Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957): 137. For the tripartite relations among Russia, Qing and Kazakhs during the first part of the nineteenth century, see chapter 7.

31 Bezikonnaia also mentioned the compilation of the republic's history in her overview on historiography, see E.V. Bezikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika rossiiskoi imperii v stepnykh oblastiakh Zapadnoi Sibiri v 20–60-kh gg. XIX v.* (Omsk: Izd-vo Omskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 2005): 15.

32 M.P. Viatkin, *Ocherki po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR*, t. 1 (s drevneishikh vremen do 1870 g.) (Moscow, 1941): 175–176 and 231.

The 1757 mission is again made mention of in a 1943 history entitled *the History of Kazakh SSR*.³³ This work clearly specifies that after the Qing subjugation of the Jungars, Ablai found it impossible to resist Qing military power and therefore "officially recognized himself as a vassal of the Qing." The work goes on to positively appraise Ablai's "attainment of basic autonomy" even within the framework of dual-subjection (*dvoinoe poddanstvo*) to the Russians and Qing and in spite of the two empires' dealings with each other.³⁴

The third work that must be considered is the first volume of the 1957 edition (third printing in two volumes) of the *History of Kazakh SSR* mentioned above. This work is notable for its attempt to accurately represent historical details, often through reference to Qing source materials. The tenth chapter, written by Appolova, states that in 1757 "Ablai sent a mission to the Bogdykhan to convey his assent toward becoming a Qing subject." While thus referencing Ablai's "document offering allegiance", the author maintains that it "illustrates the policies Ablai made use of in order to maneuver cleverly between the Russians and the Qing and in order to hold onto his own authority." In other words, the event served to increase Ablai's authority in the end.³⁵ Notable along these lines is the book's publishing of the "*Huangqing zhigong tu*"³⁶ (which presents the Kazakhs as having voluntarily submitted to the Qing) over the caption "Album of vassal states of the imperial dynasty." While the 1957 edition of the "*History of Kazakh SSR*" fails to detail the economic aspects of the Kazakh relationship to the Qing, it does describe the political dimensions very clearly. It is also worth mentioning that the book continues on to touch on the relationship between the Qing and Ablai's successor Wali.³⁷

However, the last work to consider here, the third volume of 1979's edition of the "*History of Kazakh SSR*" never mentions 1757 at all, stating only that in 1758 "the Qing Dynasty occupied Xinjiang, but its western border never expanded

33 M. Abdykalykov & A. Pankratova eds., *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR: S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* (Alma-Ata: Kazogiz, 1943). For this edition, see also H. Yilmaza, "History writing as agitation and propaganda: the Kazakh history book of 1943," *Central Asian Survey* 31-4 (2012): 409-423.

34 Abdykalykov & Pankratova, *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR*: 166-167.

35 M.O. Aueзов, et al., *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR*, t. 1 (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo Akademii nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1957): 263-264.

36 Illustrations edited according to imperial edict in the Qianlong era. The original text mentioned, "Kazakhs surrendered [to the Qing]," see *Huangqing zhigong tu*, vol. 2: 26. For images of the Kazakhs in this volume, see fig. 14 and the cover image.

37 Aueзов, et al., *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR*: 303.

beyond that point.” The emphasis here is clearly on Qing expansionism and its limitations.³⁸

As described above, there is a great difference in detail between the descriptions of the Kazakh-Qing connection to be found in the volumes produced up to 1957 and that of the 1979 edition. Why did the information regarding China become so sparse in 1979?

Post-World War II criticism of Kazakh nationalism³⁹ and efforts to rationalize the Russian annexation of Central Asia within an overall context of Russian-centrism have both been previously studied.⁴⁰ Both can be considered together as one reason for the careful nature of the narratives regarding Kazakh-Qing negotiations, most notably the relationship between Ablai and the Qing.

However, another reason must be considered as well – friction between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, especially the dispute between the two countries regarding the Xinjiang border that occurred around 1962.⁴¹ When negotiations intensified in 1964, the Chinese protested the borders established by treaty between what had been the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty.⁴² Relations between the two countries became extremely tense.⁴³

Obviously, friction between the two powers regarding their frontier zones had a powerful effect on research into the history of Kazakh’s foreign affairs to

38 A.N. Nusupbekov et al., *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo “Nauka” Kazakhskoi SSR, 1979): 76–80. This part was written by V.A. Basin.

39 Uyama, “Kyū sorenchiiki ni okeru ‘minzoku shi’”: 64.

40 Tillett, *The Great Friendship*. For instance, the publication of the materials “Kazakh-Russian Relations” (KRO 1 and KRO 2) is one link in this direction. The preface of KRO 1 clearly states that “the annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia was progressive movement (*akt*) with a historically proper reason. It no doubt played a positive role in the development of these nations [which had been annexed by Russia],” KRO 1: III.

41 For the details of the escape of Kazakhs from Xinjiang into Soviet territory in 1962, see Li Danhui, “Dui 1962 nian xinjiang yida shijian qiyinde lishi kaocha,” in *Beijing yu Mosike: Cong lianmeng zou xiang duikang* (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue, 2002): 480–509.

42 A. Iwashita, “Chūgoku no kokkyōsen to soreo meguru gaikō,” in S. Kawashima ed., *Chūgoku no gaikō: jikoninshiki to kadai* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2007): 199–200.

43 For the strict attention paid by China to the borders with the Soviet Union in Xinjiang during 1964, see Li Danhui, “1964 nian: Zhongsu guanxi yu maozedong waihuan neiyu silude zhuanbian,” in Luan Jinghe ed., *Zhong’e guanxide lishi yu xianshi* (Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 2004): 562. For the influence of the 1962 incident, see O.B. Borisov & B.T. Koloskov, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 1945–1977* (second edition) (Moscow: “Mysl,” 1977).

the east, which is the main topic of this book. From that time forward, research from both countries tended to be critical of the other party. Historical narratives also divided the area and limited themselves to lands occupied by either Russia or the Qing in the post-1864 period, that is, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tarbagatai.

Let's first examine Soviet trends further. The work of V. Basin, who was also heavily involved with the 1979 edition of the "History of Kazakh SSR," were negative in tone regarding the Kazakh-Qing relationship. Although he writes that Ablai believed he could effectively maintain ambiguous policies towards the Russians and Qing, Basin declares that the mission to the Qing emperor was sent with the singular purpose of "agreeing to details of trade arrangements" and says nothing else regarding the subjection of the Kazakhs to the Qing.⁴⁴ Furthermore, a book co-written by Basin and R. Suleimenov completely ignores the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Qing following the Qing subjugation of the Jungars, instead focusing entirely on how Ablai displayed his allegiance to the Russian Empire.⁴⁵

A conference was held in September of 1981 that celebrated the 250th anniversary of Abulkhair khan's 1730 petition for Russian subject status (see chapter 2 below) as "voluntary annexation into Russia (*dobrovol'noe prisoedinenie*)."⁴⁶ According to the proceedings⁴⁷ of the meeting, Gurevich,⁴⁸ who had already written about the history of international relations in Central Asia, contrib-

44 V.Ia. Basin, *Rossiia i kazakhskie khanstva v XVI–XVIII vv.: Kazakhstan v sisteme vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii* (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo "Nauka" Kazakhskoi SSR, 1971): 210–211.

45 R.B. Suleimenov & V.Ia. Basin, *Kazakhstan v sostave Rossii v XVIII – nachale XX veka* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1981): 82–84.

46 D. Kunaev, the First Secretary of the Communist party of the Kazakh SSR, made this remark on the fifteenth convention of the party in 1981: "The Kazakh nation has connected, voluntarily and constantly, its historical fate with that of the Russian nation for the last 250 years", B.A. Tulepbaev ed., *Naveki vmeste: K 250-letiiu dobrovol'nogo prisoedineniia Kazakhstana k Rossii* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1982): 16.

47 The editor of this book, Tulepbaev, the vice president of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Science, insisted on the significance of the defense by Russia against Qing expansion in an article titled "The voluntary annexation of Kazakhstan into Russia and its developing significance," Tulepbaev, *Naveki vmeste*: 50. This book regards the 1943 version of the History as having underestimated the progressive characteristics of the Russian annexation of Kazakhstan, while evaluating to some extent the process at work between the research published by Appolova in 1947 and the appearance of the next compilation of the History of Kazakh SSR, Tulepbaev, *Naveki vmeste*: 51.

48 Gurevich criticized the research of Kuznetsov for its standpoint of "Qing expansionism." Instead, he regarded that the Russian policy played a decisive role in stopping the expansive aims of the Qing Empire within the Central Asian frontier, B.P. Gurevich, *Mezhduna-*

uted a disquisition to the conference entitled “Russia and the Struggle against Qing Expansionism as Experienced by Kazakhstan and Other Central Asian Peoples.” Regarding *The History of the Invasion of Tsarist Russia into China’s Northwest Border Lands* (*Sha’e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi*, Beijing, 1979) and Wang Zhilai’s two-volume “*History of Central Asia*” (*Zhongya shi*, 1980), Gurevich declares that they “are written with the intent of slandering everything related to Russian policy” but that the entire history of Russian-Kazakh relations “refutes every Maoist fabrication.”⁴⁹

This particular type of research into Central Asian international relations would become intimately linked with the publication of historical materials. One example is 1989’s *International Relations in Central Asia* (MOTsA). The editorial policies of this collection led to the presentation of certain documents (no. 201, 202)⁵⁰ with the express purpose of demonstrating that “the Qing would later have no choice but to recognize that Ablai and other Kazakh lords had previously become Russian subjects.” One gets the impression that the editors are being led by their ideology⁵¹ and this topic will be discussed further in chapter 3.⁵²

Published in the same year as *International Relations in Central Asia*, the *Qing Empire and the Kazakh Khanates* (TsIKKh) was edited by the same team. Perhaps because it was produced for internal use, this volume has received less attention. However, although the *Qing Empire and the Kazakh Khanates* contains a variety of valuable documents, care must be taken when using it due to the same biases in presentation it shares with the more well-known volume (MOTsA). This editorial bias is evident in the following passage:

In line with the Chinese feudal historical narrative, modern Chinese historians consider the Kazakh monarch to have been a subject of the Bogdykhan [Qing Emperor]. Not only do they therefore fail to acknowledge the strong political and economic connections between Kazakhstan and Russia, they are completely blind to the armed struggle against the

rodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v. (second edition) (Moscow: Nauka, 1983): 11.

49 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii*: 220.

50 MOTsA 1: 18.

51 For the problematic compilation of this material, see J. Miyawaki, “17–19 seiki mongoru shiryō no bunseki: nendaiki to bunsho,” *Shishiryō habu: chiiki bunka kenkyū* 5 (2005): 118–119.

52 One of the goals behind the compilation of this collection seems to be to show the framework of the Kazakh and Southern Altai coalition that fought against Qing expansion, MOTsA 1: 19.

Manchurian Chinese [Qing Dynasty's] invasion of the Middle Juz, particularly during the time of Ablai.⁵³

One can go so far as to say that Soviet academics were blinded by their own biases to the true nature of the Kazakh Khanates' foreign relations in the east during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The methodology inherent in the above historical narrative style seems to have been inherited by researchers in post-independence Kazakhstan. Just as information from mainly Russian language sources was once manipulated in order to emphasize the Russian point of view, sources that reflect the Russian perspective have been used in the effort to support Kazakh autonomy in the era following independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, it has been very difficult to realistically address such issues as the meaning of Ablai's mission to the Qing, the positions maintained by imperial Russia and the Qing Dynasty within their own negotiations, and, especially, the difference in attitude between historical Kazakh approaches to Russia and the Qing.⁵⁴

For example, the relatively recently published the *History of Kazakhstan*⁵⁵ seems to rely on the *Qing Empire and the Kazakh Khanates* in the following passage (written by E. Abil):

In 1757, Ablai sent a delegation represented by Kenjeghali. During their audience with the Qing emperor, the Kazakh envoys declared Kazakh actions against the Qing during 1756–1757 to have been a mistake and put the blame on a conspiracy by Amursana, but, on the other hand, they also asserted that Tarbagatai was legally their pasturelands and demanded that it be returned to them. A reading of the documents shows that, in reality, Ablai did not voluntarily consider himself to be a subject of the Qing, yet peace was established. In spite of this, the Qing, following their official foreign policy tradition, considered the Kazakhs to be a distant but loyal subject nation.⁵⁶

As this example shows, the authors do not exhibit much awareness of the degree to which Ablai and others took great pains to show in Russian documents that they denied any subjugation to the Qing. Ultimately, the authors

53 TsIKKh 1: 40–41. For the Kazakh mission in 1757, see TsIKKh 1: 29.

54 J. Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku: Surutan to shinchô no kankei o chûshin ni," *Tôyô gaku* 87 (2) (2005): 34–35. See also chapter 2.

55 Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*.

56 Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*: 250.

only go so far as to say that, regarding relationships with both empires, the policies of Ablai “tried to demonstrate as much flexibility as possible.”⁵⁷

Among research conducted post-independence, the work of Khafizova can be said to focus most on the Kazakh-Qing connection. However, Khafizova's method of considering such issues as titles of nobility, trade, and the status of vassal-states from the perspective of the Qing as a typical Chinese dynasty (for example, Khafizova interprets the Qing imperial rescript to the Kazakhs according to principles of Confucianism) often seems old-fashioned. Even regarding Ablai's mission, Khafizova focuses mostly on formal aspects such as the tributary offering of horses and other goods.⁵⁸ Other researchers including Kasymbaev and Aldabek have conducted research on economic ties with the Qing,⁵⁹ but, regarding political aspects of the Kazakh-Qing relationship, they also fail to progress beyond the early steps of analysis as described above.

2.3 Chinese Research

As mentioned above, the 1964 Chinese-Soviet negotiations served as a turning point and the Chinese came to protest the unequal nature of Russian-Qing treaties leading up to the 1860 treaty of Beijing. According to “*The History of the Invasion by the Tsarist Russia into the China's Northwest Boundaries*” (*Sha'e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi*, 1979), the book maligned by the Soviets, the missions of Ablai and others served as an opportunity for the Kazakh Middle and Great Juz to swear allegiance to the Qing government in 1757.⁶⁰ Qing lands therefore extended to the Lake Balkhash. However, with the two unequal treaties of 1860 (Convention of Peking [Beijing]) and 1864, Russia carved a 440,000 square kilometer swath of territory out of the Chinese northwestern frontier. In other words, Russia's actions are interpreted as a seizure of territory⁶¹ and one gets the impression that great efforts are being made to emphasize the illegal nature of that seizure through the book's extensive use of maps. Map 3 serves as one example.


57 This description is based on TsIKKh 1 (p. 100), see Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*: 255.

58 K.Sh Khafizova, *Kitaiskaia diplomatiia v Tsentral'noi Azii (XIV – XIX vv.)* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1995): 135.

59 Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan - Kitai: karavannaia torgovlia v XIX – nachale XX vv.* (Almaty: Ölke, 1996); N.A. Aldabek, *Rossiia i Kitai: Torgovo-ekonomicheskie sviazi v Tsentral'no-aziatskom regione XVII–XIX vv.* (Almaty: Qazaq universiteti, 2001).

60 “*Sha'e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi*” bianxiezhu ed., *Sha'e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979): 123.

61 *Sha'e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi*: 2.



MAP 3 Territories laid claim to by the Qing (Since the 1960s, the government of the PRC has claimed these areas as former Chinese territory).⁶²

Regarding the border situation following the fall of the Jungars, the third volume (1981) of *The History of the Invasion of China by Tsarist Russia* (*Sha'e qinhua shi*) series, of which publication began in 1978, maintains that the entire area south of Ust' Kamenogorsk and east of the Ayaguz River and Lake Balkhash was Chinese territory. Also, regarding Russian expansion into the Kazakh Steppe, the book argues that the 1731 and 1740 declarations of allegiance to the Russian Empire by the Small and Middle Juz were done in name only and further describes as military expansionism Russian actions east and south of Lake Balkhash during the 1840s and 50s.⁶³

The Modern History of Central Asia (*Zhongya jindai shi*)⁶⁴, written in the same style as the aforementioned *Zhongya shi*, quotes from the PDZFL to explain that the Kazakhs were "vassals to the Qing".⁶⁵ Russia, on the other hand, "invaded" Central Asia, and the mission to the Russians by Abulkhair in

62 *Sha'e qinlue zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi*: between 56 and 57.

63 Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, *Sha'e qinhua shi*, vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981): 52–54, 107, 112.

64 Wang Zhilai, *Zhongya jindai shi: 16–19 shiji* (Lanzhou: Lanzhou daxue chubanshe, 1989).

65 Wang, *Zhongya jindai shi*: 114.

1730 is described as a one-time event.⁶⁶ These examples of Chinese literatures clearly show how incompatible their thinking was with the assertions of the Soviet Union.

What can be referred to as official histories have been published within China as well including *The Concise History of Xinjiang* (*Xinjiang jianshi*, two-volumes, 1980) and *The Concise History of Kazakhs* (*Hasake zu jianshi*, 1987). Wang Zhilai was involved in the editing of *The concise history of Xinjiang* and similarities can be found between them in the way the Kazakhs are described as vassals of the Qing and the Russians are portrayed as having annexed Kazakhstan.⁶⁷ *The Concise History of Kazakhs*, while making use of such Russian language sources as Levshin, still maintains that the Kazakhs surrendered and became vassals of the Qing.⁶⁸

As previously mentioned, the works of Toru Saguchi are still indispensable for an understanding of research into the Kazakh-Qing relationship. One reason for this is the comprehensive inclusion in his works of Qing documents that have been made publicly available. However, it must be repeated that there is a limit to the validity of Saguchi's particular research trends. Specifically, Saguchi views the Kazakh Khanates completely as one aspect of Qing frontier history.⁶⁹ It is therefore difficult to perceive the powerful impact on Kazakh history of the relationship with imperial Russia. Two of Saguchi's books have been translated into Chinese (in 1983 and in 1989) and are often quoted in Chinese research, but it can be said that this is due to its being easily manipulated to support the Chinese point of view.

The basic thrust of Chinese research is to show that the Kazakhs surrendered to the Qing in 1757, serving as vassals to the Qing thereafter, and that the Russians invaded Central Asia, including the area of the Kazakhs. However, some of Li Sheng's research in recent years has recognized that, after swearing allegiance in 1757 and entering into a vassal-suzerain relationship with the Qing, the Kazakhs did maintain a relationship with the Russians and served in a "doubly subject" (*Shuangchong chenfu*) state.⁷⁰ Even so, there are problems

66 Wang, *Zhongya jindai shi*: 119.

67 Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo ed., *Xinjiang jianshi*, vol. 1 (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1980): 259, 341.

68 "Hasake zu jianshi" bianxiezu ed., *Hasake zu jianshi* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1987): 178–182.

69 T. Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986): 434.

70 Li Sheng, *Hasakesitan ji qiyu Zhongguo Xinjiang de guanxi: 15 shiji–20 shiji zhongqi* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004): 167.

within the work of Li Sheng because Russian sources tend not to be fully considered.

In short, research on both sides has failed to progress beyond the point of using its own sources mainly in an effort to continue focusing on border issues. As a result, while it is important to understand the viewpoints of each side, it seems necessary to avoid getting caught up in the genesis of modern borders as they developed post-1864 and, instead, focus on the historical relationship between eastern Kazakhstan and (particularly northern) Xinjiang.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the main influence on the Central Asian historical narrative to date has not been a simple scheme of tension between conflicting ideologies so much as a focus since the 1960s on Chinese and Soviet territorial issues. The Soviet Union has, of course, ceased to exist, an independent Kazakhstan has embarked on its own direction of research, and new historical documents are being periodically discovered. Within such a situation, surely the basic focus must be on organizing historical records while turning our attention to investigation of topics related to the historical relationship of the eastern Kazakh Steppe and northern Xinjiang – topics that have been overlooked, or simply impossible to investigate, until now.⁷¹

3 Historical Relations between the Kazakh Steppe and Xinjiang

3.1. *The Tavārīḥ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī as a Source Regarding the History of Eastern Kazakhstan*

Such research regarding the Kazakh Khanates as that outlined in the introduction to this book requires a reevaluation of basic trends as described in the historical sources. Special attention must be paid to clarify what point of view the sources reflect. Furthermore, it is necessary to grasp the Kazakhs' own unique perspective. In other words, when conducting research on Kazakh–Qing relations in the east, it is imperative to focus on the area located between the eastern region of the Kazakh Steppe and Northern Xinjiang. This area corresponds to the pasturelands of the Kazakhs as it existed following the Qing subjugation of the Jungars and is not restricted by the Russo-Qing border as demarcated later during the middle of the nineteenth century.

71 For the latest research on the Qing materials and the Qing-Kazakh relations from the Qing Empire's perspective, see T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014).

Although the Kazakhs of these periods left few written historical records themselves, we can refer to Qurbān ‘alī Ḥālīdī’s *Tavārīḥ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī* (hereafter, THS) of 1910, which can be translated as “A History of the Five Peoples of the East.”⁷² The author of this account lived for a long period in the peripheral Qing town of Chughuchaq (Tarbagatai) shown below. Borrowing from Qurbān ‘alī Ḥālīdī’s perspective and content, I will try to move beyond the limitations of the Russian and Qing imperial sources in an effort to reevaluate our understanding of Kazakh foreign relations in the east during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

First, the background of Qurbān ‘alī Ḥālīdī as a Tatar Muslim deserves some attention. His father, Khalid, was a Tatar from Russia’s Volga region who came to the Kazakh Steppe during the end of the eighteenth century. Khalid moved to Ayaguz by the 1840s and Qurbān ‘alī was born in 1846 at Ayaguz. The town lies to the north of Lake Balkhash and was the location of a type of Russian local administrative office known as a “*okruzhnoi prikaz*”. Qurbān ‘alī trained at *madrāsas*⁷³ in Ayaguz and Semipalatinsk. Later, he moved with his farther to Bakht, a Qing frontier town⁷⁴, and in 1874 finally settled in Chughuchaq, a famous town in northern Xinjiang also known as Tarbagatai, where Qurbān ‘alī served as the town *imam*. Qurbān ‘alī’s travels within Eastern Turkestan resulted in the publication in Kazan during 1889 of the *Kitāb-i Tārīḥ-i Jarīda-yi Jadīda*.⁷⁵ Following this, Qurbān ‘alī decided to make a pilgrimage to Mecca by way of Eastern Europe in 1897–1898. Finally, he finished writing the THS in the

72 “The Five” seems to consist of the following: the Khoqand Khanate, Eastern Turkestan, the Kazakh Khanates, the Oyrads, and Mongols. For the conception of “the Five.” See also N. Light, “Muslim Histories of China: Historiography across Boundaries in Central Eurasia,” in Z. Rajkai & I. Bellér-Hann eds., *Frontiers and Boundaries: Encounters on China’s Margins* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012): 161. Light explains that the Five correspond to the Qoqand, Kashgaria, Qazaqs, Nughays (Tatars and Bashkirs), and Qalmaqs.”

73 Qurbān ‘alī’s master in Ayaguz, Muhammad Sadiq was from the Chelebi province of Russia. Muhammad Sadiq was much respected in the town, and Kazakh sultans also visited him. He played a role in enlightening the Kazakhs with Islam, THS: 407–408 and 411. See also Qurbān ‘Alī Ḥālīdī, *An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe, 1770–1912* (A.J. Frank & M.A. Usmanov eds., Leiden: Brill, 2005): 145. In Semipalatinsk, Qurbān ‘alī learned from Abdul Jabbar who had received his own education in Bukhara, THS: 391. See also Qurbān ‘Alī Ḥālīdī, *An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe*: 132–133.

74 That is *karun* (guard post) in the Qing era.

75 For the instruction on this work, see M. Hamada, “19 seiki uiguru rekishi bunken josetsu,” *Tōhō gaku* 55 (1983): 379–381. The famous Turkic philologist Hofman overlooked its relations with THS, see H.F. Hofman, “Qurbān ‘A. v. Ḥālīd ‘Ayāgūzī Čūgūčā (k)-/(q)ī Ḥālīdī qāri,” *Turkish Literature: A Bio-bibliographical Survey*, III-1, vol.5 (Utrecht, 1969): 75–78.

Tatar/Turkic language in 1909 and published it in 1910, three years prior to his death.⁷⁶ It is important to note that the author of the THS was born from Tatar emigrants and was a deeply trained Islamic intellectual. Care must be taken to consider how these elements affected his major work, the THS.⁷⁷

The THS is comprised of twelve chapters (*juz*'), each of which is divided into various subheadings. In general, it consists of three parts: a history of the Five Peoples (*Ḥamsa*), an appendix (*Tatimma*, p. 290–), and a supplementation (*Takmila*, p. 640–). The history of the Five Peoples is divided into the following chapters.

1. The khans of Ferghana (*Farḡāna ḥānlari*)
2. The khans of Altishahr (*Alti šahr ḥānlari*)
3. Historical events and khans related to the Kazakhs (*Qazāq ḥāllari vā ḥānlari*)⁷⁸
4. A genealogy of the Kazakhs (*Silsila-yi ajdād-i qazāq*)
5. The tale of the Qalmaqs and Mongols (*Qalmūq Mongūl bayāni*)⁷⁹

76 On his biography and works, see D.Kh. Karmysheva, "Kazakhstanskii istorik-kraeved i etnograf Kurbangali Khalidi," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* 1 (1971): 100–110; A.J. Frank, "The Qurban-'ali Khalidi manuscript collection in Almaty," *Shiḡhiis* 1 (9) (2008): 39–45.

77 After the publication of the Kazakh translation in 1992, the use of this work in historical and ethnological studies increased, Qurbangali Khalid, *Tauarikh khamsa*, transl. by B. Totenaev & A. Zholdasov (Almaty, 1992). Later, it was reproduced in, Khalid, K. *Tauarikh khamsa* (Pavlodar: EKO, 2006). Artykbaev considers that this literature highly evaluated the *shejire* (genealogy) as historical sources for the Kazakhs, Zh.O. Artykbaev, "K. Khalid i traditsionnye shkoly i formy kazakhskogo shezhire," in *Tauarikh khamsa* (2006): 266–280. For the history of its publication, see also Light, "Muslim Histories of China." Kazakhstani scholars Artykbaev and Alpysbesuly, adding to the works by Kazakh intellectuals of the early twentieth century like Shakarim Qudaiberdiuli and Mashhur Jusip-Kopeiuli, indicated the THS to be a document concerned with Kazakh history, see Zh.O. Artykbaev & M. Alpysbesuly, "Kazakhskoe shezhire: k probleme metodologii." *Otan tarikhi* 2 (1999): 5–10. The newly compiled "History of Kazakhstan" also referred to Qurbān 'ali as a writer of historical material between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*: 63. The Kazakh translation, however, is not complete with many omissions due to an incorrect understanding of Qing affairs. We also know of a partial Chinese translation (1962) which has not been much used, Kuerban'ali (Xinjiang shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaochaazu transl.), *Wuben lishi* (Beijing: Zhongguo kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo, 1962).

78 This chapter considers the etymology of "Qazaq" and the meanings of such terminologies related to the Kazakhs as Alash, Juz, Qipchaq, Bashqort, Baraba, Noghay (Tatars).

79 See A. Frank, "The *Mongol-Qalmāq Bayāni*: a Qing-Era Islamic Ethnography of the Mongols and Tibetans," *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* LXIII/2 (2009): 323–347.

It is important to note the fact that the first part “the history of the Five Peoples” actually only contains information regarding four groups of people: the Khoqand Khanate (ch. 1 in THS), the dynasties of Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) or Turkic Muslims in China (ch. 2), the Kazakh Khanates (ch. 3 and 4), and the Oyrat and Mongols (ch. 5).⁸⁰ The meaning of the “Five Peoples” is therefore quite ambiguous. Nonetheless, it is certain that this work aims to clarify the history of the territory ranging from the eastern part of the Kazakh Steppe to northern Xinjiang, where the author lived most of his life.

3.2. *Qurbān ‘alī’s Sources*

Through careful analysis, it is possible to categorize the sources which Qurbān ‘alī used into four types in addition to what he wrote from his own experience⁸¹: The first such source was his informants (in the text, *rāvi*). Muslims⁸² from Russia or Qing territory who appeared in Tarbagatai, the trading town where the author lived, were precious sources for Qurbān ‘alī when writing the local history. His father, who had come to the Kazakh Steppe around 1780,⁸³ also served as a significant informant.

It appears that Qurbān ‘alī even collected information from the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans, that is, descendants of the khans who were heading clans traveling within the border region. For example, Qurbān ‘alī mentioned attaining much information from Adilkhan, who was the grandson of Abulfeiz sultan of the Middle Juz, when he visited Tarbagatai in 1305 (1887/1888 according to the Gregorian calendar).⁸⁴ In addition, Qurbān ‘alī also had relations with Boteke sultan, who was the leader of the Quzai clan.⁸⁵ As a result, Qurbān ‘alī succeeded in recording original information concerning the activities of the Kazakh sultans who were travelling within Xinjiang, the Kazakh Steppe, and

80 Qurbān ‘alī himself declared that, “the fifth of my *Ḥamsa-yi šarqī* is the tale of the Mongols and Qalmaqs,” THS: 288. He explained as follows: “In the ‘appendix’ I wrote regarding the details of the Eastern affairs (*šarq aḥvālī*). Thus, I add the name of *šarqī* to *Ḥamsa*, and the name of my book *Ḥamsa-yi šarqī* also derives from this.” It may therefore be that Qurbān ‘alī gave the name of “Eastern” to his work, keeping in mind the Mongols, Japan, and China which were mentioned in the “appendix,” See THS: 289.

81 Qurbān ‘alī had visited Tarbagatai twice (in 1859 and in 1860) and gained information regarding the events which occurred before his immigration, THS: 310.

82 For example, he recorded the following: “Mullah Waliallah Bekmatov, a merchant from Karkarali, came to Tarbagatai in 1313 (1895/1896). I gained much information on that region through conversations with him,” THS: 446.

83 THS: 19.

84 THS: 459.

85 THS: 258. For Boteke, see chapter 7.

Western Siberia during the first half of the nineteenth century. Such sultans as Beksultan⁸⁶ and Sibanqul are referred to in the THS as having frequently crossed the border between the Russian and Qing Empires.

The second sources were the works of orientalists, particularly Russian orientalists. Qurbān 'alī was acquainted with N. Katanov and was also surely acquainted by way of translations with the monographs of such orientalists as V. Radlov and A. Vambery. This knowledge of the research of Western orientalists is reflected in the THS.

Qurbān 'alī's third source was Islamic historiography. It is possible to identify the names of Merjani⁸⁷ (from the Volga Tatars), Mullah Bilal (from Eastern Turkestan),⁸⁸ Ahmadwalī⁸⁹ (from Semipalatinsk), Zakir Efendi⁹⁰ (from Kopal [Qopal]) as well as many other authors of Islamic histories within the THS.

The fourth and most important source was oral tradition among the Kazakhs. Regarding his motivation in writing the book, Qurbān 'alī himself stated that "much of the history of the Kazakhs or of the Kazakh khans existed in everyone's mouth (*ağiz*) but there were no special historical documents or biographies regarding it." Unquestionably, this means that Kazakh history was passed down orally from one generation to the next. Qurbān 'alī qualified this assertion, however, with the statement that "recently, however, the Kazakhs obtain pleasure and knowledge from their history through reading and writing, and have ceased to pay attention to the oral tradition (*ağiz söz*). Consequently, there are few people who know the words we could have heard 25–30 years earlier."⁹¹ For this reason, Qurbān 'alī decided to record the history of the eastern lands, especially of the Kazakh territory.

86 He appears in another work by Qurbān 'alī, see Qurbān-'Alī Khālidī, *An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe*: 107–109.

87 Šihābeddīn Merjānī was the author of *Mustafād al-Aḥbār fī Aḥvāl Qazān vā Bulğār* (Qazan, 1897). For details, see H. Komatsu, "Bukhara and Kazan," *Journal of Turkic Civilization Studies* 2 (2006): 101–115.

88 Qurbān 'alī mentioned Mullah Nazim Bilāl's famous work "*Ġazavāt-i Ćin*," THS: 299. On Bilal, see M. Hamada, "Murrā=birāru no 'seisenki' nitsuite," *Tōyō gaku* 55 (1973): 31.

89 THS: 405. His work on the town of Semipalatinsk corresponds to the former half of the following work, A.J. Frank & M.A. Usmanov eds., *Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk: two manuscripts by Ahmad-Walī al-Qazānī and Qurbān'ali Khālidī* (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 2001).

90 He was an *imam* of Kopal, and collected a genealogy of the Kazakhs which could be traced to Alash, THS: 668.

91 THS: 140–141.

Let us further consider the reason for Qurbān ‘alī’s interest in Kazakh history. Qurbān ‘alī clearly stated the following regarding his emphasis on the Kazakhs of the Middle Juz: “The roots of the Kazakhs (*qazāqīya*) is three Juz, and, among these three, it was the Middle Juz that spread over this region (*ṭaraf*). [Chapter three of the THS] tells much about the khans of this Juz and incidents that occurred within this part (*qaṭī’a*).”⁹² Qurbān ‘alī additionally reasoned that historians had said nothing about the Naiman clan of the Middle Juz, while there were historians that could write the history of the other two Juz.

I believe that a second reason for Qurbān ‘alī’s great interest in the Kazakhs and their history can be explained by the fact that, when categorizing populations as “Turks” or “Muslims,” the Kazakhs seemed to him to fall within the same framework as the Tatars – Qurbān ‘alī’s own ethnicity. In one part, he points out that the Kazakhs of the three Juz used many names to refer to themselves, such as Alash, Tatars, Uzbeks.⁹³ In another part, the author argued that the process of Kazakh self-identification can be described in the following way.

The Kazakhs have a saying that “we are all the child of one Muslim”. Accordingly, all Muslims are brothers. ... Secondly, to insist on the brotherhood by the blood, it is said “all of us are brothers who share the battle cry [*ulan*], *Alash*, and are the children of one Uzbek⁹⁴.” This phrase demonstrates that the Kazakhs are not an outsiders, but belong to the brotherhood of the Noghay [*Nūǵī*, that is the Tatars]. Thirdly, there is another saying among the Kazakhs that “we are all the children of one Kazakh, the descendants of the three Juz, and the clan subdivisions thereof.” These words separate the Kazakhs as an independent [ethnic group] from the Noghays. Fourthly, there exist the Great, Middle, and Small Juz. When one is affiliated (*taḥṣīṣ*) to a Juz, he is distinguished from the other two Juz.⁹⁵

Simply put, Qurbān ‘alī described the structure of Kazakh self-identification within social groups and units as follows: as members of each individual Juz

92 THS: 140.

93 THS: 195.

94 This may mean Uzbek khan, whose name was adopted as the name of a Turkic Muslim group under the Ulus of Jochi.

95 THS: 196.



MAP 4 Towns in eastern Kazakhstan and Northern Xinjiang
(The border corresponds to the contemporary one).

(the smallest unit), as Kazakhs, as Türks (including Tatars), and finally as Muslims.⁹⁶

It is quite unclear to what extent the work of Qurbān 'alī was influenced by the Pan-Turkism which prevailed among the Muslims of the Russian Empire. However, he is known to have subscribed to "*Terjuman*," a journal which stimulated Turkic Muslims with articles written in the common Turkic literary language.⁹⁷ In summary, in addition to the motives behind Qurbān 'alī's writing, we can clearly understand both his conceptualization of the history of the Kazakhs as well as the geographic regions his work dealt with.

96 According to Uyama, a Kazakh intellectual, M. Dulatov, who was a contemporary of Qurbān 'alī, indicated his own identity in the following order: a Kazakh, a Muslim, and, finally, a Russian, see T. Uyama, "20 seiki shotō ni okeru kazafu chishikijin no sekaikan: M. duratofu mezameyo kazafu o chūshinni," *Suravu kenkyū* 44 (1997): 1–36.

97 THS: 689.

3.3. *Localism of THS*

It is natural that the environment in which Qurbān ‘alī lived would influence the content of his work. Thus, the history described in his work should be localized as belonging to Northern Xinjiang, the area of the Russian Irtysh fortified line (Western Siberia), and eastern Kazakhstan.

For example, let's compare the THS with the work of Qurbān ‘alī's better-known contemporary Shakarim Qudaiberdiuli (of the Middle Juz, 1858–1931). Within Shakarim's work on the genealogy of the Kazakhs,⁹⁸ no genealogy of the sultans residing along the border can be found, while Qurbān ‘alī wrote about them in detail.⁹⁹ Although the two works shared sources in such anthologies as *Kutadju Bilig* and *Shajara-yi Türk* by Abūlgāzi,¹⁰⁰ Shakarim concerned himself with a history of the Kazakhs that concentrated on their relations with the Russian Empire. Qurbān ‘alī, on the other hand, preferred to include descriptions of the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Qing in his own work. Therefore, Qurbān ‘alī's work is certain to possess a particular localism related to the boundary area between the two empires. In other words, the THS contains unique information regarding the border regions.

This framework of a new territorial conception could be connected to the formation of ethnic identities. Research by A. Frank shows that a historical account more deeply focused on local regions began to appear among the Muslims of the Russian Empire during the period from the second half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁰¹ Typical of such accounts are the *Tavārīḥ-i Bulgārīya* of the Tatars (1870) and the

98 Shākārim, *Türük, qırghız-qazaq häm khandar shejresı*. His work was originally published in Orenburg in 1911. We have to refer again to Mashhur Jusip-Kopeiuli as a contemporary historian on the Kazakhs. As recent research by Frank indicates, Mashhur Jusup knew the history of the Kazakhs well and collected oral traditions, see A.J. Frank, "Sufis, Scholars, and *Divanas* of the Qazaq Middle Horde in the Works of Mäshhür Zhüsip Köpeyuli," in N. Pianciola & P. Sartori eds., *Islam, Society and States across the Qazaq Steppe (18th – early 20th Centuries)* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013): 213–232. However, the relations between the Kazakhs and the Qing don't appear in his works, even though he collected detailed information regarding the genealogy of Kazakh sultans, see *Mäshhür Zhüsip Köpeiüli Shıgharmaları*, tom 7. (Pavlodar: EKO. 2006).

99 In particular, the THS has a lot of information regarding the lineage of Tursun sultan which the Qing called the "Western Section [Ch. *xibu*]." For the Western section within Qing historical documents, see chapter 4 of this book.

100 These literatures were "discovered" by the modern Russian orientalists, and the two authors may have used them from Russian reprints or translations.

101 A.J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and "Bulghar" Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden: Brill, 1998). Frank also analyzed "*Tārīḥ Nāma-yi Bulgār*" (1805) as an earlier example.

aforementioned work by Shakarim. We can also include literature by Mullah Musa from Eastern Turkestan such as the *Tārīḥ-i Amnīyā* (1903) and the *Tārīḥ-i Ḥamīdī* (1908).¹⁰² These synchronic tendencies of reevaluation and rewriting of history, in addition to the awakening of national identities, could have led to the formation of new territorial conceptions.

The original standpoint of Qurbān 'alī's work becomes clearer when we compare it with the historiographies produced since the Soviet era which were discussed in the last section. For instance, the book *"Towns in Eastern Kazakhstan"* by Zh. Kasymbaev published during the last days of the Soviet Union investigated the following towns: Semipalatinsk, Ust' Kamenogorsk, Bukhtarma, Kokpekti, Ayaguz, and Zaisan (see map 4). Regarding the relations of these towns to the Qing Empire, however, it only considers the role the towns played within trade between Russia and the Qing.¹⁰³ A previous book from the same author, regarding Russian towns in eastern Kazakhstan as a border between Russia and Kazakhs, put emphasis on their significant role as fortified lines against Kazakhs and didn't describe in enough detail the political relations of this area to the Qing.¹⁰⁴ Needless to say, these two books relied wholly on Russian historical sources and paid no attention to periodicals produced at the beginning of the twentieth century or historiographies produced by local Muslims such as the THS.

In contrast, there is no doubt that the THS is accurate regarding the history and genealogy of the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans judging from the sources mentioned above from which its information was collected. The author describes the following towns in individual subheadings: Ili and Tarbagatai in Xinjiang, Ust' Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk, Ayaguz, Karkarali,¹⁰⁵ Kokterek (Kokpekti), Kopal, Almati, Lepsi, Urjar, Sarqand, Bakht, Zaisan and Jarkent. From these towns, it is likely that Qurbān 'alī kept in mind the towns around the Irtysh fortified line, where the Russian District offices (*okruzhnoi prikaz*) were situated, and the forts constructed later in Semirech'e. The territory in which these towns are scattered was the same region within which Turkic Muslims such as Tatars (who came for reasons of religion (Islam) or commerce) spent their lives.

102 Regarding these two literatures, see Hamada, "19 seiki uiguru rekishi bunken josetsu."

103 Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg. (sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii aspekt)* (Alma-Ata: Ghilim, 1990): 36–42.

104 Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Pod nadezhnuu zashchitu Rossii* (Alma-Ata, 1986).

105 Qurbān 'alī introduced a pamphlet (*risāla*) about the town, THS: 399.

Above all, Semipalatinsk was an international commercial town¹⁰⁶ with a Muslim population.¹⁰⁷ These were not only Muslims of Russian citizenship but also merchants from Tashkent and Bukhara¹⁰⁸ who came to this town and had connections with Siberia, Central Asia, the Kazakh Steppe, and Xinjiang (for details, see chapter 6 of this book). Semipalatinsk, or towns in which District offices were situated (many that had been operating in the Kazakh Steppe since 1820s) were visited by Tatar Mullahs mainly from the Volga-Ural region.¹⁰⁹ These religious persons taught Islam, a fact which is also recorded in the THS.¹¹⁰ It is well known that Tatars had found places of activity within the East since the reign of Ekaterina II in the second half of the eighteenth century. Russian documents from the former half of the nineteenth century sometimes contain petitions by Tatars hoping to migrate into Russian Districts established within the Kazakh Steppe.¹¹¹ The THS also mentions a Tatar Mullah who stated to Siuk sultan, the son of Ablai khan, that:

We, Noghay [=Tatars], first entered [the pasturelands of] the Kazakhs no earlier than 1800. The first [case] was *MS'D* [=Musagid] ağa, the son of Ġabdul Mu'min.¹¹²

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- 106 Baltic German geologist G. von Helmersen said "Semipalatinsk gets Asiatic goods from Khoqand, Tashkent, and Qing towns: Tarbagatai and Ili," *Istoriia Kazakhstana v zapadnykh istochnikakh XII–XX vv.* (transl. from German, L.A. Zakharova), t. 5 (Almaty: Sanat, 2006): 401. The text is the Russian translation from *Raise nach dem Altai, im Jahre 1834 fusgeführt* (1848).
- 107 For the mosque in this town, see Frank & Usmanov, *Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk*.
- 108 Frank & Usmanov, *Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk*: 31. The mosque for them, so-called *Sart masjid*, was independent from the Ufa Spiritual Muhammedan Assembly, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1364, l. 3.
- 109 A.J. Frank, "Islamic Transformation on the Kazakh Steppe, 1742–1917: Toward an Islamic History of Kazakhstan under Russian Rule," in T. Hayashi ed., *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido univ., 2003): 261–290; G. Sultangalieva, "Tatarskaia diaspora v konfessional'nykh svyaziakh kazakhskoi Stepi (XVIII – XIX vv.)," *Vestnik Evrazii* 4 (11), 2000: 21–35.
- 110 The same is true to the following two works, Frank & Usmanov, *Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk*; Qurbān-'Alī Khālīdī, *An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe*.
- 111 IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1131. See also THS: 165–166.
- 112 THS: 385. This person seems to correspond to a Tatar Mullah, Musaghid, who visited the Kazakh aristocrat, Siuk sultan of the Great Juz. This sultan dispatched his mission to the Russian Empire in 1818 requesting the construction of a *masjid* within his pasturelands. For the official Mullah in the Kazakh Steppe (Ru. *ukaznyi mulla*), see I.A. Rechkina,

A new ethnicity known as "*Chala-qazaq*"¹¹³ (half-Kazakh) even developed during the first half of the nineteenth century as a result of this migration. Qurbān 'alī's ancestors, as well, were the result of Tatar migrations from the Volga region to Central Asia.

It is worth paying attention to the activities of Tatar emigrants who expanded further into Xinjiang after crossing the Kazakh Steppe. These included the family of Qurbān 'alī and reached Qing territory in spite of the ongoing demarcation of the Russo-Qing borderlines.¹¹⁴ A typical example can be found in those groups of people who lived in Tarbagatai, where Qurbān 'alī also lived his life. These Tatar migrants were related to the religious network as well.¹¹⁵ A biography compiled by Qurbān 'alī reveals that a religious connection developed between the cities in the eastern Kazakh Steppe to those of Northern Xinjiang. As Frank explained, "Qurbān 'alī's book focused on the Islamic scholars and Sufis of the Semipalatinsk and Tarbagatai." He regarded these Islamic intellectuals as mainly Tatars or Kazakhs.¹¹⁶

"Organizatsiia musul'manskogo pravleniia v kazakhskoi stepi v kontse XVIII–nachale XIX vv," in *Stepnoi krai Evrazii: istoriko-kul'turnye vzaimodeistviia i sovremennost'* (Omsk: OmgU, 2003): 79–81.

113 They had their origin in the mixed blood between the Tatars and indigenous ethnicities including the Kazakhs, V.V. Radlov, *Iz Sibiri: stranitsy dnevnika* (Moscow: Nauka, Glav. red. vostochnoi literatury, 1989): 582. For Chala-qazaq on the Russian archival documents, see B.T. Zhanaev, "Chala-kazaki v XIX – nachale XX v.: proiskhozhdenie, rasselenie, zaniatiia," in *Rol' nomadov v formirovanii kul'turnogo nasledii Kazakhstana. Nauchnye chteniia pamiati N.E. Masanova* (Almaty: Print-S, 2010): 272–304.

114 See S. Ōishi, "Kashugaru ni okeru jadido undō: mūsā bayofu ke to shinhōshiki kyōiku," *Tōyō gakuho* 78 (1) (1996): 95–120; M. Gosmanov, *Yabilmagan kitap yaki chāchelgān orliklar* (Kazan: Tatar. kit. nāshr, 1996); M. Usmanov, "Tatar settlers in Western China (second half of 19th century to the first half of the 20th century)," in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, Vol.2 (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1998): 243–269. The Chinese research literature also states that some Tatars went further to the East into the territory of the Qing during the 1840s, see Zhou Jianhua & Guo Yongying, *Tataerzu* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1993): 11.

115 It is already mentioned by A. Frank who has translated the biography from the original. He published, in addition to the original text with the English translation, two manuscripts (one edited by Ahmad Wali, and the other by Qurbān 'alī) in another volume concerning the history of Semipalatinsk in the eastern Kazakhstan, see Qurbān-'Alī, *An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe*; Frank & Usmanov, *Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk*.

116 Qurbān-'Alī, *An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe*, XXI–XXII. When we consider the reader of his works, the necrology on the periodicals would be worth mentioning. His necrology was published in the following Russian Muslim periodicals: *Šūrā* (Orenburg, 3.15.1913, no. 6: 163), *Sībūrā* (Tomsk, 3.31.1913, 93: 3), *Qazāq*

Consequently, Qurbān ‘alī conceived of the territory as a place where a local Islamic scholarly network had been in development since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and we can assume that he kept this area in mind while writing the THS. If we consider this geographical space within the themes of this book, we can find the territory where the Kazakhs of the Middle and Great Juz were migrating and where the commercial network was established. As a result, it turns out that the THS plays a role in describing the “local history”¹¹⁷ connecting these three territories of the Russian Western Siberian frontier, Northern Xinjiang, and the eastern Kazakh Steppe.

In fact, Qurbān ‘alī emphasizes his focus on the clans of the Middle Juz, especially the Naimans who were moving around Ayaguz and the Russo-Qing border area.

The history of the Kazakhs of the Middle Juz who occupied this region (*jānab*), especially those of the Naiman clan must be described clearly because Ayaguz was my hometown and the Naiman clan was the clan among which I lived.¹¹⁸

In addition to the phrase “this region,” the author often repeated the phrase “our territory (*ṭarafmīz*).”¹¹⁹ An explanation can be found in the author’s insistence on describing the territory mentioned above.

Thus, the origin of the THS is found in the history of the territory where the Kazakhs of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were active and which the book aimed to describe. Qurbān ‘alī focused on the common space shared by the three elements mentioned above: the towns he was familiar with,¹²⁰ the Islamic network, and the migratory movements of the Turkic Muslims within the Steppe. It is remarkable that this territory also corresponds to the region where the Kazakhs lived nomadically and conducted trade with the two empires.

Accordingly, the first finding is Qurbān ‘alī’s special viewpoint as an emigrant. This particular viewpoint allowed him to succeed in reconstructing the

(Orenburg, “İçki Haberlar,” 4.9.1913, no. 5: 4). For the necrology of *Sibīrya*, see S. Dudoignon, “Un islam périphérique?,” *Cahiers du monde Russe*, 41/2–3 (2000): 308.

117 While Qurbān ‘alī omitted the history of Western Mongolia, probably due to the lack of a Muslim population there, the Khobdo region of Western Mongolia and Altai region of Siberia have to be included within the context of this book. See chapter 3.

118 THS: 140–141.

119 THS: 370.

120 In chapter six of the THS, the author describes the towns constructed by Russians from the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries that are located between the Irtysh fortified line and the Balkhash basin system (Ru. *Semirech’ë*).

local history regardless of the Russo-Qing borderlines. Moreover, Qurbān 'alī had a special affinity with the Kazakhs, as a Muslim or a Turk, while at the same time being able to objectively describe the history of Kazakhs because of his non-Kazakh Tatar origin. This helps to explain his smallest concern about the uprising by Kenesari, which caused great unrest within the Kazakh Steppe from 1837 to 1847.¹²¹

The second finding is the original source of Qurbān 'alī's information. Despite the influence of documents produced by Russian orientalists, the THS, mainly based on the traditions of the Kazakhs, is a historical account written from a local viewpoint. Its contents, needless to say, have to be verified through comparative research to Russian and Qing documents which will be conducted by the following chapters of this book.

Conclusion

The first half of this chapter sought to reconsider historiography regarding the relations of the Kazakh Khanates in the east. Since 1757 (QL22), Ablai sultan of the Middle Juz conducted bi-lateral relationships with both the Russian and Qing Empires. Taking Ablai's diplomatic activities as an example, I have illustrated the differences within the research trends of Russia (including the Soviet period) and China. From this, it became clear that comparative study regarding historical materials is highly necessary in order to maintain objectivity.

The latter half of the chapter examined the usefulness of the THS within research on the history of Kazakhs due to its unique information in spite of the fact that it was written no earlier than the beginning of the twentieth century. Not only does the THS contain original content, it also reconstructs the history of the Kazakh Steppe in a manner quite different from history written with a positive interpretation of Russian annexation. Also, due to the unique origins of the author, Qurbān 'alī, the THS puts much emphasis on Kazakh relations with the Qing. In other words, by referring to the THS, it is possible to obtain a viewpoint regarding the history of Kazakhs which is based on Qurbān 'alī's conceptual unification of the regions¹²² including the eastern Kazakh Steppe, the Russian towns along the Irtysh River, and Northern Xinjiang.

121 THS: 472. Qurbān 'alī just said, "[Kenesari] fought for many years against Russia. He also fought with the Kirghiz several times. In the end, he was killed, along with his family, by the Kirghiz."

122 See map 1 of the introduction of this book. Regarding commercial ties among the regions, see chapter 6.

The Impact of Russian Advances into Central Asia on Kazakh-Russian Relations

Introduction

This chapter will seek to identify the range of issues to be addressed from chapters three onward by first providing a historical overview of the early-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century Kazakh-Russian relationship which served as a background to the Kazakh relationship to the Qing. When outlining this Kazakh-Russian connection, it is important to consider, partly through reference to past research, how the Russian Empire perceived the nomadic Kazakhs. In addition, it is also important to understand how Russian perceptions of their relationship to the Kazakhs were influenced by the existence of a Kazakh-Qing connection, and, finally, to identify the particular place occupied by Kazakh-Russian relations within this book's overarching theme of Central Asian international relations.

1 The Petition for Russian Subject Status and an Oath on the Quran

1.1 *The Oath of Abulkhair*

In this subsection I will treat the Kazakh-Russian relationship from the first half of the eighteenth century as one aspect of Kazakh foreign relations and reconsider how that relationship was entered into.

First, it must be remembered that the relationship with the Kazakhs was actually well-established within Russia from the end of the sixteenth century. Jurisdiction regarding Kazakh affairs was held by the Diplomatic Office (*Posol'skii prikaz*) until it was reassigned to the College of Foreign Affairs (*Kollegiia inostrannykh del*) following the eighteenth century reforms of Peter I. Relations with the Kazakhs were approached by the Russians within the framework of foreign affairs in general. Actual negotiations with the Kazakhs were conducted within the Siberian governorate centered around Tobol'sk. Additionally, after relocation to its present location in 1743, Orenburg also served as a seat of negotiations with the western Kazakh lands.

The Kazakh Khanates are believed to have maintained unity of leadership until the end of the reign of Tauke khan from 1680 to 1715. Russian historical

sources even include mention of the appearance of missions sent by Tauke khan. However, after the death of Tauke, the Kazakh Khanates' unity collapsed and a plurality of khans began to appear. During this period, the Kazakh Khanates divided into clan confederations that eventually became known as Juz. At least according to Russian sources,¹ khans were chosen from within each of these Juz. In addition to relations with Russia, it is known that one post-Tauke khan, Qaip (died in 1718), sent correspondence to the Ottoman Empire.²

Abulkhair khan (reigned 1710–1748), a khan with influence over the Small Juz, was able to solidify his power during the “Barefoot Retreat” caused by the Jungar (Oyirad) invasion of 1723–1725.³ The Kazakhs of this period were engaged in complicated foreign relationships, not only with the Jungar, but also with other local powers such as the Torghut (Volga-Kalmyk). In 1726, for example, Kazakh khans including Semeke, Baraq, Abulkhair and Ishim crossed the Ural River to raid the pasturelands of a Torghut named Lobji⁴ while at the same time Dorji Nazar, from the Torghut as well, attempted to form an alliance with Abulkhair against another Torghut named Ceren Donduk (the son of Ayuki khan and a khan himself from 1731 to 1734).⁵ Additionally, there were also approaches to Russia by the Kazakhs for protection from the Torghut.⁶

It was due to circumstances like these that Abulkhair decided to send an envoy to Ufa. The envoy arrived on 20 July 1730 and reported (as described below) regarding the Kazakh Khanates' state of affairs. It also communicated

1 For an illustrative example, we can refer to the diary of Tevkelev dispatched to Abulkhair khan, KRO 1: 62. Within this document, Bogenbai batir told Tevkelev that the peculiar khan of the Great Juz was Jolbars, and the khans of the Middle Juz were Semeke and Kushuk. Finally, he states that Abulkhair was the khan of the Small Juz.

2 The envoy of the Kazakh Qaip Muhammad khan visited Istanbul in 1713. A reply was sent from the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire in 1715, see M. Saray, *Rus işğali devrinde Osmanlı devleti ile Türkistan hanlıkları arasındaki siyasi münasebetler, 1775–1875* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1984): 12–13.

3 The Jungars succeeded in gaining control of Turkistan, the central town of the Kazakh Khanates, IKRI (*Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikakh XIV–XX vekov*) 2: 342 (received on 1.15.1725, courier from Florio Beneveni, the envoy of Bukhara to an official of the College of Foreign Affairs).

4 V. Bakunin, “Opisanie istorii kalmytskogo naroda,” *Krasnyi arkhiv* 94, t. 3 (1939): 225.

5 M. Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: the Russian state and the Kalmyk nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992): 196.

6 Report from the Kazakh envoy to the College of Foreign Affairs, 3.17.1726, IKRI 2: 354. This report says that elders of the Khordes of Kirgiz-Kazaks (*Kirgis-kasatskaia orda*) and rulers of the Small Juz desired to be under imperial protection.

Abulkhair's desire to become a subject of the Russian Empire.⁷ As pointed out by Bodger, beyond such pragmatic motives as strengthening his authority within the Small Juz and seeking to attain rights to lands claimed by the Bashkirs (Bashqort), Abulkhair's mission to Russia was undertaken within a larger context of trying to improve relations with the Cossack, Torghut and Bashkirs – all groups with whom conflict existed on the level of the Jungar threat.⁸

Care must be taken here to define what is being referred to as “subject status” to the Russian Empire. For the purposes of this book, I render the original Russian terms “*poddannyi*” or “*poddanstvo*” (both of which refer to the state of being subject) as “subject status” rather than simply “vassal” for the simple reason that the terms are generally used to emphasize the “state of being a subject” rather than the subject itself. Etymologically, the words are both based on the term “*dan*” which can be translated as “taxation.”⁹ In other words, the obligatory payment of taxes was an inherent part of subject status. An important aspect of taxation was that it served as a type of formality for the creation of ties with “heathen” (non-Russian Orthodox) peoples.¹⁰ These ties also took concrete shape through the swearing of oaths of fealty.

When considering the beginnings of the Kazakh-Russian relationship, it becomes clear that the foundation of the relationship for both parties was the Kazakh petition for subject status and an oath of fealty. The first example of such a petition and oath is that of Abulkhair khan on 8 Sep. 1730. Written in the Tatar language with Arabic script, the petition document describes the mission's purposes as follows:¹¹

Tatar original:

Emdi al-ḥāl siz davlatlı uluḡ pādšāh ḥaḍratıñız sāyasıda panāh olıp ... uçun
(Seeking to attain the protection of Your High Imperial Majesty...)

7 IKRI 2: 369.

8 A. Bodger, “Abulkhair, Khan of the Kazakh Little Horde and His Oath of Allegiance to Russia of October 1731,” *Slavonic and East European Review*, 58–1 (1980): 48 and 56. For the tension between the Kazakhs and Bashkirs, see K. Toyokawa *Roshia teikoku minzoku tōgōshi no kenkyū: shokumin seisaku to bashikūru jin* (Sapporo: Hokkaido daigaku shuppankai, 2006).

9 V.V. Trepavlov, “*Belyi tsar*”: *obraz monarkha i predstavleniia o poddanstve u narodov Rossii XV–XVIII vv.*, (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura RAN, 2007): 135.

10 Trepavlov, “*Belyi tsar*”: 138.

11 KRO 1: 35–36.

Russian translation by an official interpreter:

Zhelaia byt' sovershenno podvlastnym Vashemu Velichestvu...
(Desirous to be completely subject to Your Majesty...)

While differences in nuance are evident between the original and the Russian translation, it goes without saying that it was the Russian version which went on to serve as the basis of subsequent discussion within the Russian government. Even the initial report regarding the petition (dated 10 Oct.) interprets Abulkhair as “seeking to become subject to the emperor.”¹² Furthermore, Abulkhair does declare at the end of the petition that “I, Abulkhair, declare my submission along with that of many Kazakhs, including the entire population of the Middle and Small Juz which follow me.”¹³ The fact that there were those in Russia who recognized Abulkhair’s authority among the Kazakhs is clear from the Russian report containing such phrases as: “There are six khans among the Kazakhs (*kasaki*), ... Among these, that with the greatest [power] is Abulkhair.”¹⁴

Once Abulkhair received documentation outlining the Empress Anna’s approval (formally recognized on 19 Feb. 1731), he again pledged “to be a subject of the emperor (*byt’ v poddanstve*)” and to demonstrate “ceaseless loyalty.” Within the introduction to this new pledge (dated 10 Oct. 1731), Abulkhair is described as testifying to its authenticity by kissing the Quran (*alkoran*).¹⁵ In fact, upon receiving Abulkhair’s initial petition, the College of Foreign Affairs had dispatched an official interpreter, Tevkelev, to Abulkhair with specific instructions¹⁶ that the oath be taken upon the Quran. Abulkhair’s behavior

12 KRO 1: 35–37. A document of the nineteenth century, wherein a Kazakh declared himself to be a subject of the Empire, contains expressions such as “[I have] surrendered to the Emperor” (*hadratlarına qaradum*), which is different from the wording of the petition here, see MIPSK (*Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana*): 162.

13 The original text is as follows: “Biz Abū al-ḥayr ḥān qırq san qazāq Orta yüz Kiçi yüz barčamız ra’fyat qarajalarım birlä baş saldıñ.” In the Russian translation, we find the phrase: “we prostrate ourselves before You” (*prekloniaemsa pered Vami*).

14 Statement by a Bashkir, 9.29.1730, IKRI 2: 372–373.

15 MIPSK: 16–17; KRO 1: 54.

16 KRO 1: 42. The purpose of dispatching Tevkelev was to let Abulkhair and his followers petition for subject status to the Russian Empire. Through this, he tried to confirm the followings as duties of Abulkhair: the protection of Russian caravans, the payment of *yasak*, the submission of hostages, and the improvement of relations with all those holding Russian subject status, I.V. Erofeeva, *Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel’ i politik* (Almaty: Sanat, 1999): 195.

and the wording of the new oath itself all follow these instructions from the College of Foreign Affairs.¹⁷

As will be seen regarding subsequent oaths sworn by the khans of the Middle Juz in 1740, such swearing of oaths upon the Quran was to be occasionally repeated.¹⁸ Furthermore, as evidenced by the utilization of the Quran for oaths sworn in courts of Kazakh customary law during the nineteenth century,¹⁹ this practice went on to become customary procedure for Russia's dealings with surrounding non-Christian populations.²⁰ In this way, Russia made use of Islam as part of its justification for the lord and vassal relationship it established with the Kazakhs.

After swearing allegiance, Abulkhair sent hostages (*amanat*) to the Russians and began the practice of paying a fur tax known as *yasak*. These customs proved to the Russians above all else that the Kazakh homage was sincere. Kirilov, the leader of a Russian expeditionary force to Orenburg, would later describe Russian attitudes toward the Kazakhs as follows: "The Kazakhs made an oath (*shert'*) Although they cannot be trusted, it is possible to make them render service to Russia."²¹ In addition to a proposal by Kirilov that a fortress be built in Orenburg, Abulkhair himself requested such construction as a way to solidify his own power. The fortress was built and, as noted by Koichi Toyokawa, Kirilov's plan served as a turning point in Russia's policy of ethnic division.²² To an eighteenth century Russia that was beginning to feel the effects of the European Enlightenment, the sudden appearance of the Kazakhs appeared to be voluntary homage along the same lines as that of the Torghut

17 The sample made on 3.26, MIPSK: 16.

18 The 1810 text of Kazakh sultan oaths, contains the wording "I kiss the sacred Quran" (*qur'ān-i majdīn obamīn*), TsGA RK: f. 345, op. 2, d. 159, l. 11.

19 For the symbolic meaning of the Quran, see V. Martin, "Kazakh Oath-Taking in Colonial Courtrooms: Legal Culture and Russian Empire-Building," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5:3 (2004): 510. For the formality of oath-taking on the Quran, see Y. Malikov, *Tsars, Cossacks, and Nomads: the formation of a borderland culture in Northern Kazakhstan in the 18th and 19th centuries* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2011): 92.

20 Early in the sixteenth century, Tatars and other Muslims took oaths on the Quran, M. Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The making of a colonial empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002): 243.

21 The "draft" of Kirilov, 5.1.1734, A.I. Dobrosmyslov, *Materialy po istorii Rossii: Sbornik ukazov i drugikh dokumentov, kasaiushchikhsia upravleniia i ustroistva Orenburgskogo kraia*, t. 1 (Orenburg, 1900): 8–9. For the establishment of Orenburg and the role of Kirilov in it, see Toyokawa, *Roshia teikoku minzoku tōgōshi no kenkyū*: 186–203.

22 Toyokawa, *Roshia teikoku minzoku tōgōshi no kenkyū*: 194 and 442; K. Toyokawa, "Russia in the Age of Enlightenment and I.K. Kirilov's Colonial Policy," *Japanese Slavic and East European Studies* 30 (2010): 50.

and Bashkirs that were already considered to be their subjects.²³ Even with two changes of location, the Orenburg fortress became in later years an important foothold for Russian expansion of power into the Kazakh Steppe. Following that of the Small Juz, the leader of the Middle Juz, Semeke khan, made his own oath to the Russians in 1732. Finally, the sultans (members of the Kazakh-Khanates' aristocracy, or Chinggisid) of the Great Juz followed suit by sending their own petition to the Russians in 1733. Within this document as well can be found the phrase that "We submitted to [Her] Imperial Highness" (*Aq hān uluḡ bādšāhina baš salduḡ*).²⁴

While it appears that by this point the entire Kazakh nation had submitted and become subjects to the Russians, that subject status ("*poddanstvo*" in the Russian translation) was of a formal and superficial nature. It is therefore difficult to agree with the interpretation²⁵ that by the 1740s all Kazakhs (excepting the Great Juz) had yielded allegiance to the Russian Empire. In fact, many of the Kazakh elders refused to acquiesce at the time of Abulkhair's oath. Also, both the Middle Juz and the Great Juz would not send hostages or even pay taxes from the start while the Small Juz itself also occasionally refused to send hostages.²⁶ As Khodarkovsky has noted, there was a large gap between the perceptions of the Kazakhs, who considered the oath to be nothing more than a formality to improve their own particular situation, and the Russians, who interpreted the oath as real submission to the emperor.²⁷ It should also be mentioned that not only did the Great Juz go on to temporarily lose its relationship with Russia completely when it was subjugated by the Jungars, but there were wavering degrees of enthusiasm regarding their own relationships

23 This was written by Kirilov, Dobrosmyslov, *Materialy po istorii Rossii*: 37–38. Regarding Russian policy for the Kazakh Steppe, it seems that the collapse of Jungar powers and Russia's contacts with the Qing raised the issue of the subjection of the Kazakhs in Western Siberia (see chapter 3). These events let the Russian Empire advancing further into the steppe. Notably enough, while Kirilov's "draft" and the instructions for him were still referred to in the 1750s, they were understood only on the assumption of Kazakh subjection to Russia. For example, see report of Rychkov and Tevkelev, 1.22.1759, KRO 1: 576. Then, the expedition by I. Andreev in the second half of the eighteenth century enabled Russians to see the pasturelands of the Middle Juz Kazakhs located near Qing territory. For the meaning of the frontier expedition, see W. Sunderland, "Imperial Space: Territorial Thought and Practice in the Eighteenth Century," in J. Burbank et al. eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007): 33–66.

24 KRO 1: 102.

25 Toyokawa, *Roshia teikoku minzoku tōgōshi no kenkyū*: 187–188.

26 IKRI 3: 321.

27 Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*: 51–56.

to Russia among both the Small and Middle Juz – with the khan of the Small Juz consistently showing the highest level of commitment, a typical example of which was Abulkhair's case.

1.2 *The Relationship between the Small Juz and the Government of Nadir Shah*

The differences in Kazakh perceptions regarding its relationship with Russia can be said to have been instrumental in allowing it to form other diplomatic relationships with surrounding powers from the 1730s onward. As one example, let us turn our attention here to the dealings of the Kazakhs with the regime of Nadir shah regarding the city of Khiva.²⁸

In November of 1740, Abulkhair khan travelled to Khiva by invitation of its residents in order to be appointed the territory's khan.²⁹ We have a detailed record regarding this trip due to the presence of two Russians, Gladyshev and Muravin, in Abulkhair's entourage. According to Gladyshev's account, the Kazakh Small Juz was "Abulkhair's domain."³⁰ Similarly, although the product of a later era, the nineteenth century chronicle of the Khiva Khanate entitled "*Firdavs al-iqbāl*" (Paradise of Joy) also describes Abulkhair as "the king of the Kazakhs (*Qazāq pādšāhi*)" and "ruler of the Kazakh hordes (*Qazāq ulusnīy vālisi*)."³¹ Persian language historical sources of the time also contain reference to Kazakh lands as "the territory of the Kazakhs (*Mamlakat-i Qazāq*)," thus demonstrating a distinct recognition by foreign powers of the space occupied by the nomadic Kazakhs.³²

In those days, Nadir shah, who had extended his influence as far as Mawarannahr, was advancing with his eyes on Khorezm (the downstream region of the Amu Darya). Upon reaching Khiva, Gladyshev sent Muravin to inform Nadir that Abulkhair was already a subject of the Russian Empire.³³

28 For my analysis on the sources, see J. Noda, "Vzaimosviazi kazakhov s Khivinskim khanstvom i gosudarstvom Nadir-shakha (1730–40-kh gg.)," in *Istoriko-kul'turnye vzaimosviazi Irana i Dasht-i kypchaka v XIII – XVIII vekakh*; *materialy mezhdunarodnogo kurglogo stola* (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2004): 128–132.

29 November 1740, JN: 358.

30 "Poezdka iz Orska v Khivu i obratno, sovershennaia v 1740–41 godakh poruchikom Gladyshevym i geodezistom Muravinym," *Geograficheskie izvestiia*, izdavaemye ot Rossiiskogo geograficheskogo obshchestva (SPb, 1850): 525.

31 FI: 161 and 169.

32 AN 3: 209b. Although few, examples do exist of the Kazakhs being described as a "Kazakh state" (Ma. *hasak gurun*) by the Qing Empire, see XMD vol. 27: 233 (QL22(1758)/12, memorial of Ailungga (Ch. *Along'a*)).

33 "Poezdka iz Orska": 594.

However, a letter that Abulkhair himself had Muravin deliver to Nadir made no reference to the Kazakh-Russian relationship.³⁴

Muravin's subsequent report maintained that the shah recognized Abulkhair's subject status to Russia.³⁵ However, in correspondence³⁶ to Abulkhair immediately thereafter, Nadir addresses Abulkhair as "the noble and supreme monarch Abulkhair" and merely requested that Abulkhair visit Nadir. Persian language sources regarding Nadir also mention Abulkhair as the "leader of the Kazakhs (*vālī-yi Qazāq*)"³⁷ and make no mention at all of the Kazakh-Russian connection.

Abulkhair subsequently fled from Khiva without accepting Nadir's invitation.³⁸ In a letter to the Empress Anna dated 24 Jan. of the following year,³⁹ Abulkhair mentions his trip to Khiva, his sending of an envoy (Muravin) to Nadir, and that the people of Khiva were desirous to become subjects of the Russian Empire. However, he also reports that the city was captured by a Persian (Nadir) firmly putting all responsibility on Nadir.

It should be noted that Abulkhair's son Nurali was also temporarily the khan of Khiva (from mid-1741 to the spring of 1742). Persian sources describe him as "Nurali khan of Aral on the Chinggisid lineage (*Nūr 'alī ḥān-i Ārālī ki az silsila-yi Čingīzīyat*)."⁴⁰ This indicates that, including Abulkhair's case itself, the blood connection between the Kazakh khans and the descendants of Chinggis khan became one justification for their sovereignty over the territory of Khorezm.⁴¹

Two lessons can be learned from the negotiations between Abulkhair and Nadir shah regarding Khiva, and from the information above regarding the

34 Dated 1153 of the Islamic calendar (the only existing text is a Russian translation), KRO 1: 170. According to Erofeeva, it was between 5.5 and 5.11 of 1740, Erofeeva, *Khan Abulkhair*: 245.

35 "Poezdka iz Orska": 597.

36 While the existing Russian translation mentioned the date 11.28.1740, the original text should have the date 28th of Shaaban, 1153, i.e., 11.7.1740, KRO 1: 170–171. The same text is found in "Poezdka iz Orska": 543–544.

37 JN: 358.

38 On 11.11, KRO 1: 179. According to *Jahānguṣā-yi Nādirī*, he fled due to the fear for the Nadir shah's blood sanction, JN: 358.

39 It should be 1741 (A.H. 1153), KRO 1: 133.

40 AN 2: 313a. A contemporary document mentioned that Nurali was the khan of Aral too, KRO 1: 187–188.

41 For the political significance of the Chinggisid lineage, J. Miyawaki, "The Legitimacy of Khanship among the Oyirad (Kalmyk) Tribes in Relation to the Chinggisid Principle," in R. Amitai-Preis & D. Morgan eds., *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999): 319–331. See also R. Sela, *Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan's Inauguration Ceremony* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003).

ascension of Abulkhair and members of his clan to the position of khan within Khiva and Aral. First, it is clear that Abulkhair behaved in whatever way was most beneficial for himself when caught up between the Russians and the Nadir regime. Second, the 'subjection' of the Kazakhs (particularly, in this instance, the Small Juz) to Russia was incomplete. As we shall see from the following discussion regarding relations with the Jungar, the Russian-Kazakh relationship changed in tandem with the Kazakhs' relations with other local powers.

1.3 *Subjection to the Jungar*

Turning our attention to the north, the Jungars mentioned above increased in power and became an increasingly imminent threat to the Kazakh Steppe from the 1740s onward.⁴² As will be examined more in chapter 3, the position of the Kazakhs became highly unstable. In fact, Abulmanbet khan, Ablai sultan and others of the Middle Juz became completely incorporated within the Jungar area of influence in spite of having already sworn allegiance to the Russians at Orenburg.⁴³

On 13 May 1741, Urusov, the chief of the Orenburg expeditionary force, wrote to the College of Foreign Affairs to remind them that Abulmanbet and Ablai had sworn allegiance (*prisiaga v vernosti*) to the empire and claiming that the Kazakhs, loyal Russian subjects, could not stand in the face of a Jungar attack in Siberia without Russian supervision.⁴⁴

On 14 April 1742, Galdan Tsering of the Jungar sent a letter by envoy to Abulkhair. This letter made several demands, among them, that Abulmanbet khan and Batur sultan live in Turkistan; that sons, including Abulkhair khan's son, be sent as hostages (*amanat*); and that every Kazakh household within the Small Juz send a fur from a fox or other animal as a form of tax. The penalty stated for failing to comply with these demands was that a detachment of soldiers would be sent to annihilate the Kazakhs.⁴⁵

Recently published historical materials help to shed light on how such treatment of the Kazakhs impacted Russian-Jungar relations. In September of 1742, the Russians demanded that the Jungars refrain from taking military action

42 H. Kawakami, "Aburai no seiryoku kakudai: 18 sēki kazāfusutan ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu," *Machikaneyama ronsō* 14 (1980): 27–49.

43 No later than Aug. 1740, KRO 1: 168–169.

44 RDO: 74.

45 Report of Gok, an English merchant, no later than 5.15.1742, RDO: 79–80. The same demand of Galdan Tsering was also reported in the following document. See letter from Abulkhair to Nepliuev, 6.18.1742, RDO: 81.

against their subjects the Kazakhs. Russia also sent an army captain named Miller to meet with Galdan Tsering.⁴⁶ Correspondence dated 2 Sep. to Galdan from the chief of the Orenburg Commission, Nepluev not only showed how Russia was unyielding in its insistence that the Kazakh Small and Middle Juz were subjects (*vernopoddannnye*) of the empire,⁴⁷ but even went so far as to contain a copy of the document recording the oath of allegiance itself.⁴⁸ As for the Jungar, the Noyan (an elder) Manji admitted that he had attacked the Kazakh Small Juz and demanded hostages and the payment of taxes. However, Manji also insisted that in spite of Russia's demands that prisoners of war such as Ablai be released as subjects of the empress, considering the friendship that existed between the Russians and the Jungar, there was no way that the Kazakhs could possibly be true subjects of the Russian Empire because they had threatened the borders of the Jungar.⁴⁹

Ablai was eventually released by the Jungar and Soviet era research tends to attribute this result to the efforts of the Miller mission. V. Moiseev, however, has shown this assertion to be too positive and has even found signs of a negative impact on Russian-Kazakh relations.⁵⁰ A report sent to the Orenburg Border Commission stated that Galdan Tsering's statement upon the release of Ablai was to the effect that "the Kazakhs (*kaisaki*) are my own subjects as evidenced by the fact that Abulmanbet sent his son as a hostage,"⁵¹ so it does appear that at least the Jungars themselves believed they held jurisdiction over the Kazakhs. Somewhat later, in an account written in 1762, the Russian geographer Rychkov stated that "the Jungar subjugated the Kazakhs after having separated them from their status as Russian subjects by force and temptation."⁵² This must have been a common sentiment within Russia at the time. These facts seem further borne out by correspondence from Abulkhair to the Governor of Siberia, Soimonov, in which he states that Abulmanbet khan and others had "become subjects of the Jungar monarch."⁵³

46 MOTsA 1: 317; KRO 1: 199.

47 KRO 1: 228.

48 I.V. Erofeeva, "Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia v 40-kh gg. XVIII v. i Kazakhstan (posol'stvo K. Millera)," in *Iz istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v Tsentral'noi Azii: srednie veka i novoe vremia* (Alma-Ata: Ghilim, 1990): 63.

49 Manji to Nepluev, 2.1.1743, RDO: 83–85.

50 V.A. Moiseev, *Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke: ocherk vneshnepoliticheskikh otnoshenii* (Barnaul, 1998): 107–108.

51 Report from a Bashkir to the secretariat of the Orenburg Commission, Sept. 1743, RDO: 95.

52 P.I. Rychkov, *Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii* (Ufa: Kitap, 1999): 27–28.

53 Instruction of Senate to College of Foreign Affairs, 5.20.1742, KRO 1: 199.

Finally, it should be reiterated how these negotiations between the Russians and the Jungar underscore the instability inherent in the Kazakh-Russian relationship. They also illustrate how that relationship was continually affected by other surrounding powers and their relationships with the Kazakhs.

1.4 *Russian Idea of "Subject Status" Compared to the Qing View of "Subject"*

As a conclusion to this section, the meaning of the Russian term "*poddanstvo*" (vassal or, rather, subject status) should be touched on once again.⁵⁴ There is no doubt that, beginning with Abulkhair in 1731, one Kazakh khan after another took oaths of fealty in order to become "Russian subjects." Regarding the 1740 oath of Abulmanbet khan and Ablai, late-eighteenth century Russian documents clearly state the Russian understanding that "the oaths to become eternal subjects (*vechnoe poddannichestvo*) of Her Imperial Majesty were undertaken on behalf of the entire Khorde [that is, the Middle Juz]."⁵⁵

However, as will be examined in chapter 3, the Kazakhs were later able to make a similar oath to the Qing,⁵⁶ which would seem to imply that the oath to the Russians was not as binding as it might initially appear. Regarding the Torghut, whose allegiance to the Russians preceded that of the Kazakhs, Ayuki khan made repeated oaths of "subject status" but a distinction must be made between Russian intents and the expectations of the oath-takers.

Furthermore, the meanings of the Russian terms "*poddanstvo*" (a subject status) and "*poddannyi*" (the state of being a subject; also used to delineate a specific subjected people) were sometimes rendered in Kazakh correspondence with words of Arabic origin such as "*raʿīyat*" and "*tābaʿ*," but they were never translated into Turkic. Within Turkic documents, the words were used in their original forms. For example, the word "*būdān*" is used as well as eventual transliterations of the synonym "*bīrnā-būdānī*."⁵⁷ One simple example of such usage is that of a Kazakh oath (1810) seeking permission for nomadic grazing within Russian territory that reads "*bu 'ahd-nāma buyunča pūddānğa tūšün*

54 Regarding this terminology, Bykov, analyzing the discussion of the dependency of Kazakhs upon Russia from the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, showed the differences in understanding existent among researchers from differing standpoints, A.Iu. Bykov, "Rossiia i Kazakhstan (XVII–XIX vv.)," *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik: 2002: Rossiia i tiurkskii mir* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2003): 68.

55 I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998): 34.

56 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 43.

57 The original Russian word is "*vernopoddannyi*."

qur'ān arqilī anṭ ettilār (with this document, and on the Quran, we swear our allegiance to be in the subject status).⁵⁸

It is possible to compare the meanings of what the Russian empire considered “*poddanstvo*” (subject status) with what the Qing termed “*albatu*” (subjects).⁵⁹ Takahiro Onuma, based on the fact that the Kazakh Jochi sultan used the word “*albatu*” within Turkic-language correspondence (1800) with the Qing, argues that “the Kazakhs considered themselves to be the *albatu* of the Qing.”⁶⁰ However, it becomes possible to interpret this in a different way if one considers relations between the Russians and the Kazakhs.

Within a document written by Dair sultan in 1781 (which will be further considered in chapter 4), the phrase “we follow the Ejen (Qing Emperor)” appears without usage of the term *albatu*. Altinsari sultan, who inherited the Qing rank of *han*, uses the term “*bodam*”⁶¹ when he writes to the Qing that “there are some *töres* (sultans) who are subjects (*bodam boldī*) of Russia and other *töre* who are subjects (*bodam boldī*) of the Khoqand. From the time of our forefathers, we have followed the Ejen Bogdo (*Ejen buğdağa qarab turamiz*).” On the other hand, there are instances such as Ghubaidulla (see chapter 5) writing to the Qing and using the term “*albatu*” to describe his own subject status to the Russians. Rather than the Kazakhs using these terms in the way that the Qing

58 Jan. 1810, TsGA RK: f. 345, op. 2, d. 159, l. 11. The modern Kazakh language also has the word “*bodan*,” which means the status of being subject.

59 *Albatu* were regarded as subjects or servants who owed the duties (Mo. *alban*) imposed by the master (*Ejen*, Emperor of the Qing), T. Onuma, “Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the ‘ejen-albatu Relationship’ in Central Asia,” in J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo, 2010): 100. In Chinese texts, the word was sometimes translated as “*chenpu*.” Onuma, in his article, regards the Qing Empire as developing its ‘ejen-albatu relationships’ (which were originally the relationships with Mongol nomads) when the Qing established political relations with the Central Asian powers including the Kazakhs. He emphasizes that this relationship symbolizes “the master-servant relationship” between the Qing emperor and Central Asian people (especially their chieftains). Onuma later developed this notion in the following way: The relationship functioned as a “logical foundation for the practice of the policy” within the Qing court, see T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014): 211. See also discussion in chapters three and four in this book.

60 Onuma, “Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads”: 106.

61 DGS (1828)/4/26, attached document of the memorial, JMLZ: 4058–060/198–1898 (Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 76). Also notably enough, in the document, the word “*albatu*” was not used when showing subjection to the Qing emperor.

understood the *ejen* and *albatu* relationship, it seems likely that they used the word “*albatu*” to describe the state of vassals in much the same way that they used the word “*bodam*” when corresponding with the Russians. If this were not the case, it would be impossible to consistently interpret such phrases as Ghubaidulla’s assertion to the Qing that he was “already *albatu* to the Russians.” While it may be true that the strict meaning of *albatu* had been lost to some degree by the nineteenth century, it is still important to keep in mind the differences in understanding between the imperial powers and the Kazakhs.

As we have seen in this section, the Russians and Kazakhs had considerably different perceptions regarding their relationship. However, it is an undeniable fact that, as time went by, the Russians gradually strengthened their interventions into Kazakh affairs according to the principles outlined in the Kirilov proposals mentioned earlier. The next section will focus on one symbolic example of such intervention: the rank of khan within Kazakh society.

2 The Kazakh Title of “Khan”

An analysis of how the Russian Empire perceived the Kazakh rank of khan will be one focus of the present section. Attention will be paid to other ranks as well, and the actual authority of the khans within Kazakh society will also be examined.

Past research regarding the rank of khan includes that of S. Zimanov during the Soviet era.⁶² I. Erofeeva’s work must also be mentioned.⁶³ More recently, A. Bykov’s diachronic analysis of the khan title within the Small and Middle Juz is an excellent reference,⁶⁴ but it fails to address the other themes of this book, namely, the Kazakh-Qing relationship in general, the issue of Qing titles among the Kazakhs, and the interaction between the Russian and Qing empires pertaining to the Kazakhs. With regard to these issues, it seems necessary to reexamine the meaning of the khan rank, particularly as it related to titles bestowed by the Qing Dynasty – an issue that will be taken up below in chapter 5.

62 S.Z. Zimanov, *Politicheskii stroi Kazakhstana kontsa XVIII i pervoi poloviny XIX vekov* (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo AN KazSSR, 1960).

63 I.V. Erofeeva, “Kazakhskie khany v khanskii dinastii v XVIII – sereдинe XIX vv.,” in *Kul’tura i istoriia Tsentral’noi Azii i Kazakhstana: problemy i perspektivy issledovaniia* (Almaty: Izd. Instituta filosofii, 1997): 46–144.

64 A.Iu. Bykov, “Khanskaia vlast’ u kazakhov: zvanie i ili dolzhnost’,” *Etnograficheskie obozreniia* 3 (2006): 127–148.

For now, let us rely on past research to rethink how Russian historical sources have clarified the meaning of the khan title.

2.1 “Khan” of the Small Juz Kazakhs

Within the hereditary regime of the Golden Horde, the usage of the title “khan” to denote the monarch of the Kazakh Khanates was an obvious reality. However, as previously mentioned, after the death in the early eighteenth century of Tauke khan, it appears that no other single monarch was able to lead the entire Kazakh nation.

Let us examine the view of a British artist, John Castle (Ru. Kestel’), who visited the khan of the Small Juz, Abulkhair (see fig. 3). The diary of Castle for 1737 clearly describes three independent Juz, each presided over by its own khan:

The Kirgis-Kaisak [Kazakhs] are divided into three *Orda*.⁶⁵ Accordingly, there are three different khans. In addition to his own lands, the most well-known of the khans is Jolbars khan (*Scholburschan*) and the city of Tashkent falls within his territory. The khan of the second *orda*, whose name is Semeke (*Shemiaki*) khan, is also powerful and the city of Turkistan lies within his domain. The third khan rules over the smallest *orda*. His name is Abulkhair and I was his guest. These three khans have no authority over one another but rule independently while maintaining a friendly relationship with each other.⁶⁶

The khan of the Great Juz mentioned above, Jolbars, was killed by the Jungar in 1740 and, from that period on, the power of the khans of the Great Juz gradually weakened. Many facts regarding subsequent successions remain unclear and will be addressed further in chapter 4.

While it goes without saying that the khans were originally chosen by the Kazakhs themselves, the Kazakh petitions to the Russian government that were examined in the last section served to complicate Kazakh-Russian relations and eventually led to an ability on the part of Russia to influence Kazakh

65 *Orda* is the Russian word meaning the nomadic clan coalition.

66 Dzhon Kestel’, *Dnevnik puteshestviia v godu 1736-m iz Orenburga k Abulkhairu, khanu Kirgiz-Kaisatskoi ordy* (Almaty: Jibek jolı, 1998): 109. The italicized spellings above follow the original German. While an English translation was recently published, there are differences between the translations. My understanding here is based on the Russian translation. See B. Teissier ed., *Into the Kazakh Steppe: John Castle’s Mission to Khan Abulkhayir (1736)* (Oxford: Signal Books, 2014): 139–140.




FIGURE 3 *Audience with the khan.* SOURCE: DZHON KESTEL', *DNEVNIK PUTESHESTVIA V GODU 1736-M IZ ORENBURGA K ABULKHAIRU, KHANU KIRGIZ-KAISATSKOI ORDY* (ALMATY: JIBEK JOLĭ, 1998): 25.

affairs through a process of confirming khan appointees. Let's first examine the case of the Small Juz.

It has been shown that, after the death of Abulkhair khan, the Russian government was petitioned by the Kazakhs regarding his son Nurali's succession and the Russians had given their approval. Specifically, in a letter to the empress Elizaveta (dated 15 Oct. 1748), Nurali declared that he had been chosen khan by the people of the Small and Middle Juz and requested Russian recognition of this decision.⁶⁷ An imperial edict sent to Nurali simply expressed recognition of his having become "a khan of the Kirgis-Kaisak," but it is clear from subsequent historical records that Nurali only had influence over the Small Juz so it

67 KRO 1: 409; MIPSK: 39.

is possible to infer that Nurali was only recognized by Russia as the khan of the Small Juz.⁶⁸

2.2 *Reign of Ablai and His 'Bi-Lateral' Diplomacy*

Regarding the Middle Juz, as previously mentioned Abulmanbet and Ablai swore allegiance to the Russian empress in 1740, but only Abulmanbet was recognized as khan of the Middle Juz at that time. Following Abulmanbet's death, Ablai was made khan in 1771 (reigned 1771–1781) and a Russian imperial order officially recognized the Middle Juz khan title itself in 1778.⁶⁹ By this time, however, Ablai was seeking to become khan over all three Kazakh Juz⁷⁰ and was refusing to make an oath to the Russians.⁷¹

Before the Russians recognized his title in 1771, following the establishment of relations with the Qing in 1757 (which will be discussed in chapter 3), Ablai had already received the title of *han* from the Qing.⁷² Although he didn't claim the title of khan within the Tod language 'surrender' document to the Qing of 1757,⁷³ soon thereafter Ablai began to refer to himself as the "small Kazakh *han*"⁷⁴ in hopes of receiving a title of *han* or *wang*. As a result, Ablai was

68 Instruction by Elizaveta to the Governor of Orenburg, Nepluev, 2.15.1749, KRO 1: 444. For the edict, see KRO 1: 443. Bykov considered it as the first instance of Russia interfering in the selection of khan, A.Iu. Bykov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii khanskoi vlasti u kazakhov mladshego zhuza," *Vostochnyi arkhiv* 13 (2005): 15. Kundakbaeva pointed out that the Russian Empire fixed the lineages of the members who became khan, Zh.B. Kundakbaeva, "Znakom milosti E. I. V. ...": *Rossia i narody Severnogo Prikaspiia v XVIII veke* (Moscow: AIRO-XXI, 2005): 141–142.

69 Ekaterina II's edict, 5.24.1778, KRO 2: 90–91.

70 Report of College of Foreign Affairs to Ekaterina, 5.24.1778. It was reported that Ablai requested approval on his khan rank (*khanstvo*) on the grounds that he had been elected khan by the Kazakhs of all three Juz (*orda*). The document also mentioned that the Small Juz maintained a khan independent from that of the Middle Juz, Nurali khan, KRO 2: 88–89.

71 P.B. Suleimenov & V.A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka: o vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Abilaia* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1988): 121–122.

72 J. Noda, "Shinchō ni yoru kazafu eno shakui juyo: Gubaidurra no hanshaku jitai no jirei," *Nairiku ajiashi kenkyū* 21 (2006): 35. For the differences between the traditional Kazakh "khan" and Qing title of *han*, see chapter 5.

73 Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 11–12.

74 PDZFL (Ma.) *zhengbian* vol. 41: 43. The Emperor Qianlong mentioned the difference between his own title *han* as a ruler of the world and the small "*han*" of Ablai, see Q132/5/7, edict to Agui, QMJD vol. 7, no. 1062. See also T. Onuma, "Nusan shisetsu no haken: 1757 nen ni okeru shin to abulai no chokusetsu kōshō," *Ajia bunkashi kenkyū*, 14 (2014): 1–20.

eventually bestowed the title of *han* by the Qing (See chapter 5 for more discussion of the titles bestowed by the Qing Dynasty).⁷⁵

On the other hand, it is clear that the Russians only considered Ablai to be a sultan (member of an aristocratic family). We know from an order issued by the College of Foreign Affairs in May of 1758⁷⁶ that Ablai was likely given a sword in the name of the empress bearing the Turkic inscription “To my subject (*tāba’miz*) Ablai, sultan of the Kirgis-kazak.”⁷⁷ The Russians continued to use the title of sultan in reference to Ablai until they clearly recognized him to be khan as evidenced by a 1777 reference to “[one of] the Kazakh sultans, Ablai khan.”⁷⁸

In order to best understand the background of Kazakh relations with the Russian and Qing empires, it is important to confirm the nature of Ablai’s diplomacy here. Ablai adopted a bi-lateral diplomatic policy whose unique policies towards the Russians and the Qing allowed him to maintain his own power even while sandwiched between the two empires.⁷⁹ Ablai and his allies tried to balance this two-sided relationship in the following manner.

During the initial stages of diplomacy, when Ablai and others sent their missions to the Qing court in 1757, they tried to minimize Russian perceptions of Qing influence over the Kazakhs. For example, the above-mentioned ‘surrender’ (according to the view of the Qing Dynasty) by the Kazakhs to the Qing was presented to the Russians as a mere “conclusion of the peace” between Qing troops and Ablai at the banks of the Ayaguz River during June 1757.⁸⁰ A Russian document contains the following sentences:

Ablai sultan received the edict (*gramota*) with the seal from Bogdo Han [the Qing emperor], in which the Han ordered Ablai and all of his subject

75 J. Noda, “An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents,” in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (2010): 129.

76 Instruction of College of Foreign Affairs to Tevkelev and Rychkov, 5.6.1758, TsIKKh 1: 157.

77 MOTsA 2: 127. See also the figure in the following, Noda, “An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents”: 148.

78 Report from Tobol’sk Governor, Chicherin to Senate, 2.20.1777, KRO 2: 86.

79 J. Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku: Surutan to shinchō no kankei wo chūshin ni,” *Tōyō gaku* 87 (2), 2005: 29–59. This policy can be contrasted with the diplomacy of Ayuki Khan of Torghut between Russian and the Ottoman Empire, see M. Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: the Russian state and the Kalmyk nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

80 Information from a Kazakh clan chief to a Russian military officer, MOTsA 2: 82.

people (*ulus*) to lead their nomadic life at Altai-tau where the Jungars (*Kalmyk*) who had fled to Russia had once been situated.⁸¹

Following this report, Russia came to believe that the Kazakhs would be permitted by the Qing emperor to move into ex-Jungar territory. Ablai's letter to the Russian authorities mentions that the Kazakhs and the Qing had concluded a peace agreement (*mir*), and had held trade negotiations at the suggestion of both sides.⁸² A Tatar known as Qurbān 'ālī also believed that the Kazakhs had been given land at the conclusion of peace – a perspective which is quite different from that of Qing sources.

After the reconciliation (*muṣāliḥa*), the Kazakhs started to advance slowly and quietly. Crossing the Ayaguz River, [they] moved to Ala kol. In addition, some of them reached as far as Zaisan and the Tarbagatai mountain range.⁸³

The following quote from the THS also shows how the Kazakhs justified their own movements as being in accordance with permission received from the Qing court: "[Ablai attained] an edict from the emperor of 'Khitay' (China, or the Qing) which gave to him the 'Ili [River]' and its surrounding areas – that is, the area between the mouth of rivers and Lake Balkhash [Semirech'e] – as summer and winter pastureland."⁸⁴

Simply put, the Kazakhs' dispatching of a mission and subsequent submission to the Qing caused the Qing Empire to interpret Kazakh actions as a voluntary surrender. For this reason, the Qing court refused to affirm Russian statements regarding Kazakh subject status to Russia.⁸⁵

However, in dealings with the Russians, the Kazakhs behaved as if they were a sort of advanced guard for the Russian empire that rejected conciliation offers from the Qing side. It bears emphasizing that this posturing was undertaken even while the Kazakhs demonstrated allegiance to the Qing Empire and without mention of their relations to Russia.⁸⁶ For this reason, the Qing, once learning of the relationship that existed between Kazakhs and Russia, could

81 MOTsA 2: 83.

82 Jan.1758, KPO 1: 548.

83 THS: 258–259.

84 THS: 439–440.

85 GZSL vol. 580: 20.

86 GZSL vol. 580: 19. For the details of the relationship among the three parties, see chapter 3.

assert that the “Kazakhs have long been double-faced.”⁸⁷ This belief furthermore allowed the Qing to continue insisting that the Kazakhs were subject to the Qing Empire.⁸⁸

When considering the historical background to the relations between the three powers, it should be noted that much of the information collected by the Russian side was based on hearsay from the Kazakhs. For instance, the following report concerns conciliatory measures taken by the Qing emperor toward the Kazakh mission:

Bogdo Han, using admonitory and deceptive words, [told the Kazakh sultans who visited Beijing as envoys that]: the Kazakh people should live among the Qing people (*kitaitsy*) peacefully, and should not be independent from Bogdo Han, who should be considered the same as their own monarch. This is because the Qing nation shared its origins with Kazakhs in that they both came from the ancient lineage of Chinggis khan (*edino-plemennyye pokoleniia Chingizkhanova*).⁸⁹

Whether it was true or not that the Qing had made such a statement, by passing such information on to the Russians, the Kazakhs could then demonstrate their plans to refuse such Qing overtures. These diplomatic strategies of the Kazakhs were influential in the establishment of imperial policy in Russia regarding recognition of the traditional title “khan” among the Kazakhs.

87 QL44(1779)/11/1 (*xingsi*), GZSL vol. 1094: 1–2. See also T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 340. A document dated 1778 (QL43) mentions a report by a Kazakh elder describing Ablai’s two-faced character (*iki yakli*). This demonstrates that the Kazakhs themselves recognized the true nature of their bi-lateral policy to the empires, see B. Näsenov ed., *Abilay khan (11 tarauı). Ombı arkhivı söyleydi. XII bölim-xVII kitap* (Almaty-Novosibirsk, 2005): 346–348.

88 Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Qing Empire continued to insist to Russia that the Kazakhs were subject to the Qing, see J. Noda, “Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan: 1831 nen ayaguzu kanku kaisetsu made,” in Y. Shinmen ed., *Chūōajia niokeru kyōzoku ishiki to isuramu nikansuru rekishiteki kenkyū* (Tokyo, 2002): 127. For an example of the Qing’s belief of the loyalty of the Kazakhs, see QMJD vol. 22, no. 391 (QL56/2/10).

89 Report from a Russian translator (Gordeev, who had visited Ablai) to Roden, commander of Troitsk fortress, 7.3.1761, KPO 1: 621.

2.3 *Developments from the Eighteenth Century*

Although finally recognized as the khan of the Middle Juz, Ablai died in '1781.⁹⁰ Ablai's son Wali⁹¹ first reported his father's death to the Qing, who subsequently sent an envoy to Wali that presented him with an imperial edict⁹² recognizing him as heir to the title of *han*.

In spite of his report to the Russians regarding the Qing envoy⁹³, Wali waited until 23 Jan. 1782 to tell the commander of the Siberian fortified line, Ogarev of his succession to the status of khan.⁹⁴ In fact, Ogarev had already received information regarding an envoy from the Qing emperor sent to "celebrate Wali's status as khan (*khanstvo*)."⁹⁵ It is important to keep in mind that the Russians were aware of the details regarding Kazakh-Qing negotiations concerning Wali's inheritance of the khan title.

Upon receiving word that Wali had already held his own coronation, another coronation ceremony was held in the Petropavlovsk Fortress for Wali to make an oath of allegiance to Russia.⁹⁶ The Ufa and Simbirsk Governor-General, Iakobi, as well as an Islamic cleric (*akhon* [āḥūnd]) sent from Kazan were in attendance. Together with the oaths on the Quran described in the previous

90 It has been thought that the death of Ablai was in 1781. However, Altan-Ochir found within Manchu documents that this event should have happened in QL45/10, that is, October or November of 1780, see Altan-Ochir, "Issledovanie daty smerti Ablai-khana," in *Mirovye tsivilizatsii i Kazakhstana*, chast' 1 (Almaty: Qaynar universiteti, 2007): 156–160. The report of Ogarev to College of Foreign Affairs dated April 1781 also shows the same content, IKRI 6: 145.

91 Khafizova, supplying Chinese research such as Alatang'aoqier & Wang's, has produced new research on Wali's relations with the two empires, see K.Sh. Khafizova, "Vali-khan i ego otnosheniia s Rossiei i Kitaem." in *Vzaimodeistvie Kazakhstana s sopredel'nymi stranami v XVIII -nachale XX v.: sovremennyi vzgliad na problemu* (Aktobe, 2004): 9–16. Aidar Mirkamal also paid attention to the activity of Wali as a successor of Ablai, see Mirkamalūli, Aidar, "Ablaydan keyinggi handiq müragerlik," *Shinjiyang qoghamdiq ghilimi* (2014, vol. 4): 21–36. Nevertheless, these works do not touch on the consideration by Wali for Russians, which the author pointed out here.

92 QL46/6/6 (*dingchou*) (7.26.1781), imperial edict to Wali, GZSL vol. 1134. For the ritual on his succession at that time (the end of 1781), see chapter 5 in this book.

93 Wali to Ogarev, 11.30.1781, AVPRI: f. 122/3, 1781 g, No. 3, l. 35.

94 In Russian documents, the Qing title "*han*" was recognized as same as the khan rank (*khanstvo*).

95 Report from Ogarev in Omsk to Iakobi, 11.13.1781 (received on 12.30), AVPRI: f. 122/3, 1781 g, No. 3, ll. 1–10b. His earlier report had already mentioned that Wali succeeded to khan title, August 1781, from Ogarev to Iakobi, IKRI 6: 150.

96 11.1.1782, Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 38. The edict (*gramota*) dated 2.25.1782 confirms the khan title (*utverzhenie khanom*), MIPSK: 40–41.

section, this episode helps to illuminate how the relationship with the Kazakh monarch fit into the framework of Russian imperial theory.

The following historical sources contribute to an understanding of how Wali continually attempted to strengthen his relationship with the Qing even in the face of the growing influence of the Russian Empire during this period.⁹⁷

First, attention should be paid to the relationship between Wali and the Qing around the year 1785. A report from Iakobi, at this time the Governor-General of Irkutsk and Kolyvan, to the Foreign Council dated 12 Nov. 1785 noted that sources among the Kazakh elder described Wali as having a friendly relationship with the Qing court and receiving an edict from the Qing emperor in September of that year. Within that edict, the Qing emperor expressed his intent to open hostilities with Russia and requested that Wali fulfill his obligation as a subject (*dolzhnost' vernopoddanstva*) by supporting the Qing actions.⁹⁸ The Kazakh elder had not seen the edict directly, nor has the present author been able to verify such a claim within Qing historical sources, but, at the very least, this report can be interpreted as a sign of Russia's lack of trust in Wali. On the other hand, the report does present Wali's response to the Qing in the following manner:

You [the Qing emperor] have written of your intentions to make trouble with the Russians, but I cannot agree with this plan. ... This is because while my father Ablai was alive, neither he nor the [people of] Khorde itself were ever caused suffering or discontent by the Russians and both sides were always able to live peacefully together without quarrel. ... Furthermore, upon his death, my father firmly demanded that we, his children, always continue to deal peacefully and quietly with the Russians.⁹⁹

Again, this response is unverifiable from Qing sources¹⁰⁰ and it is possible that, rather than proof of Qing plans to attack Russia, the information was

97 The profit from trade with the Qing has to be considered. For details regarding this trade, see Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku": 46–48. See also chapter 6 of this book.

98 TsIKKh 2: 113–114.

99 Report from an Omsk merchant who visited Wali to Fedtsov, the commander of Siberian fortified line, 11.16.1785, MOTsA 2: 206. The merchant got this information from an adviser (*sovetnik*) to Wali.

100 Although I have not checked all of the documents which Wali sent to the Qing government, his letter dated QL47/2 (1782), for example, expressed only his gratitude to the Qing

intentionally leaked by Wali in order to demonstrate his having shown to the Qing his resolve to follow the Russians. Such methods on the part of Wali bear a striking resemblance to the policies of the Ablai era.¹⁰¹

Sometime thereafter, Wali sent his younger brother Qasim sultan to the Qing court. Although this was nothing more than a periodic visit to Beijing known as *nianban*, the visit was enough to incite further Russian distrust.¹⁰² As evidenced by information passed on to the Foreign Council, Wali again sought to reassure the Russians that there was no special meaning behind the mission to the Qing. The information passed on was presented as a quotation from a report written by Tatar mullahs associated with Wali and stated that “Wali khan sent five representatives including his brother to the Qing Court simply to have an audience with the Qing Bogdo Han and learn of the situation surrounding him.”¹⁰³

Notably, the Russians were aware of Qasim’s travels as envoy¹⁰⁴ and must have been particularly displeased to receive report that Qing envoys who returned with Qasim visited and held negotiations of some sort with sultans¹⁰⁵ other than Wali.¹⁰⁶ The basis of Wali’s power was clearly becoming unstable as demonstrated by such facts as the petitioning by Kazakh elders for his dethronement.¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, we know of an early nineteenth century plan by Wali to relocate to an area within Qing territory. The Russian view of Wali had become extremely cautious by this time and the local officer in Siberia considered Wali to be “cunning and greedy” as well as “unsatisfied.” The officer had also received

emperor, JMLZ: 2917–018/123–3303–3306. So, it is not likely that these letters had room to refer to the Kazakhs’ close friendship with Russians.

101 Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku”: 34–35. Later, when the Russo-Turkish war (1787–92) occurred, a Kazakh elder reported to the Russian authorities that the Ottoman Empire demanded the Bukhara khanate send reinforcements and that the Kazakhs not sell their horses to Russians. The elder clearly added that Bukhara refused the Ottoman demand and that the Kazakhs would not follow the Turkish side. This report was also related to the above-mentioned policy of Wali, see letter from a Kazakh elder to Ogarev (translation), 8.5.1788, IAOO: f. 1, op. 1, d. 249, l. 13.

102 For their travel for the imperial audience, see QL52/8/7 (*renyin*), GZSL vol. 1286. See also T. Onuma, “Kazakh missions to the Qing court” in Noda & Onuma. *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 158 (no.22).

103 Received on 1.17.1787, AVPRI: f. 122/3, no. 3, l. 34.

104 It was reported that Qasim’s party went through Ili to the inner part of China (3.16) and that he returned to Kazakh pasturelands with the Qing envoy (10.19), TsIKKh 2: 118–119.

105 The names of Chanchar (son of Sultanbet) and Tuman were found as sultans.

106 Report from Shakhov to Ogarev, 10.28.1787, IAOO: f. 1, op. 1, d. 247, ll. 447–448.

107 Petition by the Kazakh elders regarding the dethronement of Wali, 2.1.1795, KRO 2: 140.

information that Wali was attempting to separate from Russia and had engaged in some sort of negotiations with the Qing.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, when Wali khan interfered with merchant trade during 1803, Minister of Commerce Rumiantsev asked why a khan who was supposed to be a subject of the Russian Empire would act in such a manner. The officer of the Siberian fortified line responded as follows:

The khan title (*khanskoe dostoinstvo*) is recognized by both the Russian and Qing empires, both of these empires consider the khan to be their own subject, and the khan himself sends petitioning envoys to both empires. Furthermore, due to this situation, whenever the khan employs such despotic means as violence, the local [Siberian] senior officers generally have no idea how to react These are the reasons.¹⁰⁹

In other words, it was the fact that the Kazakhs also had a diplomatic relationship with the Qing that allowed them to act arbitrarily (from Russia's perspective) and it was this same fact that led to mistakes in local Russian reactions to such Kazakh actions.

It was within this context that Golovkin¹¹⁰, an ambassador (*posol'*) in charge of an envoy to the Qing, reported on the relationship of the two empires in a communication dated 26 Aug. 1805 that "in spite of an inflammatory suggestion on the part of Wali khan" the Qing Dynasty respected the will of the Russian empire. Golovkin seems to be hinting at the possibility of some new action by Wali.¹¹¹ In a report sent to the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs the next day, Golovkin does express some misgivings regarding the Kazakh relationship with the Qing, specifically declaring that "Wali khan's intentions are suspicious and require careful attention".¹¹² This is likely a reference to a plan in early 1805 to relocate to Jungaria (Northern Xinjiang) that has been described by Gurevich, but the idea was disagreeable to the clans following Wali and the khan himself was eventually forced to abandon the plan.¹¹³

108 Inspector of Siberian fortified line Lavrov to the ambassador Golovkin, 8.2.1805, RKO XIX: 208–209.

109 Lavrov to Siberian governor Selifontov, 8.11.1805, RKO XIX: 205.

110 He was dispatched to notify the Qing regarding the succession of Alexander I to the throne, but was unable to enter Beijing and was obliged to return to home, K. Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi* (Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1974): 189.

111 RKO XIX: 212.

112 RKO XIX: 214.

113 B. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983): 225.

Investigation of Qing sources pertaining to the era of Wali is still insufficient and this is one important area for future research. However, even judging solely from the materials that have been presented here, it is clear that the series of actions taken by Wali in relation to his connection with the Qing was more than enough to incite mistrust on the part of Russia, who, in 1816, approved the title of khan for one of Wali's relatives, Bokei, in his place.¹¹⁴ That said, a report by a Russian mining engineer named Shangin who conducted investigations in 1816 seems to imply an equal status between Wali and Bokei when he states that "the khans chosen by the people themselves are more respected than those who have been appointed by the Russian government – of which the current Wali and Bokei are two examples."¹¹⁵ Further evidence for Shangin's statement can be found in the fact that during 1817 reports were made regarding the appearance of two additional "khans." The authority of khans themselves had clearly become unstable.¹¹⁶ Following Bokei's death in 1819, the Russians made no new approval of a khan for the Middle Juz.¹¹⁷ More will be discussed regarding the meaning of the abolition of the position of khan from the Middle Juz in chapter 5.

When Wali died in 1821, his oldest son Ghubaidulla sent a letter informing of his father's death and declaring his desire to send an envoy to Petersburg to receive approval of his ascension to the title of khan.¹¹⁸ However, the Foreign minister Nessel'rode gave instructions (dated 29 Aug.) to Kaptsevich, the

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- 114 It is regarded that the Russian authorities, knowing of relations between Wali and the Qing, substituted him with Bokei in order to diminish Wali's influence, see M.O. Auezov, et al., *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR*, t. 1 (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo Akademii nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1957): 303. Though Basin criticized that the relations between Wali and the Qing shown in *History of Kazakh SSR* (1957 edition) was not truth, the event I presented here really happened. See V.Ia. Basin, *Rossiiia i kazakhskie khanstva v XVI–XVIII vv.: Kazakhstan v sisteme vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii* (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo "Nauka" Kazakhskoi SSR, 1971): 244.
- 115 I.P. Shangin, *Dnevnye zapiski v kantseliarii Kolyvano-Voskresenskogo gornogo nachal'stva o puteshestvii po Kirgiz-kaisatskoi stepi* (Barnaul: Az Buka, 2003): 134. He wrote that the succession of Wali aroused much opposition due to his mother's non-Kazakh origins, see Shangin, *Dnevnye zapiski*: 133.
- 116 M.K. Kozybaev, et al. eds., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Almaty: Atamūra, 2000): 274.
- 117 A. Levshin, *Opisanie kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili kirgiz-kaisatskikh ord i stepei* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996): 283.
- 118 6.28.1821, from Kaptsevich to Nessel'rode, VPR 12: 661. The seal usually used by Ghubaidulla is inscribed as following: "Ghubaidulla *khan*, the son of Wali khan." This shows that Ghubaidulla had a clear desire to inherit the khan title, see Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents*: 143. Adil, the son of Ablai, leading the clans of the Great Juz, called himself *khan* in his seal, see the seal of Adil's son, VPR 13: 46.

Governor of Siberia, to put off the selection of a new khan for the time being.¹¹⁹ From this point forward, a new system of governance was instituted for the Middle Juz and the Russians never recognized another khan. This development will be considered in the next section.

Partly due to a lack of pertinent materials, it is difficult to consider what the title khan meant to the Kazakh people. It is possible to establish from usage within their correspondence to the Russians that the expression they used for the khan rank themselves was “*hānliq*.” For example, regarding the Russian recognition of Wali’s position as khan, there is a document that states “he ascended to the rank of khan (*hānliq martabasına bolğan*) by appointment of the emperor”.¹²⁰ An 1819 petition from Shirghazi of the Small Juz also uses the same term in reference to his own position or “*hānliq daraja* (rank of khan).”¹²¹ Judging from these few examples, it seems clear that the Kazakhs placed little emphasis on whether “khan” referred to a particular post and simply emphasized its use as a title and specific rank (*hānliq*). Within Russia, however, “khan” was considered to be a particular post to which they themselves made appointment. This gap in Kazakh and Russian perceptions is likely one cause behind the issue of Russian interference in the bestowing of titles by the Qing which will be considered in chapter 5.

A general overview of the history of the khan rank within the Small Juz should also be given here. As previously mentioned, unification of the entire Kazakh Khanates had already been lost, but it appears that a certain level of communal spirit was maintained through khan family marriages and the sharing of information.¹²² Even so, the Pugachev rebellion (1773–1775) occurred during the reign of Abulkhair’s successor Nurali and was followed by the Sirimbatir rebellion (1783–1797) – two events that ushered in a period of instability within the Small Juz. The elders of the Small Juz demanded Nurali’s abdication

119 VPR 12: 282.

120 It is assumed to be in 1788, IAOO: f. 1, op. 1, d. 249, l. 133ob.

121 Sep. 1819, petition from Shirghazi khan and others to College of Foreign Affairs, MIKSSR: 331.

122 Wali of the Middle Juz supported the movement of sultans of the Small Juz regarding restoration of the khan rank, see document from Igel’strom to Wali, no later than 12.16.1787, MIKSSR: 102. On the other hand, Russians adopted clearly unique policies for each Juz. This is shown by the wording of Igel’strom to Wali, “You are only admitted by the Emperor the right of supervision over the Middle Juz, and the affairs in the Small Juz is not related with you.” Moreover, Igel’strom planned the division of the territory of the Small Juz into three parts, see G. Surutangarieva [Sultangalieva], “Minami uraru to nishi kazafusutan no churukukei shominzoku nitaisuru roshia teikoku no seisaku no dōjisei (18–19 seiki zenhan),” *Roshiashi kenkyū* 82 (2008): 67. See also chapter 4.

in 1785¹²³ and, when this request was approved by Ekaterina II, Nurali was sent to Ufa to live in a state of confinement. Another khan was subsequently appointed for the Small Juz but frequent changes soon followed.¹²⁴ The *khan-skii sovet* (Khan Advisory Board) was established in 1797 and went on to limit the authority of the khans.¹²⁵ In addition, sometime before or after 1815, khans like Aringhazi who were recognized by Khiva appeared, further contributing to an overabundance of khans.¹²⁶

In 1801, the Bokei (Bukey) Orda was established between the Ural and Volga rivers. This has been interpreted as a return to a suggestion of Igel'strom, the Governor of Orenburg, who had hoped to divide the Small Juz into a number of political units.¹²⁷ Nurali's son Bokei became the khan over this region and was officially recognized by the Russians in 1812. This particular khan lineage continued thereafter until the death of Jangir in 1845. However, there can be no doubt that this region was completely subject to the Russian Empire.

It was during this period that the "Draft regulation regarding the *Orenburg Kirgiz*" were submitted in 1822 and subsequently (1824) organized into the "Official Opinion of the Asiatic Committee Regarding Governmental Reorganization of the Orenburg District." In this way, the khan rank was eliminated from the Small Juz in much the same way that it had been removed from the Middle Juz.¹²⁸ The last khan Shirghazi, however, continued to use the khan title for himself post-reorganization. Other members of various Kazakh khan clans like Jangir, the khan of the Bokei Orda mentioned above, also continued to use the khan title post-1824 and Kenesari, famous for leading particularly

123 M.K. Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei v piati tomakh*: 227.

124 For the subsequent succession of the khan rank, see Erofeeva, "Kazakhskie khany v khanskii dinastii v XVIII – seredine XIX vv."; Bykov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii khanskoi vlasti u kazakhov mladshogo zhuza."

125 E.A. Abil', *Istoriia gosudarstva i prava Kazakhstana* (Karaganda: "Uchebnaia kniga", 2005): 145–146. In 1806, the new regulation was established, and this organization moved under the control of College of Foreign Affairs, КРО 2: 166–167.

126 Bykov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii khanskoi vlasti u kazakhov mladshogo zhuza": 15.

127 Bykov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii khanskoi vlasti u kazakhov mladshogo zhuza": 15.

128 According to Bykov, this "draft regulation" referred to the elimination of the khan rank as an official title, Bykov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii khanskoi vlasti u kazakhov mladshogo zhuza": 17. The same Bykov pointed out that the elimination of the khan rank within the Small and Middle juz occurred simultaneously, see Bykov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii khanskoi vlasti u kazakhov mladshogo zhuza": 19; Bykov, "Khanskaia vlast' u kazakhov": 145. Nevertheless, in my view, for the case of the Middle Juz, the factor of the titles given by the Qing Dynasty also has to be considered. This point will be discussed in chapter 5.

the Middle Juz in an uprising against the Russians, is known as the last Kazakh khan.¹²⁹

Within this section we have used an examination of the khan title as a way to describe how the Russian Empire's influence over the Middle Juz expanded while also touching on the relationship between Russia and the Small Juz. It is clear that the relationship with the Russians differed among the various Juz, yet, within the Middle Juz, relationships with the Qing must be interpreted as the main factor affecting their diplomacy with Russia. The next section will seek to outline how the Russian Empire introduced a new form of administration (in other words, the Russian political system) once it had abolished the title of khan.

3 Establishment of the 1822 Regulation within the Middle Juz

3.1 *The 1822 Regulation and the Development of a System of Administrative Districts*¹³⁰

In order to understand the new systems introduced into Siberia, it is necessary to first touch on the administrative reforms that formed their background and were initiated by Speranskii, who became the Governor-General of Siberia in 1819. It was during this period that the policies of the Russian Empire, which had gradually been increasing pressure on the Kazakh Khanates since the end of the eighteenth century were suddenly intensified. Speranskii is known for having worked toward the establishment of a constitutional monarchy during the period of liberalism under Alexander I,¹³¹ but, after his fall, Speranskii became involved with frontier governmental issues.

During that same year of 1819, both an Asiatic Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an Asiatic Committee under the triple jurisdic-

129 H. Sakai, "Eiyūjōjishi ga tsutaeru 'kenesaru hanran,'" *Isuramu sekai* 44 (1994): 41; Erofeeva, "Kazakhskie khany v khanskie dinastii v XVIII – seredine XIX vv."

130 For the existing research on the ruling system of the nineteenth century Siberia, see E. Bekmakhanov, *Kazakhstan v 20–40 gody XIX veka* (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe ob"edinennoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1947); Zimanov, *Politicheskii stroi Kazakhstana*; E.V. Bezikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika rossiiskoi imperii v stepnykh oblastiakh zapadnoi sibiri v 20–60-kh gg. XIX v.* (Omsk: izd-vo Omskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 2005); Abil', *Istoriia gosudarstva i prava Kazakhstana*. For the recent study, see D.V. Vasil'ev, *Rossii i Kazakhskaia step': administrativnaia politika i status okrainy XVIII – pervaiia polovina XIX veka* (Moscow: Politicheskaiia entsiklopediia, 2014).

131 T. Yamamoto, *Arekusandoru i sei jidaishi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Waseda daigaku shuppanbu, 1987); M. Raeff, *Siberia and the Reforms of 1822* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956): 112.

tion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and the Military Ministry were established. Kazakh issues came to be dealt with by these two entities.¹³² After Speranskii returned to Petersburg from a Siberian tour of inspection, a Siberian Committee¹³³ (the first of which lasted until 1838) was established on 21 June 1821 to consider his proposals.

According to ten regulations issued on 22 June 1822 (generally referred to as the "legislation [*uchrezhdenie*] for the Siberian provinces"), Siberia was divided into eastern and western areas with the Governor-Generalship of Western Siberia to be located in Tobol'sk. It seems likely that this division of Siberia into two regions was a response to earlier discussions regarding the need to lighten the burden of the single Governor who ruled over the entirety of Siberia. The territory of the newly created Governor-Generalship of Western Siberia,¹³⁴ an example of imperial Russian frontier control organization along the lines of Caucasus and Warsaw, included both Tobol'sk and Tomsk governorates as well as the province of Omsk. The governing bodies of Omsk province, under whose jurisdiction the Kazakhs fell, comprised of the chief (a combination of Civil governor and commander of the Siberian Cossack Corps); the provincial council (attended by not only the head of the civil affairs agency, but also the *ataman* of Cossack, the commander of the mining corps, and the *ober-auditor*, or head prosecutor); the provincial administrative office (the executive and tax offices); and the provincial court.¹³⁵ As can be seen in fig. 4, administrative Districts related to the Kazakhs came under the jurisdiction of Omsk province and issues were dealt with as appropriate by the council of GUZS (*Glavnoe upravlenie Zapadnoi Sibiri*, "Head Administrative Office of Western Siberia") which dealt with the entire Governor-Generalship, the Omsk provincial council, and other District councils.¹³⁶

132 N.S. Kiniapina et al. eds., *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii: vtoraiia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX v.* (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1984): 217; A.V. Remnev, *Samoderzhavie i Sibir': administrativnaia politika v pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Omsk: Izd-vo Omskogo universiteta, 1995): 72.

133 Remnev, *Samoderzhavie i Sibir'*: 77. Here, the Foreign minister and others were also included.

134 For the Russian governor-generalships, see K. Matsuzato, "General-gubernatorstva v Rossiiskoi imperii: ot etnicheskogo k prostranstvennomu podkhodu," in I. Gerasimov et al. eds., *Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva* (Kazan': Tsentr issledovani natsionalizma i imperii, 2004): 437–444.

135 Remnev, *Samoderzhavie i Sibir'*: 86.

136 For the administrative units in Western Siberia, see Remnev, *Samoderzhavie i Sibir'*: 83. Executive, legal, and financial departments within the Secretariat of the Provincial Head




FIGURE 4 Administrative units under the Western Siberian Governor-Generalship

However, reorganization in 1838 led to the abolition of Omsk province itself and the establishment of the *Pogranichnoe upravlenie*, or “Frontier Administration.”¹³⁷ Omsk and Petropavlovsk were shifted to the Tobol'sk governorate while Semipalatinsk (Today's Semei) and Ust' Kamenogorsk (Öskemen) were added to the Tomsk governorate.

Returning our attention to 1822, it was decided that the nomadic Kazakhs of the Middle Juz would be placed under the control of Omsk province by two statutes promulgated on the same day as the other new pieces of Siberian legislation: the Regulations “Regarding the administration of *inorodtsy* (Heterogeneous Peoples)” and “Regarding the administration of *Sibirskie Kirgizy*.” The latter will be referred to below as the “1822 Regulation.”¹³⁸ The

administrative office were respectively under the supervision of the Ministries of the Inner affairs, Justice, and Finance.

¹³⁷ MIPSK: 176. The chief of Frontier Administration had concentrated authorities for the response to anti-Russian movements, see Abil', *Istoriia gosudarstva i prava Kazakhstana*: 157. Official establishment of Frontier Administration was on 1.10.1839, see Bezvikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika Rossiiskoi imperii*: 142.

¹³⁸ Articles of the Regulation are known in MIPSK: 93–109. The following citation is according to texts on MIPSK.

term *Sibirskie Kirgizy* (Siberian Kazakhs) was used to refer to Kazakhs under the rule of the Governor-Generalship of Western Siberia¹³⁹ while Kazakhs under the rule of the Orenburg governorate were known as the *Orenburg Kirgiz*.

With the introduction of these new laws the Kazakhs and other non-Russian populations of Siberia were integrated into the Russian legal system as *inorodets* (“another genus,” or non-Russian and non-Slav people in this context), a new category that was established to replace that of *inoverets* (“infidels”).¹⁴⁰ In this way, the Kazakhs were subsumed into the Russian Empire even as a nomadic group of *inorodets*.

With these regulations, Russia aimed to partition the nomadic lands of the Middle Juz into separate administrative Districts, each represented by the newly created post of *Agha-sultan* (Ru. *Starshii sultan*, meaning “senior sultan”). As evidenced by a later comment of Bronevskii, the chief of Omsk province from 1827–1835, that the partitioning had brought “desirable civilization” (*zhelannaiia tsivilizatsiia*) to the Kazakhs,¹⁴¹ the purpose of Speranskii’s various reforms was to lead the native populations of Siberia (including the Kazakhs) toward a higher Russian-like order of “civilization.”¹⁴² This attitude can be interpreted as one result of Russian’s having been influenced by European secular Enlightenment thought.¹⁴³ At least regarding the Kazakhs, the 1822 Regulation can be seen as a way to eliminate un-Russian elements of older traditions like the rank of khan.

Attention will be turned here to an examination of the governing style exhibited by the partitioned Districts and District offices based on the 1822 Regulation – a system that was to last until 1854.¹⁴⁴ We have already seen how the title of khan was abolished with the enactment of the 1822 Regulation. The

139 Draft regulation regarding the *Orenburg Kirgiz* of 1822 was admitted in 1824, which resulted in the division of the territory of the Small Juz into the three parts. Each part had a sultan-administrator (*sultan-pravitel'*).

140 A.Iu. Bykov, “Proekty i reformy N.S. Mordvinova i M.M. Speranskogo po upravleniiu Kazakhstanom v nachale XIX veka,” in B.A. Moiseev & O.V. Boronin eds., *Vostokovednye issledovaniia na Altae*, vypusk III (Barnaul, 2002): 55–70.

141 Bykov, “Proekty i reformy N.S. Mordvinova i M.M. Speranskogo”: 67.

142 A. Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: a multiethnic history* (transl. by Alfred Clayton) (Harlow: Longman, 2001): 169 and 189.

143 K. Matsuzato, “Kyōkai chiiki kara sekai teikoku e: buriten, roshia, shin,” in *Yūrashia: tei-koku no tairiku* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008): 56.

144 Regulations of the Siberian Committee in 1854 which decided to adopt the Russian imperial law on the Kazakhs in Siberia can be considered the turning point. For the 1854 Regulations, see MIPSK: 183.

reason given for this abolition was simply to “return the Kazakhs to a state of peace, satisfaction, and perfect happiness.” It is worth noting that the Kazakh sultans were presented as having shown agreement after having read the Kazakh language version of the Regulation when they were enacted.¹⁴⁵

The following quote describes the ceremony pertaining to the establishment of the Kokchetau District in 1824:

... First, the Agha-sultan (and its candidates), the delegates (and their candidates), and the *volost'* sultans were selected. Following this, the mullah, the newly selected sultans, the *bis*, and the Kazakh people, gathered on a carpet spread in front of the District administrative office and, following the dictates of their faith and laws, knelt before the omnipotent god who is the source of all happiness. ... After the mullah had finished praying, all of the sultans, elders and *bis*, together with the entire gathered Kazakh people, made their oath of allegiance in the prescribed manner before the Quran (*al-koran*) and in accordance to their traditions. The elected Agha-sultan, delegates, candidates and *volost'* sultans took a further oath to render loyal service (*vernost' sluzhby*). The mullah read aloud the Kazakh translation of the oath (*akt kliatvennogo obeshchaniia*) that had been drafted in Russian.¹⁴⁶

As described above, every newly elected official from the rank of Agha-sultan down was compelled to re-proclaim their oath of fealty to the Russian emperor in front of the general public. Due to the lack of such older ceremonies as the coronation of the khan with him sit upon a carpet,¹⁴⁷ the gathered masses can be expected to have realized that something different from the normal coronation of a khan was taking place. As we will see below, the status of the Agha-sultan was not only non-hereditary, but its authority was limited by the assistance they received from the Russian delegates.

It is certain that during the 1820s one sultan after another requested the establishment of administrative Districts, but, as noted by N. Aristov,¹⁴⁸ it is difficult to interpret this as the will of the Kazakh people themselves and there

145 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 476, ll. 1 and 9. Negative Russian opinions regarding the khan title will be further examined in chapter 5.

146 Report to chief of Omsk province, Bronevskii, 4.30.1824, KRO 2: 212.

147 I will consider the example of the ceremony in the eighteenth century in chapter 5.

148 In Aristov's view, the introduction of the 1822 Regulation was against the will of the majority of Kazakhs, in spite of the demands of the sultans. Moreover, he regards that even the sultans were pressured by Russian authorities to express their request regarding the new governmental system, N.A. Aristov, *Usuni i kyrgyzy ili kara-kyrgyzy: ocherki istorii*

are also examples of sultans raising their voices in objection.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Districts were not established at the same time as the proclamation of the 1822 Regulation. Plans were gradually instituted following the dissemination of such governmental intentions as those embodied by Governor-General Kaptsevich's proclamation of 7 Jan. 1824 prohibiting "barbarous acts" like the practice of plunder – an act that was well-established within Kazakh society – and encouraging the development of "peace and happiness" among the Kazakhs.¹⁵⁰

It should be stressed here how, when establishing the early administrative Districts, the Western Siberian authorities followed a policy of separating the Wali and Bokei families that had theretofore produced numerous khans. Regarding the Karkarali District, it was decided that it "be composed of the *volost'* previously under the jurisdiction of the late Bokei khan."¹⁵¹ Meanwhile, the Kokchetau District "was established through a great meeting of the sultans, elders and bis of the clans [*rod*] that followed the House of Wali: the Atighai, Kerei, Qipshaq, Kanjighali and a part of the Qaraul."¹⁵² This shows how, even while having abolished the title of khan, the Russians did show some consideration for the traditional Kazakh schemes of authority.

Even if his power was largely of a nominal nature, what roll did the Agha-sultan play within these newly established administrative Districts? The post of Agha-sultan was filled by electing a Chinggisid sultan (*töre*) for a term of three years. The rank of sultan was a hereditary position. Furthermore, the Agha-sultan was considered to be local officer with the rank of major.¹⁵³ Two Russian delegates were appointed by the provincial chief to serve as assistants to the Agha-sultan and a further two Kazakh delegates were appointed by a council of *bis*. In either case, the assistants were appointed for a term of two years. According to a passage from the previously-mentioned work of Qurbān 'alī, the position of Agha-sultan was comparable among the Kazakhs to the older title of khan. He states regarding the Ayaguz District that "in the Kazakh

i byta naseleniia zapadnogo Tian'-Shania i issledovaniia po ego istoricheskoi geografii (Bishkek: Fond "Soros-Kyrgyzstan", 2001): 479.

149 For example, the younger brother of Wali khan, Qasim sultan opposed the district system. This issue will be discussed in chapter 7.

150 KRO 2: 207–209.

151 Instruction of Bronevskii to the Karkarali District office, 4.11.1824, MIPSK: 113. This also mentioned that the upper limit of the population of the District was 20,000 households or 60,000 male persons.

152 Proposal of Bronevskii to the provincial office, 4.30.1824, MIPSK: 136.

153 N.E. Bekmakhanova, "Tsarskoe pravitel'stvo i institut sultana Srednego zhuza v XIX v.," *Izvestiia AN Kaz. SSR, Ser. Obshchestvennykh nauk* 2 (1968): 37.

language, ‘Agha-sultan’ are called ‘khan’ and ‘*zasedatel’* (delegate)’ are referred to as ‘*qādī*.’¹⁵⁴ Under the Agha-sultan, the leaders of each *volost’* composing a District were chosen from among the sultans and known as *volost’* sultans.

It thus seems that the Kazakh khan lineage was able to maintain some of its authority post-1822. Even so, when the representatives of both the Karkarali and Kokchetau Districts went to the capital city of Petersburg to inquire regarding the possibility of raising the position of Agha-sultan to that of khan and the possibility of attaining tax exemptions, they were told by the Russian government that “the rank of khan had ceased to exist and no one could possess it.”¹⁵⁵ The Russian position seems to have been to consistently limit the authority of the sultans. Although the leaders of each *volost’* composing a District were chosen from among the sultans (and known as *volost’* sultans) it is also clear that the number chosen from the khan lineage was decreasing.¹⁵⁶ The Russian attitude regarding the khan lineage and the limiting of their power will be further discussed in chapters five and seven.

Although a five year period of exemption was granted, the Russians did eventually collect the *yasak* tax – specified as one percent of the total livestock owned by each individual *kibitka* (the Russian term for the tents in which nomadic families lived).¹⁵⁷ The fact that travel across District borders was forbidden¹⁵⁸ also indicates the degree to which the Kazakhs were being incorporated into the Russian Empire.

Within the Regulation, administrative Districts to be created in the future were specified as “Frontier Districts” – demonstrating how the 1822 Regulation was already training an eye on the nomadic Kazakh lands bordering the Qing.

154 THS: 375. The same page told, “he [Agha-sultan] was entrusted with all happening among the people” (*il ičinde olan har vuqū’ātī bunlara tafvīz edib*).

155 Director of Asiatic Department of Foreign Ministry, Rodofinikin, to Governor-General, Vel’iaminov, 6.6.1830, IKRI 8–1: 29–30 (TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 410, ll. 229–231ob.). The Agha-sultans at that time were Tursun Chingisov and Ablai Ghabbasov.

156 According to the decision of the provincial council on 5.23.1860, when the Districts (Baianaul, Karkarali, Akmola, Kokchetau, Amankaragai, and Uchbulak) were established, the number of the *volost’* sultan is 43 Chinggisid sultans and 44 non-Chinggisid. Later, in 1860, 11 Chinggisid and 62 non-Chinggisid, MIPSK: 187–190. For detail information (influential persons, their livestock and pasturelands) on Districts, see IKRI 8–1.

157 R.B. Suleimenov, & V.Ia. Basin, *Kazakhstan v sostave Rossii v XVIII – nachale XX veka* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1981): 120. According to the law dated 5.20.1831, the *yasak* payment by direct descendants of Wali and Bokei was reduced to some extent after the 5 years tax exemption. Nevertheless, the privileges of khan aristocrats were gradually restricted, see S. Eshmukhambetov & S. Zhekeev, *Iz istorii kazakhov* (Almaty: Jalın, 1999): 464.

158 78 article of the 1822 Regulation prohibits Kazakh nomads to cross the border of Districts.

As will be considered in detail in chapter 6, a great number of caravans traversed the areas of Western Siberia and Xinjiang during this period. It must be stated that one reason for the establishment of the administrative Districts was to help prevent the plunders, which actually increased during the 1830s and 1840s, by Kazakhs of caravans travelling between Russian and Qing China.¹⁵⁹

Following the establishment of the administrative Districts of Karkarali and Kokchetau in 1824, further Districts were established one after another in Ayaguz (1831),¹⁶⁰ Akmola (1832); Baianaul and Uchbulak (1833); and, finally, Amankaragai (1834)¹⁶¹ and Kokpekti (1844).¹⁶²

According to the dictates of the Regulation, each District was composed of fifteen to twenty *volost'*, which in turn were composed of ten to twelve *aul*. Finally, each *aul* contained fifty to seventy *kibitka* (tents). Please refer to map 5 and table 1 for details regarding the District borders and the scale of each administrative unit.

Steps were also taken toward the establishment of administrative Districts in areas of the Great Juz that were located farther south of Russian fortified lines, but these plans could not be immediately realized. During the 1840s, negotiations were held by the Russians and the Qing regarding the pasturelands of the Great Juz, but this topic will be discussed further in chapter 7. Brief mention should be made here, however, regarding the background of these negotiations and the reasons behind the failure to quickly establish administrative Districts within that area.

The first approach made to the Russians by a sultan of the Great Juz was made by Ablai's son Siuk sultan in 1818. When the issue of the establishment of administrative District among the Great Juz was debated in 1831, Siuk's earlier behavior was summarized as follows:


The Great Juz of the *Kirgiz-Kaisak* (Kazakhs), suffering from internal trouble, has long sought for Russian protection. The sultans, bis and

¹⁵⁹ TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, l. 500b.

¹⁶⁰ For the relations between the District's establishment and Russian policy toward the Qing, see J. Noda, "Roshin kankei jō no kazafusutan: 119–133.

¹⁶¹ Moved to Kushmurun in 1843, Bezvikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika*: 96.

¹⁶² Official establishment was in 1844, Eshmukhambetov & Zhekeev, *Iz istorii kazakhov*: 471. However, it functioned in reality as early as at the early 1830s. We can find the "Kokpekti District" mentioned in archival documents. See document from Vel'iaminov to Dosan sultan of "Kokpekti District," 8.2.1834, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1349. l. 15.



MAP 5 *The administrative Districts within the Middle Juz*¹⁶³

TABLE 1 *Scale and population of Districts*¹⁶⁴

Districts	Volost' in 1839	Volost' in 1851	Aul in 1839	Aul in 1851	Household or kibitka in 1839	Household or kibitka in 1851
Karkarali	17	18	419	147	22,864	18,325
Kokchetau	10	14	144	167	8,778	11,147
Ayaguz	13	12	2,964	118	15,057	16,808
Akmolinsk	15	20	118	212	6,655	15,007
Baianaul	12	14	791	149	18,132	11,819
Kokpekti		15		106		15,508
Uchbulak	11		300		15,019	
Amankaragai	33		188		11,049	
Kushmurun		5		63		4,385

elders voluntarily pledged their loyalty as subjects in 1818.¹⁶⁵ At the time of the promulgation of Regulation on behalf of the Siberian Kazakhs in 1822, inquiries were quickly received about the possibility of establishing administrative Districts within that land [the Great Juz] as well. Requests

¹⁶³ Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*: 301.

¹⁶⁴ Zimanov, *Politicheskii stroi Kazakhstana*: 166

¹⁶⁵ The text of the oath by Siuk is reproduced, VPR 10: 555–562.

were also made for the dispatching of troops. The purpose behind these requests was to reestablish *tishina* (peace) within the Juz.¹⁶⁶

As described here, following the petition for Russian subject status, Siuk went on to request the establishment of administrative Districts in 1824. Troops were dispatched in an effort to verify the petition, but this later led to problems between the Russians and the Qing. In the end, Russia prioritized its relationship with the Qing and denied Siuk's requests. Because these issues are related to Russian-Qing negotiations, the details will be presented in section two of chapter 7.

Following the example of Siuk, the children of Adil (another of Ablai's sons) also submitted oaths of loyalty as petitions for subject status in 1823.¹⁶⁷ However, the Governor-General of Western Siberia refused to recognize the petitions on the grounds that the pasturelands involved partially bordered the Qing. Furthermore, the applicants were not only respected among the Kazakhs but had also received good treatment at the hands of the Qing government.¹⁶⁸ As a result, although troops were again dispatched to verify the petitions as in the case of Siuk, it is clear that the Russians were acting with caution. Subsequent requests by other sultans for Russian subject status were quietly recognized, but no mention was made regarding the establishment of administrative Districts.¹⁶⁹ In these cases as well, the Russians were obviously acting with the Qing in mind.

Returning our attention to the Middle Juz, the establishment of administrative District offices within each District should be noted. These offices were known as *prikaz* in Russian and as *divan* in Turkic. The Kazakhstani researcher Abil' has briefly outlined the roles they played (according to article 62 of the 1822 Regulation) as follows:¹⁷⁰

1. The enforcement of tax collection.
2. The gathering of information regarding population, livestock amounts, areas of cultivated land, and amounts of foreign trade.
3. The preparation of reports for higher organizations regarding administrative activities.

166 Vel'iaminov, commander of Corps in Tobol'sk to Foreign minister, Nessel'rode, 5.23.1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17677, l. 20.

167 VPR 13: 45.

168 Governor-General Kaptsevich to Nessel'rode, 2.10.1823, VPR 13: 49–50; KRO 2: 204–205.

169 Edict to sons of Adil, 5.13.1824, KRO 2: 214.

170 Abil', *Istoriia gosudarstva i prava Kazakhstana*: 111.

4. The formation of corps to punish *aul* (village) refusing to submit to Russian authority.
5. The maintaining of order within the District.

In regards to number five above, it should be noted that the District offices also served as judicial agencies (1822 Regulation, article 22). Within clause 56 of the Regulation, the maintenance of peace and order is clearly mentioned to be one role of the Agha-sultans. Furthermore, the conducting of initial investigations in the event of criminal cases is also outlined as a role of the government offices by clause 210. There is no mistaking the fact that the District offices played a major role in legal proceedings, but historical sources regarding judicial process are few, making this a topic that requires further research in the future.

Bezvikonnaia, seeking to locate the rule of the Kazakh Steppe area of Western Siberia within the framework of imperial Russian rule, interprets the administrative Districts as a transitional phase in the process of dividing and organizing Western Siberia into governorates. Bezvikonnaia also sees the Districts as having limited Kazakh pasturelands, strengthened the political authority of Kazakh clan aristocrats, and lead to the permanent stationing of Cossack military units. The District system had a large impact on social life on the Kazakh Steppe, eventually even contributing to the rise of various social movements.¹⁷¹ Although examinations of Kazakh and Russian perceptions can lead to multiple interpretations, the District offices clearly came to serve a role in support of Russian imperial rule. Kazakh reactions to the administrative District system will be examined again in chapters five and seven.

3.2 *The Transformation of District Borders into National Borders*

3.2.1 The Limits of Administrative District Jurisdiction

From the Russian point of view, the development of the administrative District system was a process intended to incorporate the Kazakhs into the empire. Let us first consider what belonging to a given administrative District meant for the Kazakhs.

Oaths taken during District establishment ceremonies can be seen as having imbued the introduction of imperial rule with symbolic meaning. An 1833 document presented to the Russian authorities by sultans directly following the establishment of the Uchbulak District contains the following passage:

¹⁷¹ Bezvikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika*: 71 and 93.

We made our oath (*qasam qilduq*) to the newly established District office of the Uchbulak administrative District. The *toi* and *baiga*¹⁷²... you held were thoroughly enjoyable. We will follow the laws (*nāzām*) given to us, the Middle Juz of the Kazakhs, and will gladly pay the taxes (*zakāt*) imposed upon us. We have understood each and every law to the best of our ability (*hāl qaderinjä*).¹⁷³

While clearly of a formal nature, this document does illustrate how being incorporated into the administrative District meant adhering to the “law” (the 1822 Regulation) and accepting the responsibility to pay the *yasak* taxes. Within a later document related to the Kokpekti District, we can find a similarly clear statement that “having become subjects of the Russian empire, the Kazakhs of the Kokpekti District will follow the implications of Russian legislation.”¹⁷⁴

In this way, the possession of pasturelands within an administrative District implied adherence to Russian laws. Of course, this also implied that Russian laws were not applicable beyond District borders. This fact was particularly pertinent when said borders were adjacent to the Qing Dynasty.¹⁷⁵ An episode regarding a portion of the Naiman clan (of the Middle Juz) that escaped from the Ayaguz District into the nomadic domain (located within neighboring Qing territory) of Sibanqul sultan, who had received the title of *taiji* from the Qing, is illustrative of this point.

Within Russia, Sibanqul was expected to be a “loyal subject of Russia.”¹⁷⁶ While some reservations must be held when considering Russian sources on Sibanqul, there are statements such as the following that demonstrate a Russian awareness of the limits of Russian authority once a subject had passed over the Ayaguz District border into Qing territory: “Due to his having presented them with tribute, [Sibanqul’s] right to travel nomadically within the Qing territory was recognized by the councilor (*Anban*) of Tarbagatai. Sibanqul is confident that he will not be pursued by Russian forces and that the Qing

172 Their meanings are “party” and “horserace” respectively.

173 Kazakh sultans addressed to Shubin, commander of the Petropavlovsk fortress, 8.27.1833, IAOO, f. 3, op. 12, d. 17684, ll. 109–109ob.

174 Discussion of council of Siberian Kirgiz Frontier administration, 11.1.1839, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1349, l. 69ob.

175 As the next case shows, because the Qing law was adopted within the Qing territory, some left the Qing into Russian territory. See also chapter 7.

176 Report from Cossack lieutenant Maslasov to Ayaguz District office, 3.15.1835, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, l. 31.

government will not consent to his extradition.”¹⁷⁷ Similarly, Russian documents describe the Kazakhs of the Nazar branch of the Naiman clan who crossed over to join Sibanqul as “believing that the Russian government cannot apprehend them within Qing territory” and states that they were therefore “unafraid of Russian forces.”¹⁷⁸ Information from an indigenous people from Tashkent, confirms that “the Kazakhs travelling within Qing territory have, on several occasions, stolen cattle from Russian subjects, but no one could follow them into Qing territory (*cherta*)” and even states that “it was forbidden to pursue them.”¹⁷⁹

Regarding this problem, a document sent from the Administrative office of Omsk Province to the Governor-General of Western Siberia states that “Because they have entered Qing territory, we have no authority to carry out instructions that might lead to a breach of peace treaties and friendly relations with our ally [the Qing].” For this reason, it was decided to consider the propriety of entering negotiations with the Qing and demanding that Tarbagatai’s minister repatriate the escaped Kazakhs.¹⁸⁰ Although it is difficult to believe that such negotiations ever took place, this example does underscore that, not only the Russians but the Kazakhs as well, were aware of the limits of Russian law when applied to the issue of escaping over administrative District borders.

3.2.2 Kazakhs Who Followed the Qing

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Qing came to view their connection with the Kazakhs as an ‘official’ relationship. However, the Russians still considered Qing relationships with the Kazakhs to be of only a formal nature. In eastern areas, the Kazakhs travelled nomadically on lands claimed by the Qing, but in such instances they paid a tax of one percent of their livestock to the dynasty.¹⁸¹ Sivers, who conducted investigations during the late eighteenth century, wrote in 1793 that “this tribute is merely a symbolic gesture of loyalty to the Qing emperor.”¹⁸² Andreev, who was working for the Siberian

177 Delegate Nazarov to Ayaguz District office, 4.1.1835, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, ll. 29–30. For crossing over the border by Sibanqul himself, see chapter 7.

178 IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, ll. 31–32.

179 Information of the Tashkenti, Auchu, 4.9.1835, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, l. 490b. About Auchu, see also N. Konshin, “Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: VI. K istorii otkrytie Kokpektinskogo okruga,” *Zapiski Semipalatinskogo Podotdela zapadno-sibirskogo otdela Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, vyp. 2 (Semipalatinsk, 1905): 11.

180 Report from Omsk provincial office, 4.23.1835, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, ll. 18–22.

181 Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku”: 32.

182 I. Fal’k, *Opisanie vsekh natsional’nostei Rossii* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1999): 82.

fortified line at this time, maintains that the dispatching of Kazakh missions to the Qing “had no other reason than to seek a reward.”¹⁸³

However, as we have seen above, while the incorporation of Kazakh pasturelands into administrative Districts under Russian rule did serve to raise awareness among the Kazakhs that they were Russian subjects, it also had the effect of clarifying which Kazakhs were unwilling to follow the Russians. As a result, sultans and the Kazakhs below them who did have a relationship with the Qing began to actively consider themselves to be Qing subjects.

The previously mentioned Sibanqul sultan is said to have believed that the Nazar branch of Kazakhs who joined him “did not consider themselves to be subjects of Russia but of the Qing and therefore under the rule of the Qing *wang* (Ch. *wang*) Jankhoja (Sibanqul’s older brother) upon whose order they relocated from Russian lands.”¹⁸⁴ In other words, the Nazar Kazakhs serving under a sultan who had received the title of *wang* by the Qing could be considered Qing subjects. Bezvikonnaia has examined the relationship between the areas that fell under the jurisdiction of Russian law and the Qing national borders.¹⁸⁵ However, since she fails to address the issue of laws on the Qing side, there are debatable points within her arguments.

Let us examine the degree to which the laws of both empires extended by reviewing an example related to judicial administration. A report addressed to the chief of Omsk province in 1838 details how 1500 troops were dispatched from the Mongolian city of Khobdo in order to expel a group of Kerei branch Kazakhs that had been pillaging within Qing territory from the Qara Irtysh River basin.¹⁸⁶ During this action twenty-nine Kazakhs were killed. In addition, Aji sultan received reports that the Tarbagatai’s Commandant (*lingdui dachen*) was coming to Kerei pasturelands in order to apprehend seventeen Kazakhs and one sultan who were suspected of having participated in raids against Qing subjects.¹⁸⁷ Although the Kerei Kazakhs agreed to pay compensation, they refused to hand the sultans over to the Qing. This was done “out of fear that the Qing officials would execute them.”¹⁸⁸

183 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 43.

184 Information (dated 3.31.1835) contained in the report by Maslasov, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, l. 26.

185 Bezvikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika*: 129.

186 The most upper area of the Irtysh River beyond the Lake Zaisan.

187 Report from Portniagin, Cossack lieutenant of the army at Kokpekti, to chief of Omsk province, Talyzin, 12.3.1838, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 166, ll. 9–100b. Aji was a grandson of Abulfeiz of the Middle Juz and leading the Kerei clan.

188 Report by Portniagin, 12.10.1838, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 166, l. 13.

The Kazakhs were obviously aware that if they committed a crime there was a possibility of execution at the hands of the Qing. As will be examined in chapter 7, the Qing maintained a series of guard posts (Ma. *karun*/Ch. *kalun*) from which they sought to defend the frontier areas. Within Northern Xinjiang, the line connecting the *karun* formed a defensive line against the Russians and nomadic peoples.¹⁸⁹ It is possible to find examples in Qing records of Kazakhs crossing over the *karun* line into Qing territory in order to steal horses that were punished with *Zhengfa* – capital punishment.¹⁹⁰ Although not the most reliable of sources, a secondhand account exists of a Qing government official saying that “corpses were dressed in their clothes and laid out beyond the castle walls so that Kazakhs travelling near the town could see the executed pillagers (*khishnikov*) and be deterred by fear from committing thefts or pillages themselves.”¹⁹¹ Such public warnings likely played a role in raising awareness among the Kazakhs of the possibility of execution.

Russia, on the other hand, went as far as to send a military detachment to Tarbagatai to request the extradition of Kazakhs who had escaped into Qing territory.¹⁹² The reason for this was likely Russian knowledge that they could conduct neither investigations nor trials regarding Kazakhs living under Qing rule – a fact borne out by other matters as well.¹⁹³ Examples do exist of the Qing conducting some repatriations. For example, Qing sources contain a memorial¹⁹⁴ which reports that an Andijan with Russian citizenship was seeking a Kazakh sultan named Qanbar¹⁹⁵ who was responsible for the murder of one of the Andijani’s relatives. Additionally, Russian sources mention that

189 Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku”: 31.

190 DG12 (1832)/9/28 (*renshen*), edict, XZSL vol. 220.

191 Report by Nedorezov to chief of Omsk province, Bronevskii, 12.15.1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, ll. 284–284ob.

192 Chief of Siberian customs district to Financial minister, 1.28.1830, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 38, ll. 6–6ob.

193 Tomsk provincial office to chief of Omsk province, 5.8.1834, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 830, l. 10. Regarding the theft of horses by Kazakhs in Bukhtarma, the Russian authorities expressed the following opinion: “[the Russian side] cannot judge these Kazakhs due to their being under Qing jurisdiction.” Thus, it was reported that the Russian authorities couldn’t get proof regarding the thefts. However, the Chinggistai *karun* of the Qing refused to repatriate accused Kazakhs because they were followers of the Qing Empire, see document from Tomsk provincial office to chief of Omsk province, 9.16.1834, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 830, l. 13.

194 JQ18 (1813)/6/18 (*guichou*), edict, RZSL vol. 270.

195 *Hamuba'er* in Chinese. He was conferred the *taiji* title by the Qing government.

the Qing commandant who captured Qanbar brought him to Russian territory.¹⁹⁶

In this way, the issue of Kazakhs crossing the border occasionally escalated into larger problems between the two empires, including the issue of jurisdiction. It is difficult to determine exactly how the Kazakhs felt about the borders, but, in reference to Sibanqul's nomadic travels within Qing territory, other Kazakh sultans wrote that he "was in the area of the Qing *karun*" (Čürčütning qarayulning üstünde).¹⁹⁷ This statement is one proof of how the Kazakhs recognized the *karun* fortification line as being the border between themselves and the Qing. In addition, a Tatar man who was staying within Kazakh pasturelands referred to the Qing *karun* as "border strongholds" (*čet qarāvulī*).¹⁹⁸ Without the territory of the Qing Dynasty itself the fortification line was clearly seen as a border. In chapter 7, we will further examine these perceptions regarding the Russian-Qing border, particularly emphasizing how they came to be seen as 'national borders.'

3.2.3 The Kazakh Relationship with the Khoqand Khanate (Tashkent)
Turning our attention to the south, a reorganization of political power took place in Mawarannahr between the latter half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. This reorganization contributed to an increase in the strength of the Khoqand Khanate which, after defeating Tashkent in 1810, began to wield influence over the Kazakhs of the Great Juz.¹⁹⁹ As a result, Kazakhs who "followed the Tashkent" (*Taşqan yurtuna qarağan*) began to appear within the historical record.²⁰⁰ The phrase above was used in reference

196 Translation of the report of a Tashkenti, IAOO: f. 6, op. 1, d. 3, l. 90aob. It is true that an official named Jirkangga (Ch. *jierkang'a*) was dispatched. See JQ18/7/16, the memorial of councilor at Tarbagatai, *Qingdai wajiao shiliao*, Jiaqing chao, vol. 4: 14. The Ili military governor at that time, Jinchang was blamed for his dealings with Russia, and was finally dismissed, see T. Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986): 426.

197 Sons of Jochi sultan to the Ayaguz District office, 1.29.1835, IAOO: f. 3.op. 1, d. 1463, l. 70b. Onuma pointed out that the Kazakhs considered the karun line to be a border in accordance with a letter from Bopu sultan to the Tarbagatai Councilor (1788/QL53), in which Kazakhs outside of the karun line requested permission to meet their relatives within the karun line, Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 237–238.

198 A Tatar clerk, Musaghit to Bronevskii, Feb. 1826, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 641, l. 70b.

199 Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana*: 291.

200 A Kazakh bi, Irdas to Karkarali District office, the end of 1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17678, l. 82. See also report from Tursun of Karkarali District to chief of Omsk province, De-sent-Loran, 4.26.1832, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17678, l. 78.

to the Qongrat clan of the Great Juz – a fact that can be determined from details of taxation (called *alim* or *zaqat*) collected from the Kazakhs by the Qoshbegi of Tashkent (ruler of the town). Certain Kazakhs of the Qongrat clan that had already been following Tashkent visited Irdas bi (of the same clan) to request he pay taxes as well. The purpose of this was to “make the Kazakhs into Russian subjects who [would pay] taxes to the Russians” (*Oroslarja qarağan* ...).²⁰¹ This shows how a clear distinction had arisen between those Kazakhs following the Khoqand and those following the Russians. The sultans of the Great Juz repeatedly complained of the pressure they were receiving at the hands of the Khoqand to both Russia and the Qing. Other related matters can help gain a sense of how both empires viewed the Kazakh pasturelands and will consequently be examined more thoroughly in section two of chapter 7.

As I have written elsewhere,²⁰² the establishment in 1831 of the Ayaguz administrative District served as a turning point in Russian-Qing relations by bringing their boundaries together and leading to Russian-Qing negotiations regarding the national borders. In this section we have examined the background of these events, but it bears repeating that the foundation of the new organizational structure following the introduction of the 1822 Regulation (intended to serve as a new ruling system over the Middle Juz) was the administrative District scheme. As the boundaries of these administrative Districts gradually transformed into national borders, the division of the Kazakhs into those who followed the Russians and those who followed other powers became clear. We have seen how issues such as the crossing of the borders into foreign territory (mainly focusing here on Qing territory) by the Kazakhs led to various problems.

Conclusion

Within this chapter, the process of establishing a system of rule based on the 1822 Regulation has been examined. This development resulted from a strengthening of the Russian-Kazakh relationship during the first half of the nineteenth century and it has been addressed here mainly from the Russian viewpoint. Russian perceptions of their relationship with the Kazakhs have therefore been clarified. In addition, we have seen how the Russian relationship with the Small Juz differed from its relationship with the Middle and

201 IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17678, l. 82ob.

202 J. Noda, “Roshin kankei jō no kazafusutan”: 119–133.

Great Juz due to these latter two having had concurrent relationships with the Qing Dynasty. After 1822, Russian rule was divided into that which was centered in Western Siberia and that which originated from Orenburg – further investigation of each on an individual basis is required.²⁰³

Under the system of governance evident after the introduction of the 1822 Regulation, the crossing of the border by Kazakhs was interpreted by the Russians as tax evasion. In addition, crossing into Qing territory was often undertaken in an effort to escape punishment for crimes like pillaging. The nomadic Kazakh lands between the two empires comprised an area that often fell under the legal jurisdiction of both powers, a situation that encouraged Kazakh movement within that area.

Because the Kazakhs were free to pursue autonomous negotiations with the Qing Dynasty during the pre-1822 era, it seems necessary to reexamine the Kazakh-Russian connection (which has to date been largely considered through Russian sources and according to Russian ways of thinking) in light of the influence it must have received from the Kazakh-Qing relationship of that period. Within such an endeavor, the tripartite relationship between Russia, the Kazakhs and the Qing, as illustrated by fig. 2 found in the introduction to this work, must be taken as a basic presupposition. In an effort to show how both empires kept an eye on the developments of the other while attempting to manage its own relations with the Kazakhs and other powers of Central Asia, the next chapter will focus on the turning point within the establishment of this tripartite relationship, specifically the ‘official’ establishment of Kazakh relations with the Qing in 1757.

203 The idea of the “Great Orenburg” raised by Matsuzato is helpful to consider the difference of the administrations regarding the Kazakh Steppe, see K. Matsuzato, “Chiiki kenkyū shigaku to roshia teikoku heno kūkanteiki apurōchi: 19 sēki no dai orenburuku niokeru gyōseikukaku kaikaku,” *Roshia shi kenkyū* 76 (2005): 38–49. The combination of “South Ural and Western Kazakhstan” (by Sultangalieva) can be contrasted with “Western Siberia and Eastern Kazakhstan,” see G. Surutangarieva [Sultangalieva], “Minami uraru to nishi kazafusutan no churukukei shominzoku nitaishuru roshia teikoku no seisaku no dōjisei.”

PART 2

The Foundations of Kazakh-Qing Relations



The Problem of Kazakh Subjection and the Russian-Qing Relationship in Central Asia

Introduction

One turning point in the Kazakh-Qing relationship, which was officially recognized by the Qing in 1757, can be found in the Qing expedition against the Jungars. As touched on in the previous chapter, the Jungar Empire was extremely active within Central Asia during the mid-eighteenth century.¹ Not only did the Jungars fight with the Qing to the east, they also expanded their influence westward and, crossing the Kazakh Steppe, southward. In addition, the Jungars applied pressure to the Russians in both Siberia and the area of the Urals. Consequently, both the Russian and Qing empires struggled to deal with the Jungar presence in Central Asia.

However, this situation changed with the collapse of the Jungar regime in 1755, from which point forward the Kazakhs and other powers of Central Asia found themselves directly threatened by the Russian and Qing empires. At the same time, the Russians and Qing suddenly came into direct contact with one another at the border in western Siberia. Both Russian and Qing relations with the Jungar regime before its collapse are clearly related to trends exhibited by the powers of Central Asia following that collapse, thus these two periods should be considered together.

In spite of this background, studies into Russian-Qing relations have largely focused on the ratification processes of the Nerchinsk and Kyakhta treaties and other problems related to the two empires' shared eastern border. Regarding the Russian-Qing relationship as it pertained to Central Asia west of the Jungars, the Qing mission to the Russians during the Yongzheng period is well-known, but, other than the compilation work of Bantysh-Kamenskii, not much scholarship exists regarding the subject beyond Soviet era treatments written by such authors as B. Gurevich and V. Moiseev. This Soviet work, also including I. Zlatkin's writings on how the Jungar issue affected Russian-Qing relations, made thorough use of unpublished sources to organize historical facts and, while of a partial nature, these writers also produced compilations

¹ For an outline of the Jungar regime, see J. Miyawaki, *Saigo no yūboku teikoku: Jungar bu no kōbō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1995).

of documents they collected themselves. Such works, including “*International Relations in Central Asia*” [MOTsA] and “*Russo-Jungar Relations*” [RDO], are well-worth inspection.² However, as we saw in chapter 1, the scholarship of this period tended to focus on Russian conflict with the Qing Dynasty and in the post-Soviet period it is necessary to view these authors critically.

Chinese research, on the other hand, tends to take a negative view of Russian diplomatic actions with the Jungars from 1756, describing them as “interference in the domestic affairs of China.”³ Furthermore, the contemporary scholar Li Sheng is unable to overcome a one-sided interpretation, particularly regarding the Kazakhs, by failing to address their relationship with the Russians and merely insisting that the Kazakhs “submitted” to the Qing Dynasty.⁴

As pointed out by A. Voskresenskii in his examination of the Eurasian Russian-Qing connection, Central Asian affairs became a major theme in the two empires’ diplomatic dealings from the eighteenth century on. It is therefore necessary to reevaluate the Russian-Qing relationship within this Central Asian context – paying particular attention to negotiations regarding the territory of the Jungars.⁵ Such a reevaluation will not only lead to a better understanding of the Russian-Qing relationship but will also shed light from another perspective on the international relations of Central Asia.

For this purpose, the current chapter will seek to illustrate problems that arose regarding the Jungars as well as problems arising within the territory to their west by analyzing diplomatic documents sent between Russia and the Qing Dynasty. In the first half of the chapter, I will outline various negotiations pursued by the empires, especially focusing on proposals made to Russia by a Qing diplomatic mission in 1731. I will also describe how these negotiations are related to later Russian-Qing relations within Central Asia. In the second half of the chapter, I will examine problems related to the subjection of the Kazakhs and other Central Asian powers, which had previously been under the control of the Jungars, that arose following the subjugation of the Jungars and the hunting down of Amursana during the 1750s. This framework of Russian-Qing negotiations regarding jurisdiction will be seen again regarding later issues

2 For Soviet-era research, see V.A. Moiseev, “Nekotorye voprosy kazakhsko-dzhungarskikh otnoshenii v sovetskoi istoriografii,” in *Voprosy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia Kazakhstana* (Alma-Ata, 1988): 134–150.

3 Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo ed, *Xinjiang jianshi*, vol. 1 (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1980): 259.

4 Li Sheng, *Hasakesitan ji qiyu zhongguo xinjiang de guanxi: 15 shiji–20shiji zhongqi* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004): 106.

5 A.D. Voskresenskii, *Kitai i Rossiia v Evrazii: istoricheskaia dinamika politicheskikh vzaimovliani* (Moscow: Muravei, 2004): 29.

such as the repatriation of the Torghut and negotiations regarding Xinjiang during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

It should be noted that most of the information to be presented in this chapter is reliant on Manchu language documents regarding Russian-Qing diplomacy,⁶ public archival records of the Qing Dynasty, and published documents of both empires.

1 The Jungars and Central Asia within Russian-Qing Relations

1.1 *The Treaty of Kyakhta and Its Effects on Central Asia*

This section will outline how the Jungars and the territory of Central Asia were treated within the Russian-Qing diplomacy of the first half of the eighteenth century. Russia-Qing relations officially began with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. The following Treaty of Kyakhta (ratified in 1728) reasserted the friendship between the two countries and reconfirmed border issues. In addition to Atsushi Nomiya's research on the Treaty of Kyakhta, Kin'ichi Yoshida has also given a general overview and Koichi Shibuya has examined the process of its approval.⁷

On the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty of Kyakhta, a group carrying a letter of credence and led by Sava Vladislavich acted as a diplomatic mission. Also in attendance was a diplomatic official who had previously been involved in settling Russian borders in Europe. At least in form, the treaty was concluded by Vladislavich's mission in accordance with modern ideas of international law. As described elsewhere,⁸ the treaty was also concluded in such a way that it wouldn't conflict with the preexisting Qing tributary system. For the Qing, facing conflict with the Jungars, the greatest priority was the establish-

6 I have yet to conduct research on *Eluosi dang*, the main Qing source regarding Russian affairs. See A. Yanagisawa, "Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōankan shozō no roshia kankei manbun tōan nitsuite," *Manzoku shi kenkyū tsūshin* 10, 2001: 38–57. Recent publications like QZHG 1 (*Qingdai zhongha guanxi dang'an huibian*) and QMJD (*Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian*) don't contain materials related to the Jungar-Kazakh relations around 1757 focused on in this chapter, but XMD (*Qingdai xinjiang manwen dang'an huibian*) in particular does contain many documents from that period.

7 K. Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi* (Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1974); A. Nomiya, *Roshin gaikō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Sakai shoten, 1977); K. Shibuya, "Kyafuta jōyaku no bunsho tsūshin nikansuru jōkō nitsuite: jōyaku teiketsugo no shingawa niyoru roshiagawa shokan juryō kyohi mondai o megutte," *Jinbun gakka ronshū* (Ibaraki University) 45 (2006): 33–56.

8 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 144.

ment of borders in Mongolia. The Russians, for their part, were mostly concerned with reestablishing trade with the Qing.⁹

The official text of the Treaty of Kyakhta is comprised of eleven articles. Attention will be turned here to an examination, based on the Latin (authentic) text possessed by both parties, of the treaty's content in order to clarify which articles are directly related to the theme of this chapter.¹⁰

Article Two, which regulates the treatment of fugitives, has the most direct relationship to the topic at hand. Differences in interpretation regarding this article were one problem that led to complications during later negotiations regarding the repatriation of Amursana and the Altai. Article Two stated that "In the event of the appearance of fugitives in the future, they will in no way be accepted by either party. Rather, both parties will assist¹¹ in searches¹² and such persons will be turned over to the appropriate authorities stationed at the border."

Although Article Two regulated the treatment of individuals over which one of the powers held jurisdiction, Article Three, dealing with border issues, demarcated areas as far as Shabin-dabaga, or modern-day Tuva (Ch. *Tangnu Wulianghai*). Article Three also forbade the paying of tributes by the Tuva who lived on the other side of the border. Although the Qing considered Tuva to be a tributary state,¹³ the Russians, based on the establishment of the Omsk fortress by I. Bukhgol'ts,¹⁴ were unwilling to give up territorial rights they claimed within the Irtysh River basin. In defense of their position, the Russians produced a copy of a document swearing allegiance to Russia by Altan khan (Badma Erdeni Khong Tayiji) of the Khalkha Mongols.¹⁵ Russia claimed jurisdiction over Tuva based on the fact that Tuva paid tribute to Russian-subject Altan, but this subject-based interpretation was not recognized by the Qing. Vladislavich would later suggest a demarcation based upon the actual spheres of influence of the day,¹⁶ and, as a result, Russia came to recognize Qing juris-

9 RKO (*Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*) 2: 421; MOTsA (*Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*) 1: 258.

10 *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s Kitaem, 1689–1881 gg.* (Sanktpeterburg, 1889): 50–83.

11 The phrase "respectively" was inserted into the Manchu text by the Qing court.

12 Replaced by "captures" in the Latin text prepared by the Qing.

13 PDZFL qianbian, vol. 16: 21 (Chinese text).

14 Bukhgol'ts explored the river-side areas of Irtysh in 1715–1717.

15 RKO 2: 505.

16 N.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del mezhdru rossiiskim i kitaiskim gosudarstvami, s 1619 po 1792-i god* (Kazan', 1882): 131–132; V.A. Moiseev, *Tsinskaia imperiia i narody Saiano-Altaiia v XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1983): 46.

diction over the majority of Tuva lands.¹⁷ However, such spheres of influence were defined by subject-based concepts of jurisdiction that focused on the payment of tributes – there was little emphasis on borders and the actual definition of subjection was left unclarified. The area west of Tuva belonged to the Jungars and jurisdiction over the various groups they held influence over was not considered to be addressed by the treaty. These issues of subjection and jurisdiction were deferred until the time when negotiations were carried out following the Qing subjugation of the Jungars. As the above indicates, differences in interpretation regarding “subjection” proved to be a recurring source of trouble between Russia and the Qing.

Kin'ichi Yoshida has referred to the content of both treaties using the generic term ‘the Nerchinsk-Kyakhta Treaty System,’¹⁸ but, as Akira Yanagisawa has noted, this model does not take into account all developments leading up to the nineteenth century.¹⁹ Even limiting focus to the Russian-Qing relationship as it pertained to Central Asia during the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, the model is undeniably insufficient. In particular, the change in the relationship between the two powers once the Qing Dynasty turned its attention to Central Asia following the subjugation of the Jungars has not been sufficiently examined.

When considering these issues, it becomes clear that the Kyakhta Treaty system must be examined with the Jungar situation firmly in mind and within the larger context of Russian-Qing relations as they played out in the ‘eastern areas’ of Mongolia and Northeast China. Put another way, due to the existence of the Jungars, western areas at that time could only be regulated as far as Tuva and this fact led to conflicts during later negotiations between the Russians and the Qing.

1.2 *The Beginnings of a Russian-Qing Relationship in ‘the West’*

Within this western expanse of territory unregulated by the treaties, including Siberia and Central Asia, in what ways did the Russians and Qing come into contact with one another? One example can be found in early eighteenth century negotiations between Russia and the Qing regarding the Torghut people who were located within the lower region of the Volga. It was during these negotiations that attempts were made by each of the two empires to establish relations with the residents of the Kazakh Steppe as well as Mawarannahr.

17 Moiseev, *Tsinskaia imperiia i narody Saiano-Altai v XVIII v.*: 48.

18 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 109.

19 A. Yanagisawa, “1768 nen no ‘kyafuta jōyaku tsuika jōkō’ omeguru shin to roshia no kōshō nitsuite,” *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 62 (3), 2003: 599.

One element of the background of these negotiations that should be explained here is the invasion of Central Asia by the Jungars. Tsewang Rabdan (reigned 1694–1727) violently attacked the Kazakhs in an effort to regain influence in Central Asia that had been lost in battles with Kangxi emperor during the time of Galdan Boshogtu khan.²⁰ Following these events, Abulkhair khan, leader of the Small Juz (the westernmost of Kazakh's three Juz), pledged loyalty to Russia and was officially recognized in 1731 (see chapter 2 above).

At this time, the Jungars were also involved in a conflict with the Qing, who sought the cooperation of both the Russians and the Torghut in this struggle with the Jungars. The Torghut were an Oyirad clan that had relocated to the lower reaches of the Volga river basin (abbreviated below as “Volga”) after being defeated by the Jungars. The Qing Dynasty sent missions to the Russians on three different occasions. The first of these missions was led by Tulišen, who had reached the Torghut in 1714. The second was a mission to Russia led by Toši (Ch. *Tuoshi*) in 1731. Finally, Dešin (Ch. *Dexin*) led the third mission to Russia in 1732.

The first mission traveled west through Siberia having received secret orders to both survey the Torghut situation and attempt to gain their cooperation.²¹ “The Record of Foreign Regions” (*Yiyulu*) regarding the mission states that the Russians were aware that they shared borders with the Kazakhs, Qaraqalpaqs, and Jungars. It further states that Russian officials had told the author of the report, Tulišen, that all three powers were in a state of opposition with one another.²²

During the era of Galdan Tsering (reigned 1727–1745), actions by a younger brother named Louzan Shunu who also sought succession (to the position of their father) became problematic for the Russia-Qing relationship. It seems likely that the second mission (led by Toši) was sent with orders to attain participation of the Torghut in the conflict against the Jungars. For their part, the Russians interpreted the mission's purposes as, first, to seek assistance in the conflict against the Jungars, second, to confirm that Galdan Tsering would be deported in the event of an attempted escape to Russia, and third, to encour-

20 V.A. Moiseev, *Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi: xvii–xviii vv.* (Alma-Ata, 1991): 62.

21 K. Shibuya, “Kōki nenkan no shin no torugūto kenshi: iwayuru mitsumei setsu no saikentō o chūshin ni,” *Jinbun gakka ronshū* 29 (1996): 71–93. However, Russia didn't allow Ayuki khan to dispatch a return envoy to the Qing. This was because the Torghut were Russian subjects, and the journey was considered dangerous, RKO 1: 143.

22 Tuliessen [Tulišen] (Imanishi Shunjū ed.), *Kōchū iikiroku* (Tenri: Tenri daigaku Oyasato kenkyūjo, 1964): 108.

age Shunu to revolt against Galdan Tsering.²³ V. Bakunin, the official of the College of Foreign Affairs, who received the mission, also reported that Toši declared a desire to win over Shunu's cooperation.²⁴ A letter²⁵ to the Russian Senate from the Qing Dynasty's Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan*), however, only states that the Toši mission was undertaken to express felicitations regarding Emperor Feodor's accession to the throne as well as to visit the Torghut, who the Qing considered to be an "obedient" nation. In addition, the Qing emperor's instructions to the third mission make clear his position that Russian military aid was unnecessary.²⁶ For these reasons, it is important to assess Qing motives carefully.

In any case, during the second Toši mission's visit to the Torghut, a squad led by Mantai did manage to trace Shunu's location and met him in the area of the Volga to which he had escaped with the help of blood relatives. Secret talks were held there and Shunu's cooperation in the conflict with the Jungars was sought after.²⁷ However, as evidenced²⁸ by the fact that Bakunin showed a copy of the Torghut chief Ceren Donduk's response (to the Qing Emperor) to the Qing mission, one main result of the mission was to impress upon the Qing court just how powerful Russia's influence over the Torghut was.²⁹ The details of the proposals to the Russian Emperor made by the Toši mission will be described in the following section.

The third mission, led by Dešin, also attempted to visit the Torghut – the main purposes being to secure their cooperation against the Jungars and to

23 Report from Glazunov, who had accompanied the Qing envoy, 7.7.1730, RDO (*Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia*): 49.

24 V. Bakunin, "Opisanie istorii kalmytskogo naroda," *Krasnyi arkhiv* 94, t. 3 (1939): 234.

25 YZ7 (1729)/5/18, QZEG (*Qingdai Zhong'e guanxi dang'an shiliao xuanbian*, ser. 1, vol. 2): 528.

26 YZ9 (1731)/6, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 550.

27 YZ10/3/5, report by Mantai, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 560. Diplomatic correspondence also mentioned that the Qing emperor was ready to cooperate against Shunu's enemies if he came to Qing territory, see 3/12, from Lifanyuan to Russian Senate, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 561; RDO: 66. The Russian attained information regarding what the Qing envoy told Shunu. According to the diary of Beklemishev, the envoy stated that "if Shunu wanted to wreak revenge on his brother and rule the father's territory, Shunu can request the protection of Bogdokhan (Qing emperor)," RDO: 60. Nevertheless, Shunu had already made contact with the Russian authorities, and this expectation of the Qing was never realized, RDO: 45–46 (1729, two letters from Shunu to the Russian government).

28 Bakunin, "Opisanie istorii kalmytskogo naroda": 236.

29 Russia gave instruction to the Torghut elders on how to receive the Qing mission, see A.A. Kurapov, "Novye materialy o kitaiskikh posol'stvakh v Kalmytskoe khanstvo v 1714 i 1731 gg.," in S.M. Murgaeu ed., *Kalmykiia v rossiisko-kitaiskikh otnosheniakh: istoricheskii opyt i sovremennost'* (Elista: Dzhangar, 2007): 79.

invite Shunu to Beijing³⁰. This time, however, permission to make such a visit to the Torghut was refused by the Russians. At the time of the Toši mission, the Qing Dynasty was already planning to notify the Kazakhs and the inhabitants of Bukhara, who were enemies of the Jungars, of their plans to dispatch troops against the Jungars.³¹ In addition, following the intended visit to the Torghut, the Dešin mission planned to visit the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Yarkand, and Kashgar in order to seek entry into the conflict against the Jungars by these powers as well.³² A record exists of the Qing mission sending a letter to a Kazakh khan,³³ and, although the content of the letter is unknown, it seems likely that they were attempting to establish contact with Shunu because the Qing had received information that he was residing among either the Kazakhs or the Torghut.³⁴ Abulkhair, who has been discussed above, had formed an alliance with and sent hostages to the Torghut.³⁵ It is also known that Abulkhair received envoys from the Torghut³⁶ so the possibility also exists of Qing correspondence with the Kazakhs indirectly through the Torghut. These events certainly contributed to the situation³⁷ leading up to the attack on the Jungars by Shunu (who had married Abulkhair's daughter) in league with the Kazakh military in 1731. During the 1720s and 1730s, the Kazakhs (of the Small Juz), the Torghut, and the Bashkirs experienced a complicated series of alliances and conflict against the backdrop of the three-sided Russian-Qing-Jungar relationship. It can be said that Russia largely sought during this period to negotiate with these foreign ethnic groups through three main local agencies – specifically, the agencies of Irkutsk (via Kyakhta for dealings with the Qing), Tobol'sk and the Irtysh fortified line (for dealings with the Jungars), and Ufa and Astrakhan³⁸ (for dealings with the Kazakhs, Torghut, Khiva, Bukhara, etc.).

30 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 154; Shibuya, “Kyafuta jōyaku no bunsho tsūshin nikan-suru jōkō nitsuite”: 38.

31 YZ9/6/14, from Lifanyuan to Russian Senate, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 548. Toši actually mentioned the notification to the frontier powers in Moscow, MOTsA 1: 276.

32 YZ10/3/12, from Lifanyuan to Russian Senate, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 562. The same aim is found in a report by Glazunov, 8.12.1730, RDO: 50.

33 YZ10/3/5, memorial of Mantai and others, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 560. Mantai told “something” to Kazakhs who visited the Torghut land, YZ10/4/6, memorial of Heshuo shuncheng qinwang, Xibao and others, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 566.

34 YZ7/1/7, memorial of Shaanxi-Sichuan Governor-General, Yue Zhongqi, JJD (*Junjichu dang*): 402000011.

35 Bakunin, “Opisanie istorii kalmytskogo naroda”: 225.

36 See diary of the translator, Tevkelev, KRO 1: 80.

37 T. Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986): 314.

38 Later, its function was moved to Orenburg.

Furthermore, in a letter dated YZ10(1732)/3/12, the Qing Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan*) wrote to the Russian Senate that the Jungars must be suppressed in order to preserve “border peace.”³⁹ During the leap fifth month of that year (according to the Chinese calendar), the Qing again called for Shunu to be handed over but the request was not recognized.⁴⁰ Following these events, the Qing interest in such matters as Louzan Shunu’s whereabouts, trends among the Kazakhs, and the Russia-Torghut relationship continued unabated and they gathered what information they could from captives and others.⁴¹

However, in spite of all this Qing activity, Russia failed in the end to ever permit negotiations between the Torghut and the Qing. In the first place, the Russians considered the Torghut to have long been their own subjects.⁴² Regarding the demands of the third mission, Russia refused on the grounds that it was too far from the Volga area to Jungaria so it would be impossible for the Torghut to contribute troops to fight the Jungars. Within the expanse of territory between the Volga and Jungaria, there existed various powers hostile to the Torghut like the Kazakhs and the Qaraqalpaq who wouldn’t let them pass through the region. Russia tried to contain the Qing Dynasty by stating that Galdan Tsering was on friendly terms with both Russia and its subject peoples.⁴³ Russia’s behavior can be seen as based on a policy of avoiding interference into both the internal affairs of the Jungars and the Jungar-Qing conflict. Furthermore, the Russians feared that Qing agitation among the Central Asian powers could lead to their taking initiative in a potential war with the Jungars.⁴⁴ Behind the scenes, Russia itself exchanged missions with the Jungars. These missions started with investigations along the shore of the Irtysh River by Bukhgoľts, continued with a failed attempt to vassalize the

39 QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 561. *Lifanyuan* also stated that the Jungars were originally under Qing jurisdiction.

40 QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 570.

41 YZ12/3/21, memorial of Dingbian dajiangjun, Fupeng, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 605.

42 Shibuya, “Kyafuta jōyaku no bunsho tsūshin nikansuru jōkō nitsuite”: 39. See also a communication from the Irkutsk vice Governor, A. Zholobov to the Qing court, 3.30.1732, RDO: 63.

43 Moiseev, “Nekotorye voprosy kazakhsko-dzhungarskikh otnoshenii v sovetskoi istoriografii”: 67–68.

44 Report by Zholobov and others, 10.16.1731, RDO: 53. One of the reasons was that the Kyakhta Treaty didn’t regulate Qing missions to the Torghut. See Shibuya, “Kyafuta jōyaku no bunsho tsūshin nikansuru jōkō nitsuite.”

Jungars by I. Unkovskii,⁴⁵ and also included missions led by L. Ugrimov and K. Miller.⁴⁶

Such developments as those outlined above help to illustrate both the international relations of the time as well as understandings of subjection of Central Asian powers as perceived by both the Russians and the Qing.

1.3 *Suspension and Reopening of the Russian-Qing Relationship within Central Asia.*

Following the events described in the last section, there followed a period in which Russian-Qing negotiations regarding Central Asian issues ceased to be carried out with regularity, partly due to such issues as confrontation over the titles of the senders of correspondence.⁴⁷ During this period, the Jungars and Qing decided that the Altai Mountains would serve as the border between the Jungars and the Khalkha Mongols, and in 1740 the Jungars re-embarked on their western offensive. As Haruhi Kawakami has shown, during the winter of 1741 this offensive was so successful that Ablai, the influential figure of the Kazakh Middle Juz, was taken captive.⁴⁸ The Jungars crossed over Semirech'e and expanded their influence as far as Tashkent and Ferghana. Having heard of these developments, actions were quickly taken within the Russian government⁴⁹ to strengthen the defenses of the Siberian Fortress Line (a general term for the three fortified lines of Irtysh, Kuznetsk, and Ishim.⁵⁰ One result of the

45 See K. Shibuya, "Unkofusukī shisetsudan to 1720 nendai zenhan niokeru jūn=garu, roshia, shin no sōgokankei," *Jinbun komyunikēshon gakkā ronshū* 2 (2007): 107–128.

46 For these missions, see V.A. Moiseev, *Rossīia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke: ocherk vneshnepoliticheskikh otnoshenii* (Barnaul, 1998).

47 Shibuya, "Kyafuta jōyaku no bunsho tsūshin nikansuru jōkō nitsuite."

48 H. Kawakami, "Aburai no seiryoku kakudai: 18 seiki kazāfusutan ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu," *Machikaneyama ronsō* 14 (1980): 32–35. From testimony found in Qing documents written by Kazakhs captured by the Jungars, we can learn fragmentally about the relations between Ablai and Galdan Tsering. A memorial mentioned that Galdan Tsering requested captive Ablai to capture Louzan Shunu, QL6 (1741)/9/3; see also memorials from Yongchang and others, JHLZ: 8261–45/604–3203–3204. Russian documents also confirm that Galdan Tsering considered the extradition of Shunu to be a condition, KRO 1: 202. Shunu had already passed away, see document from Russian Senate to Lifanyuan, 1.20.1733, Bantyskh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 205; Moiseev, *Rossīia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke*: 68. However, Galdan Tsering paid attention to the activity of Shunu. This was related to a Bashkir, named Qarasaqal, who pretended to be Shunu, while hiding in the Kazakh Steppe, MOTsA 1: 310; MOTsA 2: 9; KRO 1: 202.

49 Proposal of Nepluev and Sukharev, 3.17.1743, RDO: 85.

50 The fortress line functioned as the border with the southern nomads. The southernmost post was the Ust' Kamenogorsk fortress.

renewed Jungar expansion was that, as part of the process of freeing the captive Ablai, the vassalage of the Kazakh Middle Juz to the Jungars was claimed by the Jungars in spite of the Kazakhs having already sworn subject status to the Russians in 1740 (cf. part 1, chapter 2 of this book). According to Russian sources, Galdan, the Jungar ruler, claimed that the Kazakhs themselves recognized their subjection to him as evidenced by the fact that Abulmanbet khan of the Middle Juz had sent one of his sons as hostage (*amanat*).⁵¹

When the Russian government received word regarding the pressure being put on the Kazakhs by the Jungars they decided to respond by communicating to the Jungars that “while accepting hostages from among the influential members of the Middle Juz is acceptable, Abulkhair khan of the Small Juz should be left in peace.” In other words, their response varied depending on which Juz was in question, and the Russians refused to yield ground regarding the Small Juz.⁵² In this way, the situation evolved to the point where the Russians and the Jungars both came to wield influence over the Kazakhs at the same time.

It is unclear exactly how the Qing perceived this state of affairs in Central Asia, but in a 1743 (Q18) communication from the Qing Court of Colonial Affairs to the Russian Senate the Qing mentioned that Emperor Qianlong was pleased with the cordial relations between Russia and the Qing. It therefore seems safe to assume that Russia-Qing relations at the time were satisfactory.⁵³ In conclusion, despite the temporary rallying of power by the Jungars, their influence would soon begin to wane due to problems of succession that arose after the death of Galdan Tsering and other internal disturbances. As this decline progressed, negotiations between Russia and the Qing again became more frequent and often dealt deeply with trends among the Altai and Kazakhs as well as the Jungars. These developments will be discussed in section three.

51 Report of a Bashkir, Sep. 1743, RDO: 95. A document sent by Manji of Jungar to Nepliuiev states that “the Kazakh Middle Juz and Small Juz are not subject to the Russian Empire,” RDO: 92. He also mentioned that Abulmanbet had sent a hostage to the Jungars, RDO: 93.

52 Document within College of Foreign Affairs, 8.20.1743, RDO: 92–93. This incident was influenced by the fact that Abulkhair had already sent his hostage.

53 Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 247.

2 The Toši Mission's Proposals (1731) and Russia-Qing Negotiations

2.1 *The Wording of the Toši Mission's Proposals*

A close examination will be made in this section of the proposals made by the Qing Dynasty's 'Toši Mission' to Russia in 1731. The Toši Mission, so called because it was led by the ambassador Toši (Chinese title: *shilang*; Ma. *ashan-i amban*), was the first Qing mission to Russia following the conclusion of the Kyakhta treaty. Having left China in 1729, the mission reached Moscow in January 1731. As described above, the mission's aim was to attain a military alliance with the Torghut against the Jungars. Much research has been conducted regarding this mission – in addition to Yoshida's general survey,⁵⁴ Moiseev's consideration of the issue from the point of view of Jungar-Russian relations is also an important example.⁵⁵ However, due to the rarity of Qing missions to Russia, most of the focus within such research has been on the basic facts of the Toši Mission whereas, within the current chapter, I will focus on how the proposals of the Toši Mission continued to influence events in later years.

Research into the lasting influence of the Toši Mission has been limited. The only examples that can be given are Russian accounts by Zlatkin and Gurevich,⁵⁶ as well as a few documents (see document #12 from table 2 of the next section) from the "*Gugong ewen shiliao*" (Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace, GES) that are partially dealt with by Yoshida⁵⁷ and Nomiya.⁵⁸ In fact, however, much of the subsequent diplomacy between the Russians and Qing between 1756 and 1758 came to be centered on interpretation of the wording of the Toši Mission's proposals. To date, there has been insufficient research into such issues as how the original wording and subsequent negotiations were at odds, and how each party held different interpretations of that wording.

54 K. Yoshida, "Yōsei nenkan ni shinkoku kara roshia ni haken sareta nikai no shisetsu nit-suete," *Kiyō* (Kawagoe kōkō toshokan) 2 (1965): 2–9.

55 Moiseev, *Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke*: 61–64.

56 I.Ia. Zlatkin, *Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva (1635–1758)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1964): 297; B.P. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983): 110 and 139.

57 Yoshida believed that the Qing court had forgotten the missions, see Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 156. However, as I will show later, the Qing mentioned this envoy in a document addressed to Russia. Thus, it seems that the existence of the mission was not recorded within Qing internal documents – intentionally due to the Toši Mission's compromising words.

58 Nomiya, *Roshin gaikō no kenkyū*: 119–129.

In order to understand these issues, it is first necessary to evaluate the actual wording of the proposals made to Russia by the Toši Mission. An accurate record of the contents can be found in *International Relations in Central Asia* (MOTsA), and it is important to note that there are a number of differences between the MOTsA text and the version that is well-known from the work of Bantysh-Kamenskii.⁵⁹ Because the Qing government's instructions to the Dešin Mission (which followed the Toši Mission) can be easily found within various documents, it seems that there would exist some documentation regarding Qing instructions to Toši as well, but no such documentation has been confirmed. At the very least, however, the way in which Russia reacted to Toši's proposals can be surmised from the text that will be examined below.

Toši's oral presentation of the proposals was given during an audience granted on 9 Feb. 1731.⁶⁰ The Empress Anna's response to the four clauses of the proposal was prepared on 24 Feb. 1731.⁶¹

First, Toši declared that Galdan Tsering, like his father, was in a state of enmity with the Qing due to his refusal to turn over a fugitive (Lobzan Danjin) that should justly be repatriated to China. Furthermore, Toši requested that the Russians be unsuspicious in the event that the Qing move troops to the area of the Russian-Qing border. The Russians praised such advance notice by the Qing as "highly in accordance with our friendly relations and the contents of our peaceful treaty." The Russians also expressed that "if both great governments desire to maintain their friendly relationship, they will always act in such a fashion."

Secondly, regarding issues of territorial cession, the Qing went so far as to state that "if any Jungar territory they might occupy was considered necessary by the Russian Imperial Majesty, they "could yield [it] to Russia." Regarding this statement, the Russians replied that "Russia had no desire to annex any territory at all, but that, regarding territory occupied by the Qing, ... agreement could be reached (*soglashenos' byt' mozhet*)."

The third clause dealt with the turning over of Jungar fugitives. Starting from the point of view that the Jungars were Qing subjects, the Qing requested that "of the Jungars who had escaped into Russia, the monarch and *zaisan*

59 Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 178–181.

60 MOTsA 1: 275–277. See also I.T. Moroz, "O pervom kitaiskom posol'stve v Moskve (1729–1732 gg.)," in M.L. Titarenko et al. eds., *Razdvigaia gorizonty nauki: k 90-letiiu akademika S.L. Tikhvinskogo* (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2008): 178 (Moroz may wrongly consider that the meeting was held on 2.19).

61 MOTsA 1: 278–281 (The supplementation was made on 2.28). See also Moroz, "O pervom kitaiskom posol'stve v Moskve": 179–180.

[clan leaders] be turned over to the Qing Dynasty while the other individuals that Russia had accepted be purposefully kept in a location where they could in no way cause rebellions in the borderlands.” The Dešin Mission would eventually be instructed to make these same requests.⁶² As can be confirmed from Unkovskii’s being sent to Jungars with the purpose of making Tsewang Rabdan into a Russian vassal, the Russians also considered themselves dominant over the Jungars.⁶³ In addition, the Russians were wary of the growing strength of Qing pronouncements regarding the Jungars. For these reasons, Russia avoided making a full response to the above Qing demands and simply replied that “while in Russian territory, [the Jungars] would not be allowed to make any display of dissidence regarding the Qing or any of their subject peoples.”

The fourth clause concerned Russia’s treatment of the intended Qing mission to the Torghut. Regarding the Torghut, the Qing showed both recognition of them as subjects of Russia and recognition of the necessity to make its requests regarding them directly to the Russian Senate. For its part, Russia responded that a mission would be “allowed one time only.” Research into this clause has been conducted by Shibuya.⁶⁴

Although the first and fourth clauses described above dealt with the specific situation of the time, the second and third clauses, dealing with aspects of future diplomacy, came to be problematic within Russian-Qing negotiations following the year 1756. Regarding the third clause in particular, it is important to note the half-hearted tone of Russia’s response that “we can agree (*soglashe-nos*)” on the issue of repatriation out of respect for the amity between our governments.” In reality, the Russians were merely expressing a willingness to consider the issue rather than giving a firm answer to the Qing proposal. The Qing, however, took this statement as an affirmative response (see document #17 listed in table 2 of the next section).⁶⁵ For this reason, problems over issues of interpretation would arise during later negotiations.

In order to attain Russian consideration of their requests, the proposals discussed above contained concessions on the part of the Qing – who were in need of both a friendly relationship with the Russians and the support of the Torghut. As has been pointed out by Nomiyama,⁶⁶ the third clause of the Toši proposals dealing with the detention of fugitives to Russia is at odds with the

62 YZ9/6, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 552.

63 Shibuya, “Unkofusukī shisetsudan to 1720 nendai zenhan niokeru jūn=garu, roshia, shin no sōgokankei”: 110.

64 Shibuya, “Kyafuta jōyaku no bunsho tsūshin nikansuru jōkō nitsuite”: 37.

65 AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, ll. 67–68.

66 Nomiyama, *Roshin gaikō no kenkyū*: 144.

second article of the Kyakhta Treaty which had outlined complete repatriation of all such persons. The later Dešin Mission's demands contained "wording to the effect that, based on the peace treaty [the Kyakhta Treaty] established between the two empires, neither party should harbor fugitives from the other but should rather repatriate any who might be apprehended."⁶⁷ This stance represents a return to the principles outlined in Article Two of the Kyakhta Treaty and was recognized by the Russians. Based on the details of any given situation, however, Russia would come to make use of the validity of both the Toši proposals and the Kyakhta Treaty. In this way, not only did Qing plans (including the Dešin Mission) end in failure, but the wording of the proposals – lacking even definition of scope – took on a life of its own during negotiations in later years.

2.2 *Reappraisal of the Toši Proposals*

More than twenty years after the Toši Mission, internal discord among the Jungars and the revolt of Amursana led to a new round of negotiations between Russia and the Qing regarding Central Asia. The event that triggered these negotiations was the temporary escaping into Kazakh territory in late 1751 of Dawachi, a contender to succession of the Jungar government, and Amursana, an ally of Dawachi and the grandchild of Tsewang Rabdan by a daughter married into another family.⁶⁸ At this time, Russia sought to bring both Dawachi and Amursana to Orenburg where their actions could be monitored.⁶⁹ As surrenders by Jungar leaders to the Qing Dynasty occurred one after another, both Russian and the Qing attention quickly shifted to how the Jungar issue would develop.

In 1752, Amursana again went into hiding within the Kazakh territory of Ablai following trouble with Dawachi who had by then ascended to the Jungar throne. Amursana would later fall in with the Qing and, in March 1755, Amursana and the Qing military overturned the Jungar sovereign family. However, unsatisfied with the treatment he received at the hands of the Qing, Amursana gathered the remaining Jungar military power and took up arms in revolt against the Qing Dynasty.⁷⁰

67 Russian Senate to Lifanyuan, 7.13.1732, QZEG (ser. 1, vol. 2): 597.

68 PDZFL (Ch.) qianbian, 54: 3. Regarding Amursana's actions of this period, see Kicengge (Chengzhi), "Amu'ersana 'panluan' shimo kao (shang)," *Faculty of International Liberal Arts Review* (Otemon Gakuin University), 8 (2015): 41–73.

69 Tevkelev to Dawachi and Amursana, no earlier than 8.31.1752, RDO: 173–174.

70 T. Morikawa, "Amurusana omeguru roshin kōshō shimatsu," *Rekishigaku chirigaku nenpō* 7 (1983): 75–105.

In April 1756, having once again escaped into Kazakh territory, Amursana petitioned Ablai for assistance,⁷¹ but their combined forces were completely defeated by the Qing. In order to hunt down Amursana, the Qing sent troops into Jungaria and Siberia. Russia, on the other hand, decided on the basis of the Toši proposal wording that it could grant subject status to petitioning Jungars.⁷² Those who converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity were sent to live among the converted Torgkut while all others were merged with the Torgkut of the Volga area.

Messengers were sent to invite Amursana to Russia as well. The Bashkir elder Kaskinov, who acted as Russia's envoy made contact with Amursana in October⁷³ thus leading to Russian interference in Jungar affairs. However, Russia's offering to allow Amursana to maintain his rank can be interpreted as an excuse to invite him to Russia with their real motive being an attempt to limit the expansion of Qing influence among the Jungars by keeping Amursana under their control in Orenburg. Amursana himself had petitioned the Russian emperor for support for asylum⁷⁴ illustrating how both parties were making approaches to one another. Because it is necessary to clearly outline and consider the differences in Russian and Qing stances regarding the second and third clauses of the Toši proposals that would be referred to during intensified Russian-Qing negotiations regarding Amursana, this issue will be described in more detail in section three of this chapter.

As a result of this disruption of the Russian-Jungar-Qing balance of power, the various ethnic groups of the Altai (formerly subject to the Jungars and sometimes referred to in historical sources as the Uriankhai) next began escaping into Russian territory. This fact led to the reopening of negotiations between the Qing and Russia regarding Central Asia in step with the Qing suppression of the Jungars. The following will seek to explain the situation behind these events.

Among the Siberian Altai groups, those concerned with the events above were southern Altai, particularly the Altai-kiji, the Telenggut (also known as the Kalmyk of the Altai Mountains), and the Teleut (also known as the Teles or White Kalmyk). The Qing referred to the groups inhabiting the area between

71 Later, the Kazakh intellectual Shakarim described the scene of Amursana's visit to Ablai, see Q. Shākārim, *Türk, qırghız-qazaq hām khandar shejiresi* (Almaty: Qazaqstan; Sana, 1991): 29–30.

72 Memorandum within College of Foreign Affairs, 1755, MOTsA 2: 94–95.

73 Report by Kaskinov, 10.31.1756, MOTsA 2: 47–49. See also Morikawa, "Amurusana omeguru roshin kōshō shimatsu": 82.

74 Letter from Amursana to Empress Elizaveta Petrovna, no later than 12.26.1756, MOTsA 2: 54.

northwest Mongolia and the Altai as the Tannu Uriankhai, the Altai Uriankhai, and the Altan-noor Uriankhai. However, the southern Altai ethnic groups centered around Telenggut are the same group as the Altan-noor Uriankhai. The term Uriankhai was also often used by the Russians to refer to the Southern Altais (map 6).



MAP 6 Altais and Kazakhs⁷⁵

Following Qing attacks after 1754, the sympathies of the southern Altai ethnic groups began to lean strongly toward Russia in 1755. Ombo and other *zaisan* who had been followers of the Jungars expressed their desire to become Russian subjects to local Russian government offices.⁷⁶ To the Russians, the Altai were *dvoedanets*⁷⁷ – a “doubly subject” people who paid both *yasak* (a fur tax) to the Russians and *alban*⁷⁸ to the Jungars. Within instructions to Nepliuev, the Governor of the Orenburg governorate, dated 1756.1.27, the Russian government recognized that the Qing Dynasty considered the “Uriankhai” and Tau-Teleuts to be their own vassals but at the same time stated that they would be

75 J. Noda, “18 seiki chūō ajia ni okeru roshin kankei: Jūngaru seiken hōkai kara kazafu, arutai shozoku no kizoku mondai e,” *Shigaku zasshi*, 116 (9) (2007): 13.

76 Report by Nepliuev to College of Foreign Affairs, 11.21.1755, RDO: 186. “Zaisan” appears in Manchu documents as “jaisang.”

77 MOTsA 2: 222. It was the Russian side that defined the Altais in this way.

78 This is the Mongol word meaning “tribute.” In Russian texts, *alman* is also found. According to information from 1752, it costs 2–3 sables per person, see commandant of Bikatun fortress, Keneman to commander of army of Siberian fortified line, I. Kraft, 7.23.1752, RDO: 162–163.

accepted into Russian territory if secretly relocated to the Volga region.⁷⁹ On 18 April, a petition from Ombo and others for Russian subject status arrived at the Russian College of Foreign Affairs.⁸⁰ The Qing as well received reports that “Ombo’s son Bolot, a *zaisan* of the Uriankhai, has escaped into Russian territory” thereby showing their awareness of these developments.⁸¹

Instructions dated 2 May from the College of Foreign Affairs to Miatlev, the Governor of the Siberian governorate, ordered the internment of Ombo and other “Jungar” *zaisans* and quoted from the Toši proposals as follows. This citation of the Toši proposals seems the earliest such reference during 1756–1758.

Ashan-i amba[n] Toši, who stayed here in 1731, proposed that “if Jungar people (*zengorskie ulusy*) escape to Russia following attacks by the military of the Qing Dynasty, Russia will be requested to accept them...” Furthermore, “[the Qing] should yield to us [Russia] the necessary amount of Jungar territory.”⁸²

Although the above quotes are taken from the second and third clauses of the Toši proposals, they make no reference to the fact that the Toši proposals actually requested the turning over of such members of the ruling class as the *zaisan*. It is quite apparent that Russia cherry-picked only what was convenient from the proposals. Such a perception of the Toši proposals was shared by local Russian offices in many areas and, during later negotiations, Russia repeatedly asserted this type of interpretation. At any rate, having received the above instructions, Miatlev reported on 9 Nov. that: “the Uriankhai, Teleut, and Kazakhs have willingly sought to become subjects of Her Majesty and, *in keeping with the suggestions of Toši* [emphasis added] who visited in 1731 ..., they have been accepted.”⁸³

It can safely be assumed that Russia’s decision to accept Amursana and others (including such Altai leaders as Ombo) was undertaken in an effort to both maintain their influence over the Jungars and to prevent an increase in the power of the Qing Dynasty. However, it is worth pointing out that they could manage to justify this behavior only by considering Ombo and others to be subjects of the Jungars and by manipulating the wording of the Toši proposals.

79 RDO: 194.

80 RDO: 202–203.

81 PDZFL (Ch.) zhengbian, vol. 29: 11.

82 MOTsA 2: 29–30.

83 MOTsA 2: 51.

The Qing Dynasty, on the other hand, began to consider the Tannu-Uriankhai to be Qing subjects from the middle of the seventeenth century on.⁸⁴ Also, following the capitulation of the Jungars to the Qing and according to the contents of the Kyakhta Treaty, the Qing considered it a matter of course that former Jungar subjects like the various ethnic groups of the Southern Altai (the Teleuts, Telengguts, etc.) would be repatriated to Qing territory.⁸⁵ The Russians were aware that the Qing still regarded such people as the Tau-Teleuts (all of whom were considered to be “Jungars [*zengorskoi narod*]” by the Qing), including Ombo, to have surrendered to the Qing empire.⁸⁶ In this way, jurisdiction over the Altai ethnic groups came to be a major issue between Russia and the Qing.⁸⁷

In addition, the Qing were attempting to secure the involvement of Ablai (influential within the Kazakh Middle Juz) in the conflict against the Jungars. In February 1755, during the process of deposing the last Jungar sovereign Dawachi, the Qing decided their first policy regarding the Kazakhs: “Should the Kazakhs surrender [to us], out of consideration for their chieftain, an invitation to the capital shall be extended for the purposes of having an audience with the emperor and receiving a title.”⁸⁸ As is clearly evident from three edicts sent to Ablai during QL21 (1756),⁸⁹ the Qing continually pointed out that Amursana resided within the nomadic land of the Kazakhs and demanded his arrest and repatriation. Simply judging from Qing historical sources, the Kazakhs led by Ablai appear to have been basically loyal and the issue of Amursana was nothing but an obstacle to such friendly relations.⁹⁰ Just as the Qing had hoped to attain Kazakh cooperation in the struggle against the

84 The Qing Empire regarded that the Tannu-Uriankhai had been under Qing jurisdiction since 1655, Fan Mingfang, *Tangnu wulianghai lishi yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2004): 25. The Qing established the post of *zongguan* (supervisor in chief) among the Uriankhai, when the rebellion by Chingunjav occurred in 1756.

85 L.P. Potapov, *Ocherki po istorii Altaitsev* (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1953): 183.

86 An instruction by Elizaveta to Nepliuev, 1.27.1756, RDO: 194.

87 Moiseev, *Tsinskaiia imperiia i narody Saiano-Altaiia v XVIII v.*: 97.

88 PDZFL (Ch.) zhengbian, vol. 8: 13. Previously, Ablai had petitioned for surrender to the Qing Empire in QL20/7, QZHG 1: 11. Kicengge (Cheng Zhi) analyzed Manchu documents from the earliest period of Kazakh-Qing relations that also touched on the subjugation of the Jungars, see Kicengge, *Daichin=gurun to sono jidai: teikoku no keisei to hakkishakai* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2009): 109–110.

89 Li, *Hasakesitan ji qiyu zhongguo xinjiang de guanxi*: 100–106.

90 Saguchi also believed that Amursana involved Kazakhs in the battle against the Qing, see T. Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 266.

Jungars during the 1730s, during this period they expected the Kazakhs to cooperate in the apprehension of Amursana once they learned of his taking refuge on Kazakh nomadic lands.⁹¹

However, the Kazakhs never offered Amursana to the Qing. In fact, as has been mentioned above, after once again escaping into Kazakh lands during April 1756, Amursana sought Ablai's cooperation and their combined military forces were defeated by the Qing in August. The Russians were also aware at this time of the position the Kazakhs took with Amursana against the Qing.⁹² The Kazakhs retreated as far as the Siberian fortified line and, according to a memorial to the throne by Nepluev on 8 Oct., some of these Kazakhs came to seek Russian protection.⁹³ In this way, the issue of under whose jurisdiction the Kazakh lands, into which Amursana had fled, became a bone of contention between the Russians and Qing along with the previously discussed problems regarding jurisdiction over the Altai.

In the next section, we will examine in more detail the diplomatic correspondence of 1756–1758, during which period negotiations were frequently held between the Russians and the Qing. This will be undertaken in an effort to illustrate how the problems of interpretation regarding the wording of the Toši proposals as mentioned above affected Russia-Qing negotiations. This examination will also show how problems of jurisdiction came to be dealt with as a result of the negotiations.

3 The Russian-Qing Negotiations of 1756–1758 Regarding Central Asia

After 1756, negotiations came to be held between Russia and the Qing on such issues as Amursana, the Uriankhai, and the Kazakhs. However, narratives regarding these negotiations within *Daqing shilu* and the compilation *Pingding Zhunga'er fanglüe* (Imperial Commissioned Military History of the

91 For a memorial on the possibility of Amursana's fleeing into the Kazakh Steppe, see PDZFL (Ch.) zhengbian, vol. 27: 35.

92 From Miatlev to College of Foreign Affairs, 10.27.1756; report from Miatlev to Governing Senate, 11.9.1756, MOTsA 2: 46 and 50. As a background of Amursana's rebellion, Onuma recently characterized the activity of Amursana in contrast to the Jungar rebellion as a reaction to Qing policies that oppressed the power of Jungar traditional heads, see T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014): 101–115.

93 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*: 129–130. Nepluev was the Governor of the Orenburg region.

Pacification of the Jungars) are incomplete and contain no reference to any give and take regarding the wording of the Toši Mission. For these reasons, this chapter's analysis of the Russian side will be based on diplomatic documents organized by Bantysh-Kamenskii and mainly Manchu documents housed within the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), while the Qing point of view will be analyzed using the *Archives on Russia (Eluosi dang)* supplemented with the *Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace (Gugong ewen shiliao)*⁹⁴ as well as duplicates of memorials contained in the *Junjichu lufu zouzhe* and *Yuezhedang*. Particularly indispensable for an understanding of the Qing demands is the AVPRI collection (*fond*) of documents related to China (f. 62/1) which contains diplomatic correspondence from the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan*) to the Russian Senate. In order to fully grasp the multi-faceted nature of these negotiations, it is necessary to use these documents not only to consider the central negotiations conducted between the Court of Colonial Affairs and the Russian Senate, but also to pay attention to negotiations that took place within the Siberian fortified line, which was unregulated by the sixth article of the Kyakhta Treaty. Within these boundaries, negotiations were not only conducted through correspondence but orally as well.

The general outline of 1756–1758 Russian-Qing negotiations following the escape of Amursana into Kazakh territory can be grasped from table 2.

In general, Russian documents were written in Russian or Latin while those of the Qing were written in Manchu, Latin, or Russian.⁹⁵ Within the table above, entries in brackets represent negotiations that were conducted orally. Circles in the appropriate columns indicate whether the content of the negotiations dealt with the Toši proposals, the problem of Amursana's location and repatriation (issues related to Chingunjav of Hotogoito are also indicated in this column), the issue of repatriation and jurisdiction over the Altai, or, finally, the issue of jurisdiction over the Kazakhs. Dates according to the lunar calendar are shown first on the table, followed by the same dates according to the Julian calendar.

94 A second edition with many supplementary materials was recently republished, GES 1 and GES 2.

95 For the system of documentation or language in Russo-Qing correspondences, see Yanagisawa, "Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōankan shozō no roshia kankei manbun tōan nitsuite": 48.

TABLE 2 Main negotiations between Russia and Qing in 1756–1758⁹⁶

No.	Date of sending (Qing calendar / Julian calendar)	Date of receiving or translating	Sender	Addressee	Contents of documents			Sources
					Toši	Amursana	Altaiś	
1	QL21/1/25 2.13.1756		Qing's border guard	Russian Governing Senate	°			BK: 267
2	4/6 4.23		<i>Dingxi jiangjun</i>	Senate	°			97
3	4/9 4.26	10.13.1756	Qing Lifanyuan	Senate	°			GES 2: 66–67 RDO: 203–204
4	6/25 7.10	10.13	Lifanyuan	Senate		°		MOTsA 2: 34–35 BK: 268
5	8/11 8.24	11.28	Lifanyuan	Senate	(on Chingunjav)			GES 2: 64 BK: 268

⁹⁶ “AVPRI” and “BK” in Table 2 indicate respectively “AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2” and Bantysh-Kamenskii’s collection of documents. Research by Yanagisawa and Shibuya was very helpful when making this table. See Yanagisawa, “Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōankan shozō no roshia kankei manbun tōan nitsuite”; K. Shibuya, “Genchi karano hōkoku: roshia teikoku gairō monjokan no chūgoku kankei bunsho nitsuite,” *Manzoku shi kenkyū* 1 (2002): 92–112.

⁹⁷ Yanagisawa, “Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōankan shozō no roshia kankei manbun tōan nitsuite”: 53–54.

No.	Date of sending (Qing calendar / Julian calendar)	Date of receiving or translating	Sender	Addressee	Contents of documents				Sources
					Toši	Amursana	Altai	Kazakh	
6	Leap month 9/13 10.25		[Trautenberg]	[a.jianggin]	o		o	o	MOTsA 2: 50
7	10/2 11.12		Lifanyuan	Senate		o			BK: 272
8	10/19 11.29		Lifanyuan	Senate		o	o		BK: 272
9	12/16 1.24.1757		Iakobi	Sangjaidorji	o		o		MOTsA 2: 56–58
10	QL22/1/25 3.4	7.8.1757	Lifanyuan	Senate			o		BK: 267
11	3/11 4.17	QL22/6/13 (translation)	Senate	Lifanyuan		(on Chingun-jav)			GES 1: 175–176 BK: 271
12	4/14 5.20	QL22/7/8 (tr.)	Senate	Lifanyuan	o	o	o	o	GES 2: 70–76 MOTsA 2: 58–65
13	5/10 6.14	10.24.1757	Lifanyuan	Senate		o		o	AVPRI: 15–17

TABLE 2 *Main negotiations between Russia and Qing in 1756–1758 (cont.)*

No.	Date of sending (Qing calendar / Julian calendar)	Date of receiving or translating	Sender	Addressee	Contents of documents				Sources
					Toši	Amursana	Altai	Kazakh	
14	6/18 7.22	10.14	Šundene	Remberkh ⁹⁸	◦				AVPRI: 40–43 BK: 280
15	6/18 7.22		[Trautenberg]	[Šundene]	◦	◦		◦	JMLZ: 1669–5/ 47–857
16	7/11 8.14	11.6	Šundene	Fortress of Semipalatinsk				◦	AVPRI: 46–55
17	7/11 8.14	11.5	Lifanyuan	Senate	◦		◦	◦	AVPRI: 64–74
18	7/27 8.30		Lifanyuan	Senate		◦	◦	◦	GES 2: 97–98
19	7/29 9.1	1.20	Lifanyuan	Senate		◦		◦	BK: 279

98 It seems to be Trautenberg.

No.	Date of sending (Qing calendar / Julian calendar)	Date of receiving or translating	Sender	Addressee	Contents of documents			Sources
					Toši	Amursana	Altaiś	
20	8/14 9.16 ⁹⁹		[Sabrov ⁷]	[Šundene]	°			GES 2: 98
21	9/22 10.23	3.18	Lifanyuan	Senate	°			PDZFL zhengbian, vol. 44:17
22	11/1 11.30 ¹⁰⁰		Fude	Senate	°		°	AVPRI: 287-315 BK: 281
23	QL23/1/21 2.17.1758		Senate	Lifanyuan	°	°	°	JMLZ: 1688-6/ 48-1063-1075

99 Šundene reached Semipalatinsk on 7/26 and began to negotiate with the Russian side, see QL22/8/11, memorial of Jaohūi, XMD vol. 25: 48. Memorial of Fude dated 9/27 mentioned that Sabrov negotiated with Šundene as well on 9/15, JMLZ: 1657-034/46-2008-9. The memorial is also included in XMD (vol. 26: 59).

100 According to Bartysh-Kamenskii, the date of reception was 10.5, but this seems wrong when considering the date it was sent.

The last communication listed (#23) is dated 17 Feb. 1758. The assertions of both parties had solidified by this time and this document¹⁰¹ comprises a response from the Russian Senate to the Court of Colonial Affairs regarding issues of jurisdiction over the Jungars (including Amursana) as well as groups formerly influenced by the Jungars like the Uriankhai and the Kazakhs.¹⁰² While referring to this document, points of conflict within the Russian-Qing negotiations regarding the Jungars (1), the Altai (2), and the Kazakhs (3) will be summarized and considered below.

3.1 *The Jungars and Amursana*

Regarding the Amursana negotiations, Morikawa Tetsuo has made use of the works of Bantysh-Kamenskii and Zlatkin in order to organize the available published sources of both Russian and Qing origin.¹⁰³ Morikawa gives differences of interpretation regarding the Kyakhta Treaty as the source of conflict, but the focus in this chapter will be on the role played within negotiations by the Toši proposals. While clarifying the positions of both Russia and the Qing, consideration will be made of the treatment of the Amursana and Jungar issues within the negotiations.

Throughout negotiations, the Qing consistently demanded repatriation of Amursana. According to Bantysh-Kamenskii, such demands on Russia began with a document (#1) dated QL21/1/25 (1756). The sender of this document was listed as a Qing “border official,” but another document (#3) was sent from the Court of Colonial Affairs to the Russian Senate on 4/9 (of the lunar calendar). This second document, having asserted that “the Jungars,” including Amursana, “were loyal” to the Qing, reported that the Qing had deployed troops in response to Amursana’s escaping into the territory of the Kazakhs. It further demanded that Amursana be repatriated in the event that he escape into Russian territory.¹⁰⁴

However, the Kazakhs of the Middle Juz under the command of Ablai “submitted to” and came to be aligned with the Qing.¹⁰⁵ At this time the Kazakhs

101 This document contains texts which had been exchanged between the two empires. Thus, we can infer the contents of the original correspondence by referring to document #23. The same document is contained in XMD (vol. 29: 201–221, probably received on QL23/3).

102 Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 281–282.

103 Morikawa, “Amurusana omeguru roshin kōshō shimatsu”: 99–100.

104 RDO: 203.

105 For the background and process of this event from the Qing perspective, see T. Onuma, “Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the ‘ejen-albatu Relationship’ in Central Asia,” in J. Noda &

claimed that Amursana escaped after stealing their horses,¹⁰⁶ thus displaying a willingness to punish Amursana.¹⁰⁷ That having been said, Amursana's escape into Russian territory was aided by the Kazakh clan chief Umir who sheltered him from the Qing military. Because Umir was later rewarded by the Russians,¹⁰⁸ it is possible to assume their participation in the events. Even so, the Qing became able to rely on Kazakh cooperation following their subjection of the Kazakhs.¹⁰⁹ Before these developments, the Qing expressed their suspicions to Russia that, because Amursana couldn't be within the territory of the Kazakhs, he must certainly be somewhere in Russia (#13). The Qing continued by stating that they had discovered a letter¹¹⁰ sent by the Russian colonel Degarriga to Amursana. While criticizing Russia on this point, the "Middle Kingdom" (expressed variously within the Kyakhta Treaty as "*dulimbai gurun*," "*sinenses*," or "*Sredinnoe gosudarstvo*" in Manchu, Latin, or Russian respectively) declared their expectation, as a great state, that Russia would honor Qing positions. The following quotes from document #23 relate to this matter:

[The Qing] came into possession of a letter sent in answer to Amursana ... and sent the following request regarding the matter. Namely, the [Qing] divine ruler is desirous within his heart that a Russian response be made to Amursana and that he be invited to Russia with the intent of deceiving and deporting him to the Qing.¹¹¹

For their part, the Russians had originally responded conditionally by asserting that, in any event, "the Jungar" Amursana was not currently residing within Russian territory, yet, even if he were to appear in Russia, Qing "desires that he be deported could only be based on the friendly relationship between the empires" rather than on appeal to the Kyakhta Treaty owing to the fact that the Jungars were an independent power themselves (#12).¹¹² This wording is the

T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (2010): 86–125. For his revised discussion, see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*.

106 Memorial of Jaohūi, imperially endorsed on QL22/7/16, JMYD 91 (1) the second volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the seventh month of QL22: 24.

107 This content was announced by Lifanyuan to Russia, AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 21.

108 I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998): 86, 171–172.

109 Memorial of Jaohūi, imperially endorsed on QL22/7/16, JMYD 91 (1) the second volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the seventh month of QL22: 146.

110 MOTsA 2: 54–55.

111 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1063.

112 Russia had a policy of accepting Jungar elders fleeing Qing expansion into Jungaria, see Morikawa, "Amurusana omeguru roshin kōshō shimatsu": 82.

same as that used by the Empress Anna in her response to the Toši proposals and only indicates the possibility of consideration of Qing requests. Once the Kazakhs had come under the jurisdiction of the Qing and the possibility of Amursana's escape into Russian territory came to be more real, the Qing tone toward Russia increased in severity.

During this same period, the Russians promised (#11) to deport Chingunjav, who was guilty of causing an uprising against the Qing. However, this promise was actually made after the Qing had already apprehended Chingunjav and, as will be described later, simply led to a hardening of Qing attitudes (#16). As already mentioned, the discovery of correspondence between Amursana and a Russian soldier (#13) had already increased Qing suspicions (#18). Regarding Russian attitudes evident in an earlier document (#12) that had incurred the displeasure of Emperor Qianlong, Bratishchev, a government official from the College of Foreign Affairs stationed in Beijing, reported his opinion that "inaccurate" translations of Latin passages into Manchu were responsible for Russia's intentions not being clearly communicated.¹¹³ Much of the two parties' being at cross purposes was indeed caused by translation issues.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, document #16 not only criticizes Russia's failure to deport Amursana, but also touches on the second clause of the Toši proposals. Specifically, the Qing recognized that the proposals mentioned a possible cession of Jungar territory to Russia, but claimed that this cession was conditioned on Russia's offering assistance in the conflict against the Jungars. Because no such cooperation had occurred, the Qing maintained that there was no reason for them to yield territory to the Russians.¹¹⁵

Turning our attention to actual lands within Central Asia, on QL22/6/8 (1757), an imperial escort led by Šundene reached the Irtysh River, which can be considered the border of Russia, and held negotiations in the Ust' Kamenogorsk fort with fon-Traunberg, the local government official (#15). However, here as well, no change in the demands of either party can be found. The following is a quote of fon-Traunberg found within the memorial made by Šundene:

Neither Amursana ... nor any other such persons have come to us here. Even if they did, we would not provide them with refuge. This is not only [because] we are concerned with the peace between our two states, but [also because] we are in possession of the wording (*bithe*) of the *ashan-i*

113 Memoranda from College of Foreign Affairs to Russian Senate, 3.16.1758, MOTsA 2: 95.

114 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1068.

115 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1065–66; Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 275.

amban (Ch. *shilang*) Toši who came to establish stability in the frontier regions. Our Russian laws are also very strict, so how could we possibly deceive the ministers of the Qing emperor.¹¹⁶

Within the complied PDZFL, the same fon-Traunberg quote is merely given as: “Amursana and his inner circle have never been to Russia. Our Russian laws are also very strict, so why would we go so far as to break our promise and hide them.”¹¹⁷ By comparing the two quotes, we can see how Russia made use of the third clause of the Toši proposals when denying the presence of Amursana. In fact, this doesn’t mean that they were prepared to deport Amursana in accordance with the Toši proposals. Rather, it seems appropriate to interpret this as little more than Russia’s way of denying any relationship with Amursana by emphasizing that they were following the law. This content would be cited in later documents (#18 and #19) that were sent from the Court of Colonial Affairs to the Russian Senate and showed a renewed Qing desire to secure literal application of the Toši proposals by Russia.

Throughout this exchange, both parties were unable to reach an agreement and Šundene came to believe that the Russians were actually harboring Amursana.¹¹⁸ Šundene persistently requested that Russia submit “a document proving” (an official declaration stating) that Amursana was not in Russia. In the end Šundene was able to attain such a document. It seems that the Qing placed greater emphasis on the meaning that such bonds held within the context of the sixth article of the Kyakhta Treaty than the Russians did. Later, upon meeting Sabrov, the military officer in charge of defending Semipalatinsk, Šundene asked for his signature to serve as proof that documents from the Court of Colonial Affairs had been delivered (#20).¹¹⁹

On 28 July (1757), Amursana arrived in the Russian territory of Semipalatinsk. Russia leaked false information that Amursana had drowned in an effort to cover up his presence within Russian territory. However, the Qing soon gained accurate intelligence and immediately sought to refute Russia’s claims.¹²⁰ Document #22, sent by the councilor Fude, once again expressed Qing suspicions.¹²¹ Because Amursana did in fact die from an illness on 21 September, the

116 QL22/6/29, memorial of Jaohüi and Fude, JMLZ: 1699–5/47–857 (XMD vol. 24: 99).

117 PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 42: 3.

118 JMLZ: 1669–5/47–854.

119 When Šundene met Sabrov again, Šundene told him that a Jungar captive had mentioned Amursana’s fleeing to Russia, see JMLZ: 1657–034/46–2008–9.

120 PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 44: 15.

121 AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 306. A Kazakh informant pointed out the possibility that Amursana was located in Russian territory.

Russian Senate attempted to control the situation by quibbling that “although Amursana was saved from drowning, he died when sent to Tobol’sk (#23).

Russian assertions of the time can be summarized as follows. Because the Jungars were an independent power, the harboring of Jungar subjects within Russian territory was in no way in violation of the Kyakhta Treaty.¹²² Regarding the third clause of the Toši proposals, Russia would only go as far as to reassert its having previously stated a possibility to consider fulfilling the request contained in the clause and repeated that Russia was not in violation of the Kyakhta Treaty. Furthermore, Russia demanded that the Qing “remember the words spoken by [their] own envoy [Toši].”¹²³ This was a reference to the first clause of the Toši proposals regarding advance notice of military deployment against the Jungars – the Russians can even be interpreted as criticizing the Qing for subjugating the Jungars without having first notified Russia. The hard-line Qing attitude, however, was not to change. During subsequent negotiations, the focus would simply shift to demands that Amursana’s body be turned over to the Qing as well as an individual named Shereng who had fought with him.¹²⁴

While using the wording of the Kyakhta Treaty and the Toši proposals for their own purposes, the Russians continued to assert the appropriateness of accepting the Jungars into Russian territory. While being careful not to be found out by the Qing, Russia had in fact invited Amursana into Russia.¹²⁵ Faced with such Russian posturing, the Qing gradually strengthened their opposition, leading to a straining of the relationship between the two empires regarding Central Asian matters.

3.2 *The Altaïs (Altan Noor- Uriankhai)*

Claiming them all as subjects of the Qing and making an appeal to the principles of the Kyakhta Treaty, the Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifanyuan) also demanded (#4) the repatriation of *zaisan* Ombo and others of the Teleuts (referred to within the historical sources as the Uriankhai).¹²⁶ In response, negotiations were held in Ust’ Kamenogorsk on 25 Oct. 1756. During these negotiations, Russia gave notification (#6) that the Teleuts (Uriankhai) had

¹²² JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1068–69.

¹²³ JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1072.

¹²⁴ Morikawa, “Amurusana omeguru roshin kōshō shimatsu”: 92–96. For the status of Jungars who moved into Russian territory, see Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii*: 116–117. Some of the Jungar refugees to Volga experienced hardship due to their change in circumstances, see instruction from Senate to the College of Foreign Affairs, 10.28.1757, RDO: 224.

¹²⁵ MOTsA 2: 67–68.

¹²⁶ MOTsA 2: 35.

been welcomed into Russian territory in accordance with the Toši proposals. Furthermore, Iakobi, the commander of Selenginsk, quoted directly from the Toši proposals while refuting Qing demands (#9). However, it is important to recognize how Russia again made use of the proposals only in so far as they supported Russian intents: as was the case with the College of Foreign Affairs instructions previously mentioned, Iakobi left out all passages from the second clause of the Toši proposals that dealt with the treatment of *zaisan*.¹²⁷

Within the central government as well, the Russian Senate claimed (#12) that Ombo and the others had personally petitioned for subject status. In addition, because the Jungars “were subject to no one,”¹²⁸ Russia once again claimed that the Kyakhta Treaty was inapplicable and, while there was the issue of Toši proposal content related to the *zaisan*, would only go so far as to reply that a friendly agreement could be reached. This is the same policy as was taken by the Russians during negotiations regarding Amursana. Furthermore, regarding the issue of giving refuge to the Altai *zaisan* and removing them from the area of the borders, Russia explained that such behavior was justified by both the Toši proposals and the earlier communication (#4) received from Qing’s *Lifanyuan*.¹²⁹

Lifanyuan again demanded repatriation (#10), and, being rebuffed by the Russian Senate as above, followed by demanding repatriation based on the Kyakhta Treaty in the following terms (#18):

Goljokhoi (Ru. *Gulchukhai*) and Ombo [of the Teleut] ... under the terms of the peace treaty [the Kyakhta Treaty], are not the type of persons who should be given refuge by Russia.¹³⁰

The Qing were also highly critical of Russia within a document (#17) dated 14 August. It should be noted that, not only did the Qing demand “correct adherence to the peace treaty established by both countries,”¹³¹ but they also commented specifically on the Toši proposals themselves. After bringing up the fact that the Russian empress had indicated that she “hopes to deliver them to the Qing if any of the Jungar *zaisan* escape to Russia,”¹³² the Court of Colonial Affairs firmly declared that Russia’s harboring of the Uriankhai was contradictory to the Empress Anna’s answer to the Toši proposals as follows:

¹²⁷ MOTsA 2: 57.

¹²⁸ MOTsA 2: 60.

¹²⁹ MOTsA 2: 63.

¹³⁰ GES 2: 98.

¹³¹ AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 73.

¹³² AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 68.

The presence [in Russia] of Uriankhai *zaisan* that should rightly be repatriated to our country, such as Goljokhoi, Ombo and his son, does not accord with the just quoted words of *Khaton khan* [the Russian empress]. It is also at odds with what was promised through our *ashan-i amban* Toši.¹³³

It should be noted that Russia refuted the above by asserting that while Toši “made a total of four demands, [Russia] had not agreed to them.”¹³⁴

The Qing responded this time by requesting that “Uriankhai issues be resolved in accordance to the statements of Toši” (quotation within document #23).¹³⁵ The Russians, however, pointed out that the Uriankhai were not addressed by the Toši proposals and continued to refuse cooperation (#23).¹³⁶ In the end, Russia replied (also within document #23) that Ombo and others had died and, furthermore, that many of the previously subject peoples of the Jungars had already converted to Russian Orthodoxy so Russia had no intention to deport them. At this point, Russia and the Qing reached an impasse¹³⁷ – differences of opinion regarding interpretation of the Toši proposals had become the focal point of problems regarding the granting of refuge to the Altai people.

In this way, jurisdiction over a portion of the southern Altai (mainly the Teleuts and Telengguts), who dwelt nomadically within the areas of the Chuya and Katun Rivers, as well as jurisdiction over the Baraba Tatars,¹³⁸ who dwelt between the Irtysh and Ob’ Rivers, came to be held in a vague way by both Russia and the Qing. In addition to paying *yasak* to the Russians, the Altai also paid *alban* to the Qing. This situation was to continue until the settling of a treaty regarding the Tarbagatai border in 1864.¹³⁹ As previously described, the Qing classified the Altai as “Altan noor-Uriankhai” and, when new *zaisans* pledged loyalty in 1758, the Qing appointed them *zongguan* (supervisors-in-chief) and organized the Altai according to the *Niru* (*zuoling*) system.¹⁴⁰ This

133 AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 72.

134 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1072.

135 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1067.

136 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1064–1065.

137 JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1070.

138 Baraba Tatars had paid tribute to both the Jungars and Russia since the seventeenth century, T. Saguchi, *Roshia to ajia sōgen* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1966): 109.

139 Potapov, *Ocherki po istorii Altaitsev*: 187.

140 PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 47: 17. The Qing court stated in document #4 that it gave the posts of *zongguan* and *yichang* (*galade* in the text, or *gala-i da* in Manchu) to the “Uriankhai” along the Katun River (that is, the Altai), MOTSA 2: 35

seems to show how the Qing perceived the Altai to be their own subjects.¹⁴¹ Within Qing regulations, in fact, it was stated that “within the first month of every year, the Altan noor-Uriankhai will pay a tribute in animal skins.”¹⁴² Russian sources, like the following report to the College of Foreign Affairs from December 1757, also attest to this practice: “Eight members of the Qing military arrived to collect *alban* and took one sable fur for every person among the Teleuts. ... [The Teleuts also] paid *yasak* into the National Treasury of the Empress.”¹⁴³ There is also evidence from the beginning of 1758 showing that the Qing collected *alban* that year as well.¹⁴⁴

In short, the various Altai ethnic groups went from a situation in which they were paying tribute to both Russia and the Jungars to a situation in which they paid tribute to the Russian and Qing Empires. In other words, they became “double-tributors.” Boronin has written specifically about Altai trends from this point forward so I will avoid touching on that subject in detail here. However, when considering the relationship between the Altai and the Russians, it is important to note Boronin’s point that, due to a lack of serious interference into internal affairs on the part of Russia, the act of paying a small tribute to both empires allowed the various Altai ethnic groups to virtually “govern themselves.”¹⁴⁵

3.3 *The Kazakhs*

Efforts by the Qing to win over the Kazakhs of the Middle Juz, who had once been under the influence of the Jungars, are well known to have occurred as part of the process of stamping out Amursana. For this reason, the main focus here will be on examining how the issue of jurisdiction over the Kazakhs was dealt with within the Russia-Qing relationship while also describing the unique way in which Russia perceived its relationship with the Kazakhs.

During 1756, Russia was aware of the conflict taking place between the Qing military and Ablai and his allies. Apprehensive of both the proximity of Qing forces to Russia and the possibility of the Kazakhs becoming aligned with the

141 Regarding relations between the Qing and Altan noor-Uriankhai, see Fan, *Tangnu wulianghai lishi yanjiu*: 65.

142 *Kebuduo zhengwu zongce* (Rep. *Kebuduo shiyi*. Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969): 44.

143 RDO: 229–230.

144 MOTsA 2: 97–98.

145 O.V. Boronin, *Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri xvii – 60-e gg. xix vv.* (Barnaul: Azbuka, 2004): 179. Boronin illustrates the process of Siberian ethnic groups shifting from making dual tributes to Russia and the Jungars to making tribute to Russia and the Qing. Bykov contrasts Altai’s trade between Russia and the Qing with those of the Kazakhs, see A.Iu. Bykov, “Rossiia i Kazakhstan (xvii–xix vv.),” *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik: 2002: Rossiia i tiurkskii mir* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2003): 68.

Qing, Russia both endeavored to strengthen its line of fortresses¹⁴⁶ and began to proclaim to the Qing that the Kazakhs had become subject to Russia. The first example of Russia declaring jurisdiction over the Kazakhs (as well as the Uriankhai) took place during negotiations related to document #6 (see table above). The report of these proceedings to the College of Foreign Affairs, states that a part of the Kazakhs were allowed to be subject to Russia in accordance with “the suggestions of Toši.”¹⁴⁷

In June 1757, Russia realized just how possible a voluntary submission to the Qing on the part of the Kazakhs was from a statement by the influential Kazakh Kulsari batir who was, at the time, petitioning Russia for protection: “In the event that Qing troops raid us in an effort to apprehend Amursana, we intend to dispatch an mission to seek reconciliation.”¹⁴⁸ The fact that Russia sought to prevent the Kazakhs from falling under the influence of the Qing by appeasing Ablai and others can be seen from the fact that the Russian government paid an annual stipend to influential Kazakh leaders.¹⁴⁹

Russia sent a document (#12) to the Qing declaring that “many of the Kirgis-kasak [Kazakhs] are subjects (*v poddanstve*) of our most gracious of all sovereign, Her Majesty Empress, therefore, any attack made by your country upon any of these subject peoples would be incongruous with the amity that exists between our two governments.”¹⁵⁰ Although there were varying levels of intimacy between Russia and the Kazakhs of the Small and Middle Juz, it was deemed necessary to consider both parties to be Russian subjects. Although the Kazakhs had once been so strongly influenced by the Jungars they had been required to send hostages and pay tribute, it can be said that Russia restrained the Qing military’s approach to the Siberian fortified line by creating this distinction between the Jungars (currently being subjugated by the Qing) and the Kazakhs. At a conference in Ust’ Kamenogorsk (#15), Traunberg emphasized that the Kazakhs were subject to Russia by clearly stating that “Abulkhair [of the Small Juz] was a Russian subject.”¹⁵¹

Russia’s denials regarding the presence of Amursana within Russian territory can be interpreted as a way to avoid recognizing the Qing assertion of a state of enmity¹⁵² between the Kazakhs and Amursana. As a further result, by

146 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*: 103–104.

147 MOTsA 2: 51. This report was cited in a document from Miatlev to the Senate.

148 MOTsA 2: 69.

149 R.B. Suleimenov & V.A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka: o vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Abilaia* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1988): 94–95. Ablai was given 300 rubles and 212 *pud* of wheat annually.

150 MOTsA 2: 64.

151 JMLZ: 1677–12/47–2296.

152 A memorial of Jaohūi imperially endorsed on QL22/5/3, JMYD 89 (1) volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the fifth month of QL22: 32.

suggesting the possibility that Amursana might be among the Kazakhs as well as claiming that the Kazakhs were subject to Russia (and stating that no investigation within Kazakh territory would be permitted), the Russians were in effect expressly refusing to hand Amursana over to the Qing under any conditions.

For the Qing, who had long been trying to win over the Kazakhs, this was unacceptable. On QL22/6/13, the Qing sent word to Russia by envoy¹⁵³ declaring that a surrender document had been officially received from Ablai of the Middle Juz.¹⁵⁴ The Qing also informed the Russians that the Kazakhs were cooperating in the pursuit of Amursana (#17). Regarding the Qing Dynasty's perceptions of their own relationship with the Kazakhs, a Japanese scholar, Takahiro Onuma has analyzed a copy of the Tod-script surrender document and concluded that *Ejen-albatu* relations (with origins in nomadic Mongol society) were in evidence between the Qing and all of the Central Asian powers including the Kazakhs.¹⁵⁵ Even within the local Siberian area, Šundene informed Sabrov of the fact that Ablai had surrendered to the Qing.¹⁵⁶

153 For the details of this communication, see memorial of Jaohūi, imperially endorsed on QL22/7/16, JMYD 91 (1) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the seventh month of QL22: 87–88. For Ablai's diplomatic strategy to the Qing Empire, see T. Onuma, "Nusan shisetsu no haken: 1757 nen ni okeru shin to abulai no chokusetsu kōshō," *Ajia bunkashi kenkyū* 14 (2014): 1–20. See also chapter 4.

154 PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 41: 21.

155 The text in Tod of the Ablai's surrender document reads: "I, Ablai, my children, and all of the Kazakhs became your subjects (*albatu*).” See Onuma, "Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: 101. A photocopy of the text is found in T. Onuma, "Shinchō to kazafu yūboku seiryoku tonō seijiteki kankei ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu: chūō ajia ni okeru *ejen-albatu* kankei no fuen to tenkai," *Ajia Afurika gengo bunka kenkyū* 72 (2006) (<http://repository.tufts.ac.jp/handle/10108/28714>). Onuma later changed his interpretation in the following way: "I, Ablai, am your son, and all of Kazakhs became ...," see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 167. Nevertheless, my understanding is based on his previous translation. The same understanding can be reached from the Manchu translation of the surrender document, JMLZ: 1643–8/45–2679 (Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 11–14). In the Manchu text of the memorials, the phrase "[Ablai] with all of Kazakhs became *albatu* of the Great *ejen* and surrendered" (*gubci hasak be gaifi, amba ejen i albatu ome dahaha*) is repeatedly used. For examples of this wording, see JMYD 91 (1) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the seventh month of QL22: 90. In the case of Kazakhs, it seems to me that the initial symbolic usage of *albatu* was not maintained for long, and it soon became a more formal one like "the communication tool shared by the Qing and Kazakhs in their political negotiations" mentioned by Onuma, see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 271. See also J. Noda, "An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents," in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 147; chapter 2 in this book.

156 9/27, memorial of Fude, JMLZ: 1657–034/46–2008–2009.

Returning to the point of view of Russian-Qing relations, it should be noted that, even after the Kazakhs had sworn allegiance to the Qing, the Qing emphasized that “should Amursana enter Kazakh [lands], the Great Emperor [*amba ejen*] will greatly reward you if Ablai is quick to apprehend and turn him over.”¹⁵⁷ Behind all Qing efforts to win over the Kazakhs,¹⁵⁸ the desire to search for Amursana within Kazakh nomadic lands and the desire to attain Kazakh support in this endeavor¹⁵⁹ were always the main driving forces. The Qing was also unwilling to permit the strengthening of Russian influence¹⁶⁰ over the Kazakhs.

Friction between Russia and the Qing was also caused by their different approaches to establishing relations with non-Russian/Manchu populations. Even when limiting the discussion to the Kazakhs, we can see how Russia considered the basis of subject status to be the swearing of allegiance, the payment of *yasak*, and the sending of hostages,¹⁶¹ while to the Qing the main indicators were a surrender document and the paying of tribute by mission. For this reason, both empires were able to simultaneously claim jurisdiction over the Kazakhs, leading to the types of clashes of opinion that will be detailed below.

Document #17, from the Court of Colonial Affairs to the Russian Senate, details how the Qing military had defeated the Kazakhs during the previous year and includes strong language toward the Russians within such statements as: “if the Kazakhs are truly Russian subjects, how could Russia fail to know of these events? How can they possibly be considered Russian subjects [*harangga*]?”¹⁶² Later in the document, the Qing again asked a similar question: “Exactly when did the Kazakhs become your subjects?”¹⁶³ In this way, the Qing came to strongly argue against Russia’s assertions.

157 Memorial of Jaohūi imperially endorsed on QL22/7/16, JMYD 91 (1): 91.

158 The discussion by Li Sheng regarding this issue seems to lack the influence on the Russo-Qing relations, Li, *Hasakesitan ji qiyu zhongguo xinjiang de guanxi*: 109.

159 In fact, Ablai caught the remaining Jungars and transported them under his guard, PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 42: 1.

160 As Šundene memorialized (QL22/12/18) that “Kazakhs terribly fear Russians,” the Qing side paid much attention to the relations between Kazakhs and Russia, JMLZ: 1677–12/47–2296.

161 See M. Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The making of a colonial empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002): 51–63.

162 AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 66.

163 AVPRI: f. 62/1, op. 1, 1757, no. 2, l. 73.

Russian perception, on the other hand, continued to be that the Kazakhs, including those of the Middle Juz, held Russian subject status as evidenced by a passage from the report of Tevkelev, the aide to the Governor of Orenburg:

Ablai is prepared to be reconciled with the Qing and make an agreement [*dogovor*] to retreat. ... Tevkelev told the khan [of the Small Juz Nurali] that "... no agreement at all should be made with the Qing. ... The Kazakhs are subjects of the [Russian] empress and, as such, their lands also belong to Her Imperial Majesty."¹⁶⁴

Even after the Kazakhs of the Great Juz followed those of the Middle Juz in "submitting"¹⁶⁵ to the Qing, the Russians continued to maintain within negotiations with the Qing that the Kazakhs were already subjects of Russia. Even though Kazakh powers centered around Ablai were the focus of these negotiations, Russia referred to the remittance of hostages by the khan of the Small Juz in order to emphasize the influence they also held over the Middle Juz. Such an assertion can be gathered from Traunberg statement above (#15) as well as from the following quote from document #23:

The clans of the Kazakhs are subjects of our Empress. In 1730, the Kazakh Abulkhair khan, *representing his clan*, submitted to our Russian state. ... Even before that, Abulkhair khan had sent his own children as hostages. ... His son Nurali khan as well, sent his own children yearly to act as hostages. ... In 1040 [actually 1740] Ablai khan,¹⁶⁶ sincerely desirous to become our subject, offered his petition and swore an oath to heaven.¹⁶⁷ [*italics added for emphasis*]

The assertions made above follow the same logic as that used when Russia asserted its jurisdiction over the Kazakhs to Galdan Tsering of the Jungars.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ 9.26.1757, MOTsA 2: 76–77.

¹⁶⁵ As I showed in chapter 2 (70–71), this was interpreted by Russia and the Kazakhs as the conclusion of peace, J. Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku: Surutan to shinchô no kankei o chûshin ni," *Tôyô gaku* 87 (2) (2005): 33–34.

¹⁶⁶ Although Ablai was not yet elected khan, the Qing authorities had already called him as *han*, PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 44: 28. In this case, Ablai was also called *han* in the Manchu translation of the Latin copy of the document delivered by Russia, in which Ablai took an oath regarding his Russian subject status, JMLZ: 1688–12/48–1110.

¹⁶⁷ JMLZ: 1688–6/48–1073–1074.

¹⁶⁸ KRO 1: 228; RDO: 92. In the negotiation with the Jungars (Sep. 1742), the Russian government sent the copy of the document in which Kazakhs took an oath on their subject

The way in which Russia also sent a copy of Ablai's oath (1740) is also reminiscent of that earlier event.¹⁶⁹ Russia also advised the Kazakhs to be careful in their dealings with the Qing Dynasty and sought to have them express their Russian subject status to the Qing by themselves.¹⁷⁰ The Kazakhs, however, took no such action, and this fact helps to illustrate the decision taken by the Kazakhs to follow both empires.

It is worth repeating that the Russians were extremely cautious of any possibility of the Kazakhs engaging in a military invasion of Russian territory in league with the Qing.¹⁷¹ V. Bratishchev, the ambassador in Beijing, had reported that the Qing emperor hoped to send a large military force to the area bordering Russia.¹⁷² In addition, a report was made based on rumors among the Kazakhs that the Qing planned to open hostilities with Russia.¹⁷³ It is impossible to confirm whether such a plan really existed within the Qing government, but there is no doubt that Russian caution was intensified. The way Russia emphasized its rule over the Small Juz and its caution regarding Qing advances in the west show both how Russia's rule over the Middle Juz – which had been strongly influenced by the Jungars – was not fully formed and how the very principle of Russian jurisdiction itself was as yet a highly unstable concept. In addition, instructions issued to Nurali, of the Small Juz, to prepare for war with the Qing were another factor increasing Russia's caution in the area.¹⁷⁴

During the process of dealing with the Jungar issues, it became apparent that both Russia and the Qing would find it necessary to assert their jurisdiction over the Kazakhs. This is borne out by the persistent efforts of the Qing to win over the Kazakhs. Ablai's "submission" must be located within this Russian-Qing confrontation. From the perspective of the Kazakhs, the Qing's refusal to give up on the issue of Amursana and their prioritization of Jungar issues in general meant that there was a chance for the Kazakhs to make demands regarding land and trade while also seeking reconciliation (*hūwaliyame*).¹⁷⁵

status to Russia, see I.V. Erofeeva, "Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia v 40-kh gg. XVIII v. i Kazakhstan (posol'stvo K. Millera)," in *Iz istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v Tsentral'noi Azii: srednie veka i novoe vremia* (Alma-Ata: Ghilim, 1990): 63. See also chapter 2.

169 I referred to this issue before, Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku": 34.

170 Report of Nepliuiev, 1.29.1758, KRO 1: 550–551.

171 For example, instruction to Nepliuiev, 10.2. 1757, MOTsA 2: 72–73.

172 College of Foreign Affairs to Senate, 3.16.1758, MOTsA 2: 95.

173 Translator Guliaev's account, 6.19.1758, MOTsA 2: 107.

174 3.19.1758, MOTsA 2: 97 and 100–101.

175 Memorial of Jaohūi, imperially endorsed on QL22/7/16, JMYD 91 (1) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the seventh month of QL22: 24–25. In later literature, this

Within negotiations with the Qing, Ablai avoided touching on his relationship with Russia and simply swore to become subject to the Qing Dynasty – we can see here the development of Kazakh strategy.¹⁷⁶ Even while attempting to conduct negotiations regarding the Jungars in as profitable way as possible by asserting jurisdiction over the Kazakhs, Russia's actual control over the Middle Juz was not established. In fact, Russia feared a Qing-Kazakh joint struggle to the point of taking an appeasing attitude toward Ablai and others – it can even be said that the Kazakhs of the Middle Juz were in a position of independence from Russia. This situation, the result of Russian and Qing negotiations, can also be interpreted as one cause of the way in which jurisdiction over the Middle and Great Juz¹⁷⁷ was vaguely held by both Russia and the Qing.¹⁷⁸

Finally, an outline should be made of the Russian-Qing negotiations related to the following three groups: the Jungars, the Altai, and the Kazakhs. During the period before and after the establishment of the Kyakhta Treaty, both the Russians and the Qing were seeking to control the Jungars. The sending of the Toši and Dešin Missions provided an opportunity for Jungar issues to once again appear within negotiations between the two countries. However, no regulations were established regarding questions of jurisdiction or territory. The collapse of the Jungar government led to questions being raised regarding subjection of the various groups that had previously been under Jungar influence, but, the way in which the Toši proposals regarding the repatriation of fugitives were remembered at this time is a realistic representation of the stance of both empires as they tried to deal with the Jungar issues that were not covered by the Kyakhta Treaty.

The Qing, seeking the repatriation of Amursana and the Altais, kept to their initial insistence on the principles of the Kyakhta Treaty and even referred to the Toši proposals with their wording that contained elements of compromise. This policy regarding the seeking of Amursana's repatriation as well as infor-

event is described as "submission" (Ch. *guifu* / Ma. *dahaki*), PDZFL *zhengbian*, vol. 41: 20.

176 Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku": 34.

177 The khan of the Great Juz had sent missions twice during the 1730s to request Russian subject status, Moiseev, *Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi*: 109. Later the khan also dispatched tributary missions to the Qing court, see chapter 4.

178 For the later status of Kazakhs within Russo-Qing relations, see Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku." The Qing government expressed its opinion to Russia that the Qing had allowed the Kazakhs to keep relations with Russia. See Suleimenov & Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka: o vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Abilaia*: 92; GZSL vol. 580 (edict on QL24/2/11 (*renxu*)). Later, the Qing Emperor Qianlong, trusting in their loyalty, mentioned in an edict that the Kazakhs would not take sides with Russia, QMJD vol. 22, no. 3911 (QL56/2/10).

mation regarding the Toši Mission and its proposals was well understood even by local officials who became involved in negotiations with the Russians. As a result, Qing actions during the time of the Emperor Qianlong cannot simply be seen as a “hardline policy against Russia.”¹⁷⁹ In addition, it is necessary to differentiate negotiations related to the Mongols and the Northeast from those regarding Central Asia. While it is true that the basic attitude of the Qing could be coercive, with respects to the Russian-Qing relationship that even included negotiations held within the Irtysh fortified line, it must be noted how they sought to address problems beyond the limits of the Kyakhta Treaty and were especially hopeful of gaining Russian cooperation in line with the Toši proposals.

For its part, Russia – partly fearing an interruption in trade – tended to fend off the coercive aspects of Qing demands during negotiations and, by using whatever was convenient from the Kyakhta Treaty and the Toši proposals, tended to try to postpone the actual resolution of problems. While making a show of upholding the Kyakhta Treaty, Russia asserted Jungar “independence,” but when the issue of subjection arose, Russia used its interpretation of the Toši proposals as a pretext to justify their having relocated to Russian territory and emphasized that the Jungars “had already become Russian subjects.” In regards to the Kazakhs as well, Russia stressed their oath of subject status post-1731 and asserted the superiority of Russian claims to jurisdiction. However, the Qing gave maximum prioritization to the apprehension of Amursana and had no doubt regarding their claims over the Kazakhs. Thus, it seems that the Qing were forced to gradually adopt a harsher tone regarding Kazakh issues.¹⁸⁰

Following Amursana’s death, Russia again refused to comply when demands were made for the return of his body, but the issue was settled in 1760 and a new era began in Russian-Qing relations regarding Central Asia.

Conclusion

As has been outlined to this point, during the process of subjugating the Jungars, the Qing Empire moved its forces westward and eventually came to

179 Nomiyama, *Roshin gaikō no kenkyū*: 105.

180 Following document #23, the two empires held heated exchanges regarding the subjection of the Kazakhs until 1760. However, no agreement was reached, see Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 286–299. Russia sometimes insisted that the Qing not interfere with Russo-Kazakh relations because Russia had not intervened in the Qing’s Jungar campaign, see Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del*: 290–291.

hold direct negotiations with the various powers¹⁸¹ that had previously been either indirectly influenced or directly ruled over by the Jungars. Russian influence had already extended to some of these powers, but, because no clear regulations existed regarding spheres of influence, the problem of jurisdiction over these powers became a major diplomatic issue between Russia and the Qing. As the result of both sides claiming jurisdiction according to their own interpretation¹⁸² thereof, a situation of 'vague double subjection' was brought about for the Altai and the Kazakhs. On the other hand, it can be said that the submission by these peoples to both empires was very loose at this time.

While previous research has failed to associate these two powers, it can be said that, because the Altai and the Kazakhs were both located between the two empires, they tended to act as buffer zones,¹⁸³ allowing one another to maintain this vague system of alliances. Regarding the final situation faced by the powers formally under the influence of the Jungars, the following classifications can be made according to the intensity of their relationship to the Qing.¹⁸⁴

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- 181 I. Unkovskii mentioned that the Kazakhs, Uriankhai, Telengguts, Yarkand-Bukharans, Kirghiz, and Baraba Tatars were under the control of the Jungars in 1723, see N.I. Veselovskii, *Posol'stvo k ziungarskomu Khun-Taidzhi Tsevan Rabtanu kapitana ot artillerii Ivana Unkovskogo i putevoi zhurnal ego za 1722–1724 gody* (SPb, 1887): 193–194.
- 182 The Qing authorities, with their theoretical understanding, applied such relations as the 'ejen-albatu' mentioned by Onuma to relationships with Central Asian powers. See footnote 155 in this chapter.
- 183 For the status of Altai, see Boronin, *Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri XVII – 60-e gg. XIX vv.*: 169. The Altai were defined as inner nomads and put under the control of the *dianshu qingli si* which mainly administered the Outer Mongols, see *Qinding daqing huidian* (Jiaqing ed.), vol. 52: 33. This was because the banner and the *Niru* unit were established among the Altai, *Qinding daqing huidian shili*, vol. 740: 13–14. It seems that Qing authorities regarded the Altai as a closer people than the Kazakhs, while a part of Kazakhs was also organized into the *Niru*, see T. Onuma, "Lun qingdai weiyi de hasake niulu zhi bianshe ji qi yiyi," in Zhu Chengru ed., *Qingshi lunji: Qingzhu Wang Zhonghan jiaoshou jiushi huadan xueshu lunwenji* (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2003): 568–575.
- 184 Categories 3 and 4 are similar to *fanshu* (vassal states) indicated in *Xiyu tuzhi*, which categorizes the following groups as *fanshu*: the Left and Right Kazakhs (*Fanshu* 1), the Eastern and Western Kirghiz, the Khoqand, Andijan, Tashkent (*Fanshu* 2), and Badakhshan, Bukhara, Afghans (*Fanshu* 3), see *Qinding huangyu xiyu tuzhi* (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1965), vol. 44–46. In summary, Central Asian powers including the Kazakhs were basically categorized as *fanshu*. According to Kataoka, "*fanshu*" during the middle of the eighteenth century indicated a subject-based relationship rather than one of real geographical space, K. Kataoka, "Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihan, chōkō koku nokankei," *Komazawa shigaku* 52 (1998): 240–263. At least, in the context of Chinese literature, the Kazakhs were considered to come under the influence of the emperor's "virtuous

1. The Xinjiang area fell within Qing influence in a narrow sense as “outer feudatories” (*waifan*) (later just “feudatories” (*fanbu*)).
2. Some powers, including the Southern Altai and the Baraba Tatars, came to be seen by the Russians as “paying double tribute.”
3. The Kazakhs who had previously had relations with Russia adopted a “bi-lateral diplomatic policy”¹⁸⁵ subsequent to the raising of jurisdiction claims by both Russia and the Qing.
4. Some powers to the west of Tianshan and Pamir like the Eastern and Western Kirghiz (*Bulute*), Khoqand, Andijan, Namangan, Bukhara, and Badakhshan, became new tributary vassals (*fanshu*) of the Qing.

While the relationship between the Qing and the members of groups three and four above tended to be of a nominal nature, the simple fact that they did dispatch tributary missions to the Qing was enough to bring about additional caution on the part of Russia. It seems that Russia was associated with the armed Muslim alliance against the Qing which was created among various Central Asian powers following the subjugation of Eastern Turkestan (or “Xinjiang”).¹⁸⁶ This is a topic that will require further investigation in the future.

The results of the renewed attention to Central Asian affairs which followed the subjugation of the Jungars can be summarized into the following two points:

First, the maintenance of the Kyakhta Treaty system with regards to border issues must be mentioned. No other system appeared to regulate the problems addressed between Russia and the Qing other than the Kyakhta Treaty, and there was no other choice but to conduct future negotiations regarding Central Asia based on the Kyakhta Treaty. Specifically, this situation is clearly demonstrated within a document sent from the Russian Senate to *Lifanyuan* on 5 October, 1826.¹⁸⁷ The Russian Senate declared that “*Because the Kyakhta Treaty declares neither jurisdiction nor border details regarding the Kazakhs, they were in a state of independence*” (emphasis added). In other words, while expressing respect for the treaty itself, Russia manipulated its blank spots in order to

example” (*shengjiao*). It is worth mentioning that the categorization in literature of the Qing was not static. I will examine this issue again in chapter 7.

185 Ablai tried to maintain relationships with both Russia and the Qing, using the different diplomacies for each empire, Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku”: 41. See also chapter 2.

186 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*: 180–181; Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū*: 75. See also chapter 4 of this book.

187 The copy of the draft is kept in RGVA. For details, see chapter 7. There is a Chinese translation from the Russian original, GES 2: 330–331.

justify advances into the Kazakh Steppe. Final resolution of jurisdiction issues, including those pertaining to the Altai, would have to wait for the establishment of further border treaties.

Second, changes were made to trade aspects of the Kyakhta Treaty system. Qing trade with the Kazakhs was stopped,¹⁸⁸ while opportunities surfaced for Russian trade in areas not covered by the Kyakhta Treaty.¹⁸⁹ Particular attention was paid to Bukhtarma, located along the upper reaches of the Irtysh River. While detailed analysis of this issue will be undertaken in chapter 6, mention can be made here of the entrance by merchants with Russian citizenship into the trade carried out between cities located along the Irtysh River – through Siberia and into Xinjiang – that began to prosper from the early nineteenth-century and was mainly conducted by Muslim merchants.

The Kyakhta Treaty continued to serve until the middle of the nineteenth century as the model for resolving Russian-Qing disputes, and, within the context of Central Asia as well, the Kyakhta Treaty system model was maintained as a general rule. However, because the treaty was never meant to regulate Central Asian issues, problems like those described above were able to occur.

This chapter has clarified the positions of both empires regarding the Kazakhs and the Altai based on their negotiations regarding the Jungars and the negotiations that took place following the collapse of the Jungar government. The next topic that must be addressed is how the Kazakhs, once in this position, established relationships with both empires. Chapter 7 will eventually focus on the events of the first half of the nineteenth century (regarding the general situation during the latter half of the eighteenth century, please refer to chapter 2). In chapter 4, I will detail how the Qing came to perceive the nomadic society and territory of the ‘Kazakh Khanates’ once having finally established relations with them.

188 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 172–180.

189 Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku”: 47–48. Regarding transit trade conducted by Altai between Russia and the Qing, see Boronin, *Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri XVII – 60-eg. XIX vv.*: 180.

The Differing Nature of the Three Kazakh *Juz* and the Three “*Bu*” (Sections) Mentioned in Qing Historical Sources¹

Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Kazakh Khanates, suffering from attacks by the Jungars, had established relations with Russia in the west from the beginning of the eighteenth century. During June of 1757, the Khanates were ‘subjugated’ by the Qing dynasty in the east and relations with the Qing Dynasty were officially recognized by the Qing court at this time. Though I have already been using the term ‘Kazakh Khanates’ in this manner, it is necessary here to investigate the specific social structure displayed by the Khanates.

Contemporary sources show that by the latter half of the eighteenth century there existed three “Juz” within Kazakh society. These Juz constituted a type of clan confederation and were situated (from east to west) as the Middle, Great and Small Juz.² As described in chapter 2, khans were elected separately within each Juz after the era of Tauke khan, whose reign ended in 1715. Thus, from this point forward the entire society of Kazakhs may be referred to as the ‘Kazakh Khanates.’

The earliest usage of the word “Juz” within the historical record occurs in a Russian document of 1726, wherein the genitive of “*malaia ius*” (Small Juz), “*maloi iusi*” can be found.³ Though there are many variants on the etymology of Juz, one Russian source translates it as “*sotnia*.” In other words, the translator interpreted “Juz” to mean “hundred.”⁴ This interpretation may have been influenced by the Mongol military system, which was characterized by a

1 This chapter is partly based on J. Noda, “Kazakhskie «*bu*» v kitaiskikh istochnikakh i ikh otnosheniia s Tsinskoi imperiei,” in E.S. Omarov ed. *Kazakhskaiia tsivilizatsiia v kontekste mirovogo istoricheskogo protsessa: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii* (Almaty: Qaynar universiteti, 2003): 209–215.

2 See T. Uyama, “Kazafu minzokushi saikō: rekishi kijutsu no mondai ni yosete,” *Chūki kenkyū ronshū* 2 (1) (1999): 97, and the introduction of this book.

3 Report from the Kazakh envoy, 3.17.1726, IKRI 2: 354.

4 Report to Russian Ruling Senate, 7.22. 1730, IKRI 2: 370. The words “*Srednei sotni*” are used in this report.

decimal system dividing households into groups of tens, hundreds, thousands, etc.⁵

On the other hand, within their relations with the Qing, the Kazakhs were referred to as either *Hasake* (Ch.) or *Hasak* (Ma.).⁶ The Qing made frequent mention of the fact that Kazakh society consisted of three sections (called “*bu*” in Chinese). The Qing called these the Left Section (*zuobu*), the Right Section (*youbu*), and the Western Section (*xibu*). The three *bu* as defined by the Qing have often been confused with the three native Juz of the Kazakhs, and, therefore, research to date has failed to define the “*bu*” correctly.

This chapter will examine the meaning of the term *bu* within Qing documents in light of newly obtained sources. Such an examination will provide insight into the multifarious nature of the Kazakh-Qing relationship in particular, and will also lead to a clearer understanding of the foreign relations of the Qing Dynasty in general – including the details of their Central Asian subjugation of the Jungars and Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang), which were both located near the Russian Empire. Finally, this examination will also contribute to a greater ethno-historical understanding of the structure of nomadic Kazakh society in those days.

1 Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Kazakh Social Structure as Described within Qing Historical Sources

Russian sources have undeniably played a large role to date in allowing us to consider the historical details of Kazakh society. Here, however, I will focus on documents recorded by the Qing as a new source of material from which to recreate the social structure of the Kazakhs.

In spite of the existence of various figures regarding the population of each Juz, no definitive conclusions have been reached. For example, a Russian soldier named P. Velichko reported that the Great Juz comprised 70,000 households, while the Middle Juz and Small Juz contained 159,400 and 165,700

5 The Kazakh “Juz” was translated as “one hundred” in a Manchu document. According to a statement by the Kazakh envoy of 1758, the Kazakhs translated *Juz* as ‘*joo*’ in Oyirad, which likely corresponds to ‘*zuun*’ (one hundred) in the written Oyirad language. See QZHG 1: 180–182 (QTQD: 66–68).

6 In Manchu documents, the term *bu* is usually rendered “*aiman*.” However, other variations appear. According to Kicengge, the name of the Kazakhs was used as early as KX37 (1698) in a passage that mentions them fighting with the Jungars, Kicengge (Shōshi/Chengzhi), *Daichin=gurun to sono jidai: teikoku no keisei to hakkishakai* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2009): 108.




FIGURE 5

An example of the layered structure of Kazakh society (Original terms transcribed into modern Kazakh).

respectively.⁷ A. Levshin, on the other hand, recorded figures (based on number of individuals rather than households) as follows: Senior Juz – 500,000–600,000; Middle Juz – over 1,360,000; Small Juz – 1,110,000.⁸ In contrast to these figures, a Qing document recording a Kazakh mission's report on the population of the Middle Juz states that it contained 68,000 households.⁹

Under the Juz system, Kazakh nomadic society from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century was organized into a layered structure as indicated in fig. 5.¹⁰

A certain number of each unit combined to form one of each unit in the next higher class. However, it must be remembered that we are obliged to rely on Russian documents and Qing sources due to the scarcity of materials written by the Kazakhs themselves regarding the structure of their society at the time. In fact, the structure indicated by fig. 5 may be influenced by Russian regulations stipulated in 1822, which introduced an organization of administrative levels as shown in fig. 6.

7 S. Eshmukhambetov & S. Zhekeev, *Iz istorii kazakhov* (Almaty: Jalın, 1999): 173–182.

8 A. Levshin, *Opisanie Kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili Kirgiz-kaisatskikh ord i stepei* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996): 288. Uyama listed various estimations regarding the populations of the Juz, Uyama, “Kazafu minzokushi saikō”: 98.

9 QL23/1 (1758), QZHG 1: 88 (JMLZ: 1679–6/47–2594).

10 This is based on the ethnographical treatment by Tolybekov, S.E. Tolybekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo kazakhov v XVII – nachale XX veka* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1971): 511–513. Regarding the Kazakh clans since the beginning of the modern era, see Kh. Arghınbaev et al., *Qazaq shezhıresı khaqında* (Almaty: Atamūra, 2000). As mentioned in critical comments by D. Sneath, these changes seem to originate in administrative reforms by the Russian Empire. See D. Sneath, *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). It should be noted here that terminology regarding the Kazakh social system within historical materials varies greatly, and a decisive model has yet to be found.



FIGURE 6

Russian administrative units incorporated into the Kazakh Middle Juz

The original Kazakh social structure was probably altered to fit within the contemporary Russian administrative system.¹¹ Therefore, it seems that the model presented by the Soviet scholar S. Tolybekov probably doesn't coincide with the Kazakh social structure as it existed before the eighteenth century.

When examining the lower levels of the Juz during the eighteenth century, we can find such examples as that of Sultanbet sultan of the Middle Juz who is recorded in a 1762 Kazakh petition to the Russians as having been the "sultan of *Qipčaq* 'ūrūġ [ru]."¹² Whereas there are documents from this period that mention *ru* (clan), common usage of the term *taipa* came much later.¹³

- 11 Suggested in V.F. Shakhmatov, *Kazakhskaiia pastbishchno-kochevaia obshchina: Voprosy obrazovaniia, evoliutsii i razlozheniia* (Alma-Ata: Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1964): 45–46.
- 12 AVPRI: f.122/2, d.14, l. 18ob. A Chagatai-Turkic literature contains an example of *tāifa* or *ulus* corresponding to *ru*, see FI, 716 and 803. *Taipa* is apparently derived from *tāifa* in the Arabic Language. Budagov suggested that *ru* also comes from the Arabic word "urūq" (branch), see L. Budagov, *Sravnitel'nyi slovar': turetsko-tatarskikh narechii, so vklucheniem upotrebitel'neishikh slov arabskikh i persidskikh i s perevodom na russkii iazyk*, t. 1 (SPb.: Tip. Imp. Akademii nauk, 1869): 128.
- 13 Kharuzin recorded that in the Bokei (Bukey) Orda, the westernmost area of the Kazakh Steppe, a *Rod* consisted of several *taifa*, and a *taifa* consisted of several *ata-valas*, A. Kharuzin, *Kirgizy Bukeyevskoi ordy: Antropologo – etnologicheskii ocherk*, vyp. 1 (Moscow: Imperatorskoe obshchestvo liubitelei estestvoznaniia, antropologii i etnografii, sostoiashchee pri Imperatorskom Moskovskom Universitete, 1889): 153. Needless to say, his account was influenced by Russian colonialism, see Sneath, *The Headless State*: 71–84. Here I use the term "clan" to indicate the kinship units (or segments) under the Juz, which are usually called "*ru*" in Kazakh. Such usage is basically in line with a discussion by Martin, see V. Martin, "Using Turki-Language Qazaq Letters to Reconstruct Local Political History in the 1820s–30s," in Sartori, P. ed. *Explorations in the Social History of Modern Central Asia* (19th–Early 20th Century) (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013): 224. For the latest discussion regarding Kazakh society by Pianciola, see Niccolò Pianciola, "Interpreting an Insurgency in Soviet Kazakhstan: The OGPU, Islam and Qazaq 'Clans' in Suzak, 1930," in N. Pianciola & P. Sartori eds., *Islam, Society and States across the Qazaq Steppe (18th – early 20th Centuries)* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013): 297–340. My focus here is on indicating earlier sources which can serve as the basis for discussion regarding the historical Kazakh social structure.

Furthermore, it can be safely said that there was no clear definition regarding the levels below *ru*.¹⁴ Ia. Gaverdovskii, who conducted research on the Kazakhs residing northeast of the Aral Sea, describes the social structure (from larger to smaller unit) as follows: *ruu*, *aimak*, *tiubia* (*tüp* in the contemporary Kazakh language), *aul* or *ulus*, and, finally, a single household.¹⁵ It is supposed that the *aimaq* – a unit of clan confederation among the Mongols and Oyirad – replaced the unit of *taipa* between the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. This assumption is based on Fal'k's description¹⁶ of each *Orda* (that is, *Juz*) containing several *aimak*¹⁷ and each *aimak* consisting of several *ulus*.¹⁸

As Artıqbaev indicated from an ethnological viewpoint of eighteenth century society,¹⁹ an earlier record by the Russian translator A. Tevkelev exists regarding the Kazakh clans (*rod*). However, the relationship between *ru* and *rod* in Russian literature is still ambiguous.²⁰ According to Russian sources in general, each *Juz* consisted of several clans (*ru*) in which a person of the khan lineage (*aq süyek*, “white bone”)²¹ led the people, while a member of the non-aristocratic population (*qara süyek*, “black bone”)²² served as elder (*starshina*

14 Shakhmatov, *Kazakhskaiia pastbishchno*: 50–51.

15 IKRI 6: 428. See also the citation in N.E Masanov, *Problemy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Kazakhstana na rubezhe XVIII–XIX vekov* (Alma-Ata: AN Kaz. SSR. Institut istorii, arkhologii i etnografii im. Ch.Ch. Valikhanova, 1984): 112.

16 I. Fal'k (1725–1773) took part in the Orenburg expedition during the middle of the eighteenth century.

17 The author himself uses “*volost*” in Russian.

18 *Ulus* is described by Fal'k as “*rod*,” see I. Fal'k, *Opisanie vsekh natsional'nostei Rossii* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1999): 122. In another version, Bardanes, who visited the Kazakh Steppe during the second half of the eighteenth century, wrote that *Juz* consisted of several *il'*, and each *il'* consisted of *uru* [that is, *ru*], IKRI 4: 168. Thus, it seems necessary to consider the consistency of information collected by the Russian side. A discussion by Martin on these terminologies is worth noting, see Martin, “Using Turki-Language Qazaq Letters”: 224–225.

19 Zh.O. Artıqbaev, *Qogham zhäne etnos (XVIII ghasırdaghi qazaq qoghamining etnoöleumettik qıramlımı)* (Pavlodar: EKO, 2004): 152–154. Examples exist of eighteenth century Russian documents using the term “*volost*” to indicate Kazakh ethnic sub-divisions.

20 For the clans (*rod*) of the Small and Middle *Juz* Kazakhs in 1748, see KRO 1: 406–407.

21 They were also called *töre*. Qing documents mention “*suerdan*” as well.

22 In the Kazakh case, this corresponds to the non-Chinggisid people. The social structure of the Kazakhs must be compared to that of the Mongols, especially during the period following the Chinese Ming Dynasty. The Mongol status system, which bore much similarity to the Kazakhs, consisted of *Taiji*, *Qarachi*, *Lama*, and *slaves*, see H. Oka, *Shindai mongoru meiki seido no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Toho shoten, 2007): 141. It is also worth referring here to the

in Russian, sometime also called *batir* or *bi*).²³ While it is impossible here to conclusively demonstrate the “real” social structure of the eighteenth century Kazakhs, in what follows I will attempt to clarify some details by analyzing descriptions of the Kazakhs found in Qing sources.²⁴

The “white bone” lineage was commonly recognized in Kazakh society. For instance, Ghubaidulla sultan of the Middle Juz (see chapter 5) mentioned that he was from Ablai khan’s clan (*nasl*) and that this clan was called *aq siyyek*.²⁵ Kazakh society consisted of the white bones (descendants of Chinggis khan and Qoja²⁶), the black bones (non-aristocratic Kazakhs), and enslaved people called *Tölungit* who were in direct subjugation to the clan of the khan.²⁷ According to the analysis of Artiqbaev, the Tolengit were formed and organized into a “clan” (*ru*) within the Middle Juz during the eighteenth century.²⁸ A Qing document from 1758 contains the following:

The one thousand households of the clan of Tolengit (*tulunggu*) are headed by Janazar (*Janatsnar*) batir. The name of the originator is unknown. All members of the clan are considered to be the people (*urse*) of Tauke (*Teuke*) khan.

patronage of sultans mentioned by Martin, see Martin, “Using Turki-Language Qazaq Letters”: 227–230.

- 23 This example is found in the records of Andreev, who visited the Kazakh Steppe at the end of the eighteenth century, see I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998). For another example, we can refer to an 1805 report by Velichko regarding the three Kazakh Juz, see Eshmukhambetov & Zhekeev, *Iz istorii kazakhov*: 173–182.
- 24 A Qing record mentions the difference between *bi* and *batir*, see footnote 39 of this chapter.
- 25 Ghubaidulla wrote that “sultans, or the clansmen of Ablai khan, hope to be [treated] according to the principle of the white bone” (*Ablay hānning naslindan kelgān sultānlar aq siyyāklık qa'da buyınča qalarmızlar deb umīdimız bar*), IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17675, l. 1060b. The passage was dated 1.28.1831 (14th of *Sha'abān*).
- 26 *Qoja* are the (sometimes imaginary) “descendants” of Arabs such as Muhammad Khanafiya, see B. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan: Kazak religion and collective memory* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001): 99.
- 27 F.K. Zobnin, “K voprosu o nevol'nikakh, rabakh i tiulengutakh v Kirgizskikh stepiakh,” *Pamiatnaia knizhka Semipalatinskoi oblasti na 1902* (Semipalatinsk, 1902): 1–99.
- 28 Artiqbaev, *Qogham zhāne etnos*: 155. The note of P. Rychkov also describes the Tolengits in eighteenth century Kazakh society, see IKRI 4: 202.

It is quite interesting to note that the formation of the Tolengit clan was attributed to Tauke khan at the beginning of the eighteenth century.²⁹

Remarkably, the progenitor of the Kazakhs themselves is mentioned in Qing documents. As is well-known, the legendary figure Alash is said to have originated the Kazakh ethnicity (see chapter 1). The word “Alash” is also known to have been a Kazakh battle cry, and, in the modern era, this word is used as a symbol of the Kazakh nation. Interestingly, the term was also used by Kazakh aristocrats who sent envoys to the Qing Dynasty. Dair sultan, who will be mentioned later in this chapter, wrote a note addressed to the Qing emperor demonstrating the sphere of his authority as “the land of Alash” (*Alaj yūrti*).³⁰ This demonstrates how the Kazakhs at that time possessed a comprehensive identity regarding their society which could be expressed by the word “Alash”.

The Qing authorities paid much attention to the fact that the khan clans of the Kazakhs were descended from Chinggis khan. To the Qing, this was the most significant feature of Kazakh legitimacy. The hereditary linkage of the Kazakh aristocrats to Chinggis khan was interpreted as a point of affinity by the Mongol elders who were dispatched to apprehend the remaining Jungar rebels. When Ablai was captured by Galdan Tsering (r. 1727–45) of the Jungar, he told Erkešara, who was sent as the Qing envoy to the Jungars: “We all are the descendants of Chinggis khan.”³¹ Ablai later told the same thing to Chengunjab,³² the father of Erkešara and Left Pacifier of the Frontier (*Dingbian zuo fujianjun*). Chengunjab, recorded this statement as follows, thus confirming what Ablai had said:

29 QL23/1, List of clans of the Middle Juz, QZHG 1: 88. For a translation into Kazakh, see B. Ejenkhan ed., *Qazaq khandighi men Tsin patshalighining saiasi-diplomatiialiq qatinastari turali Qitay müraghat qūzhattari* (Almaty: Daik-press, 2009): 49–50.

30 A Turkic document from 1781, JMLZ: 2907–013/123–1101 (reproduced in J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo, 2010): 48). This usage of the word “Alash” is equal to that in a document sent from Qaip khan to Gagalın, the Governor of Siberia, that was translated on 1718.5.1, KRO 1: 45. There, the phrase “All Alash ulus” (*vse Alatskie ulusy*) expressed the Kazakh people as a whole. The phrase “three Alash” (*üç alač*) was also used, see Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents*: 38. For an example from Chinese texts, see T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 92.

31 The original Manchu text is: “*muse daci gemu Cinggis han i enen*,” imperially endorsed on QL22/6/12, the memorial of Chengunjab and others, JMYD 90(1) volume of the military affairs bundle regarding six month of QL22: 194. The same text is found in XMD vol. 23: 243.

32 *Chenggunzhabu* (Ch.) was an aristocrat of the Khalkha Mongol. His parents were the Khalkha taiji Tsering and the daughter of the Kangxi emperor.

According to statements made by Ablai's mission, Ablai said "General Cheng [Chengunjab], we are all the descendants of Chinggis khan. Calculating by age, you, General Cheng, should be the elder brother." Following this, we told them [the Kazakhs envoys] that "We have heard that our clansmen (*mukūn hala*) resided among the *Hotong*,³³ Russians (*Oros*), and Kazakhs. We simply didn't know where or who they were. Now that Ablai has made such a statement, I do understand the situation and am very delighted ..." ³⁴

The entire structure of Kazakh nomadic society was interpreted by the Qing side in such a way that the Kazakhs were divided into "sections" (*bu*) which were further divided into a number of *otoks*.³⁵ In the earliest recorded example, the name list of Kazakh envoys from 1757 refers to some of these *otoks*. The chief delegate Kenjeghali (*Henjigar*) was indicated to be a nephew of Hatsibek, "the *jaisang* of the Qara-kesek Argin *Otok*."³⁶ Furthermore, the vice-envoy was a clansman of Qabanbai, who was the *jaisang* of the Qara-kerei Naiman *Otok*. The other members of the party consisted of the relatives of influential persons from the *otoks* such as Uisin, Atagai-Argin, and Tortul-Argin.³⁷ We can extract information from this regarding which clans followed Ablai.

What does "*Jaisang*" (from *caisang* in Chinese) mean in this context? It is worth noting that the Qing authorities also used this term, which originated within Jungar society, to indicate the "chief of a Kazakh clan." Moreover, some

33 This term, meaning "Muslims," and is derived from the Mongol word "Qoton." (The author is grateful to Takahiro Onuma for the suggestion). See also A. Samoilovich, "Turetskii narodets Khotony," *Zapiski vostochnogo otdeleniia imperatorskogo rossiiskogo arkh-eologicheskogo obshchestva*, t. 23 (1915): 256–290.

34 Imperially endorsed on QL22/7/29, Manchu memorial of Chengunjab and Šuhede, JMYD 91(1) the second volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the seventh month of QL22: 454–455 (XMD vol. 24: 298).

35 The term *otok* (Ch. *etuoke*) has its origin in a Mongolian term. Jungar's "twenty four *otok*" seems to have been applied to the Kazakh nomads. For the *otok* of the Jungars, see S. Tayama, "17, 18 seiki niokeru oirātozoku no tōchikikō." *Shigaku kenkyū* 50 (1953): 104–116. See also T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014): 35–38. Research in China, including that of Jiang, presents this model as Juz, Ulus, Alis, Ru, Ata, and Auil. The reasoning, however, is unclear, see Jiang Chonglun, *Hasakezu lishi yu wenhua* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1998): 99.

36 QL22/6/18, memorial of Jaohūi and Fude, JMLZ: 1643–8/45–2680 (XMD vol. 23: 366). See also Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents*: 15.

37 QL22/6/18, the attachment of the memorial of Jaohūi (Ch. *Zhao hui*) and others, JMLZ: 1643–7/45–2680.

officials described Kazakh social structure in a manner similar to Russian sources. Nusan,³⁸ heading the Qing army to Eastern Turkestan, understood the situation in the following way: “You (Kazakhs) call the head of the *otok* a *batir*. Those who try legal cases are in a lower rank, and are called *bi*.”³⁹ Later Qing historical sources came to describe the *otok* as being controlled⁴⁰ by sultans together with *aqalaqchi*,⁴¹ who had originally served as elders of the *otok* under the sultans. In this way, Qing troops during the Jungar expedition, which marched to Semipalatinsk (in the north) and to Lake Balkhash and the Chu River (in the west), collected various information regarding Kazakh ethnography.

Nevertheless, the terminology of both empires as detailed above was basically used for convenience’s sake in an effort to control the Kazakh nomads. Therefore, this terminology shouldn’t be interpreted as perfectly corresponding to notions regarding the nomadic system, such as “*ru*,” “*taipa*,” which were natively held by the Kazakhs.⁴² Even information gained directly from the Kazakhs was not always correct. For example, Ablai called himself “khan” during his negotiations with the Qing Empire, while he, in fact, had not been elected khan within Kazakh society. The Qing documents discussed here, though containing such crucial terms such as *alash* and *tolengit*, must be

38 Nusan was from the Manchu Plain Yellow Banner, and participated in the Jungar expedition as a Ground councilor (Ch. *canzan dachen*).

39 The original text reads: “*suweni otok i dalaha niyalma be batur sembi, baita ichiyara niyalma gebu fejergi de bai sere hergen bi*,” JMYD 92 (2) volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the tenth month of QL22: 233. The same passage can be found in the QL22/9/14 memorial of Jaohūi and Fude, XMD vol. 25: 400.

40 *Xichui zongtong shilüe* (vol. 11) contains a list of the *otoks*. Onuma recently published a detailed list of Kazakh *otoks* based on a report by the Manchu official Nusan, see T. Onuma, “Nusan shisetsu no haken: 1757 nen ni okeru shin to abulai no chokusetsu kōshō,” *Ajia bunkashi kenkyū*, 14 (2014): 13.

41 *Aqalaqchi* also comes from the Mongol language. In Oyirad society, “*ahalakči*” meant the chief of ten households, see S. Tayama, *Mōko hōten no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Nihon gakujutsu shinkōkai, 1967): 68. Later, a Qing official presented the idea of establishing a similar administrative ‘official’ called “*ahalakči*” within each Kazakh *otok*, see QL53/11/16, memorial of Yungboo (Ch. *Yongbao*), XMD vol. 183: 175. For the names of each *otok* and their *aqalaqchi*, see Yongbao & Xingzhao eds., *Ta’erbahatai shiyi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969), vol. 4: 26.

42 See T. Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986): 362. Although Saguchi equated the *otok* of the Great Juz to the *volost’* of the Great Juz, in reality, not all of the *otok* and *volost’* names can be considered equivalent. For the formation of *ru* in the Middle and Great Juz, see N.E. Bektakhanova, *Formirovanie mnogonatsional’nogo naseleniia Kazakhstana i severnoi kirgizii* (Alma-Ata, 1980): 254.

researched further – especially to determine just what such original terms as *otok* and *aqalaqchi* were intended to mean.

2 The Meaning of the Term “*Hasake*” within Qing Historical Records

2.1 *Review of Existing Research*

Beginning with P. Pelliot,⁴³ and continuing in further detail with Toru Saguchi,⁴⁴ many researchers have equated the three *bu* mentioned in Qing sources with the three Juz of the Kazakhs. In Kazakhstan as well, researchers have regarded the Right Section (*hasake youbu*) to be the Great Juz.⁴⁵ A similar interpretive style can be found in modern China as well.⁴⁶ However, the weak point of such an argument is that it adopts historical descriptions of Kazakh society from various materials without taking into consideration such factors as the particular year of compilation. Such a methodology inevitably leads to contradictions.

It must also be considered that the meaning of the term “*bu*” could have varied by era. J. Fletcher, referring to Saguchi’s work, expressed the reason for confusion within Qing records as follows: “by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ch’ing government’s ‘loose rein’ policy over the Kazakhs was loose in the extreme.”⁴⁷ Nevertheless, he still adamantly held to the idea that the “Right Section” had always belonged to Abulmanbet Khan’s clan within the Middle Juz. Saguchi did eventually come to revise his own opinion and drew the conclusion that “the expressions ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ Sections are essentially unrelated to the Kazakh Juz”.⁴⁸ However, his opinion that “the Qing side sometimes regarded the house of Abulmanbet as belonging to the khan lineage of

43 P. Pelliot, “Les Qazaq dans les textes chinois” and “Les Généalogies des princes Qazaq,” in *Notes Critiques d’histoire Kalmouke* (Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, 1960).

44 Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū*: 272–287.

45 In the Kazakh translation, “*Ong qanat*” refers to the Great Juz, see Q. Salgharaūli, ed. *100 Qūzhat (Qazaq khandighi men Ching imperiiası arasındaghi qarım-qatınastargha baylanıştı qūzhattar)* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996): 135.

46 For instance, *The History and Culture of the Kazakhs* (*Hasake zu lishi yu wenhua*, 1998), following *The Simple History of the Kazakhs* (*Hasake zu jianshi*, 1987), mentions that “documents from the Qing period refer to the Great Juz as the Right Section (*youbu*),” see Jiang, *Hasakezu lishi yu wenhua*: 89.

47 J. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” in J.K. Fairbank ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol.10, part 1 (Cambridge, 1978): 63–64.

48 Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū*: 336.

the Great Juz which was located close to [the Qing]" is as yet unchanged.⁴⁹ To solve this problem, first, I will analyze the historical materials in chronological order, and, following that, re-evaluate the meaning of the term "*bu*".

2.2 Analysis of Materials

During the process of the Qing's Jungar conquest and following their subjugation of the Jungar holdout Amursana (QL20–22/1755–1757), Ablai of the Kazakh Middle Juz sent a mission to the Qing side in order to surrender to the empire. This event constitutes the beginning of 'official' relations between the two parties. Thereafter, the Qing authorities used the term "*bu*" when referring to Kazakh nomadic society. This trend seems to originate from similar usage in relation to the four *bu* of the Khalkha Mongols as well as the four Jungar *bu*. This usage was eventually even extended to describe Kirghiz society.⁵⁰

The following table (table 3) lists chronological examples of references within Qing documents to the three Juz and the three *bu* from the earliest times of relations between the Kazakhs and the Qing. In addition to the *Qinding pingding zhunga'er fanglüe* (PDZFL)⁵¹ which was long considered to be the main source, the table focuses on memorials written in the Manchu language around 1757 (QL22). Table 3 enables us to grasp in detail how the Qing Empire, which had come to hold 'official' relations with the Kazakhs, went about collecting information about them. Further analysis will be presented below, mainly based on sources compiled in Chinese, to illustrate later changes in Qing perception.⁵²

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- 49 Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū*: 336 fn. 10. V. Kuznetsov also holds the opinion that the khanship of Bolat (the son of Abulmanbet) in the Right Section was recognized within the Great Juz (*Starshii zhuz*), V.S. Kuznetsov, *Tsinskaia imperiia na rubezhakh Tsentral'noi Azii (vtoraia polovina XVIII–pervaia polovina XIX v.* (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1983): 28.
- 50 The social structure of Kirghiz ("*Bulute*" within Qing sources) may be divided into eastern and western sections. These should correspond to the left (*sol*) and right (*ong*) wings, see Pan Zhiping, *Haohan guo yu xiyu zhengzhi* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006).
- 51 The *zhengbian* and *xubian* of PDZFL are particularly related to the topics of this book. It is remarkable that PDZFL exists in both Chinese and Manchu versions (*Jun gar i ba be neci-hiyeme toktobuha bodogon i bithe*, kept in the Toyo Bunko/Oriental Library). When indicating the Manchu and Chinese versions together, Manchu pagination is included in parentheses. Manchu versions from the provinces are useful because they are written in a style closer to the originals.
- 52 The main sources are as follows: GZSL, *Qinding huangyu xiyu tuzhi* (1782), *Xichui yaolüe* (1807), *Xichui zongtong shilüe* (1809), *Zongtong yili shiyi*, *Qinding xinjiang zhilüe* (1821), *Xiyu shuidaoji* (1823), *Xinjiang tuzhi* (1911).

TABLE 3 *The earliest descriptions of the Kazakhs within Qing historical sources*⁵³

No.	Juz	<i>bu</i>	Dates and sources	Commentary
1		wargi aiman i hasak (Western Kazakhs)	QL20/8/12, memorial of Bandi, QZHG 1: 17	Great Juz near Tashkent
2		[<i>Xibu hasake</i>] (Western Kazakhs)	QL20/9/10 (<i>renshen</i>) GZSL v. 496: 2	
3		Abulai ... dergi [<i>Zuobu</i>] hasak ... wargi [<i>Youbu</i>] hasak i Abilis ([Ablai's] Eastern Kazakh ... Abilis of Western Kazakhs)	QL21/5/1 (<i>xinwei</i>), PDZFL <i>zhengbian</i> , 27: 35 (61–62)	Left Section ⁵⁴ and Right Section (Great Juz)
4	Bi orto yus be dalaha bi, ula yus, kici yus sere uheri ilan aiman (I (Ablai) am leading the Middle Juz. Including the Great and Small Juz, there are three tribes)		QL22/6/29, memorial of Jaohui and Fude, XMD v. 24: 96	Meeting with Ablai was reported on 6/24 by Sundene
5	meni hasak i ortoyus, uluyus, kisiyus, ilan aiman (Our Kazakhs three tribes: Middle, Great, and Small Juz)		QL22/9/14, memorial of Jaohui and Fude, XMD v. 25: 393 ⁵⁵	Ablai's mention cited in the report regarding the event of the sixth month
6	ilan aiman [<i>San buluo</i>] (three tribes): orto yus, kici yus, ula yus		QL22/7/9 (<i>bingchen</i>), PDZFL <i>zhengbian</i> , 42: 2(3) ⁵⁶	Explanation of Ablai on three Juz

⁵³ Words in brackets indicate descriptions from Chinese language versions. Bold text indicates descriptions in Manchu.

⁵⁴ The earliest example is found in GZSL vol. 51: 16 (QL21/4/*xinyou*), see Saguchi, 18–19 *selki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū*: 265.

⁵⁵ This memorial concerns the Qing mission led by Nusan. The same information can be found in JMYD 92 (2) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the tenth month of QL22: 189 (Imperially endorsed on QL22/10/7).

⁵⁶ Though this is the first reference to the Juz found in Qing compilations, the original information is contained in memorial no. 4 above.

2.3 The Era of the *Zuobu* and *Youbu* Sections

As seen in Table 3, the Kazakhs were initially regarded as a people divided into two sections: *Zuobu* (Left Section) in the East and *Youbu* (Right Section) in the West. In fact, the words for *Zuobu* and *Youbu* which appeared in the Manchu language documents, *dergi* and *wargi*, usually mean “east” and “west” respectively.⁵⁷

A Russian document describes Abilis, who is said to be a khan of the Right Section (no.3 of table 3), as follows:

[Regarding the situation in 1742] Now, the Great Khorde [Juz] of the Kirgiz-kaisak has Abilis (*Abliazi*) as its khan. He has his residence in Tashkent. Under him, the second person in charge of this *orda* is Tole bi.⁵⁸

Assuming that Abilis⁵⁹ was the khan of the Great Juz, it would seem that if the two sections mentioned in Qing sources were indeed the same entities as the two Kazakh Juz, then the Left Section would be the Middle Juz and the Right Section would be the Great Juz. It has already been established in previous chapters that, at least within the Left Section (the Middle Juz), Ablai sultan was acting as the representative in negotiations with the Qing Empire.

On the other hand, the Qing also began collecting information regarding the three Juz. As Table 3 indicates, the earliest example is a report by Nusan and others who were dispatched to meet with Ablai in 1757 (QL22/6). According to their report, Ablai consulted with them regarding how he could get the other two Juz, in addition to his own Middle Juz, to surrender to the Qing Empire.⁶⁰ Ablai accurately described the geography of the other Juz as follows: “the Great

57 As in “left wing gate” (*dergi ashan i duka*) and “right wing gate” (*wargi ashan i duka*), the terms *dergi* and *wargi* could sometimes mean “left” and “right”, see E. Hauer, *Handwörterbuch der Mandschusprache*, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1952): 197.

58 KRO 1: 188. The more famous Tole bi (who served Tauke khan) and the Tole bi mentioned here (and, moreover, the influential *Tulibai* of the Great Juz who lived around 1758) are sometimes regarded to be the same person, see Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū*: 334–335. However, a distinction should be made. The first is considered to have lived from 1663 to 1756, especially within research in Kazakhstan.

59 Though Khafizova considered him to be Abulmanbet khan of the Middle Juz, there are problems with that interpretation, see K.Sh. Khafizova, *Kazakhskaiia strategiiia Tsinskoi imperii* (Almaty: Taimas, 2007): 51.

60 Memorial of Jaohüi and Fude, JMYD 92 (2) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the tenth month of QL22: 224–225 (XMD vol. 25: 399).

Juz is situated in the Tashkent region, and the Small Juz is situated at the end of the Sir Darya River (*Sir bira*) in the basin of the Ural (*Jai*) River”.⁶¹

Ablai went on to give further information regarding the three Kazakh Juz:

We Kazakhs have three tribes (*ilan aiman*). I myself am the chief of the Middle Juz. The chiefs of the Small and Great Juz are all my clansmen (*mukūn*).⁶²

It is very important to remember that Ablai, in fact, was not the khan of the Middle Juz. Rather, he pretended that he had authority within Kazakh society during negotiations with the Qing in order to gain such a position of superiority within the Middle Juz. The list of Kazakh envoys shown above contains a description on an envoy, “belonging to Ablai, who is from the Atighai *Otok* and controls all of the Kazakhs.” Thus, it is clear that Ablai tried to exaggerate the extent of his power to the Qing Empire.⁶³ Moreover, it is a significant fact that, in spite of the existence of the three Juz, the Kazakhs tended to present themselves as a single group, and, in fact, the individual Juz did have close relations with one another (cf. chapter 2).

According to research at the time regarding the borders of Kazakh pasturelands, the Qing understood the territory of the Kazakhs as follows:


[Details regarding] the border (*hešen*) surrounding the three Kazakh Juz (*ilan yus*): ... The eastern border runs through Russian Semipalatinsk on the Irtysh (*Ercis*) River, continues along the *Yunggul* River and moves east of *Abural-alin* into the origins of the *Isil* River,⁶⁴ the *Nura* River and *Sari-su* (*Šara usu*). Finally, it ends at the eastern edge of Lake Balkhash (*Balkasi noor*). The southern border runs through the northern edge of Lake Balkhash, through the middle of the Chu (*Cui*) and Talas Rivers, then ends at the north edge of the two lakes, *Bikul* and *Akkul*. The western border runs from the castle of Tashkent located on this side of the riverbank of the Sairam (*Sairin*) River, past the castle of Turkistan, then turns northwest, runs as far as Syr Darya [...unreadable...] this side of the Yaik

61 JMYD 92 (2) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the tenth month of QL22: 223–224 (XMD vol. 25: 395).

62 QL22/7/9, memorial of Jaohūi, PDZFL *zhengbian*, 42: 3 (Table 3, no. 6, see also XMD vol. 25: 393). The same content was reported in an earlier memorial of Jaohūi and Fude, XMD vol. 24: 96. See also Onuma, “Nusan shisetsu no haken”: 11.

63 JMLZ: 1643–007/45–2680.

64 The modern Ishim River.



MAP 7 *Borderline⁶⁵ of Kazakh territory from Semipalatinsk to Tashkent according to descriptions found in Qing documents*

(*Jai*) [Ural] River [...unreadable...], into *Wei Tohos*.⁶⁶ The northern border passes through *Wei Tohos*, and runs this side of the riverbank of the Irtysh and ends at Russian Semipalatinsk.⁶⁷

Due to the unreadable portions above, the western and northern borders remain unclear, and, at any rate, it's impossible to confirm to what extent such Qing sources are correct. All that can be said for certain is that the eastern border of the Kazakhs (map 7) corresponds almost perfectly to the border which

65 Interestingly, this corresponds to the demarcation in a map by the Swedish soldier, Renat, who was a captive of the Jungars.

66 This may be the fortress of Sviatoi Petr (later, Petropavlovsk).

67 QL22/12/18, memorial of Nusan, JMLZ: 1678–005/47–2435 (XMD vol. 27: 207–208).

would later be a topic of discussion between the Qing and Russian Empires (see chapters two and seven). This seems to imply that later Qing assertions had their origin in Qing perceptions of the border as it stood directly following the Jungar expedition. An example can be found in the map, *Daqing yitong yutu* (in 1760 or QL25) within which even the Caspian Sea is included within the scope of the Qing Empire.

How did Russia perceive the borders of the Qing Empire? A doctor named Christoph Bardanes, who conducted an exploration into the eastern region of the Kazakh Steppe during 1771 after relations between the Qing and Kazakhs had already been formed, referred to the borders as follows: “the Ili River is the border between [Qing] China and the Kazakhs. At this time, they [the Kazakhs] will not travel far beyond this river”.⁶⁸ Thus, it is clear that the Russian side also regarded Lake Balkhash, into which the Ili River flows, as one of the western border points of the Qing Dynasty.

2.4 *Appearance of the Small Juz*

Much of the confusion in descriptions on “*bu*” within Qing documents stems from early contact between the Qing army and Kazakhs of the Small Juz. This is because the Qing Empire, which equated the Great Juz with all Western Kazakhs (Ma. *wargi hasak*), also referred to these members of the Small Juz (who were located in the westernmost region of the Kazakh Steppe) as those of “the Western Section.” Table 4 contains a list of such confused descriptions and misunderstandings within Qing sources.

Consequently, the reason for confusion within the descriptions regarding the three *bu* seems to be simultaneous usage of the terms “Western Kazakhs” and “Small Juz” to refer to the same groups of people. Moreover, the fact that the meanings of *dergi/zuobu* and *wargi/youbu* were translated to mean “left” and “right” must also be taken into consideration. Let us examine this type of description in detail.

No. 1 of table 4 corresponds to a memorial describing the mission from Ablai which arrived at the Qing border on QL22/9/9 (1757).⁶⁹ When asked by Qing officials regarding the whereabouts of Batur Ubashi, a Jungar fleeing from the Qing, the Kazakh envoy answered:

68 IKRI 4: 99. Bardanes was under the command of Johann Peter Falk, the Swedish botanist who also conducted an exploration into the Kazakh Steppe.

69 QL22/9/14, memorial by Jaohūi and Fude, JMLZ: 1655–039/46–1547–48.

TABLE 4 *Three bu and Juz on the Qing sources afterwards*

No.	Juz	<i>bu</i>	Dates and sources	Commentary
1	wargi julergi kišiyus hasak tede hanci (Near the southwestern Small Juz Kazakhs)		QL22/9/24, memorial of Jaohūi and Fude, JMLZ, 655–39/46–1547	First contact of the Qing side with the Small Juz
2	cikiyus[sic:] i Erlei sultong se tumen funcere cooha gaifi, Cui sere bade genehe (Erāli sultan of the Small Juz and others, leading more than 10,000 troops, went into the place called Chu)		QL23/1/24 (<i>xinhai</i>), PDZFL <i>zhengbian</i> , vol. 49: 9–10 (18) ⁷⁰	First negotiation with the Small Juz found in the compiled source.
3		Cui, Talas be darime yabume, wargi hasak i jecen de isinafi ([Jaohūi,] going through Chu and Talas, came near by the territory of the Western Kazakhs)	QL23/7/17 (<i>bingwu</i>), PDZFL <i>zhengbian</i> , vol. 59: 11 (22)	The west of Chu and Talas Rivers corresponds to the pasturelands of the Great Juz
4		[Zuoyou hasake, <i>dongxi bulute</i>] (Left and Right Kazakh, East and West Kirgiz)	QL23/9/30, <i>Qianlongchao shangyu dang</i> : 256	Kazakhs were recognized parallel to Kirghiz.
5	uluyus aiman (the Great Juz) han Abilis ⁷¹	wargi hasak (Western Kazakhs)	QL23/8/4, memorial of Fude, QZHG 1: 138–139	Western Kazakh as the Great Juz

⁷⁰ Similar contents are found in Šundene's memorial, see XMD vol. 27: 204.⁷¹ This Abilis was later mistaken to be "Abulfeiz" of the Middle Juz, see *Xichui yaolüe*, vol. 4: 5. *Xichui zongtong shilüe* (vol. 11) also mentions "youbu han abulebis", that is, Abulfeiz of the "Great Juz."

No.	Juz	<i>bu</i>	Dates and sources	Commentary
6		wargi hasak [<i>xi hasake</i>] i urse dahame dosifi [<i>guicheng</i>] (The people of the Western Kazakh had surrendered.)	QL23/9/27 (<i>xinmao</i>), PDZFL <i>zhengbian</i> , vol. 61: 16 (30)	Western Kazakh as the Great Juz ⁷²
7		Šadihojo wargi hasak, jai Hujiyat i Pisel bek sebe goimefi (Shadi khoja met the Western Kazakhs and, next, met Fazik bek of Khujaand and others.)	QL27/4/7 (<i>xinwei</i>), PDZFL <i>xubian</i> , vol. 16: 20 (44)	Indicated are the relations between Khojas in Tashkent and Western Kazakhs, i.e. Great Juz Kazakhs.
8	Ilan aiman Ilan han... kiciyusu		QL27/11, QZHG 2: 138/ XMD, vol. 59: 397, Letter of Nurali khan	First diplomatic contact by the Small Juz with Qing ⁷³
9	kiciyus Nurlai (Nurali of the Small Juz)	wargi [<i>youbu</i>] ⁷⁴ hasak Urgenci Hayab (Qaip of Western Kazakh and Urgench)	QL28/1/11 (<i>jisi</i>), PDZFL <i>xubian</i> , vol. 20: 8 (18)	Beginning of the audience with the emperor by the Small Juz

⁷² Just after this sentence, we can find a reference to Erali of the Small Juz, who happened to be near the pasturelands of the Great Juz, see MOTsA 2: 123, 234.

⁷³ The Chinese version of PDZFL wrongly mentions, “*zuobu* (*sic*) *hasake nuerlai*” while the Manchu version correctly mentions “*wargi hasak Nurlai*,” QL27/11/18 (*bingzi*), PDZFL *xubian* vol. 19: 16 (29). It should be remembered that the notion of the three “sections” and three khans (*ilan anggi* and *ilan han*) had been raised before by Nurali khan, and probably correspond to the three Juz of the Kazakhs, QL27/3/23, XMD vol. 55: 316. “Anggi” means “tribe” or “part” in Oyrat.

⁷⁴ *Qijuzhu* (Court diary) on QL27/12/29 referred to the Small Juz as “*xi hasake*” (Western Kazakh) or “*Qijiyusi-bu*,” QZHG 2: 169.

TABLE 4 Three bu and Juz on the Qing sources afterwards (cont.)

No.	Juz	bu	Dates and sources	Commentary
10	[<i>Sanbu</i> : Yike zhun, duomuda zhun, bahan zhun] (Three sections: Yeke zun, Dumda zun, Bağa zun ⁷⁵)		Q1.37/10/18, <i>Xinjiang zhiliue</i> , vol. 12: 3–4; <i>Xiyu shuidaoji</i> , vol. 4: 45	First description of “three bu” (not <i>buluo</i>) equal to three Juz ⁷⁶
11	Three Juz: Middle Juz (<i>etuo'er</i>) belongs to the Left Section. Great Juz (<i>wulake yuzi</i>) and Small Juz (<i>jiqike yuzi</i>) belong to the Right Section.	[<i>Zuoyou hasake bu</i>] The Left and Right Sections Kazakhs	<i>Xiyu tuzhi</i> , vol. 2, <i>tukao</i> 2	In Chinese texts, the Right Section (Great Juz) and Western Kazakhs (it should be the Small Juz) began to be confused
12		Right Section: Great Juz Left Section: Middle Juz	<i>Xiyu tuzhi</i> , vol. 44	
13		Ablai sultan, the son of Kazakh Nurali dispatched the envoy to the Qing court.	Q1.48/4/11 (<i>xinwei</i>) <i>gzsl</i> vol. 1178: 12–13	The last case of the sending an envoy to the court by the Small Juz Kazakhs
14	Western Kazakh or Small Juz (<i>Xi hasake, jiqi yuzi bu</i>) [Nurali]	Three sections: <i>Zuobu</i> , <i>Youbu</i> , and <i>Xibu</i> (Left Section, Right Section, Western Section) ⁷⁷	<i>Xichui zongtong shiliue</i> , vol. 11: 5–6	“Western Section” (<i>Xi</i> or <i>Xibu</i>) corresponds to the Small Juz.

⁷⁵ These correspond to the three Juz. For the first example of an explanation in Oyratad, see QZHG 1: 182–181 (Q123/11/13). See also the next section of this chapter.

⁷⁶ The original text of this description is written in Manchu in the memorial as “*ilan aiman*,” Q137/10/18, memorial of Šuhede, XMD vol. 109: 212–213.

⁷⁷ Here, the meanings of *zuobu* and *youbu* are changed into something unrelated to the Juz.

No.	Juz	<i>bu</i>	Dates and sources	Commentary
15		<i>han</i> of the Left Section: Ablai <i>han</i> of the Right Section: Abulmanbet, Bolat [<i>Boluo</i>], Toghun who inherited the title of <i>han</i> in JQ14 <i>wang</i> of the Right Section: Abulfeiz Western Section [<i>xibu</i>]: Tursun, Kushuk, Adil, Sama	<i>Zongtong yili shiyi</i> : 164	First appearance of the Western Section (<i>xibu</i>) ⁷⁸ which doesn't mean the Small Juz
16		"There are no distinctions such as Left and Right. Instead, there are three names: Great, Middle, Small Juz [<i>yuzi</i>]. A Juz has several <i>otoks</i> ."	<i>Zongtong yili shiyi</i> : 218	Appropriate description
17		(The list of sultans of Left, Right, and Western Sections)	<i>Xinjiang zhilie</i> , vol. 12 (the genealogy of Kazakh khans)	The meaning of the three <i>bu</i> was finally confirmed as genealogical lineages
18	Left Section or Eastern part is <i>Yeke zun</i> , i.e. Uisin Otok (the Great Juz)	Western Section [<i>xibu</i>]: Erali <i>han</i> and Nurali <i>han</i>	<i>Xinjiang zhilie</i> , vol. 12: 3	<i>Xibu</i> is again regarded as Small Juz and Left Section is misunderstood as Great Juz
19		(While sultans are correctly categorized into the three <i>bu</i> , the relations between <i>bu</i> and Juz were wrongly understood)	<i>Xiyu shuidao ji</i> , vol. 4: 44	
20	Two Juz: <i>wulayuzi</i> and <i>qiqiyuzi</i>	Right-central part: the Small Juz (<i>qiqiyuzi</i>)	<i>Xinjiang tuzhi</i> , vol. 16: 3–4	Still incorrect understanding

⁷⁸ Sultans such as Hazamu (Qazim), the son of Saniyaz, who belong to the group later called “*xibu*” (the Western Section), began to send missions to the Qing court even though no explanation regarding the *xibu* itself was added at that time, Q1:37/12/12 (*renshen*), GZSL vol. 922: 27. See also QMJD Vol. 10: 587, in which an edict dated Q1:37/12/16 mentions that Hazamu made his first visit for an imperial audience.

[If he is] near the Kazakhs of the Small Juz in the Southwest, Abulkhair (*Abugair*),⁷⁹ the noble (*noyan*) of the Small Juz, should be able to capture him [Ubashi].

In reply, the Qing side told Ablai that “if Batur Ubashi comes to our side of the border, we will capture him. If he is in Sharabel, the people (*urse*) of the Small Juz must capture him.”

Following this exchange, Erali sultan of the Small Juz organized a force that went to the southern region of the Kazakh Steppe. In addition, the Qing military sent Narantu, an imperial guard (Ma. *hiya*; Ch. *shiwei*), to negotiate with Erali. At this time, Erali told Narantu the following:

Ablai is a leader among the Kazakhs of the eastern borderlands, and, within the western borderlands (*wargi jecen*), my older brother [sic] Abulkhair (*mini ahūn Abulhari*) leads.⁸⁰

These examples clearly show how the newly appeared Small Juz also came to be described as Western Kazakhs (Ma. *wargi hasak*) owing to their location in the “west.”⁸¹ The text of *Xiyu tuzhi*, which states that both the Great and the Small Juz belonged to the Right Section (*bu*), should also be taken into consideration. Consequently, we can see how the Qing Empire continued to interpret the three Juz according to the eastern-western model which was already adopted at the time of the first negotiations to be held between the Qing and Kazakhs. This tendency resulted in the confusion in Qing documents described above.

Furthermore, we can find historical sources in which the Small Juz is described as the Western Section (*xibu*). As Toru Saguchi has demonstrated,⁸² a memorial written by Šuhede in 1772 (QL37) describes the situation at that time as follows:

79 The Qing side knew Abulkhair to be a great chief (Ch. *da toumu*) through a statement made by a Muslim captive at Jungar; see a memorial by Yongchang and others, QL6 (1741)/10/3, JHLZ: 8261–46/604–3210. Nevertheless, Abulkhair had already died by 1757.

80 QL23/3/21, memorial by Jaohūi and others, JMLZ: 1690–004/48–1606–07. In fact, Erali is the son of Abulkhair.

81 The envoy of the Small Juz to the Qing court stated that “the area of our Small Juz is located near the western border of the Kazakhs” (*meni kiciyus i ba, hasak i wargi jecen de bi*), QL27/10/20, memorial of Jinggeri (Urumqi commander in chief, Ch. *Jing’eli*) and Yungde, QZHG 2: 95–96.

82 Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū*: 278.

The Kazakhs have three sections (*bu*): the Right or Eastern Section, the Left or Middle Section, and the Western Section. According to the report contained in Šuhede's memorial of QL37, "... When I checked the statements by an Oyirad who had surrendered from the Kazakhs, as well as those made by a Kazakh *Xi'ermote* and others, they all maintained that the Kazakhs had three sections: the *Yike zhun*, the *Duomuda zhun*, and the *Bahan*—*bahan* in Mongol meaning "few." The *Yike zhun* is made up of the Uisin *Otok*, which does not have a particular leader at any given time. If trouble arises, the people will consult with Ablai, Bolat, or Abulfeiz depending on the distance of their residence. The *Duomuda zhun* is comprised of the Naiman and Arghin *Otoks*. The *Bahan zhun* is made up of the Alshin *Otok*." Taking into consideration their geographical locations, *the Yike zhun should be considered as belonging to the Left Section, the Duomuda to the Right Section, and the Bahan zhun to the Western Section.*⁸³

This well-known version of the text is cited in *Xinjiang zhiliu* and *Xiyu shuidaoji* as well. Nevertheless, within in the last sentence (italicized by the author), the compiler wrongly interpreted the information in the following manner: the Great Juz as equating to the Left Section, the Middle Juz to the Right Section, and the Small Juz to the Western Section.⁸⁴ This mistaken interpretation was continued within the latest *Xinjiang tuzhi*, and is the main cause of confusion within Qing document descriptions. By this time, the Qing authorities generally tended to regard the three Juz as the equivalent to the three sections of Kazakh society.⁸⁵

83 *Xinjiang zhiliu*, vol. 12: 3–4 (Emphasis added). *Otok*, here, seems to correspond to the Kazakh clans (*ru*).

84 While this has already been pointed out by Fletcher, I must emphasize the misleading descriptions in Chinese-language sources, see Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800": 63–64.

85 *Xinjiang zhiliu* also reports that the Qing Empire later decided to conduct research on the genealogy of each "section" of the Kazakhs who came to the Qing territory for trade, see *Xinjiang zhiliu*, vol. 12: 4. This was apparently because the Qing side lacked an understanding of the two independent lineages of the Right Section: Abulmanbet's elder son, Bolat succeeded to his father's title of *han*, while the younger son, Abulfeiz, was separately conferred to the title of *wang*. See, Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800": 63. An imperial edict confirmed that Bolat should be bestowed *han* because he was older brother, see QL37/9/17, edict to Šuhede, QMJD vol. 10, no. 1590.

2.5 What Is Meant by the Term “Western Section” (*Xibu*)?

After 1757, the lineages of Ablai and Abulfeiz entered into relationships with the Qing Empire. Ablai’s lineage was called the Left Section, and the lineage of Abulfeiz (who was sometimes misunderstood to be Abilis, the khan of the Great Juz), gradually came to be known as the Right Section (*youbu*).

The lineage of Tursun, which first appears in historical sources after QL27, eventually came to be referred to as “the Western Section” (*xibu*). This may be because the terms “Western Kazakh” and “Western Section,” the usage of which had been limited to the Small Juz in earlier times, shifted to indicate Tursun’s descendants.

This new perception of three sections (*bu*), which were in fact all different elements of the Middle Juz, was confirmed in the *Zongtong yili shiyi*,⁸⁶ or the genealogical table (vol. 12) shown in the *Xinjiang zhilüe*. The *Xiyu shuidaoji*, compiled two years later than the *Xinjiang zhilüe* (in 1823), also contains a similar description. Moreover, this literature clearly shows that the terms “Juz” and “*bu*” (section) are not the same by reporting that “the Middle Juz is administered separately by Ablai, Bolat, and Abulfeiz”.⁸⁷ The following text describes how Qing authorities conferred titles such as *han*, *wang*, and *taiji* to each section respectively.

The Left Section has one *han*. This *han* is currently Wali, the son of Ablai who was the first to surrender [to the Qing]. Wali inherited the Uisin *Otok* in QL47 which had been controlled by Ablai.⁸⁸ ... The Right Section has one *han*. This *han* is currently Toghun. Toghun inherited [his title] in JQ14 and is the grandson of Abulmanbet *han*, who first surrendered [to the Qing]. This section also has one *wang*. The current *wang* is Jankhoja, the great grandchild of Abulmanbet. ... Within the Western Section there are no *han* or *wang*, but only *taiji*, the rank of which is no higher than the second class (*erpin*). The *taiji* of this section, Toqtokushuk controls the Qara-baijigit *Otok*, and Jabai controls the Kulu-baijigit *Otok*.⁸⁹

In this way, the meaning of the three Kazakh sections (*bu*) changed from indicating the actual Juz to indicating the genealogical lineages of the Kazakh

86 As indicated in Table 4 (no. 15), this document gives the most reasonable description.

87 In the text, the Middle Juz consists of the two clans of Naiman *Otok* and Arghin *Otok*, *Xiyu shuidaoji*, vol. 4: 45.

88 According to the Russian sources, Wali only inherited his father’s Arghin clan. Wali’s control over the Uisin clan, administered by Wali’s younger brothers, has yet to be confirmed.

89 *Xiyu shuidaoji*, vol. 4: 45. Toqtokushuk and Jabai are sons of Saniyaz, the son of Kushuk.

khan aristocracy. This change occurred within the context of a weakening of the Qing-Kazakh relationship (see chapter 7). It is important to note that in this way the Qing authorities of the time had already begun to lose interest in the Kazakhs from the time of the Jungar expedition. As a result, the Qing Dynasty, misunderstanding its own past memorials, mistakenly associated the former descriptions of the three Kazakh sections, which it regarded to be the three Juz, with the three Kazakh dynastic lineages. We will discuss the meaning of these three newly recognized lineages in the fourth section of this chapter.

3 Relations between the Three Kazakh Juz and the Qing Empire

3.1 *The Great Juz and the Qing*

This paragraph will consider the confusions within Qing descriptions of the three *bu*, and clarify how this confusion was closely connected to changes in Kazakh-Qing relations.

In addition to the appearance of the Small Juz, the decline of the Great Juz (referred to by the Qing as the Right Section, or “*youbu*”) played a role in confusing Qing descriptions of the three Kazakh sections mentioned above. Though Abilis khan⁹⁰ of the Great Juz maintained relations with the Qing Empire, he was frequently misunderstood to be Abulfeiz of the Middle Juz.⁹¹ Nevertheless, Qing sources from the earliest period of the Qing-Kazakh relations (during the 1750s) consistently distinguished the transliterations of Abilis and Abulfeiz. Within Manchu texts, these transliterations were “*Abilis*” and “*Abulbis*.” In contrast to Abilis khan, who was a rival of Ablai (who was influential in initiating negotiations with the Qing side), Abulfeiz had a consistently close relationship with Ablai. For example, Abulfeiz was specifically named in a document regarding Ablai’s first envoy to the Qing emperor as follows: “Abulfeiz (*Abulbis*), who controlled the Kara-kerei *Otok* and was the younger

90 Erofeeva regarded him as “Abulgazy,” see I.V. Erofeeva, “Kazakhskie khany v khanskie dinastii v XVIII – seredine XIX vv.,” in *Kul’tura i istoriia Tsentral’noi Azii i Kazakhstana: problemy i perspektivy issledovaniia* (Almaty, 1997): 197. Saguchi wrongly regarded him to be Abulfeiz of the Middle Juz, depending on the latest *Xinjiang tuzhi*, Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū*: 338.

91 For example, Abilis is translated as “*Abilpeyis*,” see Salgharaūli, *100 Qūzhat*: 42. In another case, the *han* of the Right Section in 1757 was considered to be “*Ābilpeyis* of the Great Juz,” N. Muqametqanūli, *XVIII–XX ghasirdaghi Qazaq-Qitay baylanistari* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996): 38.

clansman (*deo*) of Ablai".⁹² All of these show how Abulfeiz had no relations with the Great Juz.

When the Qing army crossed Eastern Turkestan and negotiated with the Kazakhs of the Great Juz near Tashkent, a Kazakh notable, Jolan (Ch. *Zhuolan*) described the Kazakhs in this region as follows:

When you ask about the origin of us Kazakhs, [I answer that] we are originally from the region surrounding Sharabel⁹³ and other locations. First, Ishim khan conquered Tashkent, and it was later inherited by Jangir khan, who had two sons. The older son, Shahai, leading the Middle Juz (*ortojus aiman*), eventually became khan. [His rank] was passed on from generation to generation, and was finally inherited by Ablai. The younger brother Toghum (*Tohome*) became khan of the Great Juz (*ulujuş aiman*). This position was eventually inherited by Abilis.⁹⁴

This genealogical information requires further consideration because it is lacking in several crucial areas: for example, the name of the famous Tauke khan, who we know was the son of Jangir, is not mentioned. At the very least, however, the quote above does document how Ablai (of the Middle Juz) and Abilis (of the Great Juz) both held power at the same time.

Jolan, later dispatched as envoy to the Qing emperor, spoke at the capital as follows:

We Kazakhs, have three Juz – the Great, Middle and Small. In the Oyirad [Jungar] language, they are called the *Ike Joo*, *Dumda Joo*, and *Baga Joo*. Originally, they are all said to have come from the Kunker land (*Kungker gurun*).⁹⁵ Our Great Juz has two khans. One is Abilis khan, the son of Jolbars khan, who was the son of Harabis khan. The other is Hanbaba khan, the son of Mamit khan, who was the son of Isfandiyar khan, the son of Rustem khan. ...⁹⁶

92 JMLZ: 1643–007/45–2680, or PDZFL zhengbian, vol. 42: 1 (Manchu).

93 The river between the Ili and Chu Rivers.

94 QL23/9/7, the memorial of Fude, JMYD 99 (2) the first volume of the military affairs bundle regarding the ninth month of QL23: 114. For the Qing court's impression of the subjection of Abilis, Kicengge analyzed a memorial in QZHG (vol. 1: 132–133), see Kicengge, *Daichin=gurun to sono jidai*: 112.

95 See T. Onuma, "Kongge'er guo' xiaokao: 18–19 shiji ouya dongbu aosimanchao renshi zhi yiduan," *Minzushi yanjiu* 8 (2008): 153–163.

96 QL23/11/13, memorial by *Junjichu* (Grand Council), QZHG 1: 181–182. In the original text, "meni hasak de uluyus, ortoyus, kiciyus sere ilan hasak bi. ület gisun de ike joo dumda joo,

There are two main points to be gained from this statement by Jolan. First, it contains genealogical information regarding the Great Juz, in particular, the lineage from Jolbars to Abilis. This corresponds to Russian sources which indicated that Tashkent was previously ruled by Jolbars khan, and his son was Abilis (*Ablis*) khan.⁹⁷ The lineage as presented is quite different from that regarding Abulfeiz in which the ancestor mentioned is Tauke khan. Although we currently have no information regarding the genealogy of the other khan, Khanbaba,⁹⁸ one genealogical record does list Rustem and his son, Isfandiyar as khans of the Great Juz. Thus, secondly, we can regard Khanbaba as a member of the khan of the Great Juz.⁹⁹

Therefore, Abilis khan of the Great Juz was clearly a different person in the historical records than Abulfeiz. Later, his descendants relocated in the direction of Ust' Kamenogorsk,¹⁰⁰ and lost the status of khan of the Great Juz. This was due to confusions in the territory of the Great Juz resulting from the struggle with the Khojas in Tashkent.¹⁰¹ A record regarding the expedition to Tashkent by Irdana bi of Khoqand in 1762¹⁰² already fails to mention the name of khan of the "Right Section", and this tendency is repeated elsewhere. By this time, the "Right Section" had ceased to refer to the Great Juz. Following this record, the region around Tashkent only appears in Qing documents in 1767 (QL32) when the Khoqand fought with Ablai and Abulfeiz.¹⁰³

In contrast, Russian sources¹⁰⁴ provide information regarding the situation of the time, specifically, relations between the Qing and the powers of Central Asia during the period of the Qing invasion of Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang).

baga joo sembi. daci gemu Kungker gurun ci jihengge seme donjiha. meni uluyus de juwe han bi. emke Harabis han, erei jui Yolboros han, erei jui Abilis han inu. emke Nurustuma han, erei jui Ismandar han, erei jui Mamut han, erei jui Hambaba han inu"

97 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy*: 75–76. Jolbars khan is said to be the relative of Abulkhair of the Small Juz, KRO 1: 36.

98 He seems to be *Hambaba* who sent his envoy with Abilis, see PDZFL zhengbian vol. 64: 5 (9).

99 This idea is drawn from the genealogical record (of 1735) cited by I. Erofeeva, see I.V. Erofeeva, *Rodoslovnye kazakhskikh khanov i kozha XVIII–XIX vv.* (Almaty: "Print-S," 2003): 74.

100 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy*: 75–76.

101 Regarding the existence of three Khojas in Tashkent, see *Xiyu tuzhi*, vol. 45.

102 See Table 4, no. 7 (QL27(1762)/4).

103 QL32/8/28 (*yichou*), edict, GZSL vol. 793. This issue will be discussed later.

104 Because I haven't had a chance to conduct detailed research on documents in AVPRI, I mainly refer to the diplomatic documents reproduced in MOTSA 2. These materials are also used frequently in Gurevich's work, see B.P. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow, 1983).

Based on Russian documents, after the conquest of Jungaria and Kashgaria (Tarim Basin), the Qing Empire planned to capture Western Turkestan as well. The Russian translator Arapov reported that the Qing envoy asked Ablai for help in gaining control over Tashkent. He further reported that Ablai rejected on grounds that the Kazakhs were subjects of the Russian Empire.¹⁰⁵ The Soviet historian, B. Gurevich saw this as a diplomatic failure of the Qing Empire.¹⁰⁶ However, Qing sources only say that Kazakh elders, including Ablai, demonstrated their allegiance to the Qing envoy. In fact, it is very likely that the Kazakhs would have attempted to demonstrate such relations with the Russians. In other words, the Kazakhs were seeking to act independently of the Qing Empire. Probably within the same context, Kazakh Baijigit mirza told Russian authorities that the Qing emperor (*bogdokhan*) called the Kazakh Middle Juz “my subjects (*albanluči*)”, and called Ablai “[my] little younger brother.” Nevertheless, Baijigit also stated that “[the Kazakhs] had at no time been under Qing subjection,” thus denying such a relationship with the Qing Dynasty.¹⁰⁷

In reality, it is difficult to believe that the Kazakhs could really have behaved in this way to the Qing side because trade between the Qing and the Kazakhs had already officially begun in 1758. A similar situation was seen in 1762, when Ablai reported to Russian authorities that the Kazakhs had stopped Qing troops which were marching for Samarqand and the town of Turkistan.¹⁰⁸ Another report, related in a statement by Ablai’s envoy, stated that the Qing, aware of the relationship between Russia and the Kazakhs, sought to open hostilities with Russia.¹⁰⁹ It is said that this threat by the Qing caused cities such as Kashgar, Yarkand, and Tashkent to dispatch envoys to Abulmanbet khan and Ablai sultan.¹¹⁰ This eventually led to the formation of a coalition of Muslims in Central Asia and Afghanistan during the first half of the 1760s.¹¹¹ Importantly, the Kazakhs were also induced to join this coalition. Khoja Jahan and Burhan

105 Ablai’s statement was recorded on 3.17.1759, MOTsA 2: 136. Arapov was sent to Ablai at that time.

106 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii*: 135–136.

107 Turkic correspondence of 1761 sent to fon-Veimarn, the vice-commander of Siberian fortified line troops, AVPRI: f. 113/1, 1761 g., no. 1, ll. 29–29ob.

108 11.13, MOTsA 2: 165.

109 9.30.1759, MOTsA 2: 148. The envoy from Nurali khan of the Small Juz mentioned the same plan of the Qing court on 10.14. 1758, MOTsA 2: 132.

110 MOTsA 2: 148.

111 See T. Saguchi, “The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 26 (1965): 90–91. His reference on p. 90 wrongly regards the Western Kazakh to be the Small Juz.

al-Din, brothers of the Kashgar Khoja, also sent a letter to Ablai.¹¹² It is known that sometimes even the Kazakhs sent envoys of their own.¹¹³ This anti-Qing alliance seems to have been unsuccessful. Although Gurevich simply regards the failure of the Qing march into the southwest as the result of resistance by Central Asian powers including the Kazakhs,¹¹⁴ reports sent to Russia by Central Asian Muslims often contained intentional exaggeration regarding the Qing Dynasty's offensive policy. For this reason, further investigation into these matters is required.¹¹⁵

Specifically, each power over-emphasized information about the other party. For example, Qing records clearly reflect the development of a threatening situation in regards to Afghanistan and Badakhshan during the 1760s.¹¹⁶ Having not conducted comprehensive research into the documents of both Russia and the Qing regarding this problem, I will only present here my understanding based on the published Russian documents I have examined. According to these documents, the mission dispatched by Nurali khan of the Small Juz to Beijing had heard the following information from the accom-

112 4.10.1760, MOTsA 2: 152.

113 The document dated 10.3.1763 mentions the envoy to Ahmad Shah of Afghanistan from Ablai, Abulmanbet, Tashkentis, Kashgarians, Yarkandis, and Khujandis, MOTsA 2: 175.

114 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*: 189–190.

115 As a new research, I present the following work, T. Onuma & Y. Kawahara & A. Shioya, "An Encounter between the Qing Dynasty and Khoqand in 1759–1760: Central Asia in the Mid-Eighteenth Century," *Frontiers of History in China* 9(3), 2014: 384–408. The authors describe new aspects of the Khoqand-Qing relationship. Their work especially considers the viewpoint of the author of *Muntaḥab al-Tavāriḥ*, in which the ruler of Khoqand, Irdana, sought to conduct a holy war against the Qing Empire.

116 As Pan Zhiping and Newby argued, researchers of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union had referred to these events, see Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya haohanguo yu qingdai xinjiang* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1991): 52–53; L.J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: a political history of Qing relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005): 34–35. As cited by Newby, Levshin had shown that Central Asian people (Tashkent, Khoqand, Kashgar, and Yarkand) had requested Ahmad Shah's protection against the threat of the Qing, probably in reference to the above-mentioned report (MOTsA 2: 174–176), see Levshin, *Opisanie Kirgiz-kazach'ikh ili Kirgiz-kaisatskikh ord i stepei*: 242. Ahmad Shah was the ruler of the Durrani Dynasty (r. 1747–73). The same tsarist researcher Vel'iaminov-Zernov had more carefully researched this issue, showing both the aims of the emperor of Qing and the Russian approach to this Central Asian problem, see V.V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov, *Istoricheskie svedeniia o kirgiz-kaisakakh i snosheniakh Rossii so Srednei Aziei vo vremeni konchiny Abul-khair khana*, t. 1 (Ufa, 1853). Analyzing Russian literature carefully, Y. Bregel has stated that the information from Russian sources was based on rumors, see FI: 591–592. However, I focus on the fact that Kazakh aristocrats were deeply involved with this affair due to their religious beliefs, see note 118.

panying envoy sent by Ahmad Shah of Afghanistan.¹¹⁷ 1. a letter from the Qing side sent via Sultan Shah of Badakhshan stated that “Kashgar, Yarkand, Andijan, and Kazakh are already contained within our territory. Ahmad Shah is therefore prohibited to enter these areas.” 2. Regarding these assertions, Ahmad Shah insisted that “such territories claimed by the Qing Dynasty all belong to us, Muslims.”¹¹⁸

According to a communication from Abulmanbet khan in Tashkent to Nurali khan, Ahmad Shah’s envoy,¹¹⁹ had stated to Khoqandi Irdana that Ahmad Shah had organized a large number of troops. Ahmad Shah had also demanded by letter that Nurali supply him with cattle. On the other hand, Irdana sent a letter to Ablai mentioning that “Ahmad Shah had risen up against the Qing and sent an envoy [to me].” Moreover, this final letter had fallen into Russian hands, thus further complicating the situation.¹²⁰

This unstable situation may have been closely related to the decline of the khanship within the Great Juz, which has been partially discussed above. It is said that Erali sultan from the Small Juz, who led his troops into the south of the Kazakh Steppe, was invited to be the khan of the Great Juz.¹²¹ In contrast, Abulmanbet khan, originally elected to be khan of the Middle Juz, was sometimes regarded to be the khan of the Great Juz: “He is the ruler of the Great Juz,

117 Nurali to Voronezh governor Lachinov, 7.16.1764, MOTsA 2: 179–182.

118 Potanin suggested that in 1759 Ablai also considered himself to be Muslim like the people of Kashgar, Yarkand, Samarqand, Tashkent, and Turkistan, see G. Potanin, “O karavannoï torgovle c Dzhungarskoi Bukhariei v XVIII stoletii” in G.N. Potanin, *Izbrannye sochineniia v trekh tomakh*, t. 3 (Pavlodar: Pavlodarskii gos. universitet im. S. Toraigyrova, 2005): 20.

119 It was dispatched in 1763, see Vel’iaminov-Zernov, *Istoricheskie svedeniia o kirgiz-kaisakakh*: 213.

120 8.13.1764, MOTsA2: 182–184. However, it is important to remember that the attached photocopy of the document mentioned that this document was actually addressed to “Ablai khan and Qaip khan.” For Fazil-bek’s temptation of Abulmanbet in 1763, see Vel’iaminov-Zernov, *Istoricheskie svedeniia o kirgiz-kaisakakh*: 215. The following work regarded a desire to demonstrate their opposition to Qing expansion to be Shah’s only motivation, see R.B. Suleimenov & V.A. Moiseev, *Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka: o vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Abilaia* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1988): 119–123. I would add that a document by I. Shpringer (commander of the Siberian army corps) in Omsk to the College of the Foreign Affairs (10.10.1766) reported that Irdana had sent a letter to Abulmanbet requesting he deport Ablai, while Fazil bek of Khujand also wrote to Ablai requesting he resist Irdana, AVPRI: 122/2, d. 14, l. 265ob. This very complicated situation requires further investigation.

121 Sep. 1758, MOTsA 2: 234.

and ... resides in the city of Turkistan."¹²² This resulted in the movement of Ablai and Abulfeiz to Tashkent. During the same period that Ablai and Abulmanbet developed connections with surrounding powers, they also tried to secure a trade route from Turkistan via Tashkent into Xinjiang. A Russian document reports that Abulmanbet khan called upon Ablai to liberate the trade route between the cities of Eastern Turkestan, Tashkent, and Turkistan.¹²³ However, the Khoqand powers were strongly against such a plan, resulting in conflict between the Khoqand and the Kazakhs.¹²⁴ It is remarkable that in later times the sons of Ablai (for example Adil) came to head clans which belonged to the Great Juz.¹²⁵

In summary, a clear understanding of the relationship between the Great Juz and the Qing Empire enables us to correctly grasp the international relations of Central Asia – especially those concerning Tashkent – through which the Kazakhs sought access to the trade route along the Sir Darya River. It is also important to note that, as was discussed in chapter 2, the three Kazakh Juz had cooperated to some extent with each other in the process of constructing relations with the Qing.

3.2 *The Small Juz and the Qing*

The second reason for confusion regarding the three Kazakh “sections” within Qing sources is that the Small Juz eventually lost its relationship with the Qing Empire. This was due to the influence of Russia which was located on the other side of the Small Juz. It should be remembered that relations between Russia and the Small Juz of the Kazakhs had begun before Qing troops made contact

122 8.30.1760, MOTsA 2: 158. Abulmanbet was located in Turkistan according to other sources as well (translator A. Gordeev to the commander of Arskaia liniia, Rodek, 7.5.1760), see B. Näsenov, *Abilay khan (I tarauı). Ombı arkhivı söyleydi*, xı bölım-xvı kitap (Almaty-Novosibirsk, 2004): 418.

123 Report to the Orenburg border Commission, 4.10.1760, MOTsA 2: 154.

124 In 1767, it was reported that Ablai was staying in Tashkent for a year to fight against Irdana of Khoqand, KRO 1: 685. Onuma demonstrates that the Qing emperor arbitrated the struggle between Khoqand and Kazakhs according to the logic that they were all subjects (*albatu*) of the Qing emperor, see T. Onuma, “Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the ‘ejen-albatu Relationship’ in Central Asia,” in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 120–122.

125 An Islamic chronology mentioned that Babakhan-tore, who was said to be the descendant of Ablai, was ruling the Shaikhantaur district of Tashkent, see O.D. Chekhovich, “Skazanie o Tashkente,” *Pis'mennye pamiatniki vostoka 1968* (Moscow, 1970): 157. This seems to be related to how the influence of the descendants of Ablai spread within the Great Juz.

with the Small Juz (see chapter 1). The army of Erali mentioned in Tab. 2, no. 2 was sent with the approval of Russia, which was aware of the Qing's aggressive expedition against the Jungar.¹²⁶ Erali's army met the Qing force while crossing the Chu and Talas Rivers.

Before the two parties met in the southern area of the Kazakh Steppe, the Qing side had attained the following information from the Kazakh envoy, Dolotbai: "the sons of Abulkhair khan of the Small Juz, Nurali khan, Erali sultan, and others, lead 10,000 troops and went to Sharabel to pursue [the Jungars] two months ago". The Qing officials highly praised the envoy, saying "it is very good that Nurali khan of the Small Juz and others so lead their troops."¹²⁷ However, the Qing side was not aware of the Kazakhs' relationship with Russia in the area beyond the Small Juz. Later, when the mission of Qaip sultan¹²⁸ whose base was in Urgench, and the mission of Nurali khan of the Small Juz were sent to the Qing court, this dispatch was reported in its entirety to the Russian authorities.¹²⁹

The last visitation to court for an audience with the Qing emperor undertaken by the Small Juz was in 1783. The reason for this 'final' mission was to discuss the rebellion of Sirim batir (1783–97) then occurring within the territory of the Small Juz. This rebellion eventually led to the arrest of Nurali¹³⁰ and caused huge unrest within the Juz. A further process of annexation of this

126 Nurali khan stated in conversation with Tevkelev on 9.23.1757 that his brothers Erali and Aishwaq were ready to help the Middle Juz and organized an army, IKRI 3: 376–377. Moreover, the edict of the emperor Elizaveta to Nurali khan of the Small Juz demanded the dispatch of troops for the Middle Juz, 3.19.1758, MOTsA 2: 100. For the reply of Nurali regarding this march, see TsIKKh 1: 174.

127 QL22/11/27 the memorial of Fude, JMYD 93 (1) military affairs bundle regarding the eleventh month of QL22: 364 (information before 10/11). The same is found in XMD vol. 26: 234–235.

128 Qaip's reign as khan of Khiva was from 1745–56, and he died in 1791.

129 Nurali's letter to governor of Voronezh, Lachinov on 7.16.1764 reported that he had sent his mission to the Qing Empire in 1761, MOTsA 2: 179. This mission corresponds to the one in Table 4, no. 9, which accompanied those dispatched by Abulmanbet of the Middle Juz together, see QL27/10/20, QZHG 2: 96. See also T. Onuma, "Kazakh missions to the Qing court," in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 156. Here, we should remember that Nurali was the father-in-law of Abulfeiz, the son of Abulmanbet. Thus, Abulfeiz also assisted Nurali's dispatching of missions, see QL27/11, XMD vol. 59: 398.

130 M.P. Viatkin, *Batyr Srym* (Almaty: Sanat, 1998): 224. By the time of these events, Nurali and Wali of the Middle Juz were already in contact with one another, as mentioned in chapter 2. During the nineteenth century, the gap between the Juz grew bigger, while the power of each khan of the three Juz declined. Consequently, Kazakh political unity was lost.

Juz's territory, one symbolic example of which was the foundation of the Bokei Orda (1801), makes it clear that the sultans and elders of the Small Juz couldn't maintain relations with the Qing located far in the east (see chapter 2).

In summary, the absence of an authoritative khan led to confusion within the Great Juz, and the sending of missions to the Qing was suspended by the Small Juz. The Chinggisid sultans related to these two Juz eventually lost their relationships with the Qing Empire. All of these developments were greatly affected by the relations the Kazakhs held with other Central Asian powers and with Russia.

4 The Three Sections in the View of the Kazakhs

As shown above, the first occasion for discussion regarding the three sections or Juz of the Kazakhs within the Qing Dynasty arose around 1757 when the Kazakhs began to send missions to the Qing authorities. Secondly, the Qing side began to discuss the definition of these terms after the most influential person among the Kazakhs, Ablai, died in 1781. The reason for this was that Dair sultan of the "Western Section" demanded to inherit Ablai's title. This was related to the fact that after the death of Ablai, there was trouble among the Kazakh aristocrats regarding who would take his place.¹³¹ Dair sultan's action has already been examined by Alatang'aoqier and Wu Yuanfeng¹³² using Manchu documents. However, it seems that they failed to relate this issue to the discussion of the Kazakh's three sections within the Qing side and Dair's claim of authority on the Russian side. Moreover, there is an original letter written in Turkic by Dair¹³³ which wasn't used by either scholar. For this reason, I will present more detailed analysis on this issue.

131 M.K. Kozybaev et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei v piati tomakh*, t.3 (Almaty: Atamūra, 2000): 272.

132 Alatang'aoqier & Wu Yuanfeng, "Qingting cefeng walisuletan wei hasake zhongzhang han shimo: Jianshu walihan mu e jiqi yuanyou," *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 3 (1998): 52–58. See also, K.Sh. Khafizova, "Vali-khan i ego otnosheniia s Rossiei i Kitaem" in *Vzaimodeistvie Kazakhstana s sopredel'nyimi stranami v XVIII –nachale XX v.: sovremennyi vzgliad na problemu* (Aktobe, 2004): 9. For Wali's petition and report, we have the Manchu translation contained in the memorial of Iletu, QL47/1/28 (1782) JMLZ: 2915–27/123–2901.

133 Documents sent by Kazakhs to the Qing Empire were first written in Oyrat (Tod script), and later in Turkic with Arabic scripts. See our research on documents, Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*. See also M. Wulan, *Weilate menggu wenxian ji shixue* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012). These documents refer to issues of trade, the crossing of borders, and the inheritance of titles

Dair, the son-in-law of Ablai, sent his envoy to Ili and claimed that he should inherit Ablai's title. Dair stated¹³⁴ that "[after the death of Ablai] there are no excellent elders leading us", and further went on to declare his loyal service to "Ejen hān" (the Qing emperor) basing his authority on the last will of Ablai which states that "after we are gone, the territory (*yurt*) will remain around you [=Dair]". In addition, Dair's envoy stated the following which is cited in a memorial by Iletu, the Military Governor of Ili:

We [the Kazakhs] originally had three *khans*. One was Baraq, Dair's father, another was Abulmanbet, and finally Ablai. We lost Abulmanbet and Baraq, and now even Ablai has died. Hanbaba, Dair's older brother, also passed away. We no longer have any elder figures other than Dair within the pasturelands (*nukte*) of the Kazakh. According to what Ablai said during his lifetime, "Dair is my son-in-law¹³⁵ and stands preeminent among our children. So after my death, I would like to ask Dair to look after the affairs of the pasturelands". Now, since Wali is too young to administer the land, the masses of our people hope that the inheritance of the *han* title will pass from Ablai to Dair.¹³⁶

given by the Qing court. For the issue of titles, see chapter 5. These kinds of documents sent by Kazakh aristocrats are highly important not only for research on Kazakh-Qing relations but also for the identification of Kazakhs. Further investigation on the documents is required. Recent research includes the following: Dushannali Abdilashimuli, "Tarubagatai sansandaijin ate bungo kazafugo bunsho 1 shu," *Seinanajia kenkyū* 72 (2010): 65–78; Aidar Mirkamalūli, "Abalay han handıqqa qashan otırghan," *Shinjıyang qoghamdıq ghilimı*. 2014 vol. 2: 23–37; idem, "Abalaidan keyıngı handıq müragerlik," *Shinjıyang qoghamdıq ghilimı*, 2014, vol. 4: 21–36, and also Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*. For an outline of Qing documentation regarding Central Asian policies, see T. Onuma, "The Qing Dynasty and its Central Asian neighbors," *Saksaha* 12 (2014): 33–48.

134 This document (JMLZ: 2907–13/123–1101) was reproduced in Noda & Onuma *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 48. The text of the stamp on the document reads "Dair sultan, the son of Baraq khan (*Ṭāhir sultān bn. Barāq hān*).

135 Dair's wife was the daughter of Ablai from his first wife, see I.V. Erofeeva, "Kazakhskie khany v khanskie dinastii v XVIII – seredine XIX vv.," in *Kul'tura i istoriia Tsentral'noi Azii i Kazakhstana: problemy i perspektivy issledovaniia* (Almaty: Izd. Instituta filosofii, 1997): 122.

136 QL46/11/18, the memorial of Iletu, JMLZ: 2907–13/123–1089–1091. See also Alatang'aoqier & Wu, "Qingting cefeng Walisuletan wei hasake zhongzhang han shimo": 56. The statement cited in the memorial was written in a slightly different tone from that of the original Turkic document.

From this, it can be confirmed that Dair tried to give authority to his own claims, behaving as if he had received the blessing of Ablai.

Nonetheless, the Military Governor of Ili denied Dair's claim, telling him: "we do not know when and how your father, Baraq, became *han*." In this document to Dair, the Governor preached about the legitimacy of Wali, stating: "his [Ablai's] *han* title should be inherited by his child, in accordance with reason" (*ini han i jergi be giyan i ini jui de sirabuci acame*).¹³⁷ Consequently, an edict was issued concerning the inheritance of the *han* title by Wali.¹³⁸ In this context, the reason for legitimacy was simply that the title should be hereditary.

In fact, however, Dair's request was presented to the Russian Empire as well. A request was sent to the Governor of Orenburg,¹³⁹ stating that Ablai should not occupy the position of khan. Another request was sent to the commander of the Siberian corps, confirming that Baraq was an important figure among the Great Juz and the city of Tashkent. This request stated: "After Baraq[*'s* death], Ablai attained the position of khan (*khanstvo*)... [However,] after my father[*'s* death], I [Dair] should have been, not a sultan, but a khan. Now, after Ablai[*'s* death], I should be the first candidate for his khan position."¹⁴⁰ This claim is quite similar to that made to the Qing officials. Once again, Dair's hope was not realized, and later Russian sources simply reported that "[although Dair was khan], he is regarded as a khan only by the Tortul (*diurtul*) and Qarakesek (*karakisets*) clans. The other clans don't accept [him]."¹⁴¹

From this case, it is evident that the legitimacy of Kazakh aristocratic authority was based on genealogy, as demonstrated in the petitions to both the Qing and the Russian Empires. However, the lineage of Baraq khan, which, in Russian sources, seemed considerably influential, was not considered by the Qing to be a basis for legitimacy of the khanship. As a result, Dair's claim was not accepted.

137 JMLZ: 2907–13/123–1093. Emphasis is mine. See also the edict to Iletu (QL46/12/12), which denied the authority of Baraq's lineage, QMJD vol. 15: 326 (no. 2641).

138 QL46/6/6 (*dingchou*), the imperial edict to Wali, GZSL vol. 1134: 5b–6a. Wali's enthronement ceremony was held at this time. For his elevation ceremony, see TsIKKh 2: 106. For a record of the ceremony from the viewpoint of Qing officials, see Alatang'aoqier & Wu, "Qingting cefeng walisuletan wei hasake zhongzhang han shimo": 55.

139 6.21.1781, Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy*: 37. Spasskii also cited the same contents later, see G.I. Spasskii, "Kirgiz-kaisaki Bol'shoi, Srednei i Maloi ordy," *Sibirskii vestnik*, Ch. IX–XI (SPb., 1820): 118–119.

140 Petition addressed to Ogarev, 6.29.1781, cited in I.V. Erofeeva, *Rodoslovnye kazakhskikh khanov i kozha*: 78–79.

141 Report of a merchant in Omsk to Fedtsov, 11.16.1785, MOTsA 2: 208.

This series of events demonstrates the nature of the struggle for power among Kazakh aristocrats after the time of Ablai. Additionally, Dair's claim made it evident that the three dynastic lineages (Baraq, Abulmanbet, and Ablai) should be regarded as the legitimized line for the khan of the Middle Juz. These three lines are completely equal to the "three sections" mentioned within the Qing literature. In other words, by this time, the three lines had come to be considered the most influential lineages within the Kazakh Middle Juz. As mentioned before, the notion of the three sections changed from indicating the Juz to indicating the dynastic lineage, and interestingly, this shift happened contemporarily with Dair's case.

Apparently, the meaning of the "three sections" to the Qing side was as a kind of categorization for those elements of Kazakh society who had made contact with the Qing Empire. However, it is also important to consider the perception of the Kazakh sultans themselves. As a supplementary explanation, I will introduce again the descriptions of *Tavāriḡ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī*, written in later years.

In the THS, there is a description regarding the origin of the Kazakh khans. The author of the THS first lists the genealogy from Chinggis khan to Oros khan, and mentions that this Chinggisid lineage split into three lines.¹⁴² Qurbān 'alī himself made a summary of this history:

Two generations passed from Baraq khan to Shighai khan. The sons of Shighai, Ishim khan and Ondan khan, were divided into the red banner (*Qizil tuğ*) and the white banner (*Aq tuğ*). The green banner (*Yäšil tuğ*) was split during the time of the great grandchild of Ishim khan,¹⁴³ Ablai khan.¹⁴⁴

These three "banners" mentioned by Qurbān 'alī are certainly equivalent to the three sections (*bu*) mentioned within Qing historical sources.

In addition, the genealogy of the descendants of Shigai khan¹⁴⁵ mentioned by a Russian official, N. Konshin, contains the same distinction of three genea-

142 THS: 247–248.

143 There are several variants on the origin of Ablai. In this case, Ablai himself might be confused with his grandfather of the same name "Ablai."

144 THS: 454.

145 According to Konshin, the genealogical information collected among the sultans of the Middle Juz in 1897 was kept in the archive of the Karkarali District, see N. Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: III. O zagranichnykh obstoiatel'stvakh; IV. Zametka o kirgizskikh rodakh i sultanakh v Karkaralinskoi krae," *Pamiatnaia knizhka Semipalatinskoi oblasti na 1900*, IV (Semipalatinsk, 1902): 51–52.




FIGURE 7 *Three lineages of Kazakh khans and three sections in the Qing sources (Bolded portions indicate the 'founder' of each section).*

logical lines, though it also contains the questionable statement that a person named Tauke is wrongly considered to be an ancestor of Ablai khan. Considering both the claim of Dair and the genealogy collected by Konshin, it can be said that the perception of the three genealogical lines actually existed among the Middle Juz Kazakhs. Nevertheless, it is also true that such literature as Shakarim's,¹⁴⁶ which collected the genealogies of the Kazakh khan dynasty, lacks clear perspective regarding the three lines.

The three dynastic lineages confirmed by the discussion are given in fig. 7.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the meaning of the three sections (*bu*), a term which the Qing Dynasty applied to nomadic Kazakh society. As a result, it has become clear that the shift in perception regarding the three sections was closely connected to the changes in Kazakh–Qing relations. These changes were not the same throughout all of the three Juz, and it must be concluded that consideration of the shift in meanings must be undertaken uniquely with regards to each Juz.

The Qing troops which invaded the Kazakh pasturelands from 1757 to 1758 also collected geographical information regarding the Kazakhs. But the Qing officials of the later generation didn't inherit the information. However, the Qing authorities – and Russian authorities as well – continued to understand nomadic Kazakh society based on the khan lineages. This is confirmed by the fact that the three sections discussed here eventually came to refer to the

¹⁴⁶ Q. Shākārīm, *Türk, qırghız-qazaq hām khandar shejiresi* (Almaty: Qazaqstan; Sana, 1991).

dynastic lines of the Kazakh khan aristocracy. Furthermore, the information in Qing documents also indicated that the three Kazakh Juz had loose relations with one another.

How the Kazakh Chinggisid aristocrats (sultans from the khan lineages) maintained their own relationships with the two empires is not well-understood, although they did hold various privileges within their societies.¹⁴⁷ Thus, in the next chapter, I will consider the role of the members of the khan lineages who were regarded as leaders of the clans, focusing on the 'titles' they were given by the Qing Empire.

¹⁴⁷ V. Martin, *Law and custom in the steppe: the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian colonialism in the nineteenth century* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001): 132–133; V. Martin, "Kazakh Chinggisids, land and political power in the nineteenth century: a case study of Syrymbet," *Central Asian Survey* 29 (1) (2010): 79–102.

Titles of Kazakh Sultans Bestowed by the Qing Empire: The 1824 Case of Sultan Ghubaidulla¹

Introduction

Records of diplomatic transactions between the Qing court and the Kazakh nomads begin appearing in Qing historical sources around 1755 (see chapter 3). This is also the year that the Qing Empire conquered the Jungars. Soon after the fall of the Jungars, the Kazakhs established diplomatic relations with the Qing court, and these relations can be traced through the historical sources as far as the mid-nineteenth century. The foundation on which these relations were built was the granting of titles on the Kazakh sultans by the Qing court, a practice which began from 1757. Hence, to understand relations between the Kazakhs and the Qing court, it is necessary to study the Qing system of ‘bestowing’² titles on Kazakh leaders. Past research, however, even while acknowledging the existence of the system, has not sufficiently studied it from the viewpoint of Kazakh history.³ In particular, contemporary Chinese studies based on Qing historical sources tend to take Kazakh submission to the Qing court for granted and to interpret Kazakh-Qing relations as having been stable. Elsewhere I have indicated that Kazakh-Qing relations were actually quite fluid during the first half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it should be

1 This chapter is a revised version of the following, J. Noda, “Titles of Kazakh Sultans Bestowed by the Qing Empire: The Case of Sultan Ghubaydulla in 1824,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 68 (2011): 63–94.

2 It should be noted here that the system of bestowal was not established at the earliest stage of the diplomatic relations between the Kazakhs and the Qing (see later discussion).

3 Toru Saguchi first analysed their relations, T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963). Khafizova discusses the conferring of titles on Kazakhs from the viewpoint of the Qing empire, K.Sh. Khafizova, *Kitaiskaia diplomatiia v Tsentral’noi Azii (XIV – XIX vv.)* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1995): 141–160. Chen Weixin also deals with the case of Ghubaidulla, see Chen Weixin, *Qingdai duie waijiao liyi tizhi jifanshu guishu jiaoshe 1644–1861* (Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2010): 335–341. However, his analysis on the topic is limited to Chinese sources. My emphasis is on Russian sources which reflect how Russia considered this issue.

stated that recent research on Kazakh titles has progressed in China, especially with regard to this issue of the succession of titles.⁴

This chapter will reconsider the Qing system of conferring titles from the viewpoint of the Kazakh sultans themselves.⁵ Since I have already analyzed documents from Kazakh sultans addressed to the Qing court,⁶ Russian sources will be used here to contextualize Kazakh diplomatic policies toward the Qing. I will also clarify the changes that occurred within this diplomacy and, in particular, will seek to demonstrate the significance Qing titles held for the Kazakhs. Because the Kazakhs had already established diplomatic relations with Russia during the first half of the eighteenth century, titles subsequently received from the Qing court were doubtlessly interpreted within this larger context rather than as simple diplomatic ties to the Qing. In this way, understanding how Imperial Russia itself interpreted the Qing titles is also necessary in order to clarify the logic behind its rule over the Kazakh Steppe.

In particular, this chapter focuses on events surrounding Ghubaidulla sultan's succession to the Qing 'han' title in 1824. In early research on these events, Nikolai Aristov⁷ mentioned concern that existed within the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Qing Dynasty's actions. Later, Boris Gurevich⁸ investigated the events surrounding the succession of Ghubaidulla in connection with his historical study of the region's international relations.

Also published was *"Istoriia Kazakhstana (History of Kazakhstan),"*⁹ which made use of the most recent research to describe resistance in Kazakhstan to

4 Regarding the succession of Wali to the "han" title, see Alatang'aoqier & Wu Yuanfeng, "Qingting cefeng walisuletan wei hasake zhongzhang han shimo: Jianshu walihan mu e jiqi yuanyou," *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 3 (1998): 52–58. On the failure of the succession of Jochi sultan to the "gong" title, see Hua Li, "Jiaqing 4–5 nian hasake wangsei chengxi wenti yu qingting de duiying fangzhen," in Gugong bowuyuan ed., *Gugong bowuyuan bashi huadan ji guoji qingshi xueshu yantaohui: lunwenji* (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2006): 181–192.

5 'Sultans' were members of the Kazakh khan clan who were descendants of Chinggis Khan (*tore* in Kazakh).

6 J. Noda, "An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents," in J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo: Department of Islamic Area Studies, The University of Tokyo, 2010): 126–151. In that work, I considered the title bestowal system focusing on succession.

7 N.A. Aristov, *Usuni i kyrgyzy ili kara-kyrgyzy: ocherki istorii i byta naseleniia zapadnogo Tian'-Shania i issledovaniia po ego istoricheskoi geografii* (Bishkek: Fond "Soros-Kyrgyzstan"), 2001: 479.

8 B.P. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983).

9 M.K. Kozybaev et al. eds., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Almaty: Atamūra, 2000): 323–328.

Russian efforts aimed at increasing control over Kazakh society. However, this research, while based on Russian source materials, did not take into account Russia's perception of Kazakh titles, nor did it adequately explain why Russia concerned itself with this issue in the first place.¹⁰ In other words, although these studies were informed by historical sources, they merely repeated statements made in the sources and did not manage to fully ascertain the perspectives of the three involved parties: the Kazakhs, the Russian Empire, and the Qing. Hence, differences in the positions of the three parties could not be accounted for. This chapter will investigate this matter in detail, relying on historical documents from the Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan (TsGA RK).

This discussion will lead to a deeper understanding of the realities of Kazakh-Qing relations, as well as the nature of the Qing court's bestowing of titles, and Kazakh perceptions of their relationship with the Qing.

1 Qing Titles for the Kazakhs

1.1 *The Relationship between Kazakh Tribute to the Qing Court and the Bestowal of Qing Titles*

It goes without saying that the Qing began bestowing titles on the Kazakhs only after the Kazakhs began sending tribute delegations to the court.¹¹ From the perspective of the Qing Empire, this amounted to the bestowing of a benefit on the Kazakhs. Such Kazakh missions were received either in Beijing or in Rehe (Jehol, or *Chengde*) and were granted various goods on each occasion.

Although neither the events surrounding the bestowal of titles to the Kazakhs nor the edicts ordering such bestowal of titles are ever clearly men-

¹⁰ Even Aseev, who discusses the efforts of the Kasimov brothers (Sarjan and Kenesari), and Moiseev, who sees Ghubaidulla as constrained by possible harm to the post-1822 system, do not consider the significance of the *han* title, and thus have an inadequate understanding of the system of conferring titles. See A.A. Aseev, "O vystuprenii Gabaiduly Valikhanova protiv administrativnykh reform v Srednem zhuze. 20-e gg. XIX v.," in V.A. Moiseev ed. *Rossiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii* (Barnaul: Izd-vo Altaiskogo gos. universiteta, 2001): 61–66; V.A. Moiseev, "Likvidatsiia khanskoi vlasti v Srednem zhuze i 'delo Gabaidulla Valikhanova,'" in V.A. Moiseev ed., *Rossiia – Kazakhstan* (Barnaul, 2001): 12–19.

¹¹ The first case was imaged in fig. 8, which was made by a famous Jesuit priest, G. Castiglione.



FIGURE 8 *A Kazakh mission receiving an imperial audience in 1757 (QL22). SOURCE: J. NODA, ROSHIN TEIKOKU TO KAZAFU HANKOKU (TOKYO: TOKYO DAIGAKU SHUPPANKAI, 2011): 153.*

tioned within historical sources,¹² the Qing court did in reality grant the following titles to the Kazakhs (listed here from higher to lower rank, depending on relations with the Qing court): *han*, *wang*, *gong*, and *taiji*.¹³ According to the *Zongtong yili shiyi* (Matters Concerning Control of Ili), compiled during the Jiaqing period (1796–1820), “In Kazakh there were [the titles,] *han*, *wang*, *gong*, and *taiji*, all of which were passed on hereditarily. By means of this system, order was brought to the nomads of the area.” This clearly shows that the Kazakhs indeed received four titles (Ma. *hergen*) from the Qing – *han*, *wang*, *gong*, and *taiji* – and that these titles were passed on from one generation to the next. However, other nonhereditary titles were also granted.¹⁴ The following table shows the order of title succession within the khan clans of the three Sections (table 5). In Qing historical sources, there are three recognized clans (*bu*) – the Left, Right, and Western Sections – but this Qing interpretation of Kazakh society was actually based on a confusion of the geographical distribution of the three *Juz* (clan confederations) with the three main khan clan lineages (see chapter 4).

12 The edicts (GZSL vol.548, QL22/10/15) cited in what follows merely imply the bestowal of titles, see Noda, “An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans”: 130. Also see my discussion on the edicts regarding the succession. Noda, “An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans”: 140. Abilis, who was given the *han* title, dispatched an envoy once in QL23. Thus, it is likely that Ablai also received his *han* title when he sent his envoy first in QL22. A source mentions that Ablai and Abulfeiz were given their titles first in QL29 without presenting any evidence, *Ta’erbahatai shiyi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969), vol. 4: 24.

13 A Kazakh envoy mentioned that sultans came from the lineage (Ma. *giranggi*) of *taiji*, a title which might correspond to “Chinggisid sultans,” see QL23/11/23 (1758), memorial of the Grand Council, QZHG 1: 180.

14 Concerning the *gong* title of Ghabbas, the son of Wali khan, an imperial edict said: “This title is not hereditary because it was conferred as a special favor in response to the hard work of his [Ghabbas’s] grandfather,” see XZSL vol. 61 (DG3/11/27 *xinmao*).

TABLE 5 *Succession to Qing titles within the khan clans*¹⁵

Title	Succession to title
Kazakh Left Section <i>han</i> (<i>Hasake Zuobu han</i>)	Ablai, Wali, Ablai, Wali ("who inherited the <i>han</i> title in QL 47 [1782]"), Ghubaidulla
Right Section <i>han</i> (<i>youbu han</i>)	Tauke, Abulmanbet, Bolat, Toghum ("who inherited the <i>han</i> title in JQ14 [1809]")
Right Section <i>wang</i> (<i>youbu wang</i>)	Abulfeiz ("the second son of Abulmanbet"), Khankhoja, [Jan]khoja ¹⁶ ("who inherited the <i>wang</i> title in JQ5 [1800]")
Western Section (<i>xibu</i>)	Tursun, Kushuk, Adil, Sama

The *Qinding Xinjiang zhilüe* contains much information that is helpful in determining the names of recipients of the *taiji* title.¹⁷ Among previous researchers, Toru Saguchi has already analyzed Kazakh tributes to the Qing in detail based on historical sources produced by the Qing.¹⁸ Also, Li Sheng has clarified the number of title successions that took place among the Kazakhs.¹⁹ Among these, the earliest took place after the death of Abulmanbet *han*, whose title was then inherited by Bolat. In fact, Bolat's younger brother, Abulfeiz received a Qing embassy at this time. In spite of Abulfeiz's claim to the *han* title, no succession ceremony was held.²⁰ The *han* title of Bolat was later confirmed by the Qing government.²¹ This shows how Qing policy regarding title succession was not firmly set during the first stage of their relationship with the Kazakhs.

15 *Zongtong yili shiyi*, in *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian shiliao huiji* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1990): 164–165.

16 Simply "*Huazhuang*" (Khoja), in the original text. In non-Qing historical sources, he is also known as "Janbubek," but throughout this work I refer to him using the name Jankhoja.

17 Saguchi refers to the succession of titles of the Kazakhs using this literature, Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan*: 280–287.

18 Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan*: 272–303.

19 Li Sheng, *Hasakesitan ji qiyu Zhongguo Xinjiang de guanxi: 15 shiji–20shiji zhongqi* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004): 136–137. He also notes that most of bestowals were not mentioned in the sources.

20 Only the memorial service was held "according to the example of *Jasaǵ qinwang* (princes)." See QMJD vol. 8, no. 1329 (edict to Yunggui, QL34/7/26).

21 See XMD vol. 109: 212–214 (memorial of Šuhede, QL37/10/18).

Although the Kazakhs received titles, they did not incur military obligations. Thus, titles given to Kazakhs differed in several ways from titles given to Mongols under the *Jasaǵ* system (Ch. *zhasake*). That is, according to the logic of Qing control and in contrast with the Mongols and Muslims of Xinjiang, the Kazakhs were not considered to be outer vassals (*waifan*) in a strict sense.²²

1.2 *Russian Perspectives Regarding the Qing System of Bestowing Titles*

Let us consider the Russian perspective on Qing-granted Kazakh titles which reflects a different side of these affairs. Ivan Andreev, a Russian soldier who investigated the Kazakh Steppe, viewed the Qing title of *wang* for Kazakhs as equivalent to the Russian titles of duke (*kniaz'*) or count (*graf*).²³ Andreev recorded the following account of a title conferral following a Kazakh request and the Qing court's decision thereon: "Succeeding to the title of Khankhoja, who died in 1799, was his son Jankhoja (*Ianbubek*). ... Jochi (*Iuchi*), who was Abulfeiz's son and Jankhoja's uncle, also sought the title, but the Qing court decided not to grant it to him."²⁴ The Kazakhs, in a council of nobles called the Kurultai,²⁵ traditionally granted the title of khan to the descendants of Chinggis khan. Hence, from the above statement as well, we can ascertain that the titles

22 Kataoka stated "peripheral states of *waifan*" (Ja. *Gaihan no gai'enkoku*), including Khoqand, Kirghiz, Hunza, and Gurkhas, see K. Kataoka, "Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihan, chōkō koku nokankei," *Komazawa shigaku*, 52 (1998): 256. Nevertheless, an example found in the imperial edict to Ghubaidulla shows that the Kazakhs were called *waifan*, 12.16.1823, XZSL vol. 61. Thus, we should distinguish *waifan* in a narrow sense (later, *fanbu*) with *waifan* in a wider sense (as tributaries). This problem needs further examination (see chapter 7). In another case, the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz are regarded as "*Mingyi fanbu*" (nominal dependent tribes), see Zhang Yongzhang, *Qingdai fanbu yanjiu: yi zhengce bianqian wei zhongxin* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001). See also Noda, "An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents": 131–132.

23 I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998): 42.

24 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 228. As Saguchi shows, Qing historical sources also mention that Jochi hoped to succeed to the title of *wang*, Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan*: 285. Also, Hua Li brings new historical sources to the study of this case, Hua Li, "Jiaqing 4–5 nian hasake wangsei chengxi wenti yu qingting de duiying fangzhen." According to her discussion, the Qing government regarded the titles to the Kazakhs as "favor of the Great Divine Ruler" and requested those who received titles to control the Kazakhs under them. Moreover, the Qing didn't interfere with Kazakh internal affairs, preferring to give them autonomy.

25 I.V. Erofeeva, *Rodoslovnye kazakhskikh khanov i kozha XVIII–XIX vv* (Almaty: Print-S, 2003): 14.

granted by the Qing court (the *han* title in particular) were different from the traditional Kazakh title of khan.²⁶

Of course, when Kazakhs requested titles from the Qing court, the “self-appellations”²⁷ that they requested reflected the organization of Kazakh society to some extent. Ablai, however, had already received the Qing court title of *han* before he ascended to the Kazakh throne as khan. Also, the Qing court never bestowed the title of *han* on Nurali, the Kazakh khan of the Small Juz.²⁸ Hence, there was no one-to-one correspondence between the Kazakh “khan” and the Qing “*han*.” Soon after Ablai opened relations with the Qing court, he inquired about the sorts of titles that the Qing conferred. In his request, he stated that “it would be welcome if the great Emperor (*ejen*) were to favor me with the title *wang*, and even more so if he were to favor me with the title *han*.”²⁹ Thus we know that he expected to receive the title of either *wang* or *han*.

Noteworthy in the quote above concerning Jankhoja is that the Kazakh sultans fought over titles granted by the Qing court. This fact buttresses the notion that there was rivalry among the sultans, especially those of different clans, over Qing court titles as well as over the Russian public office of *Agha-sultan*,

26 J. Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku: Surutan to shinchō no kankei o chūshin ni,” *Tōyō gaku* 87 (2) (2005): 37.

27 This is the term that appears in Qing historical sources, see T. Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986): 337–338. Differing somewhat in language from the Chinese version of PDZFL, its Manchu version states that, “Currently Ablai is khan forthwith. I promptly conveyed my intent on this appointment. This is an appointment involving only the use of the khan title. Among yourselves, you [the Kazakhs] may use the title as you please,” PDZFL (Ma.) *zhengbian* vol. 41: 45a. See also Noda, “An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents”: 129. As the case of Ablai’s *han* title indicates, the Qing empire’s principle was “keeping the tradition,” see T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014): 177–178. Thus, we can suppose that, at the first stage, the Qing government only confirmed the titles which the Kazakh sultans appealed.

28 When Nurali called himself as a khan in his document addressed to the Qing authority, the Qing emperor confirmed that the Qing side would not use “*han*” in its document, see QMJD vol. 16, no. 2787 (edict to Iletu, QL48/4/12).

29 Memorial of Jaohūi and Fude, imperially endorsed on QL22/10/7 (1757), JMYD 92(2) the first volume of military affairs bundle regarding the 10th month of QL22: 233–234. For the local negotiations between Kazakhs and the Qing troops, see T. Onuma, “Nusan shisetsu no haken: 1757 nen ni okeru shin to abulai no chokusetsu kōshō,” *Ajia bunkashi kenkyū* 14 (2014): 1–20. Onuma regarded the suggestion by Nusan to be attractive to Ablai and maintains that Ablai believed the establishment of the relations with the Qing would be beneficial.

discussed below.³⁰ From another perspective, it also illustrates the high value that the Kazakhs attached to the titles of the Qing court.

1.3 *The reception of Qing envoys*

Because Russia was aware from the beginning of Kazakh tribute to the Qing court and succession to the Qing title of *han*, one can also find in Russian historical sources information regarding what titles were bestowed by the Qing court on the Kazakhs.³¹ While there is nothing to illustrate Kazakh perceptions, Russian sources do tell us about various circumstances in considerable detail. Here I will present a few such cases.

First and remarkably, N. Ogarev,³² the commander of the Siberian fortified line, reported on the ceremony for Wali's succession in 1781 to the *han* title. His report was based on a letter from a Kazakh sultan. In the ceremony, Wali, was lifted up on a white felt carpet (*beloi voilok*) as the *han* ("khan" in the text) title was conferred on him.³³ 100 head of sheep were slaughtered in memory of his deceased father, Ablai. A fire was lit, and various silk items, along with numerous slips of paper,³⁴ were thrown into the fire. Also, the Qing envoy brought out a chair (*kreslo*) covered in glass beads, on which Wali sat and was again lifted up. The chair symbolized the Qing court's recognition of Wali's succession to the Qing title of *han* (*khanskoe dostoinstvo*).³⁵ Moreover, according to Manchu documents examined by Alatang'aoqier and Wu Yuanfeng, Wali knelt down three times and kowtowed nine times (*sangui jiukou*) during the ceremony.³⁶ Russian sources do not mention this detail, however, so it is possible that it was made up by the Qing envoy.

30 Konshin states that because the clans of the sultans of the Middle Juz were divided, they could not unite for the restoration of the Kazakh khan, N. Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: V. K istorii Karkaralinskogo i Aiaguzskogo okrugov v 30-kh i 40-kh godakh XIX st.," *Zapiski Semipalatinskogo Podotdela zapadno-sibirskogo otdela Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva* vyp. 1 (Semipalatinsk, 1903): 2.

31 Regarding Russian observation of Qing-Kazakh relations, see Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku."

32 He was at the post in 1776–88.

33 Report of Ogarev to College of Foreign Affairs, 1.22.1782, TsIKKh 2: 106. According to the letter from Wali to Ishim sultan (2.1.1782), the Qing embassy even shed tears, TsIKKh 2: 108.

34 This may be the *jiwen* (elegiac verse) or *zhiqian* (paper made to resemble money).

35 For Ablai's ceremony of the enthronement where he was lifted up on the white felt, see Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 36–37.

36 Alatang'aoqier & Wu, "Qingting cefeng Walisuletan wei hasake zhongzhang han shimo": 55.

I would like to draw attention here to the fact that the ceremony performed when the Qing envoy visited for the succession to the Qing *han* title imitated the traditional ceremony that the Kazakhs performed for ascension to the Kazakh title of khan.³⁷ This ceremony had the effect of enhancing the prestige of Kazakh khans within their society. Wali himself, in his letter to Ogarev, wrote, “Before the mission [from the Qing court] and *according to precedents of our laws*, I succeeded my deceased father to the position of khan.”³⁸ It is not clear whether the ceremony for ascension to the traditional position of khan and that for succession to the Qing title of *han* were carried out separately or not, but for the Russians who received Wali’s report on ascension to the position of “khan,” the distinction between the khan and *han* titles was not at all clear. That is, the Russians conflated succession to the Qing title of *han* with ascension to the traditional Kazakh position of khan.

Andreev also conveys to us the scene of Khankhoja sultan’s receiving an imperial mission from the Qing court in February 1784.³⁹ This Qing detachment was headed by a unit commander (*Ambo* in the text⁴⁰) and two “generals,” and consisted of fifty Kalmyks (Torghut or Oyirad), fifty Mongols, and six Manchus. On the Kazakh side, there were one thousand men under four sultans. One can thus imagine what a grand affair it must have been.

At the reception, an area of the steppe was partitioned by twelve tents arranged in a circle, and various foods were laid out. A felt tent was ordered to be set up for the Qing commander. When the commander came, the whole assembly stood silently at attention, and the commander entered the felt tent. Someone asked who Khankhoja sultan was and to whom the imperial edict

37 Sela discusses the Kazakh ascension ceremony, R. Sela, *Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan’s Inauguration Ceremony* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University, 2003).

38 TsIKKh 2: 107 (emphasis added).

39 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 43–44.

40 It means *Lingdui dachen*. For this Qing embassy, see QMJD vol. 16, no. 2854 (edict to Iletu, QL48/9/7). As described in chapters two and four, conflict between candidates occurred during succession of titles. Onuma regarded the noninterference policy of the Qing toward the Kazakhs as having become decisive by the end of the eighteenth century. In support of this argument, he cites imperial edicts from the time of Jochi sultan’s complaining to Jankhoja about his succession to the *wang* title of his farther, Khankhoja., see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 242–244. I have also found an edict regarding Bopu sultan’s complaint regarding the succession of Khankhoja, QMJD vol. 16, no. 2880 (QL49/2/4). Nevertheless, the final decision about who could become a candidate was made by the Qing authorities, thus I regard the denial of such complaints as a form of interference by the Qing into matters regarding Kazakh titles. At the very least, the Qing side anticipated that Khankhoja could manage the problems among the nomads (*nukte i baita*).

should be passed on. After the Kazakhs pointed out the individual responsible, the order was issued for everyone to be seated. An attendant was ordered to read the imperial edict and imperial gifts were presented to the Kazakhs.⁴¹ The reception was carried out in this way and, three days later, a memorial service is recorded as having also been held for the preceding generation. Thus, we can see how the Qing mission was obliged to hold a memorial service for Khankhoja's deceased father, Abulfeiz.

In addition, a Tatar mullah in Tarbagatai, Qurbān 'alī, who was acquainted with Kazakh history, wrote that "*gong* is equivalent to the Russian position of agha-sultan."⁴² This comparison of the Qing title of *gong* to the position of agha-sultan in Russian areas of control is of great interest in considering the significance of Qing titles among the Kazakhs. In any case, the existence of facts concerning the imperial edict addressed to Khankhoja (held by his descendants) and the imperial edicts addressed to Ablai khan and his posterity (held by close relatives of Choqan Valikhanov) demonstrate the high value Kazakh sultans placed on imperial letters.⁴³

Needless to say, the Qing court, by bestowing titles, sought to draw the Kazakh ruling class closer to itself. From the considerations of this section, we can infer that during generational transitions from one sultan to another, visits of Qing imperial missions, grand traditional ceremonies, and imperial edicts from the Qing emperor all added to the authority of the sultan within Kazakh society.

It is difficult to know what the Kazakhs thought about offering tribute to the Qing court. All we have is Qurbān 'alī's report⁴⁴ of a statement by Jamantai sultan, which suggested that he was unsatisfied with the pro forma reception he got when presenting himself at the Qing court.

41 The conversation on this occasion was conducted in Oyirad, and the imperial edict was also written in Oyirad. For the language of the edicts, see chapter 4.

42 THS: 461. Agha-sultan means the elder sultan. This position was introduced by the new Russian Regulation for the Kazakh Steppe of 1822. Russian documents referred to it as "*starshii sultan*."

43 Li Sheng refers to the symbolism of the prestige which was in the *dingdai hualing* bestowed by the Qing court, Li, *Hasakesitan ji qiyu Zhongguo Xinjiang de guanxi*: 136. For the examples of the Qing imperial edicts, see Noda, "An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents": 133.

44 THS: 458–459. Jamantai sultan was a member of the tribute delegation in 1809 (JQ14). There is a study that makes use of Qing archival sources to introduce an 1809 tribute mission, see B. Ejenkhan, "Qazaq khandighining 1809 jili Tsin patshalighina jibergen diplomatiialiq missiası," *Shighis*, no.1 (2005): 153–168. There were cases that the audience with the emperor at Beijing was held in the *Taihe* hall, see QZHG 1: 70.

After the death of Ablai khan, who maintained his power as the head of the Middle Juz by means of bi-lateral diplomacy with both Russia and Qing,⁴⁵ his eldest son Wali continued in his footsteps. During Wali's reign, relations between Russia and the Qing were turbulent (see chapter 2). Amid such unstable conditions, Kazakh tributary missions to the Qing court and visits by Qing missions continued, though not with the frequency of former times. In a Russian investigative report as well, there is mention of a Qing imperial mission to participate in the events surrounding Wali's succession to the *han* title.⁴⁶ The fact that Russia would make note of a mission from the Qing court indicates that Russia constantly observed Kazakh tributes to the Qing court. Wali died in 1821, and the Russian Empire introduced new regulations to the Kazakh Steppe in 1822. What effect did these regulations have on Kazakh relations with the Qing court? The case of Ghubaidulla's declining the *han* title, which will be described in detail in the next section, vividly illustrates these changes.

2 Sultan Ghubaidulla and His *Han* Title

2.1 *The 'Last' Tribute Mission from the Kazakhs*

The importance of evaluating the Ghubaidulla incident should be mentioned here. First, the case is ideal for studying the Kazakh reaction to the 1822 Regulation on Siberian Kirgiz (*Ustav o sibirskikh kirgizakh*), an important instance of Russia's exerting control over the Kazakh Steppe. It also illustrates the different expectations of Russia and the Qing with regard to the Kazakh Steppe. Furthermore, the case represents a turning point in the history of Kazakh titles. Documents pertaining to this case are collected in fund 338, catalog 1, case 401 of TsGA RK.⁴⁷ In this chapter, I rely mainly on these documents and historical materials in *Tsinskaia imperiia i Kazakhskie khanstva* (The Qing Empire and the Kazakh Khanates, TsIKKh).

The Ghubaidulla incident began in 1823 as part of the 'last' Kazakh tribute mission to the Qing court. According to a report by Bedel Nigmatov, a Tashkent merchant who traveled throughout the Kazakh Steppe between Xinjiang and Russia, the mission consisted of nine sultans, including Tauke, who was a son

45 Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku." See also chapter 2 in this book.

46 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 41.

47 Fund 338 gathers historical documents pertaining to the Omsk provincial office. The Omsk National Archive also has items related to the Ghubaidulla case, but when my investigation was carried out in 2008, these materials were not available.

of Aghadai, the *gong* of the Right Section.⁴⁸ Alternatively, according to *Daqing lichao shilu* (Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty), the thirty-nine member mission was headed by the official envoy Ishim, who was a son of Toghthum, *han* of the Right Section.⁴⁹ In fact, Ghubaidulla's younger brother traveled with the mission as far as Ili, and its purpose was to request succession to a title.⁵⁰

There is also a report on this mission left by the Russian Orthodox mission in Beijing. Of particular interest is the rare description of the sultans in Beijing. According to the report sent back to Kyakhta, the physician attached to the Russian Orthodox mission met three of the Kazakh "sultans." Because they spoke neither Manchu nor Chinese, the Tatars who accompanied them interpreted for them in Russian.⁵¹ During this conversation, it was mentioned that Kazakh tribute missions occurred once every three years. Hence, we can infer that there were other tribute missions not mentioned in Qing sources.⁵² The fact that this report was included in case 401 indicates that Russia too thought that the movements of this mission were related to Ghubaidulla's title.

The Qing court already knew of Wali's death on 23 July 1822 (according to the Julian calendar).⁵³ According to Russian sources, at the end of that year a letter arrived from the Military Governor at Ili and the councilor of Tarbagatai that invited Ghubaidulla, Wali's son, to Beijing.⁵⁴ Ghubaidulla later formally sent his younger brother, Jantore sultan, to Beijing as part of a mission seeking an imperial audience. Jantore delivered a letter written in Turkic to the Military Governor at Ili saying that the Kazakhs, in council, had decided that Ghubai-

48 TsIKKh 2: 135, 147–148.

49 DG3/12/22 (*bīngchen*), XZSL: vol. 63.

50 DG3/11/27 (*xinmao*), XZSL: vol. 61.

51 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 217–223.

52 It was regulated that missions took place once every one to three years, *Qinding huijiang zeli*, in Lu Yiran et al. eds., *Menggu lili, huijiang zeli* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1988), vol. 4: 15. But this frequency does not agree with the frequency of real imperial audiences recorded. Onuma shows that Kazakhs dispatched missions every year until 1769, Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 214. See also his analysis on *Hasake dang* (Kazakh archives), T. Onuma, "Kazakh missions to the Qing court," in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 152–159. Although an edict (QL49/2/19) requested that the Kazakh tribute missions should be dispatched every three years, it seems that the request was not realized, see QMJD vol. 16 no. 2883.

53 DG2/4/18 (*gengwu*), XZSL: vol. 34.

54 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 78. This letter may correspond to the text cited in the following volume, *Istoriia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i materialakh: Al'manakh*, vyp. 3 (Karaganda Ekozhan, 2013): 36–38. The point is that these documents were transmitted to the Russian authorities.

dulla was to succeed to the title of *han*. In response, the Daoguang Emperor issued imperial instructions to that effect on 16 Dec. 1823.⁵⁵

The mission carrying the emperor's edict arrived at Ghubaidulla's pastures in June of the next year (1824), and, presumably, the ceremony for succession to the *han* title was carried out at this time. However, this imperial letter was never handed to Ghubaidulla as will become apparent from what follows.

2.2 *Details of the Ghubaidulla Incident*

In 1822 the Russian government established new regulations for most of the nomadic pastures of the Middle Juz. From this time, Russia would no longer recognize the "khan" of the Middle Juz. Russia divided the steppes into Districts (*okrug*) and established an agha-sultan (*aja sultān*, or Ru, *starshii sultan*) to serve as representative for each District. The practice of the time was for the agha-sultan to be elected from one of the Kazakh khan clans. The agha-sultan elected for the Kokchetau District, in the northern central part of the steppe, was Ghubaidulla.⁵⁶ According to the understanding of the Omsk provincial council, Ghubaidulla regarded all of the provisions of the 1822 Regulation as advantageous and had himself requested the establishment of the District.⁵⁷

The next report marks the beginning of a disturbance that embroiled the Western Siberian Governor-General and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the report, Ghubaidulla's "son" headed out from Ili to Ghubaidulla's residence.⁵⁸ A Qing detachment of "500 men"⁵⁹ left Ili in pursuit on 15 May and headed west over the Kazakh Steppe.⁶⁰ A Qing historical source informs us that this detachment was in fact the Ili detachment under unit commander Leshan.⁶¹ This detachment appears again on

55 DG3/11/27 (*xinmao*), XZSL: vol. 61.

56 This is according to a document dated 4.30.1824, KRO 2: 211. His investiture occurred on 29 April. Even after his investiture as agha-sultan, his seal still carried the "khan" title, I.A. Erofeeva, *Simvoly kazakhskoi gosudarstvennosti: pozdnee srednevekov'e i novoe vremia* (Almaty: "Arkaim," 2001): 88–89.

57 MIPSK: 140–141.

58 In fact, this was Jantore, his younger brother, mentioned above. He was stationed in Ili by the Governor at Ili.

59 In a document dated 29 June, the figure was revised to "300 men," see TsIKKh 2: 134.

60 June 2, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 1–10b.

61 XZSL: vol. 73 (DG4/9/10 (*jihai*)). According to the memorial of Leshan (Ma. Lešan) regarding his mission (DG4/8/11), he, blaming the Russian troops for their rudeness, tried to avoid direct conflict with Russians. It is also important that he fundamentally believed in the loyalty of the Kazakhs even while he really recognized the two-sided diplomacy they utilized, see XMD vol. 245: 217–222.

28 June.⁶² Its purpose, which the Russian army had already grasped, was to invest Ghubaidulla with the title of *han* and to deliver numerous offerings in mourning for Wali's death. Without obtaining permission from Russia, Ghubaidulla, in secret, personally went to meet the Qing detachment.⁶³ Of particular interest is the fact that the above information is from a report from a Kazakh sultan to the Russian authorities in which Tursun sultan informs them that the Qing detachment passed through his pastures.⁶⁴ Tursun was the grandson of Bokei, who was proposed as the next khan by Russia. Here it is necessary to consider the rivalry among different sultan clans. Later, Ghubaidulla approached the camp of the Qing detachment, which had reached Baianaul, but on 8 July he was captured by Karbyshev, a Cossack lieutenant, and the next day was forced to meet the Qing commander with the Russian army.⁶⁵

To determine how to deal with this incident, the matter had to go through various levels of the Russian domestic bureaucracy (See map 8), requiring considerable time. In short, views differed among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Western Siberian Governor-General, the Omsk provincial chief, and the military detachment at the scene and these differences should be taken into account, but I wish to deal with this issue on another occasion.

Here I will pass over the views of local low-level government offices and treat a report dated 10 Aug. from Kaptsevich, the Western Siberian Governor-General, to Nessel'rode, minister of foreign affairs (report no. 1), as reflecting the views of those on the scene. Report no. 1 presents the following as the main points of the Ghubaidulla incident.⁶⁶

- A Qing detachment came to present the *han* title to Ghubaidulla, who was already a Russian subject.
- The Qing detachment met several times with the Russian official and Ghubaidulla, before returning home.
- Ghubaidulla was captured and escorted to Omsk in Siberia.


62 Report from Karbyshev to Bronevskii, 29 June, TsIKKh 2: 133. Leshan's memorial also refers to the same date (DG4/6/14) when he arrived at Baianaul. The pasture of Ghubaidulla was located in the distance of 70 *li* (approximately 40 km) from Baianaul, see XMD vol. 245: 218.

63 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 82.

64 Tursun, the agha-sultan of the Karkarali District at this time, received a recommendation from the Omsk provincial chief and was a person who took sides with the Russians.

65 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 1150b.–116.

66 TsIKKh 2: 141–144.



MAP 8 *Communication channels for transmission of information and orders concerning the Kazakh Steppe*

Report no. 1 sought direction on how to deal with the events listed above. Attached to this report is the gist of a report from the Omsk provincial chief (report no. 2). There then follows an eight-point conclusion by the Western Siberian Governor-General himself. This is summarized below:

- Even after the Russian officer explained the illegality of such behavior, *Ghubaidulla still strongly wanted to receive the han title from the Qing court* (emphasis added).
- Though the meeting with the Qing commander went well, the Qing commander no doubt felt that the Russian response to this affair was not in good faith. Hence, involvement by the central Qing government was unavoidable.
- According to the 1822 Regulation, Ghubaidulla's behavior could only be judged to be treason (*gosudarstvennaia izmena*).

Report no. 1, cautioning about misgivings of the Qing court and criticizing Ghubaidulla for his attitude, was thus sent to the minister of foreign affairs.

In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 15 Aug. sent an order (order no. 1) to the Western Siberian Governor-General. The content of which can be summarized as follows:⁶⁷

- When dealing with Qing subjects, Russian officials operating in the field should follow the regulations for friendly relations with the Qing court [the Treaty of Kyakhta].
- Valuing a friendly alliance with Qing China, the Russian government will make every effort to help commanders from Ili accomplish their purposes.
- Ghubaidulla is to be released in his home territory.
- Should Ghubaidulla's son Bolat seek to meet with representatives of the Qing government, Russian officials should not interfere.

What is clear from these Russian sources is that the Russian government attached great importance to maintaining good relations with the Qing based on the Treaty of Kyakhta. One can see here that even though Ghubaidulla's behavior was viewed as treason, the Russian government sought to deal with the matter by ignoring it so as not to provoke the Qing government.

2.3 *Ghubaidulla's Document*

Among the historical sources related to the present case, the one that most clearly shows strong Russian intervention is Ghubaidulla sultan's document to the Qing *amban* (probably, the councilor of Ili or that of Tarbagatai) (fig. 9). First, let us consider the circumstances of the submission of this document. As touched on in the previous section, the Qing detachment on 9 July held a tri-lateral meeting with the Russian army and Ghubaidulla. Because report no. 2, the report to the Western Siberian Governor-General discussed above, clearly expresses the nature of these dealings, I would like to quote from it at some length:

The Qing *amban*, through his subordinates, sought a meeting to settle the matter. Present at the meeting were [the grade 8 civil servants] Putintsov and Karbyshev. *Ghubaidulla was also permitted to attend in order to explain himself to the amban.* Sultan [Ghubaidulla] explained himself as follows: "I and my subordinates, as Russian subjects, can no longer receive the *han* title (*khanskoe zvanie*) from the Qing government. It is true that I sent my brother to the court in Beijing last year to seek the *han* title, but since the title *does not accord with Russian law*, I have come to Baianaul

67 TsIKKh 2: 144–147.

not to seek the han title but to renounce (otrechenie) it." In addition to this statement, Ghubaidulla also gave Qing representatives a signed document (*list*) renouncing the title. ... However, because he neglected to bring his seal with him, this document lacked Ghubaidulla's official seal. Hence, the *amban* did not accept the document, but did regard his oral declaration as sufficient.⁶⁸

As shown here, Ghubaidulla submitted a document to the *amban* to explain himself. As report no. 1 states, Ghubaidulla was being held captive by the Russian army. Thus, we are led to think that his participation in the meeting and the text of his statement largely reflect Russian intentions.

Russian objectives in Kazakh can be discovered from a note sent from the Omsk provincial chief residing in Pavlodar to Ghubaidulla dated 9 July (notice no. 1). Since the whereabouts of the original Turkic text are unknown, I quote the Russian translation here:

We have learned that you received an invitation from the Qing court, cast aside your position in the District (*divan*) office, and *decided to leave the District* without seeking permission from your superiors. Having entered Russian protection (*pokrovitel'stvo*) and sworn your loyal subjection (*vernodobroe poddanstvo*) to the Russian emperor before God, it is your duty not to have any type of relations with the Qing government. Moreover, *you may not acquire any title or position (zvanie i dostoinstvo)* from the Qing government. ... You also may not receive gifts from the Qing court. ... [If you do so] you betray the oath that you took when we established the Kokchetau District, and you will be regarded as a betrayer of that oath.⁶⁹

In fact, it is not clear whether or not Ghubaidulla actually sought to escape Russian influence as written above. However, it is at least clear that a mission visited from the Qing court. This fact is also attested within Qing historical sources. Article 86 of the 1822 Regulation prohibited such visits: "Chinese [Qing] subjects crossing the Kazakh Steppe without permission of the government shall be sent to the provincial office and the chief will escort them to Kyakhta so that they can be delivered [back to the Qing]".⁷⁰ More important is the fact that Ghubaidulla had already sworn allegiance to Russia, indicating

68 TsGA RK: f. 338, d. 401, ll. 116–116ob. (emphasis added).

69 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 82–82ob. (emphasis added).

70 MIPSK: 97.

that Ghubaidulla and his people were Russian subjects. Also, the Russian authorities took the position that they were should not be allowed to receive titles or positions from the Qing court.

What effect did this severe reprimand of Ghubaidulla have on his explanation to the *amban*? In addition to the content, Ghubaidulla's choice of words is interesting. Both a transcription and translation of the text of his document addressed to the Qing authority follows here:⁷¹

قدوس

اولمغ ايجان بدو خان يئنگي نديان اصبغنه بنمگه عبده الله حان دلي خان ابله خان
 سوز من بودر بيلگه سرغ يلددا اينم جان تدر سلطانغ ايجان خان يئنگي
 يدرون گوز بجم خانلغومنه تيلاب يبارگلهنم دروست اولاد اولسه
 بيلگه سليلك قيليب يبار ب ايرويم روسيه يدرويشنگ اولمغ ايجان ابله خان
 آق پادشاهه انظومنه بروب جم دروست اقدواقران شريفن اولوب
 آلبات بدخانم راست اولم دا بولسه يدلومنه تولا ب ايلك اولمغ يدرويشنگ
 خانلاري بد تولاگومنه نلازيم گيرماسد ب بيلگلهم يوق نديان اصبغنه
 گيرشوب قايلمايم ديب گيلگلهم راست ايسوي ينگا بيلويم بد گيلگلهم
 يدرون شريخت گانغوقور ايلان ايشك اوچون نديان اصبغنه مغلوم
 ايداصد ايجان حانديت بروب خانلوق تولا مايموس روسيه يدرويشنگ
 نديان مايموس ياهاق يلدان اصرن صدراب اورا صرخ قايلمايوق بروب
 طرا من ايشواق اوچون مهرمنه باصدم بن عبده الله اوي خان اولمغ
 قولوم با و خوم

FIGURE 9 A document written by Ghubaidulla sultan. SOURCE: J. NODA & T. ONUMA, A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE KAZAKH SULTANS TO THE QING DYNASTY (TOKYO: DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC AREA STUDIES, THE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO, 2010): 72.

71 The original document (fig. 9) is in TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 1000b. For a contemporary translation done by a Russian translator, see TsIKKh 2: 140–141.

Transcription

(*qūpīya*)⁷²

Uluğ Ejen boğda ḥānniñ noyan ambuğa⁷³

Biz ki Ğubaydullāh ḥān Walī ḥān oğlıdan

Sözümüz bu dur, bilturğı yılda inim Jantörä sulṭānnī Ejen ḥānniñ
yüzden körüp hām ḥānluğumini tilep yibärgānim durst alayda bolsa,
bilmäslik qılıp yibärüp erdim. Rūsīya yürtüniñ uluğ imperator
aq pādšāhğa anṭumın berip, hām durüstluqda qur'an-i šarīfın öpip
albatu bolğanım rāst alayımda bolsa, yolimniñ quvalap yiki uluğ yürtüniñ
ḥānlari bu tiläküminä na-lāzīm körmäs dep bilgenim yoq. Noyan ambuğa
körüşüp taykayım dep kelgānim rāst, emdi yeñä bildim, bu kelgenim
yusun šarīgatkā⁷⁴ na-mağqūl eken, anıñ üçün noyan ambuğa mağlūm
edāmin. Ejen ḥāndin bezip ḥānluq tilāmāymin, Rūsīya yürtüniñ
noyan māyūr hām yašāvıdan amrun şurap ordamizğa qayṭayuq dep
ṭuramiz, inanmaq üçün muhrumini başdum.

Biz Ğubaydullāh Walī ḥān oğlı

qolum başdum.

Translation

To Your Majesty, Councilor of the Great Bogda Ejen Han [Qing emperor]
From Ghubaidulla khan, son of Wali khan

I humbly report the following. Without a doubt, last year I sent my
younger brother, Jantore sultan, so that he could bow down before the
Ejen Han and seek the *han* title for me. However, I dispatched him with-
out adequate forethought. It is true that I have sworn an oath to the White
khan, the Great Russian Emperor, have sincerely kissed the sacred Quran,
and have become his subject. Seeking my own way, however, I did not
realize that the khans of the two great powers would not find justification
for my above-mentioned hope. I have indeed come here to bow deeply in
front of Your Majesty, even though I understand that customary laws
do not permit me to come here. Therefore, I would like to inform Your

72 This corresponds to the Russian word "*kopiia*" (copy), which implies that this document is not an original, while TsIKKh explains that a document is original.

73 In Russian documents, *amban* was often called as "*ambo*." Thus, this Turkic version of *amban* can be transcribed as such.

74 Originally, this implies Islamic law. However, in Kazakh documents it was often used as a general term for "law."

Majesty that I wish to leave Ejen khan, I do not seek the position of *han*, I would like to take orders from the Major of the Russian Army and the Captain of the Cossacks, and I would like to return to my pastureland.

For authenticity, I have affixed my seal.

Signed Ghubaidulla khan, son of Wali khan.

In this document, Ghubaidulla tells the Qing commander that he has become a Russian subject, and that for this reason he cannot submit to both the Qing court and Russia at the same time. In view of the fact that, formerly, most sultans of the Middle Juz, such as Ablai khan and Wali khan, had submitted to both empires simultaneously, Russia's prohibiting relations with the Qing, as affirmed in notice no. 1, appears oppressive. There is no date on this document, but report no. 2 makes it clear that it was used in the 9 July meeting between the *amban* and Russian officials.

Ghubaidulla submitted his document to the Qing envoy to defend himself. Report no. 2 quotes Ghubaidulla's explanation, but its wording differs in many places from that of Ghubaidulla's document. Report no. 2, therefore, seems to reflect the details Russia sought to have Ghubaidulla include in his document. In Ghubaidulla's document one finds "I do not seek the position of *han*," whereas in report no. 2 this becomes "I renounce the *han* title." The Russian desire to have the *han* title returned finds much stronger expression here. In other words, one can perceive a stern Russian warning against Ghubaidulla's bearing the *han* title.⁷⁵

Next, let us consider the form of Ghubaidulla's document. Though this is only a copy, few documents exist from the Kazakhs to the Qing court, making this a valuable historical source. This document does not follow the form of Qing court documents, as there is no breaking of lines to elevate words pertaining to the superiors, etc. Tatar vocabulary indicates that this document resembles those the Kazakhs addressed to Russian officials. Yet use of the word "*albatu*" (sometimes translated into Chinese as *chenpu*, or "servant," originally meant "subjects") indicates that perhaps someone familiar with the styles of the Qing court was involved in writing this document.⁷⁶ It seems that the word

75 Qurbān 'alī, in his writing, displays some confusion about Ghubaidulla's genealogy, but he says that the Qing court consented to Ghubaidulla's khan title (*hānlug*). It seems that this is what is being referred to here. See THS: 440.

76 For the 'ejen-albatu relations' supposed by the Qing empire in the Kazakh case, see T. Onuma, "Lun qingdai wei yi de hasake niulu zhi bianshe ji qi yi yi," in Zhu Chengru ed. *Qingshi lunji: Qingzhu Wang Zhonghan jiaoshou jiushi huadan xueshu lunwenji* (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2003): 570; T. Onuma, "Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the 'ejen-albatu

“*albatu*” which the Kazakhs had used to express being subject toward Russia was here intentionally used toward the Qing court in order to express the situation.

By analyzing Ghubaidulla’s document and the circumstances of its production, it can be shown that Ghubaidulla, as a result of Russian pressure, was compelled to clearly convey to the Qing envoy both that he was a Russian subject and that he declined the Qing *han* title.

2.4 *Related Russo-Qing Relations*

Although I have analyzed Russo-Qing relations as they relate to the Ghubaidulla incident elsewhere,⁷⁷ some additional comments should be made here. Chinese research relies on *Qingdai waijiao shiliao*, but relying solely on this work allows one to see only the dealings that took place between the central governments.⁷⁸ However, the administrative Districts that Russia introduced played a great role in enabling it to expand its control over the Kazakh Steppe. To what extent did the Qing court grasp this development? Because diplomatic dealings between the two countries were focused mainly on issues of national boundaries, this issue was never discussed. But in fact, as if concerned with this very issue, Russia, in May 1824, conducted a survey in *Maimaicheng* (the Qing commercial district located south of Kyakhta) and determined that the Qing court knew nothing about the new administrative system of the Kazakh Steppe.⁷⁹

As B. Gurevich has shown from historical sources located in the Russian National Historical Archives (St. Petersburg)⁸⁰ and from documents in the Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the local Russian detachment informed the Qing detachment of the 1822 Regulation. According to a report dated 9 July 1824, from Karbyshev to the Omsk provincial chief Bronevskii, the Russian detachment relayed the following information:

Relationship’ in Central Asia,” in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 117. In the Russian explanation, the word “albatu” is rendered as “subject” (*poddannyi*), TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 116. See also chapter 2.

77 J. Noda, “Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan: 1831 nen ayaguzu kanku kaisetsu made,” in Y. Shinmen ed., *Chūōajia niokeru kyōzoku ishiki to isuramu ni kansuru rekishiteki kenkyū* (Hachioji, 2002): 119–133.

78 For example, Jiang Chonglun, *Hasakezu lishi yu wenhua* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1998): 66–67.

79 TsIKKh 2: 132

80 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*: 229.

We made the following proposal to the Qing officials. ... “When [you] travel outside Qing territory – for example, at the behest of Ghubaidulla’s envoy residing at the frontier city of Ili – we, as good neighbors, always escort you home from Kazakh lands and protect you from possible misfortune within Russian territory. His Majesty our loving emperor made these same Kazakhs full-fledged subjects (*sovershennoe potdanstvo*), and just recently *a new order (poriadok novogo ustroistva) has been instituted among them.*”⁸¹

Thus the Russian detachment, on the one hand, proposed escorts⁸² in order to avoid further provoking the Qing court and, on the other hand, formally informed the Qing that the Kazakh Steppe had become Russian territory and that a new system, the 1822 Regulation, had been instituted. Through this communication the Qing court may have learned for the first time of Russia’s strengthening its control over the Kazakh Steppe. In his report to the emperor, Leshan, head of the Qing detachment, noted that he had been told by some Kazakhs that “the Kazakhs have always been on good terms with Russia,” a statement that agrees with the information above.⁸³

Worth noting here is that inquiries about this case were directed to the Eastern Siberian Governor-General’s office. Since the ratification of the Treaty of Kyakhta in 1728, matters concerning the border between Russia and Qing in the east were referred from Kyakhta through Irkutsk to Tobol’sk, but after the reorganization of the Siberian Governor-Generalship in 1822, the Eastern Siberian Governor-General’s office held jurisdiction over eastern border affairs (see map 8). For example, in preparation for diplomatic dealings with the Qing government, the Omsk provincial chief sent a summary of the matter to the Eastern Siberian Governor-General on 8 July.⁸⁴

Concerning the same dealings, Bronevskii, on 3 July, sent Grigorovskii, the chair of the Omsk provincial council, a communication in which he firmly asserted the need to apprehend Qing subjects that visited the Kazakh Steppe and repatriate them through Kyakhta.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, it is clear that Russia was concerned about the reaction of the Qing court. Below I would like to examine the particular points that Russia concerned itself with.

81 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 88ob.–89 (emphasis added).

82 According to a document from the Omsk provincial chief to the Eastern Siberian Governor-General, the Qing side requested escorts, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 110.

83 XMD vol. 245: 217–222.

84 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 78–81ob.

85 TsIKKh 2: 139.

First, in July 1824 the Western Siberian Governor-General had the Omsk provincial chief investigate rumors including that “some Kazakhs have fled to Qing territory,” “Russian fishermen in Qing territory have been forced to withdraw,” “Qing frontier guard posts (Ma. *karun*) have been fortified,” “a caravan of Semipalatinsk merchants in Ili has been prohibited from carrying out transactions,” etc.⁸⁶ The investigation found that these rumors were completely untrue.⁸⁷ Although Qing strengthening of its border defenses turned out to be false, Russia’s viewing the alleged move as a reaction of the Qing court to the 1822 Regulation shows that it was apprehensive about the matter.

Moreover, in a copy of a communication dated 21 March 1825, from the Omsk provincial chief to the Eastern Siberian Governor-General, one finds a discussion of what the appropriate response would be to the Qing officials at Kyakhta should there be a question about the 1822 Regulation. The Russians speculated that the Kazakhs would engage in robbery, and that Qing subjects too would suffer losses at their hands. Hence, the appropriate response would be to explain that the introduction of the new regulations and administrative Districts was also advantageous for the Qing and to emphasize that the Russian emperor sought to remain on peaceful terms with the Qing Empire.⁸⁸

As we have noted above, the Treaty of Kyakhta was the only extant framework for Russia and Qing to deal diplomatically regarding the Ghubaidulla incident, and for this reason its significance was high. In addition, Russia used the Treaty of Kyakhta to negotiate with the Qing so as to prevent Qing missions from visiting the Kazakh Steppe. In documents that have been pointed out by Gurevich as well, the local Russian detachment told the Qing detachment that “it is not permitted for the Qing detachment to visit Ghubaidulla’s District. If the detachment sets even one foot in the area, it will be a violation of the treaty.”⁸⁹

In summary, the following conclusions regarding the Ghubaidulla incident can be made.

1. From the Kazakh perspective, Ghubaidulla failed to succeed to the *han* title and was captured by the local Russian detachment. Though Ghubaidulla was released in accordance with a decision reached within the Russian government, later Kazakh relations with the Qing were tightly controlled by Russia.

86 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 179–179ob.

87 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 182. Russia feared trade in Kyakhta would be unprofitable, see memorandum within the Eastern Siberian Governor-Generalship, “Materialy dlia istorii kirgizskoi stepi,” *Sbornik gazety Sibir*, t. 1 (1876): 454.

88 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 196–199ob. See also order no.1 examined above.

89 Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii*: 229.

Though it is difficult to judge the extent to which Ghubaidulla wished to enter into subjection to the Qing Empire, his actions were contrary to Russia's regulation of 1822 due to the fact of his being a Russian agha-sultan.

2. What were the specific positions of Russia and Qing? The Qing court, which failed to grasp Russia's introduction of the 1822 Regulation, maintained a policy of continuing their former relations with the Kazakhs. In contrast, Russia, relying on the new regulations, notified Ghubaidulla that he must return the *han* title and sever relations with the Qing court. However, Russia continued to show consideration toward the Qing government, building on the good relationship it enjoyed with Qing on the basis of the Treaty of Kyakhta.

3. This was the first time that Russia interfered in the transmission of titles among the Kazakhs, yet it was also an important turning point in Russia's rule over the Kazakhs.

In the next section, the changes that occurred after the Ghubaidulla incident will be explored and the significance of titles for the Kazakhs, the Qing court, and Russia will be further clarified.

3 Titles for Kazakhs Thereafter

3.1 *Ghubaidulla After the Incident*

Following the Ghubaidulla incident, Ghubaidulla likely maintained his position as agha-sultan. This can be inferred from an order given by the Western Siberian Governor-General to the Kokchetau District on 28 Aug. 1824: "Since Ghubaidulla and the *bi* [a judge or influential figure in the clan] have been returned to their pastures, Ghubaidulla should be invited by the District office in order that he may return to his work as agha-sultan of the District."⁹⁰ However, during the 1825 and 1826 elections ordered by the Western Siberian Governor-General, Wali's grandson Qachqanbai Gabbasov became the newly elected agha-sultan. This result reflected the desire of the authorities to avoid Ghubaidulla's clan on account of Ghubaidulla's conflict with the new system and to elect someone from another clan as agha-sultan. In his report to the Western Siberian Governor-General dated 10 Oct. 1825, the Omsk provincial chief, summarizing the situation in the Kokchetau District, stated that, although the Ghubaidulla clan was negative regarding the new regulations, most Kazakhs held positive feelings about it, and only a few sultans remained loyal to Ghubaidulla.⁹¹ However, there is also information that two influential

⁹⁰ TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 401, l. 142.

⁹¹ KRO 2: 222–223.

Kazakhs working as District delegates during Ghubaidulla's time banded with Ghubaidulla and left the District office,⁹² so this statement must be considered with caution.

Even in these circumstances, Ghubaidulla and his allies made efforts to continue relations with the Qing court. For example, in 1826 Ghubaidulla's sons went to Ili on their way to Beijing, but the Military Governor at Ili refused to give them permission, leaving them with no alternative but to return home.⁹³ There is also an instance where the *bi* and his followers, along with Ghubaidulla's son Bolat, headed off in the direction of Qing territory. According to a communication from the Kokchetau District office to the chairman of the Omsk provincial office Markevich, the *bi* and his followers went to Ghubaidulla's residence and then headed to the Qing court as a delegation from Ghubaidulla. The District office attempted to suppress this action of theirs.⁹⁴

A document from the Omsk provincial general office to the Kokchetau District office dated 18 Sep. 1828, gives the following order (order no. 2) concerning the disturbance that Bolat caused among the Kazakhs and also Ghubaidulla's plan to send a mission to the Qing court.⁹⁵

- Since noncompliance has legal consequences, tell Ghubaidulla and Bolat to cease all actions tending to incite disturbances among the Kazakhs and *instigate opposition to the order (uchrezhdenie) of the Russian government.*
- We must suppress Ghubaidulla and Bolat so that the Kazakhs do not succumb to their agitation. [However,] waiting for permission from the Western Siberian Governor-General, we should not personally lay hands on them, nor prevent them from sending a mission to the Qing court. We must maintain peace among the Kazakhs.

As seen here, for local Russian government offices, it was more important to follow Russian law than to maintain good relations through negotiations with

92 E.V. Bezikonnaia, "Kokchetavskii vneshnii okruzhnoi prikaz v 20–30-e gg. XIX v," in *Stepnoi kraj: zona vzaimodeistviia russkogo i kazakhskogo narodov, XVIII–XX vv.* (Omsk: Omskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2001): 48. After Qachqanbai's death, Ghubaidulla was re-elected as agha-sultan in 1832.

93 Report from the Karkarali session clerk to Bronevskii, 3.17.1827, see N. Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: I. Otkrytie Aiaguzskogo okruga; II. Karakirgizskaia deputatsiia 1824 g.," *Pamiatnaia knizhka Semipalatinskoi oblasti na 1900 vyp.* IV (Semipalatinsk, 1900): 112.

94 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 476, ll. 1–10b. (9.15.1828).

95 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 476, ll. 4–5 (emphasis added).

the Qing. Article 56 of the 1822 Regulation as well required agha-sultans to use any and all means to maintain peace and order.⁹⁶

How the central Russian government viewed the Ghubaidulla incident was first revealed in a notice (notice no. 2) dated 23 May 1828, from the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Bolat sultan, who had previously traveled to St. Petersburg to deliver Ghubaidulla's petition. The petition was related to the granting (*zhalovanie*) of the "khan rank" to Ghubaidulla and abolishing the District system introduced to the Middle Juz Kazakhs. Already in 1825, Qasim sultan, Wali's brother, petitioned for abolishing the Kokchetau District, but this petition was, of course, not granted.⁹⁷ Notice no. 2, the emperor's response to Bolat, contained the following points:⁹⁸

- *Under previous khan, not only did disturbances and plunder (baranta)*⁹⁹ *continue; they actually increased.*
- The rule (*upravlenie*) of most of *Horde* [the Middle Juz] is entrusted to honorable sultans elected by the people, and the Russian government judges this to be an improvement.
- Your father Ghubaidulla early on petitioned to have his own *volost* [an administrative unit of several villages] follow the new regulations. As a result of his voluntary petition and the petitions of the sultans of other *volosts*, the Kokchetau District was established.
- Your father was elected as agha-sultan, and was granted the title of District chairperson (*predsedatel'*).
- Whatever the reason, the emperor will not consider reviving the useless "khan rank" (*khanskii san*) for the Middle Juz.
- Likewise, requests to abolish the Kokchetau District will not be entertained.

Despite such a stern admonition from the Russian emperor, an imperial edict dated 27 Nov. 1828 regarding a petition from the Kazakh *han Aibileda* (Ghubaidulla) and his followers for an imperial audience can be found in Qing historical sources.¹⁰⁰ The fact that the Kazakhs sought an imperial

96 MIPSK: 96.

97 MIPSK: 137. Qasim claimed that no one desired the new system. Because Ghubaidulla then approved the system, it was rejected.

98 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 476, ll. 9–12 (emphasis added).

99 *Barimta* in Kazakh. Originally, it means the legal plunder for adjusting conflicts between the communities.

100 DG8/11/3 (*jihai*), XZSL vol. 146.

audience can therefore be established, but whether one was granted cannot be determined.

Notice no. 2, about Ghubaidulla's petition, lends credence to the notion that the logic of notice no. 2 was used in Russia to justify not continuing the "khan rank" in the Middle Juz. Of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also rejected the two demands delivered by Bolat regarding the revival of the "khan rank" with approval from Russia and the abolition of the Districts. Consequently, Ghubaidulla's petition was rejected, and the new system became the norm. As we have already seen in order no. 2, the Western Siberian Governor-General's office was concerned whether the Kazakhs were following the 1822 Regulation.

As for Qing titles, the Western Siberian Governor-General, discussing Ghubaidulla's wording in report no. 1, saw it as an instance in which "a sultan disaffirmed restoration (*vosstanovlenie*) of the khans."¹⁰¹ The Russians perceived the *han* title bestowed by the Qing court as having the same power as the traditional khan position previously held by Ablai and Wali.¹⁰² At this time, the word "han" itself was viewed as dangerous. Thus, it was problematic that the Qing envoy tried to bestow the *han* title on Ghubaidulla.

However, it appears here that as a result of the Ghubaidulla incident, the khan appellation was no longer an issue in the context of Russian control over the Kazakh Steppe. In other words, it seems that the Russian government as well understood that the Qing *han* title was no longer connected with the traditional Kazakh position of khan, a position associated with resistance to Russian control. That is, as seen in notice no. 2 from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the "khan rank" was treated as no longer having its former significance because it had been artfully replaced with the position of agha-sultan.

A case in point is that in 1826 Altinsari, a son of Toghum, met the Qing detachment, just like Ghubaidulla had done in the past, and succeeded to the *han* title for the Kazakh Right Section.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, Russia believed that Altinsari was not recognized as "khan," and it saw him as not having much

¹⁰¹ TsIKKh 2: 142.

¹⁰² Because it does not distinguish between the Qing *han* title and the traditional Kazakh khan position, "The History of Kazakhstan" edited by Kozybaev cannot adequately explain the Russians' caution, Kozybaev et al. eds., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*: 327.

¹⁰³ Noda, "Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan": 125–126. See also, Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 75.

influence in Kazakh society,¹⁰⁴ even though it had been wary of the clan of Ablai khan (which Altinsari was not from). For Russia, the recognition of Kazakh khans was no longer an issue, as can be seen from a report by the Omsk provincial chief: "There have been numerous occasions in which the Kazakhs have received various positions and titles. ... The Qing court only seeks to make the neighboring Kazakhs into superficial subordinates."¹⁰⁵

Turning attention to the Kazakh perspective, after 1822 they continued to elect khans from among themselves,¹⁰⁶ even though Russia had ceased to recognize the "khan rank." However, the Qing *han* title was no longer a means of attaining authority, and the "khan rank" had ceased to exist, replaced as it was by the position of agha-sultan. Therefore, there might have later been antagonism among the agha-sultans.¹⁰⁷ The perception of Kazakh sultans is perhaps best reflected by Qurbān 'alī's statement that the "agha-sultan is equivalent to the former khan position."¹⁰⁸

It is known that Wali's nephew Kenesari later led a rebellion against the expansion of Russian control and became khan. Steven Sabol has sought to correct the view that this rebellion was a people's liberation movement.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, as argued in *A History of Kazakhstan*, within the larger framework of resistance against Russia, one can connect the actions of Ghubaidulla with the resistance of Qasim sultan, his sons Sarjan and Kenesari. A special feature of the Ghubaidulla incident discussed in this chapter is that Ghubaidulla, responding to the situation, sought to continue receiving Qing titles in order to establish a *modus vivendi*.¹¹⁰ Here I would like to present the genealogy of the Ablai clan.

104 Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: I.": 61. Altinsari's pastures were located in the southern part of the steppe and he never held deep relations with Russia.

105 Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: I.": 62.

106 Ghubaidulla and Tursun were considered as a khan. See THS: 440; Q. Shākārim, *Türük, qırghız-qazaq häm khandar shejiresi* (Almaty, 1991): 33.

107 See, Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: V."

108 THS: 461.

109 Steven Sabol, "Kazak Resistance to Russian Colonization: Interpreting the Kenesary Kasyrov Revolt, 1837–1847," *Central Asian Survey* 22 (no. 2/3) (2003): 231–252.

110 Ghubaidulla became involved in the later rebellion led by Kenesari, was arrested in 1839, and was imprisoned until 1847. According to the oral epics collected by Mashhur Jusip, Ghubaidulla's succession failure remained in common memory as "the incident of the year of the Ox (1824)," see Zh.O. Artykbaev, *Materialy k istorii praviashchego doma kazakhov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 2001): 169–170.




FIGURE 10 Ablai's descendants ("Left Section" in the Qing historical sources).

3.2 *The Response of the Qing Court*

It is known that after the Ghubaidulla incident there were a number of dealings about succession to Qing titles,¹¹¹ but we do not know the details.

Here I would like to add some information related to Ghubaidulla's dealings with the Qing court. As mentioned above, Qing sources show that Ghubaidulla sought to send a delegation to the Qing court. It is recorded that the imperial letter addressed to Ghubaidulla was carried home the next year, 1825, by his younger brother Saribai.¹¹² This is the imperial edict mentioned by Ch. Valikhanov.¹¹³ Here again we see the significance for the Kazakhs of possessing such a letter.

Next, attention should be turned to a notice dated 8 May 1830, from the Councilor of Tarbagatai to Ghubaidulla (notice no. 3).¹¹⁴ Among documents providing information on dealings between Ghubaidulla and the Qing court, this is the latest known example. The extant Russian translation reads as follows:

¹¹¹ Li, *Hasakesitan, ji qiyu Zhongguo Xinjiang de guanxi*: 127–129.

¹¹² *Chouban yiwu shimo, Tongzhi chao* (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1971), vol. 18 : 43. Saribai also appears in a record made by Zibbershtein, who visited the Kazakh Steppe in 1825, see M.P. Viatkin, "Putevye zapiski lekaria Zibbershteina," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 1 (1936): 227.

¹¹³ Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, "Chernovoi nabrosok o drevnikh gramotakh," in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 300–304.

¹¹⁴ There is a note that notice no. 3 was written in the Kashgar dialect of Tatar. Khafizova presents this letter as an example of a standard style in letters from the Qing court, see Khafizova, *Kitaikaia diplomatiia v Tsentral'noi Azii*: 148. Ghubaidulla himself delivered this document to the Western Siberian Governor-General. Ghubaidulla kept the letter near to hand and then sent it to the Petropavlovsk Fortress in 1833. Because it was returned, he delivered it to the Governor-General in June 1834. See 6.22.1834, explanation by Ghubaidulla to the Western Siberian Governor-General, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1363, l. 40b.

From the great hebe-i amban [*khobb-amban* in the text], supervising Qing affairs in the mountains of Tarbagatai at the command of the Great Bogda Ejen [Qing emperor]

To Ghubaidulla, khan¹¹⁵ of the Kirgiz [Kazakhs]

... All issues related to the Kazakhs are under my direct control. Hence, I order you, who have received the rich blessings of the Bogda Han [emperor], to follow the example of your forbearers, and *like them, receive the titles of han, wang, and gong, and live in peace*. You thus should follow the example of your forbears ... the Great Bogda Han will think of you as his own children. Hence, enjoy the blessings of the Great Bogda Han, rule your people in the best way possible, and show fairness in all matters.¹¹⁶

Notice that the Qing court attitude evident here remains unchanged from its position before the Ghubaidulla incident, namely, that Ghubaidulla was treated according to his status as a *han*, and that Kazakhs were asked to follow the traditions of the past. After the Ghubaidulla incident, the Qing court, in its records, referred to the Kazakhs as “*albatu*” or “*harangga*” (meaning subjects), an indication that the court regarded the Kazakhs as being in some sense subject to the Qing Empire.¹¹⁷

This communication shows that Russia already knew of the dealings between Ghubaidulla and the Qing court. Governor-General Vel'iaminov, who had access to notice no. 3, concluded from the *amban's* references to Qing subjects, that “the Qing emperor regards the entire Horde [the Middle Juz] as belonging to the Qing.” Showing displeasure over such language, he then asked the army to closely observe Qing movements and deal cautiously with the Qing Empire.¹¹⁸ Thereafter, relations between the Wali clan and the Qing court do not appear in the historical sources, and cases where Kazakhs received titles

¹¹⁵ In the original text, “(*sultan*)” follows the title “*khan*.”

¹¹⁶ After this quotation, notice no. 3 continues, “The trade season is now upon us. Have the Kazakhs under (*podvedomstvennye*) you drive their livestock to our markets and conduct trade, as in the past.” This encouraging of trade is interesting in that it suggests the importance of Kazakh trade to the Qing court.

¹¹⁷ In an 1832 communication in Mongol from the Qing frontier guard post at Qonimailaqu to the Russian fortress at Bukhtarma, the word “*albatu*” was used, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 745, l. 46ob. And in a Manchu document of the later Guangxu period (1875–1908), one finds the word “*harangga*” being used, see He Xinliang, *Bianjie yu minzu: Qingdai kanfen zhonghe xibei bianjie dachen de chahetai, man, han wujian wenshu yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998): 102. More research is needed on this subject.

¹¹⁸ Vel'iaminov's note in the margin of the translation of this letter, 7.25.1834, IAOO: f.3, op. 1, d. 1363, l. 2.

from the Qing court gradually became limited to sultans with pastureland further to the east, closer to the Qing territory.¹¹⁹ This is probably related to Russia's adopting a harder line after 1830 in dealings with the Qing concerning the Kazakh Steppe.¹²⁰

In their relations with the Qing court, sultans outside the Wali clan could maintain relations with the Qing court in accordance with their interests. Sart sultan, who succeeded to the title of *gong* of the Right Section, was a subject of Russia while being under the protection of the Qing court. In 1831 the Russian government regarded the situation as follows:

Our government did not know of this situation, but in the [Kazakh] *Juz* it was regarded as a natural state of affairs. The reason is that many sultans and former khan take the oath to be subjects of our country and, *out of our sight, receive protection from the Qing court in order to receive trade rights and privileges in Qing border cities.*¹²¹

As this chapter has shown, Russia accurately grasped the bi-lateral diplomacy of the Kazakh sultans and interfered actively in Kazakh-Qing relations, especially the conferring of Qing titles on the Kazakhs.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the Qing court's bestowal of titles on the Kazakhs and, to understand more fully the significance of such titles, explored in detail Ghubaidulla's failed attempt to succeed to the *han* title in 1824. The results of this research can be summarized in the following two points:

First, this chapter clarified the role of titles within Kazakh society, namely, they added to the prestige of the sultan who acquired them, particularly during the ascension ceremony. In Ghubaidulla's case, although he expected to be able to succeed to the *han* title, his oath to Russia and his position as agha-sultan did not allow him to do so because it would be a violation of Russian law. As a result, he had to personally decline the title. The Kazakhs later attempted to maintain relations with the Qing court, but this was incompatible with the new regulations that Russia instituted in 1822.

119 On later conferrings of titles, including Chotan's succession to Altinsari's *han* title, see Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan*: 341–343.

120 Noda, "Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan": 130–131. See also chapter 7.

121 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, ll. 50–51 (emphasis added).

Second, Russia understood that the Kazakhs were receiving titles from the Qing court. At first the Russians thought that the Qing *han* title was a mere duplication of the traditional Kazakh khan position. Russia thought that the khan position was of no help in maintaining peace in Kazakh society, and that the Qing *han* title was equally worthless. Hence, on the basis of such logic, the Russians could not tolerate the Qing court's bestowing the *han* title on the Kazakhs. For this reason, during the Ghubaidulla incident, Russia restricted the Qing court from maintaining its former relations with the Kazakhs, though they were careful not to sever Russo-Qing relations. Toward the Kazakhs, the Russians strengthened diplomatic control by promoting compliance with the new system of regulations, no longer consenting to the "khan rank," and doing away with the authority of the khans.

This chapter offers many topics for exploration when we again take up the study of the process of Russia's annexation of the Kazakh Steppe. To study this process, it is necessary to look in detail at the contents of the 1822 Regulation, upon which Russian rule over the Steppe was based. Chapter 7 will touch on these points.

PART 3

*Russo-Qing Relations and the Fate of the Kazakh
Khanates*



Kazakh Participation in the Russo-Chinese Trade of Central Asia

Introduction

The life of the Kazakh nomads revolved around selling their cattle in exchange for textiles or foods, a way of life heavily dependent on their relations with the two surrounding empires. Such economic activity, initially instigated by the Kazakhs, formed the basis of Kazakh-Qing relations. For the Russians as well, trade with the Kazakhs was considered important as demonstrated by the conclusion of multiple treaties to organize its relationship with the northwestern region of the Qing Empire. Thus, research on Kazakh trade is central to understanding the international relations of Central Asia during this period.

Research by Toru Saguchi, and the team of Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi has already shed much light on the dealings between the Kazakhs and the Qing. “Kazakh trade” (Ch. *Hasake maoyi*)¹ during the latter half of the eighteenth century has been studied in particular detail. However, Kazakh trading activities should not be considered from the Qing perspective alone. When examining the entire sphere of Russo-Qing trade throughout Central Asia, it becomes clear that the Kazakhs were involved in a variety of trade activities that took place between Western Siberia and Xinjiang from the latter half of the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century. This chapter will demonstrate the role of the Kazakhs within this Russo-Qing trade by focusing on changes in the structure of that trade occurring within the first half of the nineteenth century.

1 Lin & Wang describe data on livestock trade by the Kazakhs in detail, but ignore political aspects which greatly influenced trade between the Kazakhs and the Qing, see Lin Yongkuang & Wang Xi, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi* (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1991). Saguchi’s research can be summarized as the Kazakhs holding an equal trade relationship with the Qing, which was actually one policy by which the Qing were able to maintain the status quo in peripheral areas. See, T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 314. In other work, Saguchi concludes that “governmental horse-silk trades between the Qing Empire and Kazakh sultans were smoothly conducted in Ili and Tarbagatai for almost a century between 1758 and the 1850s.” T. Saguchi, “Kokusai shōgyō no tenkai,” in *Iwanami kōza sekai rekishi* 13 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1971): 171. However, the situation of the nineteenth century requires further consideration.

1 The Kyakhta Trade and Russo-Qing Trade Throughout Western Siberia

Some studies have been conducted on the history of trade between the Russian and Qing Empires. Trade through Kyakhta (Mongolia), which officially began under the Treaty of Kyakhta (ratified in 1728), formed the backbone of this Russo-Qing trade. Korsak's work from the Tsarist era, Sladkovskii's work from the Soviet era, and the work of such Japanese scholars as Yoshida² and Morinaga have all dealt with this Kyakhta trade.³

Research has also been conducted into the 'western' trade that took place between the empires, namely, dealings between Xinjiang and Western Siberia. For example, Kuznetsov⁴ has organized information from the literature in Chinese while the works of Fletcher and Gurevich⁵ are also important as they are written from a 'wider,' geographical perspective. Saguchi analyzed not only the trade between the Kazakhs and the Qing but also Khoqand trade with the Qing Empire. Further investigation remains to be done, however, into the

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- 2 Though Yoshida regarded that "until the 1840s, Russo-Qing trade was limited to the Kyakhta trade, and land routes for trade in Central Asia were added in the 1850s," it is important to note that records of trade activity in the region can be found from even before 1850 as will be shown later in this chapter. See K. Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi* (Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1974): 191.
 - 3 A. Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem* (Kazan, 1857); M.I. Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem, do 1917 g.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); T. Morinaga, *Irukutsuku shōnin to kyafuta bōeki: teisei roshia ni okeru yūrashia shōgyō* (Sapporo: Hokkaido daigaku shuppankai, 2010). Foust's monograph analyzed trade in Kyakhta only up to the end of the eighteenth century. See C.M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's trade with China and its setting* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).
 - 4 V.S. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973); V.S. Kuznetsov, *Tsinskaia imperiia na rubezhakh Tsentral'noi Azii (vtoraia polovina XVIII–pervaia polovina XIX v.)* (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1983).
 - 5 J. Fletcher, "Sino-Russian relations, 1800–62," in *The Cambridge History of China* (J.K. Fairbank ed.), vol. 10, part 1 (Cambridge, 1978): 318–350. Although Fletcher has already considered the non-official trade between the Qing and Russia, I focus on the roles of the Kazakhs in particular. Gurevich pointed out the two routes: via Tashkent and Khoqand, and from Irtysh to Tarbagatai, see B.P. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983): 211. The classic works of Rozhkova are also worth considering because they refer to the influence of the Russo-Qing trade, see M.K. Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke so vtoroi chetverti XIX veka i russkaia burzhuaziia* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk sssr, 1949); M.K. Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskie sviazi Rossii so Srednei Aziei: 40–60-e gody XIX veka* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk sssr, 1963).

interrelated nature of these two types of trade.⁶ Other studies have mainly focused on the second half of the nineteenth century.⁷ Overall, these previous studies have not been able to provide a complete image of early nineteenth century international trade, nor have they succeeded in sufficiently highlighting the role played by the Kazakh nomads in this trade.⁸

The treaty of Kyakhta resulted in the trade previously focused on Beijing being redirected to Kyakhta, a peripheral town in Outer Mongolia. This Kyakhta trade can be characterized in two points: first, the restriction of trade activities to Kyakhta alone, and, second, the imposition of a tariff on goods by Russia. This trade averaged 5–8.1 million rubles annually,⁹ and it appears that the value of the Kyakhta trade was higher than that occurring elsewhere in Central Asia as discussed in this chapter. In general, Russia exported fur (and cotton fabrics later) and the Qing exported cotton (later, tea). Here, the focus will be on the political changes reflected in the Central Asian trade rather than on the quantity or turnover of the trade itself.

As seen in chapter 3, after issues concerning Central Asia began to arise in Russo-Qing relations, the “Kyakhta treaty system” regarding trade changed. In particular, once the Altai and Kazakhs had been brought under Russian influence, Russia was able to focus on regions other than Kyakhta as trade routes. It must also be remembered that the Qing court imposed embargoes on trade

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- 6 He seems mainly to consider the trade between southern Xinjiang and western Turkestan conducted by khoqandi merchants, see Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*; Saguchi, “Kokusai shōgyō no tenkai.” Thus, it is also necessary to take into consideration the intermediation of trade between the Irtysh fortified line of Russia and northern Xinjiang, while distinguishing northern trades (conducted by Russian Muslims) from southern ones.
- 7 Kasymbaev reported on Kazakh Steppe trade between Russia, Central Asia, and Xinjiang, Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan – Kitai: karavannaia torgovlia v XIX – nachale XX vv.* (Almaty, 1996). See also N.A. Aldabek, *Rossia i Kitai: Torgovo-ekonomicheskie svyazi v Tsentral'no-aziatskom regione XVII–XIX vv.* (Almaty, 2001); S.B. Kozhirova, *Rossiisko-kitaiskaia torgovlia v Tsentral'noi Azii, vtoraiia polovina XIX – nachalo XX vv.* (Astana, 2000). See also research from China such as Li Sheng, *Xinjiang dui su (e) maoyi shi: 1600–1990* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1993); Mi Zhenbo, *Qingdai xibei bianjing diqu zhongde maoyi: Cong daoguang chao dao xuantong chao* (Tianjin: Tianjin shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2004).
- 8 Among several separate studies, Ziaaev examines the trade between Siberia and Central Asia, see Kh. Ziaaev, *Ekonomicheskie svyazi Srednei Azii s Sibir'iu v XVI–XIX vv.* (Tashkent: Fan, 1983). Erofeeva considered economic ties between the towns on the Irtysh River and Kazakh Steppe, I.V. Erofeeva, “Znachenie verkhneirtyshskikh gorodov v torgovo-ekonomicheskom osvoenii Kazakhstana i Iugo-Zapadnoi Sibiri v XVIII–seredine XIX v.,” in *Torgovlia gorodov Sibiri kontsa XV–nachala XX v.* (Novosibirsk, 1987): 225–236.
- 9 This is according to Yoshida's calculation, see K. Yoshida, “Shiberia rŭto: roshia to shinchō no kōshō,” in K. Enoki ed., *Seiō bunmei to higashijia* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1971): 351.

taking place through Kyakhta three times (in 1762–68, 1778–80, and 1785–92)¹⁰ and that this trade did not resume until 1792. Especially conspicuous was Russia's focus on Bukhtarma, a town located along the Irtysh River, as a trade station (a fortress was established here in 1764).¹¹

In Xinjiang, on the other hand, only Kazakhs and “Andijanis” (Ch. *Anjiyan*)¹² were permitted to conduct trade. This created the necessary conditions for an ‘unofficial’ Russo-Qing trade, although the amount of the trade is unclear. It is at this point that trade between the Russian and Qing Empires which connected Western Siberia and Xinjiang began. It should be noted that the treaty of Kyakhta did not address Central Asian affairs, including trade within the region, and that more specific measures would eventually be required.¹³

Early in 1765, Shpringer, the Russian commander of the Siberian fortified line, reported that a customs house for trade with the Qing could be established in Bukhtarma,¹⁴ though his plan to send a petition to the Qing emperor came to nothing.¹⁵ Later, Ekaterina II ordered Selifontov, the Governor of Irkutsk and Koryvan, to develop trade routes in 1796, emphasizing the importance of the new trading location on the mouth of the Bukhtarma River.¹⁶ Although neither of these two attempts yielded results and the Qing side failed to show interest in trade through Western Siberia,¹⁷ it is clear that the Russians were seeking to open a new direct trade route to Xinjiang or West Mongolia.

Although the Qing Empire only permitted trade within Kyakhta, the Russians tried to negotiate for the development of trade through Western Siberia. Among these efforts, Golovkin's mission of 1805 is especially note-

10 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 172–180; Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin*: 301–315; A. Yanagisawa, “Some Remarks on the ‘Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhta’ in 1768,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of The Toyo Bunko* 63 (2006): 65–87.

11 V.A. Moiseev, *Tsinskaiia imperiia i narody Saiano-Altaiia v XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1983): 109–110.

12 This meant those from the Ferghana region under the control of the Khoqand Khanate, and sometimes those from Tashkent.

13 I have elsewhere analyzed the local Central Asian negotiations of the two empires in the first half of the nineteenth century, J. Noda, “Kazakhskaiia step’ mezhdru Kitaem i Rossiei (XIX veka),” in *Mirovye tsivilizatsii i Kazakhstan*, chast’ 2. (Almaty: Qaynar universiteti, 2007): 22–31.

14 Report to Ekaterina II, see Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, “[Arkhivnye materialy o russko-dzhungarskikh i kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh (Rukopisnye dokumenty)],” in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 4 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 215.

15 O.V. Boronin, *Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri XVII – 60-e gg. XIX vv.* (Barnaul: Azbuka, 2004): 167.

16 MOTSA 2: 242. See also Aldabek, *Rossia i Kitai*: 45.

17 Moiseev, *Tsinskaiia imperiia i narody Saiano-Altaiia*: 112–113.

worthy.¹⁸ The intentions of the Russian authorities can be understood from instructions given to a group of Orthodox Christian missionaries dispatched to Beijing. As Aldabek demonstrates in detail from Russian archival sources,¹⁹ the Russian government continually sought a way to develop trade through Bukhtarma (An example is shown in fig. 11).²⁰

I have previously examined the circumstances of the trade that took place in line with official imperial regulations in towns on the Irtysh River, such as the area between Bukhtarma²¹ and Xinjiang. This activity mainly consisted of intermediary trade conducted by Muslim merchants.²² Below, I will consider the specifics of this trade in more detail, focusing in particular on the role of the Kazakhs. Use will be made of the records of N. Liubimov, vice-chief of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, who ventured into northern Xinjiang in 1845.²³ In addition to a well-known published version of his report

18 Report of Rumiantsev, Minister of Commerce to emperor, 1.16.1805, RKO XIX: 90–91. See also instructions to Golovkin, RKO XIX: 94.

19 Aldabek, *Rossiiā i Kitai*: 62–65.

20 Secret instruction from the Foreign Ministry to the head of the mission, archimandrite Veniamin, 2.6.1830, VPR 16: 462–463. The same contents are found in the Secret instruction from the Foreign Ministry to Shiring, 3.1.1830, VPR 16: 484–486. The latter instruction even states that, “Russian merchants have been conducting trade in Tarbagatai and Ili for some amount of time, and the Qing government shows no will to prevent it.”

21 The custom house was located there until 1839, later it was moved to Omsk.

22 J. Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku: Surutan to shinchō no kankei o chūshin ni,” *Tōyō gaku* 87 (2) (2005): 47–48. For the connecting trade between the two empires conducted by Altai, see Boronin, *Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri XVII – 60-e gg. XIX vv.* 179–180; J. Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia: Regulations and Reality,” in T. Uyama ed., *Asiatic Russia: Imperial Power in Regional and International Contexts* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012): 153–173.

23 Before his expedition in Xinjiang, Liubimov was a supervisor of Orthodox Christian missionaries at Beijing, reporting his impression of the Qing government's policy, Aldabek, *Rossiiā i Kitai*: 78–79. His reports on Xinjiang were devoted to Russian policy to expand into this region, a topic that was even discussed during the Soviet period and that has been considered in recent studies like Mi, *Qingdai xibei bianjing diqu zhonghe maoyi*. The report submitted to Foreign Ministry was published and the most well-known version, see N. Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul'dzhu v 1845 g. pod vidom kuptsa Khorosheva* (SPb, 1909). The version included in the collection of works by Ch. Valikhanov is a manuscript on which Veselovskii's edition was based, see N.I. Liubimov, “[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda],” in Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, t. 4 (Alma-Ata, 1985): 278–326. In the latter, Liubimov refrained from adding his own opinions, so this version is more likely to reflect what he saw there. It should be noted that former research didn't pay much attention to the difference of these two versions. For the detail of his career, see A.S. Ipatova, “Pekinskie pis'ma P. Tugarinova k



FIGURE 11 *A Meeting of Qing and Russian Tatar smugglers in 1810–1812 (at Ong-usta, the eastern shore of the Lake Zaisan).* SOURCE: N.N. GONCHAROVA, E.M. KORNEEV. *IZ ISTORII GRAFIKI NACHALA XIX VEKA* (MOSCOW, 1987): 254.


(1909), reference to the original memoranda will also help reveal the realities of trade described in the Qing historical records.

2 Russian and Qing Trading Policies

2.1 *Routes Connecting the Two Regions*

Russo-Qing relations in Central Asia, newly established following the subjugation of Jungaria and Kashgaria during the middle of the eighteenth century

N.I. Liubimovu (40-gody XIX v),” in *I ne raspalas’ sviaz’ vremen...: k 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia P.E. Skachkova* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 1993): 164–185. Liubimov was supposed to go back from Xinjiang to Petropavlovsk to collect supplementary information on trade with the Qing, see order by Minister of Finance to the chief of Siberian customs district at Petropavlovsk, March 1845, TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 157, l. 1.



MAP 9 Routes connecting Western Siberia and the northwest territories of the Qing²⁴

(see chapter 3), created the following four routes between Western Siberia and Xinjiang:²⁵

1. Via Altai (Uriankhai)
2. From Bukhtarma to northwestern Qing territories (Khobdo and Tarbagatai)
3. Via the Kazakh Steppe
4. Via the Khoqand Khanate.

Because these routes were also concerned with Russo-Central Asian trade, it is helpful to compare them with the other trade route between Russia and

24 The border depicted is modern. The double-line is the border claimed by the Qing Empire. The map is the same as that discussed in my article, J. Noda, "Chūō ajia ni okeru roshin bōeki to kazafu sōgen," *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 68 (2) (2009): 4.

25 See Noda, "Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia." For the route, see Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg. (sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii aspekt)* (Alma-Ata: Ghilim, 1990): 45.

Central Asia which led through Orenburg.²⁶ From this comparison, it appears that the routes between Western Siberia and Xinjiang were complicated by their close proximity to the Qing Empire. Moreover, we have to pay attention to the differences between northern and southern Xinjiang (Jungaria in the north and Kashgaria in the south). This chapter will focus on northern Xinjiang, which is where the Kazakhs were mainly active.

Although the amount of trade conducted through Central Asia did not exceed that conducted through Kyakhta, Russo-Qing trade in this region was of enormous significance, both economically and politically, during the first half of the nineteenth-century. Therefore, in order to accurately interpret the history of Central Asian international relations, it is necessary to understand the structure of the region's trade.

2.2 Russian Policies

In general, the Russian attitude towards trade in this region was favorable. Russia permitted both visits by foreign caravans²⁷ and the dispatch of Russian caravans abroad. Records show that Qing merchants even visited Semipalatinsk from 1757 to 1760. The Kazakhs, as well, engaged in trade within the Russian frontier. Seeking trading places other than Kyakhta, Russia viewed foreign trade with the Qing in a very positive light.²⁸ A new commercial treaty was finally concluded between the two empires in 1851. One reason for the development of trade in this region is the short distance between Xinjiang and Western Siberia; the trip from Semipalatinsk to Tarbagatai it was only about 400 *versta*.²⁹

26 See G.A. Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie svyazi Rossii so sredneaziatskimi khanstvami cherez Orenburg: vtoraiia polovina XVIII–pervaia polovina XIX v.* (Tashkent: Fan, 1982): 75. For the activities by Tatar merchants between Orenburg and Central Asia, see M. Hamamoto, "Tatarskaia Kargala in Russia's eastern policies." in T. Uyama ed., *Asiatic Russia*: 32–51.

27 M. Krasovskii, *Oblast' sibirskikh kirgizov* (Materialy dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobranye ofitserami general'nogo shtaba), t. 16, ch.2 (SPb., 1868): 214–215.

28 For instance, in a document from the general office of Western Siberia to the chief of the Siberian customs district (8.7.1830), the Western Siberian Governor-General stated his opinion that it was highly beneficial to establish a trade base on the Ayaguz River near Semirech'e. This indicates that Russian officials related the development of the *okrug* (District) system to trade with the Qing Empire, see TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 210.

29 A *versta* is equal to 1,066 meters in distance. If the starting point is Omsk, it takes 1,114 *versta* to go to Tarbagatai via Semipalatinsk and Ayaguz. In case of Ili, it takes 1,501 *versta* via Semipalatinsk, Ayaguz, and Kopal, see P. Nebol'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei," *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, kn. 10 (1855): 140–141.

Within documents related to Russian trade policy for Western Siberia and Xinjiang, relations with Persia are sometimes mentioned, including reference to the Treaty of Gulistan (1813). This attention was due to the presence in the region of various ethnic groups – for example, within the area of the Russian boundary in Caucasia – ranging from Central Asian Muslims to subjects of the Qing. Furthermore, policies regarding the Qing Empire, i.e. the treaty of Kyakhta, are also referred to within these Russian documents. To give a concrete example, the ‘Kyakhta tariff’ – a tariff levied by the Russian government on goods from the Qing – was levied at different times although never continuously (I will explain this tariff later). Russia’s Central Asian trade therefore reflected the various foreign policies held by the Russian Empire.

The fact that various ethnic groups, as well as a wide variety of products, moved within the area is clear.³⁰ Russian policies for the promotion of trade throughout Central Asia can be described by the following four points:

2.2.1 The Issuing of Passports³¹

Russian authorities issued a passport to domestic merchants that certified both their purpose and destination. For example, a “*pushport*” issued by the Governor-General of Western Siberia (in both Russian and Turkic) confirmed that a “Bukharan” from Tara (the agent of a Semipalatinsk merchant of the first guild) and others could travel to Ili for purposes of trade for a period of six months. It also stated in a later passage that “as subjects of His Majesty the Emperor, Kazakh sultans, *bis*, and elders should allow these merchants to operate freely.” The text of this request almost seems formulaic. The attacks on and pillaging of caravans by Kazakhs mentioned later in this chapter may explain why the text of the passport was written in both languages. Passports of foreign merchants who entered from Tashkent, Bukhara, and other Central Asian cities also exist.³²

The ‘agent’ (*prikazchik*) system³² mentioned here also controlled the movement of caravans from Western Siberia to Xinjiang. Agents went to Xinjiang and Central Asia on behalf of the chief merchants registered in the guild. Such

30 According to Struve, in the Tsarist era, trade with Asia was regarded as important in terms of the development of Russian industrial markets as well as to serve as an approach to the barbaric Asian peoples, see P.B. Struve, *Torgovaia politika Rossii* (Cheliabinsk: Sotsium, 2007): 175.

31 Regulated by the 204th article of the 1822 Regulation.

32 The requirements for an outbound passport were eased by the 1807 edict. See M. Krasovskii, *Oblast' sibirskikh kirgizov* (Materialy dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami general'nogo shtaba, t. 16), ch. 2 (SPb., 1868): 217.

agents mainly consisted of Russian Muslim subjects, like Siberian Bukharans,³³ Siberian Tatars, and Volga Tatars.³⁴ In other words, Russians could be indirectly involved in the trade without actually going to Central Asia itself. The conditions under which Muslims could engage in commerce in Xinjiang will be discussed in detail below.

2.2.2 Permission for merchants to trade in Siberia

Regarding Russian treatment of foreign caravans, merchants of “foreign nationality” could obtain a domestic “passport” (which gave the same rights as those of the merchants of the second Russian guild) for 20 rubles. They could also trade in each of the towns along the Siberian fortified line as well as at the fair of Nizhny Novgorod.³⁵

With the later introduction of the 1822 Regulation, Russia decided not to levy a “toll” on foreign Asians – often called “Tashkenti” or “Bukharan” within the Russian literature (hereafter referred to as ‘foreign merchants’) – whose caravans travelled through Kazakh pasturelands.³⁶ This policy can be interpreted as a step to promote trade. As for “Russian” merchants (meaning those who were Russian subjects), Emperor Nikolai I opened the barter trades with

33 For their ethnicity, see Kh. Ziiaev, *Uzbeki v Sibiri XVII–XIX vv.* (Tashkent: Fan, 1968); C. Noack, „Die sibirischen bucharioten: Eine muslimische Minderheit unter russischer Herrschaft,” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 41/2–3 (2000): 263–278. Many of them came from Tara and Tobol'sk. In an earlier case from 1818, a load of Bukharans in Tara was conveyed to Tarbagatai, see Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, “Chernovoi material o torgovle Rossii s Zapadnym Kitaem i Srednei Aziei v pervoi chetverti XIX v.,” in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 2. (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 253.

34 For their activities between Western Siberia and Xinjiang, see Nebol'sin, “Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei”: 19–20; A. Frank, “Islamic Transformation on the Kazakh Steppe, 1742–1917: Toward an Islamic History of Kazakhstan under Russian Rule,” in T. Hayashi ed., *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido univ., 2003): 261–290; V. Shkunov, “Tatarskie kuptsy v rossiisko-vostochnoi torgovle (vtoraia polovina XVIII – pervaiia polovina XIX vv.),” *Gasyrlar avazy - Ekho vekov* 1997–3/4: 64–69. In recent research, Gibadullina describes examples of trade by Russian Tatar merchants in Xinjiang during 1830s–1840s, see E.M. Gibadullina, *Tatary v rossiiskoi torgovle na territorii Kazakhskoi stepi vo vtoroi polovine XVIII – 60-e gg. XIX vv.* (Kazan': Respublikanskii tsentr monitoring kachestva obrazovaniia, 2013): 159–161.

35 N.G. Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie priirtysh'ia v kontse XV – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976): 345.

36 The 192nd to 194th articles of the 1822 Regulation. These articles were confirmed in a document of the Omsk provincial council, 10.20.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1241, l. 110b.

Asian people to all guilds, both in the Orenburg governorate and in Western Siberia.³⁷

For "Asiatic merchants"³⁸ who visited Russian territories, the following conditional rights were confirmed by the Asiatic Committee in 1825:³⁹ first, they were allowed to trade only in three specified fairs⁴⁰ within the Russian inner territory, and, second, their rights were based on those outlined in the Treaty of Gulistan which had been previously established between Russia and Persia.

It is well known that Russian domestic merchants opposed the development of the activities of Asiatic merchants in Orenburg.⁴¹ In Western Siberia, too, the issue of their rights was frequently raised. Firstly, for foreign merchants (*torgovye gosti*), like those from Tashkent and Bukharans, the 1822 regulations on the *inorodets* (non-Russian people) and the 1807 *manifest*⁴² were adopted.⁴³ Later regulations regarding the Bukharans and Tashkentis adopted in 1834⁴⁴ affirmed that the 1825 decision of the Asiatic Committee mentioned above remained in effect. Therefore, foreign merchants could engage in wholesale trade (*optovoi torg*) without paying the guild tax, and conduct trade at the three large fairs. In this way, many Muslim merchants, regardless of whether

37 In other areas, only first guild merchants had this right, see V.P. Shpaltakov, "Sredneaziatskie torgovye liudi v Sibiri v XVIII–XIX vv.," in O.N. Vilkov ed., *Torgovlia gorodov Sibiri kontsa XV – nachala XX v.* (Novosibirsk: ANSSSR Sibirskoe otделение, 1987): 218.

38 According to the definition found in a document of the Omsk provincial council (10.12.1834), they were "Asiatic merchants without certifications for commerce (*kupecheskie svidetel'stva*)", see IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1365, ll. 18–19.

39 Decree issued by the Asiatic Committee, 6.27.1825, VPR 14: 210–212.

40 That is, Irbit, Nizhny Novgorod, and Korenniy or Kurskii. Shiotani regarded the Nizhny Novgorod fair as the hub for Eurasian trade bridging Asia and Russia, see M. Shiotani, *Roshia mengyō hatten no keiki: roshia sarasa to ajia shōnin* (Tokyo: Chisen-shokan, 2014): 101–105 and 272.

41 N.S. Kiniapina et al., *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii: vtoraiia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX v.* (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1984): 218–219.

42 The decree dated 1.1 was named "Manifest o darovannykh kupechestvu novykh vygodakh, otlichiiakh, preimushchestvakh i novykh sposobakh k rasprostraneniui i usileniui torgovykh predpriatii." It prohibited the "foreigners" who had not taken an oath of Russian subject status to join a merchant's guild.

43 Document within the Omsk provincial council, 10.24.1824, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 424, ll. 32–38ob.

44 Provincial council's opinion, 2.12.1834, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 7, l. 105; IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1365, l. 10. See also I.V. Shcheglov, *Khronologicheskii perechen' vazhneishikh dannykh iz istorii Sibiri, 1032–1882 gg.* (Surgut: Severnyi dom, 1993): 307; Ziiaev, *Uzbeki v Sibiri XVII–XIX vv.*: 36; Shpaltakov, "Sredneaziatskie torgovye liudi v Sibiri v XVIII–XIX vv."

they were Russian subjects or not, were involved in trading activities within the boundaries of the empire.

2.2.3 Customs Duties⁴⁵

While Russia treated foreign merchants well, the empire did levy customs duties on the goods they brought from Xinjiang. The Russian government adopted both the 'Kyakhta tariff',⁴⁶ which was imposed on goods from the Qing, and an 'Asiatic tariff' on goods from other regions.⁴⁷ Because the two tax rates were different for the same goods, merchants often sought to evade the higher charge by declaring their goods to be from either Qing China or, for example, Khoqand.⁴⁸ In response to this, the chief of the Customs district ordered the customs officials to verify whether or not the products had actually come from the Qing by checking for Chinese characters on the sacks.⁴⁹

2.2.4 Escort of Caravans

Caravans heading to Xinjiang were sometimes escorted by Cossack troops. This policy was common in the case of escorts for caravans to Bukhara within the Orenburg fortified line.⁵⁰ Usually, the Western Siberian authorities decided the particulars of dispatch escorts according to merchant requests. For instance, accepting the request from a merchant of Semipalatinsk, local authorities dispatched thirty Cossacks as well as a Cossack lieutenant to defend

45 The Siberian customs district was established in Petropavlovsk, see Noda, "Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia": 158.

46 This was according to the regulations governing trade at Kyakhta (1800), Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem*: 195. These regulations were revised in 1840, Neboi'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei": 323.

47 Shcheglov, *Khronologicheskii perechen' vazhneishikh dannykh iz istorii Sibiri*: 214; Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem*: 195. The Asiatic tariff was established in 1818 to unify the tariffs on Asiatic goods (from Persia, Central Asia) set respectively at Astrakhan, Orenburg, and other towns. Krasovskii pointed out that the tariff revenue from Russian exports diminished after the establishment of this tariff, see Krasovskii, *Oblast' sibirskikh kirgizov*: 248.

48 Report by the Semipalatinsk customs to the chief of Siberian customs district, 1.19.1834, TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 109, ll. 39–40.

49 TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 109, l. 47 (9.1.1834). Consequently, this kind of action led to inaccurate statistical data.

50 Foreign minister Nessel'rode wrote in 1824 to Orenburg military governor, Essen, that it was necessary to attach Cossack troops to caravans to protect them from robbery by Kazakhs and Khivans, VPR 13: 411–412. For the escort of caravans by Cossacks, see Y. Malikov, *Tsars, Cossacks, and Nomads: the formation of a borderland culture in Northern Kazakhstan in the 18th and 19th centuries* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2011): 198–209.

a caravan bound for Tarbagatai.⁵¹ Liubimov reported that such cases common in Western Siberia until around 1839.⁵²

These facts demonstrate that domestic and foreign Muslim merchants moved between Western Siberia and Xinjiang for trade. Goods they brought from Xinjiang to Western Siberia included silver (horse-hoof shaped *yuanbao*, or *iambu* in Russian), Chinese cotton (*biaz'*), *daba*, and cattle from the Kazakh Steppe.⁵³

2.3 Qing Policy in Xinjiang and West Mongolia and Its Results

As noted earlier, the Qing Empire only allowed Russians to trade in Kyakhta, and prohibited foreign trade in Xinjiang, except for that conducted by the Kazakhs and the 'Andijanis'⁵⁴ (Khoqandi merchants). This meant that the border with Xinjiang was not entirely closed. As shown by the cases listed above, merchants who were Russian subjects and their Russian goods were able to enter the northwestern territory of the Qing Empire by various routes.

The demand for Russian goods in Xinjiang should also be noted. While no Qing official admitted to such a market in 1828,⁵⁵ in 1845 the Russian Foreign Ministry official, Liubimov, reported that Russian goods were much in demand there.⁵⁶ Though the Qing authority frequently prohibited such trade,⁵⁷ in reality, Russian goods poured into Qing territory. Within this context, it is worth remembering that the Qing officials tried to collect customs duties personally, or in an unofficial capacity. This fact may have contributed to local Qing administrations' acceptance of trade with Russia.⁵⁸

51 Chief of Siberian customs district to the Financial minister, 1.28.1830, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 38, l. 60b.

52 Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul'dzhu v 1845*: 326.

53 For the Chinese *biaz'* cotton in the seventeenth century, see A. Burton, *The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic, and Commercial History, 1550–1702* (Richmond: Curzon, 1997): 365.

54 According to Qing regulation, Andijanis were issued passports, see Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*: 366.

55 The Qing official mentioned that there was much more demand for Asiatic (i.e. Central Asian) goods, see report to chief of Siberian customs district, 9.18.1828, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 110.

56 Aldabek, *Rossia i Kitai*: 87

57 For example, QL55/8/29 (*dingchou*), imperial edict, GZSL vol. 1361.

58 According to the interview by Liubimov, unofficial collection of customs from Kazakhs began in 1842. Liubimov suggested that Qing officials possibly pocketed the money, see Liubimov, "[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]": 290 and 303.

It is clear that in 1845 a Qing councilor recognized the fact that Russian merchants were entering Xinjiang⁵⁹ but there is also evidence of such awareness from earlier years. In 1829 a councilor in Khobdo wrote to the Russians that “[although,] trade within Qing territory by Russians violates the treaty between Russia and Qing ... Russians frequently come to Tarbagatai and Khobdo to trade with Qing merchants.”⁶⁰ Furthermore, according to a Russian document dated 1832, a councilor in Tarbagatai also knew that merchants from Russia travelled to Qing territory.⁶¹

In terms of foreign trade, a particularly significant role was played by Qing guard posts (*karun*).⁶² Garrisons at guard posts were responsible for identifying caravans, confirming merchandise, and seizing contraband.⁶³ This demonstrates how Qing policy on trade was closely connected with issues of border defense. Embarkation of Muslim merchants was limited to the area of nearby Kirghiz pasturelands.⁶⁴ Leaving Qing territory for a remote destination was generally forbidden.⁶⁵ In one exception, a Han merchant visited Nizhny Novgorod⁶⁶ and, in another, a Qing translator named Dzhogai⁶⁷ told a Russian

59 Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul'dzhu v 1845*: 316

60 Bukhtarma customs to chief of Siberian customs district, 6.25.1829, TsGA RK: f. 341, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 10–15.

61 The Tarbagatai councilor showed his understanding to the merchants who came from Russia, see Niukhalov to Omsk provincial chief, 12.20.1832, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 493.

62 L.J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: a political history of Qing relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005): 31–32. See also chapter 7.

63 Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku: 47. For an outline of the *karun* system, see Baoyinchaoketu, *Qingdai beibu bianjiang kalun yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2005). According to Korsak, the *karun* ensured that “the number of horses and members [was] counted, then written in the *yarlik* (a kind of passport), which [was] later handed to the head of caravans. The caravans [could] continue their journey with this form,” Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem*: 422.

64 This was regulated by “the regulations on trade by Muslims who leave the *karun* outpost,” QL59/11/1 (*yiyou*), memorial of Yongbao, the Councilor of Kashgar and others, GZSL vol. 1464. See also J. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: economy, ethnicity, and empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998): 123.

65 Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziiane*: 20 and 111.

66 Fletcher, “Sino-Russian relations, 1800–62”: 328

67 Department of External Trade to chief of Siberian customs district, 12.22.1827, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 36. This document reads that “when people of the Qing come, accept them with the full treatment,” which shows Russia's affirmative policy for trade. This figure, Zhogai, is found in another document as an interpreter at the Chinggistai *karun*, JJD: 405002164 (DG28, or 1838). For the negotiations between Zhogai and Russian local offi-

official of his desire to visit Irbit for trade. Several instances occurred wherein merchants privately went to Bukhtarma from Qing territory for purposes of trade.⁶⁸ When we include these private ventures,⁶⁹ trade between Russia and Qing can be shown to have definitely existed, though on a small scale. Still, customs duties were levied on imported merchandise and tariffs could vary from town to town.⁷⁰ In the case of northern Xinjiang, it was reported that the tariff on foods imported into Tarbagatai was ten percent.⁷¹

The Qing court also tried to control trade through the use of embargoes, especially on rhubarb and opium. Furthermore, the empire sought to control the trade in tea. However, these goods were traded in the same way as goods of Russian origin within the northwest borders of Qing territory. Some examples of Qing controls on tea include its seizure from Kazakh and Khoqand merchants during the confusion in Xinjiang resulting from the rebellion of Jahangir Khoja in the 1820s.⁷² In Ili, Khoqand merchants who engaged in smuggling by travelling among Kazakh caravans came under the strict scrutiny of Qing

cials in 1828, see Noda, "Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia": 156. For the location of this *karun*, see map 10.

- 68 Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan–Kitai*: 48 and 52; Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg.*: 37. A Qing official from the Chinggistai *karun* visited Bukhtarma in 1805, see document from procurator of the Siberian fortified line, Lavrov to Golovkin, ambassador of the Russian missionary to the Qing, 8.20.1805, RKO XIX: 208.
- 69 For instance, a Qing official of the Chinggistai *karun* privately bought livestock from Kazakhs living around the *karun* in the early nineteenth century. At that time, the third rank guard of the *karun* was blamed for his violation of Qing law, and his dismissal was requested, see memorial of Councilor at Khobdo, Fujun, imperially endorsed on JQ3/6/2 (1800), Meng Xianzhang ed., *Zhong-Su maoyishi ziliao* (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi chubanshe, 1991): 197.
- 70 Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*: 366–367. For details, see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*: 100.
- 71 It was reported that customs tariff rates for the Andijanis were 10 percent, see Abdul-Bali Abdul-Vagapov, "Rasskaz troitskogo 2-i gil'dii kuptsa, Abdul-Bali Abdul-Vagapova Abu-Bakirova, o puteshestvii ego s tovarami iz Troitska v Chuguchak, i o prochem," *Geograficheskie izvestiia*, vyp. 2 (SPb, 1850): 389–391. Liubimov also mentioned that a ten percent duty was collected from foreigners who visited Tarbagatai, Liubimov, "[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]": 290.
- 72 Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*: 338. The document addressed to the Khoqand khan (Chinese translation, attached to the memorial of Changling and others, DG12/2/22) mentioned that the Qing authorities would return the seized tea leaf following the precedent of Jankhoja wang of Kazakh, *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian: Daoguang chao juan* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1996): 108.

officials.⁷³ Afterwards, a regulation on the trade of tea through Tarbagatai was established (no later than DG 17 (1837)). According to this order, Qing authorities were to watch carefully how Kazakhs entered Qing territory for trade and even required they remain under inspection following the conduct of their business. Finally, the Kazakhs would be escorted by the Qing as far as the border.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the flood of tea from Qing territory could not be prevented. According to statistical records, 1,800 *pud* of *Baihua* (Ru. *baikhovi*) and brick tea were exported into Russia through Central Asia (1 *pud* is equal to 16.38 kg) during 1840. In 1849, the amount increased to 5,160 *pud* of *Baihua* and 8,528 *pud* of brick tea.⁷⁵

The export of rhubarb to Russia, other than that specified by the Kyakhta customs, had been prohibited since 1822.⁷⁶ It is also true that the export of rhubarb was prohibited in northern Xinjiang.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, we can find cases of export through Xinjiang recorded around 1820.⁷⁸

Yuanbao (or *iambu*) silver ingots were also exported from Qing territory as described in statistical customs information of Western Siberia.⁷⁹

It has been stated that the Qing only used silver for purchasing Russian goods until the 1830s.⁸⁰ However, the statistics above show the existence of payments made in silver from a later period.⁸¹ In addition, it is worth noting Kazakh dealings. Although they were officially only permitted to barter for Qing merchandise, Kazakhs could in fact obtain *yuanbao* silver. In this way,

73 DG8/7 (*bingyin*), memorial of Deingga, *Qinding pingding huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe* (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), vol. 68: 5–6. Although the relation with Kazakh caravans is not clearly indicated, see also Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*: 372.

74 JHLF: 8295–29/605–1884 (*Minzu lei*).

75 Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem*: 440. See also Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia”: 164.

76 Shcheglov, *Khronologicheskii perechen' vazhneishikh dannykh iz istorii Sibiri*: 272.

77 *Qingdai wajiao shiliao*, vol. of Daoguangchao (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), vol. 2: 39.

78 E.K. Meiendorf, *Puteshestvie iz Orenburga v Bukharu* (Moscow: Glav. red. vostochnoi literatury, 1975): 129. The earliest examples are of rhubarb being transported from Tarbagatai to Semipalatinsk during 1793–1794. I. Fal'k, *Opisanie vsekh natsional'nostei Rossii* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1999): 41. Regarding the demand for rhubarb in Russia, see T. Saguchi, *Roshia to ajia sōgen* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1966): 151–153. See also Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin*: 164–185.

79 See also Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia”; Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*: 79.

80 Fletcher, “Sino-Russian relations, 1800–62”: 328.

81 See also Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem*: 417.

TABLE 6 *Silver ingots (iambu in the text) imported from the Qing into Siberian towns (unit: Ruble; the table indicates "silver imports / total of all articles").*

Year	Through Semipalatinsk	Bukhtarma	Omsk
1827 ⁸²	623,637 / 866,146 ⁸³	60,394 / 88,192	24,500 (7 pud) / n/a
1843	84,648 ⁸⁴ / 228,848 (from Qing)		

silver poured into Russian Siberia through the Kazakhs. We will consider the circulation of silver within Kazakh society itself later.

Regarding opium, a report mentioned that it had been brought into the northwest of Qing through Semipalatinsk after 1834.⁸⁵ In Russia, opium was embargoed in 1841,⁸⁶ and the following year there were negotiations between the two empires regarding this opium embargo.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, many examples of opium trade can be found in the historical materials.⁸⁸ Liubimov also reported the Russian export of opium from Irbit to northern Xinjiang around 1845.⁸⁹ In one case from 1846, 200 *pud* of opium was imported from Troitsk and

82 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 3–57.

83 Here, from Tarbagatai or Kazakh Steppe.

84 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 152, ll. 1–8. Here, the amount of imported silver from Ili to Semipalatinsk is indicated, which corresponds to the information shown by Korsak, see Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem*: 417.

85 Krasovskii, *Oblast' sibirskikh kirgizov*: 258.

86 Shcheglov, *Khronologicheskii perechen' vazhneishikh dannykh iz istorii Sibiri*: 318; N.S. Kiniapina, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii pervoi poloviny XIX v.* (Moscow: Vysshiaia shkola, 1963): 272–273.

87 Russian Senate declared to the *Lifanyuan* that Russia would prohibit exports by Russians to Qing territory on 5.1.1842, GES 2: 360.

88 For the opium trade during 1840, see N. Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: VI," *Zapiski Semipalatinskogo Podotdela zapadno-sibirskogo otdela Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, vyp. 2 (Semipalatinsk, 1905): 16. For the example of 1842, see Ayaguz District office to Office of Siberian Kirgiz, 11.2.1842, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1. The famous English traveler, Atkinson recorded the smuggling of opium before crossing over the Qing's border, see T.W. Atkinson, *Oriental and Western Siberia: A narrative of seven years' explorations and adventures in Siberia, Mongolia the Kirghis steppes, Chinese Tartary, and part of Central Asia* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1858): 158–159.

89 Liubimov, "[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]": 292 and 302.

Semipalatinsk to Tarbagatai for 3,600 rubles (at that time, equal to 10 ingots of *yuanbao* silver).⁹⁰

As has already been pointed out, trade in Xinjiang was controlled under the official trade policies of the Qing dynasty. Regarding the Kazakhs, the following description can be found in the Collected Statues of the Qing: “the Kazakhs traded [*hushi*] their livestock at Ili and Tarbagatai.”⁹¹ In spite of attempts at control by the Qing authorities, governmental regulations were not very effective, and international trade beyond the scope of the Kyakhta Treaty had many ways of escaping control at all.⁹² On the whole, it was mainly Kazakh and Khoqandi merchants⁹³ who were engaged in the intermediary trade between the empires, which will be discussed in the following sections.

Analysis of the evidence shows us that the Qing Empire's trade policy was much more inward looking than that of Russia. This was because requirements for the Qing were limited to the necessities of the stationed troops,⁹⁴ though protection of the border may also have been an important factor in this regard. From the perspective of the entire Qing economy, trade in Xinjiang was considered to consist mainly of Kazakh dealings.⁹⁵ However, in Kashgar, the capital city of southern Xinjiang, we can find far more cases of free trade, though precise statistics are unavailable. Thus, we need to assess the trade of Khoqandi

90 A. Ianushkevich, *Dnevnik i pis'ma puteshestviia po kazakhskim stepiam* (Pavlodar: EKO, 2006): 190. Judging from this rate, 1 *yuanbao* (50 tael) was exchanged for 360 rubles (paper *assignatsiia*). In a case, 1 *yuanbao* was converted into 375 rubles in Inner Russia, see Liubimov, “[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]”: 300. 3.5 rubles of paper *assignatsiia* corresponds to 1 silver ruble which began to circulate in 1840.

91 *Daqing huidian shili* describes how the towns Ili and Tarbagatai were doing *hushi* with Kazakhs in the way of exchange between livestock and cotton fabrics, *Qinding daqing huidian shili*, vol. 52: 24–25. For the institution of *hushi* (literally: “mutual trade”), see S. Iwai, “Shindai no goshi to “chinmoku gaikō,” in S. Fuma ed., *Chūgoku higashi ajia gaikō kōryūshi no kenkyū* (Kyoto: Kyōtodaigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2007): 354–390. See also chapter 7.

92 My previous analysis focused on the real distribution of merchandise behind imperial politics, see Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia.”

93 As cited by many researchers, an English official, Wathen, described the role of Khoqandi merchants, see W.H. Wathen, “Memoir on the U'sbek state of Kokan, properly called Khokend, (the ancient Ferghana,) in Central Asia,” *The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 3–2 (1834): 376.

94 When mutton to feed troops became inadequate, the Qing side would buy sheep from the Kazakhs, see *Yijiang jizai*, in *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian shiliao huiji*: 115.

95 M. Kishimoto, *Shindai chūgoku no bukka to keizai hendō* (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1997): 178. For trade in southern Xinjiang from the viewpoint of the Qing, see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*: 104.

merchants who frequently visited Kashgar. Later in this chapter, I will only touch on a substituting role played by Khoqandi merchants on behalf of the Kazakhs.

The above-mentioned differences in the Russian and Qing trade policies parallel their other policies toward Central Asia, and eventually influenced their attitudes towards the Kazakh Steppe. This fact will be touched on in the fourth section of this chapter.

3 Intermediary Role of the Kazakhs in Russo-Qing Trade

The previous section focused on analysis of the trade policies of both empires. Next, the role of Kazakhs played in the region's trade will be discussed. Regarding Kazakh trade with the two empires, especially the Qing, many points have already been made. For example, we have seen how Kazakh trade was based on a system of barter for necessities. Therefore, the following discussion aims not so much to consider the economic aspects of the trade, but to focus on the significance entailed by the presence of Kazakhs in the boundary areas who maintained relations with both empires and participated in international trade. In this section, I will analyze in detail the evidence from northern Xinjiang (Ili, Tarbagatai). This was the area where the most Kazakhs conducted business because trade in southern Xinjiang was dominated by Khoqandi merchants.

3.1 *Dealings of the Kazakhs with Russia and the Qing*

As was pointed out by Saguchi, Kazakhs traded at the Russian Irtysh fortified line as well as in the Qing territory of Xinjiang⁹⁶ but only after they had already begun trading with the Russians. The main research on Kazakh trade with Russia until the second half of the eighteenth century was conducted by Apollova. When the power of the Jungar declined in the 1750s, the Kazakhs began exchanging their livestock for Russian products at the Irtysh line, following similar activity at the Orenburg line in the west.⁹⁷ The well-known *menovoi dvor* (merchants' court) was established in 1764 at Semipalatinsk.⁹⁸ There,

96 Saguchi, *Roshia to ajia sōgen*: 238.

97 Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie priirtysh'ia*: 322. Though tax exemption for foreigners in Orenburg was regulated by the imperial edict of 1747, this place was not convenient for Kazakhs in the east, see Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie priirtysh'ia*: 320.

98 I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998): 40; Krasovskii, *Oblast' sibirskikh kirgizov*: 215

Kazakhs could exchange livestock for goods of Central Asian origin – especially those from Bukhara.⁹⁹ The fact that caravans in the steppe were under the control of Chinggisid sultans is evidenced by the request of Abulfeiz sultan to levy the customs duty on caravans moving through the steppe.¹⁰⁰ Kazakhs did not stress the establishment of footholds in the towns, in contrast to Khoqandi merchants, and were instead concerned about controlling caravans that passed through the Steppe.

Kazakh livestock was valued by the Russians, who observed that “[it is] an important article for governmental dealings as well.”¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the exchange of Russian products was also beneficial for the Russian side. In one case from 1824, a Kazakh sheep was bought for 4 rubles and a horse for 200 or 300 rubles in Petropavlovsk.¹⁰² Apart from livestock, the Kazakhs sold fox, sable, and wolf furs, and in turn obtained velvets, tanned leather, wheat, and other grains from the Russians.¹⁰³ It must be remembered that their trade with Russia was, in theory, conducted at Russian towns of the fortified line that had customs posts.¹⁰⁴ Only after the 1822 Regulation were established could Kazakh caravans enter inner Russian territory to trade.

In the east, the Qing had experience trading with nomads like the Jungar¹⁰⁵ and its trade with the Kazakhs began in 1758 (QL23) after the Kazakhs entered into official relations with the Qing court in 1757. One of the Kazakh sultans, Ablai, said that “if we bring our own herd of horses to Qing towns and exchange them for what we don’t have, it will be greatly profitable [*umesi tusa*].”¹⁰⁶ In response to this, local Qing generals memorialized regarding the profitability of trade with Kazakhs.¹⁰⁷ As a result, trade began the following year at Urumqi and lasted until 1765.¹⁰⁸ When the Kazakhs explained to Russia why they had

99 Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie priirtysh'ia*: 323

100 However, the request was rejected by the Russian authority, Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie priirtysh'ia*: 325.

101 This perception was concerning trade at Orenburg. Memorandum for the Commerce minister by Colonel Stolkov, 11.23.1810, VPR 5: 617.

102 Attached document to the report of Lukin to chief of Omsk province, 12.22.1824, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 351, ll. 5–6.

103 This is based on the statistical information of the Bukhtarma customs for 1828, Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg.*: 28.

104 Zh.K. Kasymbaev, *Pod nadezhnuiu zashchitu Rossii* (Alma-Ata, 1986): 69.

105 Cai Jiayun, *Qingdai Xinjiang shehui jingji shigang* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006): 78.

106 QL22/9/14, memorial of Jaohui and Fude, JMLZ: 1671–016/47–1391.

107 QL22/10/7 (*bingyin*), memorial of Jaohui and Fude, GZSL vol. 548.

108 Cai Jiayun classifies trade by Kazakhs in Xinjiang into three stages: an ascendant stage (1760–65), a stage of prosperity (1766–91), and a stage of sustainable development

relations with the Qing Empire, they insisted that their purpose was simply to trade. This shows how a need for trade with the Qing at that time was evident to Kazakhs.¹⁰⁹ The Qing side, in turn, needed war-horses¹¹⁰ and livestock for eating, and was ready to pay the Kazakhs with fabrics and tea.

The Chinese scholars Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi have already made clear what the Kazakhs sought to gain by exchanging their livestock. Based on their research into the *Junjichu Manwen Yuezhedang* (Manchu monthly memorial packets of the Grand Council), the Kazakhs sought such valuable articles as silk fabrics. Also conspicuous were satin (*duanzi*), colored fabrics (*xuzi*), figured satin (*lunzi*), and gauze (*sha*) (listed in order of quantity traded).¹¹¹ For example, in 1769 (QL34/4–5), Kazakh caravans brought 147 horses, which were sold for 3.4 teals (silver), 2.4 teals, and 1.9 teals, according to their quality. Eleven head of cattle were sold for 2.2 teals each, and 295 sheep for a teal each. To cover this cost, the Qing gave satin fabrics (*duan*) and red-threaded silk fabrics (*banhuahongxian*) to the amount of 494.6 teals.¹¹² *Huibu* (literally “Muslim cloths,” cotton fabric of southern Xinjiang origin), which later became the main article of the Kazakh trade, cost 0.4 teals per bolt. In line with the regulations of Tarbagatai, 10 horses were exchanged for 30–50 bolts of *huibu*, 10 cattle for 20–40 bolts, and 100 sheep for 75–80 bolts.¹¹³ The total quantity of *huibu* exchanged for Kazakh livestock annually is estimated at 99,000 bolts.

Following Urumqi, Ili (1759) and Tarbagatai (1765) later became major towns for trading and, eventually, the Qing Empire only allowed Kazakh caravans to enter its territory through these towns. Earlier, trade at Kashgar had also been permitted, but this was eventually banned.¹¹⁴ In response to this, Ablai requested free trade at Kashgar in both 1763 (QL 28)¹¹⁵ and 1768

(1792–1850), Cai Jiayun, *Qingdai Xinjiang shehui jingji shigang*: 217–222. During the last stage, however, of the trade was clearly in decline as discussed below.

109 Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku”: 34.

110 In the case of QL52/7 (1787), Yungboo (Ch. *Yongbao*), Councilor at Tarbagatai, reported that he would buy cattle bred by Kazakhs for distribution among the troops, NGDK: 195882.

111 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*: 458.

112 An attached document to the memorial dated QL34/6/1, JMLZ: 2317–43/85–3178. The detail up to QL29 (1764)/9, see QZHG 1 and 2. Of these collections, some parts are translated into Kazakh, see B. Ejenkhanūli, *Qazaq khandighi men Tsin patshalighining sauda qatinastari turali Qitay muraqhat qūzhattari*, 1 t. (Almaty: Daik-press, 2009).

113 *Ta'erbahatai shiyi*, vol. 4: 7.

114 For the prohibition of the Kazakh trade in Kashgar, see a memorial of Agui and others, imperially endorsed on QL26/12/21, QZHG 1: 522–523.

115 QL28/7/5, memorial of Yunggui, Councilor at Kashgar and others, QZHG 2: 285–283.

(QL 33),¹¹⁶ and his son Adil, bringing livestock, visited the same city to request permission to trade as well.¹¹⁷ The importance of Kashgar lay in the high price horses were sold for in southern Xinjiang.¹¹⁸

In Ili there was a “trade pavilion” (*maoyi ting*)¹¹⁹ outside the western gate of the *Huiyuan* castle where Kazakhs could conduct trade (see fig. 12).¹²⁰ According to regulations, when a caravan reached the trade pavilion, the local Office of military affairs (*Yingwu chu*) would report its arrival and guards (*shiwei*) would be dispatched by the Governor to watch the business dealings. Personal trading by members of the military and civilians was prohibited. Livestock obtained by the Qing entered the official storage.¹²¹ Importantly, Kazakhs were not allowed to trade directly with Qing merchants. The Procuring Office (*Liangxiang chu*) at Ili was the office for military supplies, which annually ordered such goods as the following for both local needs and trade: 99,084 bolts of *huibu* fabrics and 15,000 bolts of ordinary cotton fabrics from Yarkand or elsewhere and transferred 20,000 of these bolts to Tarbagatai. It also ordered 115,000 *jin* of leaf tea per year, and about 1,500 *jin* of various colored silk fabrics (*chouduan*).¹²² This trade pavilion was referred to by Russian travelers as “*menovoi dvor*.” It seems that there were similarities between what they saw here and what they encountered when conducting trade with Kazakhs in the Russian border areas.¹²³

Tarbagatai had a similar trade pavilion that was described in more detail (see fig. 13). This pavilion was situated outside the east gate¹²⁴ and was called *maitaza* (i.e. *maitingzi*) by such Russians as Liubimov. Liubimov described

116 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*: 539.

117 Adil was told by the Qing local authority that it was as a rule prohibited for Kazakhs to trade in the “Muslim area” (*huizi difang*, or Kashgaria), JQ13/7/11, memorial of Fan Jianfeng and others, JJD: 404011281.

118 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*: 536

119 Similar to *maimaicheng* in Kyakhta. For the structure of Kyakhta, see Bao Muping, “Trade Centre (Maimaicheng) in Mongolia, and their function in Sino-Russian Trade Networks,” *International Journal of Asian Studies* 3/2 (2006): 211–237.

120 In fig. 12 they were supposed to sell their livestock in Ili.

121 *Yijiang huilan*, in *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian shiliao huiji*: 76–77. Horses got at Ili and Tarbagatai were forwarded to Khobdo as well, see *Kebuduo shiyi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969): 57.

122 *Yili wendang huichao* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 2004): 274–276. 1 *jin* approximately corresponds to 1.3 pounds.

123 The report by Gens and Heltersen in 1839, see *Istoriia Kazakhstana v zapadnykh istochnikakh XII–XX vv.* (transl. from German, L.A. Zakharova), t. 5 (Almaty: Sanat, 2006): 59. See also Nebol'sin, “Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei”: 342.

124 *Ta'erbahatai shiyi*, vol. 3: 11.



FIGURE 12 *Kazakhs in front of the Huiyuan-cheng (Ili) in 1907.*

SOURCE: C.G. MANNERHEIM, *ACROSS ASIA FROM WEST TO EAST IN 1906–1908*, VOL. 1 (HELSINKI: SUOMALAIS-UGRILAINEN SEURA, 1940): 223.

how merchants had to stay at the *Kurgan* as a caravanserai beside the trade pavilion.¹²⁵ Qurbān ‘ali said that it was called “*Sart-qorjan*” and was situated against the *mūytāza* [*maitingzi*].¹²⁶

The Kazakh trade season in Xinjiang was almost completely limited to the period between the fourth and ninth months of the lunar calendar.¹²⁷ A Russian record mentioned “Kazakhs living near the *karun* of the Qing, cross the *karun* [line] to sell their horse at Tarbagatai, when *anban* (councilors) went out to watch the *karun*.”¹²⁸ Therefore, the time of trade would seem to have been spring or summer after the thaw.

The cases mentioned above are examples of official trade. However, it was natural that behind such official dealings there were private and irregular deals on the western border of the Qing Empire.¹²⁹ For instance, Kazakh caravans

125 Liubimov, “[*Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda*]”: 288. This may be the same as what appears in the Qing literature: “a small-fort (*tubao*) was established around the trade pavilion, where all of Kazakhs pitched their tents to stay,” *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), vol. 1: 5.

126 THS: 308.

127 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*. See also Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū*: 319.

128 Niukhalov to De-sent-Loran, 3.12.1835, TsGA RK, f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, ll. 144–145.

129 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*: 541.




FIGURE 13 *Chughuchaq (Tarbagatai) in 1841*. SOURCE: RGVA: F. 447, OP. 1, D. 292, L. 1.¹³⁰

sometimes brought to Xinjiang such Russian products as fox pelts. An imperial edict of 1767 (QL33) stated that Russian products through Xinjiang were acceptable since trading at Kyakhta had been suspended. However, transportation of Russian goods by Russians was prohibited, while their transport by Kazakhs was only possible on the condition that the prices were low.¹³¹ In 1788 (QL53), it was reported that a Khoqandi merchant had smuggled Russian goods from Semipalatinsk.¹³² The following imperial edict to the Military governor at Ili, Booning (Ch. *Baoning*) against this situation is of particular note here.

Andijanis, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs are all “outer people” (*tulergi aiman*).¹³³ Although they go to Russia to trade outside the *karun*, we don’t intervene.

¹³⁰ It is reproduced by Brill as “Russian Military Intelligence on Asia.” Points A and B are the Karavan Sarai and customs house respectively.

¹³¹ QL33/7/4, the edict to Barpin (Ch. *Ba’erpin*), QMJD vol. 8, no. 1231. A related text is found in the memorial of Iletu (QL33/8/13), Meng Xianzhang ed., *Zhong-Su maoyishi ziliao*: 193–194 (XMD vol. 89: 89–93). For the case of QL32, Saguchi, 18–19 *seiki higashi torukisutan shakai-shi kenkyū*: 77.

¹³² QL53/10/20, memorial of Booning, see Meng Xianzhang ed., *Zhong-Su maoyishi ziliao*: 194.

¹³³ Regarding whether the Kazakhs are included in the category of *waifan* (outer feudatory), see chapter 7.

But, it should be prohibited for inner Muslims like those living in Kashgar or Aqsu to privately travel to Russia for trade. For this reason, the following is to be sent to Booning and others: "You must clearly tell them [Andijanis, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs] that they are not permitted to sell to our [Qing] people goods of Russian origin because trade [with Russia] is closed at Kulun."¹³⁴

This shows that the Qing authority strictly prohibited the import of Russian merchandise. Afterwards, the Qing continued to prohibit the importation of Russian goods. There may have been a difference in the enforcement of the regulations between north and southern Xinjiang because it was pointed out that while it was very difficult for Russian goods to enter Qing territory through Ili, it was easier through Kashgar.¹³⁵ Therefore, goods prohibited by the Qing were definitely coming across the Xinjiang boundary.

The circulation of Qing silver ingots within the Kazakh Steppe also serves as evidence for the type of private or irregular trade mentioned above. It is further confirmed by a Kazakh petition addressed to the Russian local authorities to be allowed to pay the *yasak* tax with *yuanbao* (*iambu*) silver instead of actual goods like livestock.¹³⁶ When the Western Siberian office inspected the situation, the result was a report stating, "Such Kazakhs as sultans or other high-ranked figures no doubt have *yuanbao* silver."¹³⁷ As already mentioned, this silver was brought to Russian markets. In addition, Kazakhs sometimes carried Qing products directly into Russia.¹³⁸ Based on this, we can be sure that Kazakhs were engaged in relaying activities between the Irtysh fortified line and Xinjiang by carrying Russian products to Xinjiang or buying Qing products for the Russian side.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ QL53/11/14, QMJD vol. 21, no. 3659. The same edict was cited in the memorial of Booning, imperially endorsed on QL54/1/9, see Meng Xianzhang ed., *Zhong-Su maoyishi ziliao*: 194–195.

¹³⁵ R.N. Nabiev, *Iz istorii Kokandskogo khanstva (feodal'noe khaziaistvo Khudoiar-khana)* (Tashkent, 1973): 198.

¹³⁶ Report by Office of Siberian Kirgiz, 11.19.1843, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17723, l. 1.

¹³⁷ Proceedings of council of main administration of Western Siberia, 1851, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17723, l. 15.

¹³⁸ Instruction by the Department of External Trade to Semipalatinsk customs, 6.13.1825, TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 109, l. 3.

¹³⁹ The discussion of Ibragimov seems inadequate in terms of historical materials, see S.K. Ibragimov, "Iz istorii vneshnetorgovykh svyazei kazakhov v XVIII v.," *Uchenye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniia*, T. XIX (1953): 53. Nevertheless, it is true that the classification of the statistics was so rough that it is difficult to clarify the details of turnover.

3.2 *Kazakh Intermediation*

When assessing the other role played by the Kazakhs, it is worth noting the fact that Kazakh caravans were routinely inspected by the Qing *karun* garrisons. Kazakh caravans to Ili and Tarbagatai, were dispatched by Kazakh sultans who were clan leaders¹⁴⁰ and whose letters guaranteed the caravan's identity. As a result, these caravans were allowed to cross the guard line.¹⁴¹ The fact that Kazakh caravans required identification from the sultans is closely related to the role Kazakhs played as intermediaries.

A report addressed to the Siberian governorate in 1805 gave an overview of trade between Western Siberia and Xinjiang as follows:

Only the Kazakhs are allowed to cross the border. Thus, trade with the Qing conducted in the towns of its western periphery is conducted by way of Kazakh sultans. For this reason, Russian merchants are obliged to purchase the *favor of sultans* at high prices. These sultans accompany the caravans to the border of the Qing [with identification] by their individual names. In addition to *making the Russians subordinate to themselves in this way*, they also frequently make various requests or extortions of the caravans on the way. Furthermore, sultans who dispatch the caravans do not use force to protect them, although the caravans leaving Russian borders are always in danger of pillage. The owners of the caravans are regarded as subordinate to the sultans, and have no right to [individually] petition Qing authorities regarding trade matters. In the towns of the Qing, trade is conducted by the [Qing] officials only. Private trade is forbidden between individuals and the Kazakhs or those who have entered Qing territory under Kazakh auspices. Due to these controls, the profit for our [Russian] merchants is low.¹⁴² [Emphasis added by the author]

This report clearly shows that "Russian merchants" (those merchants who were subjects of the Russian Empire, including Muslims), if they wanted to trade in Xinjiang, had to do so through the intermediation of Kazakhs. Behind this was a regulation that only Andijanians and Kazakhs were allowed to trade in Xinjiang.¹⁴³ In other words, "one-way trade" in Qing products from Russia was

140 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*.

141 Noda, "Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku: 46–47.

142 Lavrov to Siberian Governor-General Selifontov, 8.11.1805, RKO XIX, 204.

143 While Li Sheng pointed out: "it was to a large extent normal for Russian merchants to trade at Ili and Tarbagatai from the end of the eighteenth century to the first of the next century, ... the need to bring the letter or permission by Kazakh aristocrats had already disappeared." However, this ending point seems too early according to the text cited

only conducted by local or foreign Muslim merchants, as already demonstrated. Until at least the first half of the nineteenth century, Russian merchants were obliged to rely on Kazakh intermediation.¹⁴⁴ It should also be noted that this trade was not regarded as being very profitable to the Russian side.

In addition to the Kazakhs, Russian merchants also operated through the intermediation of "Andijanis." It was reported that Russian Tatars or Tashkentis who moved from Ust' Kamenogorsk or Semipalatinsk to Ili, always entered Xinjiang "under the name [*pod nazvaniem*] of Tashkenti or Kazakh merchants."¹⁴⁵ Normally, Russian subjects could not pass through Qing territory as Russian subjects. In addition to the direct intermediation, we can find references in contemporary sources to the fact that they could pass through Qing territory by means of "Asian clothing," that is, by pretending to be Muslims.

According to the report by a Tatar, Murtaza Faizuddin Marziyan, who travelled from Semipalatinsk to Ili in 1807, "No one has the right to trade with private individuals. A Governor and an official (*galadai*) come to the Caravanseraï [probably indicating *maoyi ting*] to exchange merchandise, not for money but for actual goods. They also levy customs duties here. ... The only foreigners the Qing accept in *Kul'dzha* [Ili] are Andijanis ... Nevertheless, *various people come and go there pretending to be Andijani*. In the cities of the Little Bukharia [southern Xinjiang], travel and trade are free."¹⁴⁶ This passage demonstrates existence of intermediation by Khoqandi merchants. The author of this report, Nebol'sin, also maintained that cotton fabric obtained through barter by merchants who had come to Qing territory from Russia as described was subsequently sold when the merchants returned to Russia. Alternatively, it could be sold to Kazakhs on the steppe.¹⁴⁷ Thus, it was possible for Kazakhs, in turn, to obtain Qing products through Russian merchants.

above, Li Sheng, *Xinjiang dui su (e) maoyi shi: 1600–1990* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1993): 44. Kuznetsov mentioned, "by 1825 the prohibition of selling Russian products became formalized," V.S. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973): 112. However, it lacks the mention of the system which made the situation possible. See the last footnote (231) of this chapter.

144 For this tendency, Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg.*: 41.

145 The report of the mining chief (gitten-ferwalter) Pospelov, no earlier than Jan. 1805, RKO XIX: 860. In this document, it is said that "Russian merchants don't go [to Xinjiang] at all because of the danger."

146 Nebol'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei": 340–343. (Emphasis added by the author)

147 Nebol'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei": 343.

Probably from information attained by Liubimov (in 1845), researchers believe that Russian merchants were able to sneak into Xinjiang simply by wearing “Asian clothing.”¹⁴⁸ However, the possibility for Russian-subject merchants to enter Xinjiang can also be explained by taking into consideration the three facts of attacks and pillaging that were committed by Kazakhs, Kazakh intermediation, and changes that occurred in the influence of Khoqandi merchants that will be discussed later. The above-mentioned Councilor at Khobdo noted in 1829 that, “[Russians trading in Qing territory] can enter *only by disguising in Kazakh dress*.”¹⁴⁹ It is known that Andijani, who were restricted to exporting tea, could steal out of the *karun* by mingling with Kazakhs.¹⁵⁰ From this fact, it seems very likely that the Qing could not distinguish the appearances of Kazakhs and Andijani (see fig. 14).¹⁵¹

On the Russian side, this kind of disguising was regarded as a “formality” (*naruzhnoe prilichie*).¹⁵² In this way, Kazakh intermediation and attaining access through disguise enabled Russian caravans to be dispatched from Siberian territory to towns in Xinjiang.¹⁵³ The cases discussed above show how the Qing had come to recognize the reality of trade being conducted by “Russian merchants” from around 1830. However, the Qing Empire continued to insist on the application of traditional regulations, which explains why such a “formality” was required to enter Qing territory.

Two unique cases provide a detailed picture of the trade conducted by Russian subjects. First, in 1811, a caravan was dispatched from Semipalatinsk to Aqsu, where sources mention that “there were an observation point and customs house.”¹⁵⁴ The total of goods exchanged (between Bukhtarma on one side

148 Such researchers as Rozhkova, Kuznetsov, and Sladkovskii have already mentioned this way of evading seizure (Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke*: 337; Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane*: 112; Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem*: 212), while I demonstrate the other patterns in this book.

149 Bukhtarma customs to chief of Siberian customs district, 6.25.1829, TsGA RK: f. 341, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 10–15. (Emphasis added).

150 *Qinding pingding huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe*, vol. 68: 5–6 (1828).

151 Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 136.

152 Report to Financial minister, 8.14.1832, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 48, ll. 93–93ob. This report describes the situation in which Russian merchants visited Ili and Tarbagatai.

153 Although Kasymbaev pointed out the Kazakhs' intermediation, his analysis doesn't cover the Qing affairs, see Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg.*: 40–41.

154 Governor-General, Glazenap to Foreign minister, Rumiantsev, 8.22.1811, VPR 6: 160. This document also mentioned that trade by Russians in Xinjiang was prohibited and that only Asians were allowed to deal in it.



FIGURE 14 Qing representations of Kazakhs (left) and Andjanis. SOURCE: HUANGQING ZHIGONGTU (COMPILED IN QL26 (1761)).¹⁵⁵

and Ili and Tarbagatai on the other) reached 156,941 rubles 70 *kopeika* that year.¹⁵⁶ Second, Rafailov, who also visited Aqsu from Semipalatinsk in 1811, traded goods to a total of 321,045 rubles.¹⁵⁷ After these incidents, the annual turnover of the Semipalatinsk customs (for trade with Xinjiang) in 1815–1827 came to 70,000–120,000 rubles in export (to Xinjiang) and 140,000–260,000 rubles in import (from Xinjiang), resulting in a surplus of imports.¹⁵⁸ These figures clearly demonstrate that trade was already being conducted by Russian subjects during the first half of the nineteenth century.

¹⁵⁵ By permission of the Waseda University Library.

¹⁵⁶ Glazenap to Rumiantsev, 9.30.1811, VPR 6: 188. For the turnover during the early nineteenth century, Aldabek, *Rossīa i Kitai*: 51. This year, a Russian official Putimtsev also invaded Tarbagatai and Ili mingled among Kazakh caravans carrying identification provided by a Kazakh sultan. See Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hān koku: 47 (based on the report by G. Putimtsev who traveled to northern Xinjiang in 1811).

¹⁵⁷ VPR 7: 392.

¹⁵⁸ Aldabek, *Rossīa i Kitai*: 61.

There was another complex type of infiltration wherein merchants disguising themselves as Khoqandi obtained the intermediation of the Kazakhs as well. Let us refer to the account of Zibbershtein, a medical officer who visited the Kazakh Great Juz in 1825:

Our [Russian] merchants ... called themselves Andijani. This fabrication is enabled by the Kazakh sultans who provide letters asserting that caravans are from this territory [Tashkent]. ... Merchants who receive these letters from the sultans accept responsibility for paying a tax at the request of the sultans and deliver tributes (*tartu*)¹⁵⁹ to the Governor.¹⁶⁰

In summary, Kazakh sultans guaranteed the false identities of Russian merchants disguised as citizens of Tashkent. In return, the merchants brought tribute horses to the Qing's officials on behalf of the sultans. A contemporary travelogue also mentioned how "*through giving presents*, [Russian] merchants get a letter from influential sultans addressed to the chief of the towns of the Qing Empire. Their caravans are then allowed to enter [Qing territory] as belongings of the patron sultans."¹⁶¹ Russian merchants thus needed to take upon themselves additional expenses when they borrowed the name of Kazakhs in order to enter Qing territory. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the fact that records show how a Kazakh sultan guaranteed the identity of Russian merchants detained at a Qing *karun*,¹⁶² the intermediation of Kazakh sultans was indeed necessary. In addition, Kazakh intermediation could save caravans from being pillaged by other Kazakhs.

We even find an instance of a Russian merchant being appointed as the commander of a caravan of Kazakhs and then entering the territory of the

159 A Turkic word, meaning 'present.' For a case in which a Kazakh sultan presented horses as *tartu* to the Ili military governor (in 1828), see JMLZ: 4058–060/198–1898. See also J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo, 2010): 78.

160 M.P. Viatkin, "Putevye zapiski lekaria Zibbershteina," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 1 (1936): 254. Zibbershtein accompanied the Russian soldier Shubin dispatched there.

161 *Zhivopisnoe puteshestvie po Azii, sostavlennoe na frantsuzskom iazyke pod rukovodstvom Eirie I ukrashennoe graviurami* (Perevod Korsha, E., izdanie Shriaeva, A.S.), t. 1 (Moscow: Tipografia Nikolaia Stepanova, 1839): 169. For the original text, see J.-B. Eyriès ed., *Voyage pittoresque en Asie et en Afrique* (Paris: Furne et Cie, 1839): 49. The author of the travelogue is supposed to be C.A. Meyer (Ru. K. Meier), who traveled Altai and the Kazakh Steppe in 1826. See also fig. 11.

162 Ust' Kamenogorsk customs to chief of Siberian customs district, 7.9.1830, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 197.

empire. The Qing side referred to the commander of the caravan as an *aqalaqchi* (originating from a Mongol word). This system of caravans being headed by *aqalaqchi* could also only have been formed because of the guarantees of the Kazakh sultans.¹⁶³

3.3 *The Pillaging and Protection of Caravans*

The Kazakhs not only played an enabling intermediary role but were at the same time the greatest obstacle faced by caravans travelling from Western Siberia to Xinjiang. This is due to the fact that the caravans had to pass through Kazakh pasturelands where caravans – including those of other Kazakhs – were frequently attacked and pillaged.¹⁶⁴

Such incidences of attacks and pillaging were brought to the attention of Russian authorities when victims complained of their losses. For instance, a Tashkenti who was also a Russian subject reported that his caravan was attacked by Kazakhs on the way from Xinjiang. He added the following request for protection in his report: “I plan to visit Ili [again]. I beg you to order the [Russian] officers to accompany [us] at that time with 50–60 Cossacks for the safety of the caravan.”¹⁶⁵

As previously noted, Russian authorities were obliged to assign a guard of Cossacks to protect caravans. Apart from providing Cossacks, Russia also requested the Kazakhs to cease pillaging caravans through political channels. A Russian official, Bubennov, travelling from Semipalatinsk to Aqsu in 1813, reported that on the way to Xinjiang, he conveyed an order from the Governor-General to Kazakh sultans, *bis*, and elders “not to pillage or persecute the trading merchants.” Moreover, he continued, “even if some stupid action occurs, it is to be treated strictly according to the Russian law.” Adil, sultan of the Great Juz, responded to this request, and his *tolengit* (servant) accompanied Bubennov on his journey.¹⁶⁶ Bronevskii, later the provincial chief of Omsk, explained Russian policy as follows: “If the Russian government values the Asiatic trade, it will have to make the greatest effort possible to attract the sultans of the Middle Juz.” He further pointed out (mentioning the names of Sart,

163 Aldabek shows that the *aqalaqchi* who headed caravans received letters from Kazakh sultans. This figure appeared in the information compiled in 1830, see Aldabek, *Rossīia i Kitai*: 47.

164 *Barimta* is known as a method of solving conflict between the clans, see V. Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe: the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian colonialism in the nineteenth century* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001): 140–155.

165 Petition of the Russian subject Tashkenti elder, Mirkurban Niazov to the Governor-General Glazenap, 6.13.1817, IAOO: f. 6, op. 1, d. 18, l. 44.

166 Report from interpreter Bubennov to Glazenap, 1814, IAOO: f. 6, op. 1, d. 19a, l. 6.

the grandson of Abulfeiz, and Siuk, the son of Ablai) that “caravans travel through Bukhara, Tashkent, Khoqand – as well as towns of the Qing such as Ili and Tarbagatai – under the protection (*zashchita*) [of these sultans].”¹⁶⁷ This shows how Russia expected to receive the protection of the sultans, whom they regarded as subjects of Russia. The earlier-mentioned “passport” issued by Russian authorities was based on this type of expectation. In addition, the intermediation of the Kazakhs also functioned as a guarantee for the safety of caravans.

After the establishment of the 1822 Regulation, many Kazakhs even began to show an inclination to voluntarily protect the caravans, at least if they were pro-Russian sultans. According to a petition to a Russian general by Kazakh sultans of the Middle Juz,

You wrote in your letter, “You shall protect (*esän-sav ötkäzsünlär*) the merchants who go through [Kazakhs] pasturelands from Russia to Kashgar and Khoqand. ... You shall not commit any crimes or harm [them] (*zorliq va zombuliq qilmasunlar*).”¹⁶⁸

In this way, the sultans confirmed the content of the letter they had received from the general and promised not to attack Russian caravans, declaring, “[as subjects to Russia] we, with all of the Naimans under us, will not do any harm to, nor collect tolls (*alim*) from these merchants.” Almost simultaneously, Siuk, sultan of the Great Juz, also held similar communications with the General.¹⁶⁹ It is therefore apparent that, as Russian influence increased, it became customary for the Russians to request the cooperation of sultans within the Kazakh Steppe. Russia’s expectations were so obvious that an imperial letter from Nikolai I to the sultan Tursun Chingisov in 1827 mentioned that Kazakhs under the control of Tursun had protected a Russian caravan travelling between Bukhara and Tashkent.¹⁷⁰

The amount and types of merchandise as well as the routes of caravans moving between Western Siberia and Xinjiang were mentioned within the petition made in response to the attacks by Kazakhs.¹⁷¹ Khoqandi merchants

167 G.M. Bronevskii, “Zapiski o Kirgiz-kaisakakh Srednei ordy,” *Otechestvennye zapiski*, ch. 41–43 (1830): 233.

168 Letter from Shangqai sultan of the Middle Juz and others to Kaptsevich, no later than 10.28.1825 (in Turkic), VPR 14: 289–290.

169 Letter from Siuk to Kaptsevich, 8.30.1825, VPR 14: 253.

170 Imperial rescript of Nikolai I to Tursun, agha-sultan of the Karkarali District, 4.4.1827, VPR 15: 67.

171 See Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia”: 158.

whose caravans had been pillaged complained to the Russian local authorities because they considered the Kazakhs to be Russian subjects. The Russian Siberian customs district ordered each customs post to investigate cases where Kazakhs who were registered at the District offices were accused of being participating in such raids.¹⁷² According to N. Konshin, if the accused presented himself, stolen goods were sometimes returned to the original owner.¹⁷³

In 1835, a Muslim merchant (not a Russian subject) reported that formerly, when travelling from Semipalatinsk to Ili and Tarbagatai, they could count on Russian protection, while at present frequent attacks had led to a great stagnation of trade. In particular, he complained that he had “been victimized by self-centered sultans who didn’t regard themselves as subject to either of the empires.”¹⁷⁴ There was a complaint, too, about collecting tolls (*alym* in Russian texts) from the Asian merchants who were not Russian subjects and were only passing through the pasturelands. This was a problem that arose from the Kazakh sultans taking advantage of the 1822 Regulation.¹⁷⁵ According to the understanding of these Tashkenti and Bukharan merchants, attacks by Kazakhs were the biggest obstacle to the Russo-Qing trade through Central Asia, and resolving this issue should have been a major priority in Russian policy towards the Kazakh Steppe.

As for the trade between the Kazakhs and the Qing, Saguchi has stated that the “governmental trade” continued steadily until the 1850s.¹⁷⁶ However, from my analysis, we can conclude that there would have been various forms of

172 Chief of the Siberian customs district to Semipalatinsk customs, 3.28.1836, TsGA RK: f. 478, op.2, d. 75, ll. 42–43.

173 N. Konshin, “Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: I. Otkrytie Aiaguzskogo okruga; II. Karakirgizskaia deputatsiia 1824 g.,” *Pamiatnaia knizhka Semipalatinskoi oblasti na 1900*, vyp. IV (Semipalatinsk, 1900): 48–51.

174 Concretely, the names of followings were presented: Erasill(a), Nurasill(a), and Ab(d)-ulfaiz Samaev from the Quzai clan, Beksanzhin Abulfaizov from the Semis-naiman clan, Osman Dzhenaevev from the Tuma clan, Sivankul (Sibanqul) Khan-khozhin from the Murun clan, and Turap Siukov from the Bajjigit clan.

175 Chief of Semipalatinsk customs to Chief of Siberian customs district, 8.21.1835, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 74, ll. 33–36ob (Emphasis added). A caravan of Tashkentis was requested to give presents as a toll on the way from Ili to Russia at the lands of Janbubek sultan of the Murun clan, see report from Starkov, Cossack cavalry (*sotnik*) to colonel (*polkovnik*) Rusanovich, 9.24.1810, TsGA RK, f. 345, op. 2, d. 158, l. 74. Until the end of Kenesari’s revolts in 1840s, there were payments to sultans, but such cases are not found after that, see Nebol’sin, “Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei”: 65. According to the 192–193 articles of the 1822 Regulation, it was possible to collect the toll only from such merchants as conducted trade with Kazakhs at their pasturelands.

176 T. Saguchi, “Kokusai shōgyō no tenkai”: 171.

business dealings including the relaying of trade by the Kazakhs between Russia and the Qing, trade accomplished through Kazakh intermediation, and, finally, private trade that was not mentioned in the statistics. It was true that the turnover of this region was lower than that of Kyakhta, but my emphasis is on the fact that the flow of merchandise and people could connect the two empires on the western border between Russia and the Qing, as well as result in changes in the structure of trade as discussed below. Needless to say, the Kazakhs also played a central role in the negative aspects of trade in this region, such as demanding tolls and pillaging caravans.

4 Changes in the Structure of Trade

4.1 *The Rise of Khoqandi Merchants and the Decline of the Role of the Kazakhs*

At this point, we need to examine the “Khoqandi merchants” that have been mentioned several times above. The Khoqandi role in trade between Russia and the Qing grew even as the intermediary role of the Kazakhs declined, particularly after 1822. In earlier times, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Siberian and Central Asian trade was connected by the “Bukharan” merchants.¹⁷⁷ However, from the second half of the eighteenth century, Khoqandi merchants (from Ferghana and sometimes Tashkent) also became an influential trade power¹⁷⁸ due to the establishment of the Khoqandi regime, which consisted mainly of the Uzbek Ming clan.

The Khoqandi freely traded with Eastern Turkestan (later, Xinjiang) during the reign of the Jungar,¹⁷⁹ and they also played a role in trade with the towns along the Irtysh river.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, after the collapse of the Jungar regime, they continued to connect Xinjiang and Western Siberia, a fact which can be contrasted with the intermediation of Kazakhs. For instance, beside Bukharans

¹⁷⁷ Ziiaev, *Ekonomicheskie svyazi Srednei Azii s Sibir'iu*: 147

¹⁷⁸ In the Turkic documents, for example, the Khoqandis were described as *Taşkäntlik* (on the document in 1845) or *Qoqandlik*, see IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1961, l. 412; TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 38, ll. 41–41ob. (petition on robbery from Khoqandis to chief of Siberian customs district in 1830).

¹⁷⁹ Secret instruction from the Foreign ministry to the chief of Christian missionary at Beijing, 2.6.1830, VPR 16: 462.

¹⁸⁰ Ziiaev, *Ekonomicheskie svyazi Srednei Azii s Sibir'iu*: 148. Although Ziiaev emphasized the role of Khoqandi merchants through minute analyses on the trade in the Irtysh line and Central Asia, room exists for discussion on his work – in particular regarding whether Tashkent was simply a market for Russian merchandise.

and Kashgari, Tashkenti also visited Semipalatinsk during the second half of the eighteenth century bringing various silk fabrics, tea, rhubarb, *kitaika* (Nanjing cotton¹⁸¹), and *yuanbao* silver.¹⁸² The presence of Tashkenti, who traded between Qing territory and Ust' Kamenogorsk¹⁸³ is known. As previously mentioned, "Andijanis" (*Anjiyan*) conveyed merchandise in the opposite direction from Russia to Xinjiang.

In 1811, the Khanate of Khoqand conquered Tashkent. This development led to confusion in international trade for a time. As a result, caravans from Khoqand and Tashkent ceased coming to Petropavlovsk and total trade turnover accordingly decreased.¹⁸⁴ By taking Tashkent, the Khoqand Khanate was able to secure the route to Orenburg and Siberia, which was a significant turning point in the development of trade. The subsequent activity of Khoqandi merchants, especially with the Qing, has been thoroughly analyzed by Toru Saguchi.¹⁸⁵

During the same period, Russia sought to improve its relations with the Khoqand Khanate.¹⁸⁶ In response, the Khoqand government dispatched a mission to Russia to request the opening of the route through Petropavlovsk and as well as economic privileges for those Khoqandi living in Petropavlovsk, Omsk, and Semipalatinsk.¹⁸⁷ As seen earlier in this chapter, foreign Muslim

181 For *kitaika*, which was famous in seventeenth century's Siberia, see Burton, *The Bukharans*: 368.

182 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 87

183 Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie priirtysh'ia* 337

184 Glazenap to Financial minister, Guriev, no later than 3.8.1812, VPR 6: 310.

185 See T. Saguchi, "The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 26 (1965): 47–114. However, his discussion is focused on the cases related to the south part of Xinjiang (Kashgaria). Newby also discussed the trade relations between Khoqand and Qing, clarifying the profits of Khoqand, Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 142. For the goods transported between Khoqand and Kashgar, see Nebol'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei": 172.

186 A document from Guriev, Financial minister to Rumiantsev, Foreign minister dated 1.12.1811 mentioned: "Governor-General Glazenap dispatched a son of the sultan of the Middle Juz Kazakh to the ruler of Khoqand, inviting him to enter commercial relations with Russia. The ruler accepted the invitation and desired that his delegation be allowed to visit the Russian court to restore the trade relations with Russia," see VPR 6: 16–17.

187 The envoy of Khoqand submitted the letter to Rumiantsev in Dec. 1811. Rumiantsev affirmatively regarded that the direct trade with Khoqand had brought about more profit than that through Bukhara conducted previously, VPR 6: 726. In return the envoy received the edict (dated 1.27.1812) of Alexander I to 'Umar Khan of Khoqand, which confirmed the Khoqand's "agreement about opening the trade relations between the two states," VPR 6: 271. Bukhari mentioned the Russo-Khoqand negotiations in Petropavlovsk, see 'Abd

merchants, including Khoqandi, were living in the towns of the Siberian fortified line, and some of them had even become Russian subjects. Remarkably enough, the *Khoqand* government requested the Qing to establish the *qādi beg* post at Kashgar, the main town of southern Xinjiang.¹⁸⁸ The *qādi beg* was requested by ‘Umar khan of the Khoqand (r. 1810–1822) in 1813 for the purpose of protecting and controlling Khoqandi merchants in Xinjiang as well as in Western Siberian frontiers. Thus, we can observe the Khoqand behaving in a similar fashion with both empires simultaneously, a point I will discuss later.

Regarding the economic activity of Central Asian merchants based on extra-regional trade, let us examine the following case. Mirniyazov was a Bukharan merchant, who moved between the Russian inner towns (from Irbit through Semipalatinsk to Tarbagatai) to exchange the products of Irbit for the Qing tea, silk, and cotton fabrics. He returned to Bukhara, then travelled again through Semipalatinsk to Irbit to sell the tea and *daba* (cotton fabric) to Kazan Tatars located there.¹⁸⁹ In this way, Central Asian merchants, including Khoqandis, moved freely between the Russian Empire, Central Asia, and Xinjiang under the Qing’s rule

Attention should be paid to the Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang of the 1820s. As is well known, a series of rebellions led by members of the Kashgar Khojas was supported by the Khoqand Khanate and resulted in the trading activities of the Khoqandi in Xinjiang being restricted. The most significant effect on trade was that Khoqandi merchants were expelled from Xinjiang province¹⁹⁰ in spite of having already lived for several years in provincial towns like Kashgar, Aqsu, and Yarkand. In northern Xinjiang (the main focus of this chapter), 1,466 Khoqandi were expelled from Ili in 1829.¹⁹¹ These events were also recorded in Russian documents, one of which mentioned that, “due to the strife between the Qing and the people of Central Asia, the Asians have come rely on the

al-Karīm Buḥārī, *Afjān va Kābul va Buḥārā va Hīvaq va Hōqand ḥānlarniing...* (Paris: École des Langues Orientales Vivantes, 1876): 102. See also Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia.” Nakamura recently analyzed the negotiations on trade between Russia and the Khoqand Khanate, see T. Nakamura, “19 seiki kōhan kōkando=hankoku no kenro shi-seitsu to roshia no chūōajia seisaku,” *Ajia shigaku ronshū* 5 (2012): 1–18.

188 Saguchi, “The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate”: 96–97. See also Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 69.

189 Report by Mirniyazov to Semipalatinsk District office, 1.25.1836, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17976, l. 55.

190 Saguchi, “The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate”: 83; Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 136–137.

191 DG9/2/1 (*yiyi*), memorial of Deingga (Ch. *Deyinga*), the Military governor at Ili and other, *Pingding huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe*, vol. 78: 2–3. See also Saguchi, “The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate”: 85.

Russian boundary (*predel*) for [selling] their merchandise.”¹⁹² This shows how Russia knew about the confusion in trade caused by the rebellion as well as the consequent dependence by Khoqandi merchants upon the Russian peripheral towns.

The confused commercial situation in Xinjiang caused by the Khojas attracted Russian interest. The Russian government, after receiving news about the revolt in Xinjiang, decided to collect further information and encourage the khan of Khoqand by explaining the benefits of trade in Siberia for Khoqandi subjects.¹⁹³ Fortunately for Russia, the Khoqand Khanate sent a mission to Russia at the same time. Russian Foreign minister Nessel'rode stated, “our government will make efforts to protect Khoqandi in the step of the Kazakhs who have been long-time Russian subjects and live a nomadic life between the Caspian Sea and China.” This statement recognized and confirmed the statement made in an earlier letter to Russia from the Khoqand khan Madali (r. 1822–41), which proposed the “continuation of correlative and *commercial relations*” between Russia and Khoqand.¹⁹⁴ In short, he demonstrated a clear intent to secure trade by Khoqandi merchants. This attitude was also reflected in an imperial edict to the khan of Khoqand.¹⁹⁵

First, we will discuss the activities of Khoqandi merchants in the northern regions of Xinjiang. After the expulsion of Khoqandi merchants, the Qing policy forbid any Khoqandi to stay in the area.¹⁹⁶ According to a Russian record of 1832, while Russians could enter Ili or Tarbagatai, “Tashkenti [were] strictly prohibited” from doing so.¹⁹⁷ A Russian merchant who entered these two towns in “Asiatic cloths” reported that the Qing gave better treatment to Russians than to Muslim merchants.¹⁹⁸ Within northern Xinjiang, the *aqsaqal* system which had been set up under the influence of Khoqand in the south was not established (see below), and Khoqandi merchants came under stricter

192 Department of foreign trade to the chief of Siberian customs district, 3.30.1827, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 1, l. 5. The same content is included in a secret instruction on the same date from Department of foreign trade to the Bukhtarma customs, see TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 5. According to the document cited by Valikhanov (report from Kaptsevich to Nessel'rode, 3.17.1827), Russia paid attention to the Khoqandi merchants' coming to Petropavlovsk, see Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, “Chernovoi material o vosstanii v Kashgare v 1825 g.,” in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 2 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 322.

193 Proceedings of the Asiatic Committee, 5.5.1827, VPR 15: 105.

194 Emphasis added. Nessel'rode to the Khoqandi envoys, n.d., IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 756, l. 61.

195 Nikolai I to Madali khan, 2.5.1829, VPR 16: 91.

196 A memorial of 1829, *Pingding huijiang jiaoqin niyi fanglüe*, vol. 78: 3.

197 Report from a Bukharan to troops at Akmola, 5.20.1832, KRO 2: 261.

198 Report to Financial minister, 8.14.1832, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 48, ll. 93–93ob.

Qing control after the Muslim rebellion. This resulted in an increase in power for Muslim merchants who were Russian subjects, and also led to further gains in power within Xinjiang for Russia itself.

Needless to say, the development of diplomatic relations between Russia and Khoqand was followed closely by the Qing. When a Khoqandi mission reached Russia in 1831, Russia, considering its relationship with the Qing, gave instructions to tell the Qing government through Irkutsk that “[Russia] didn’t accept the mission from Khoqand.”¹⁹⁹ Later, the Qing Empire sent a letter to the Russian Senate requesting them to reject the mission by the Khoqand Khanate which invaded the Qing border.²⁰⁰

The situation in southern Xinjiang was quite different from that in the north. As we know, the Qing Empire was unable to defend itself against the invasion from Khoqand, and, in the end, signed a “treaty” with Khoqand in 1832 (a process that has been well described by Pan Zhiping).²⁰¹ It is worth noting that Khoqand requested the establishment of the post of *shangtou* or *hudaïda*,²⁰² the chief of commerce, in Kashgar.²⁰³ According to the Khoqandi

199 Report from Nessel’rode to Nikolai I, 5.30.1831, VPR 17: 360. For this Khoqand mission, see also Valikhanov, “O kokandskom posol’stve”: 308–311.

200 *Lifanyuan* to Russian Senate, 10.20.1831, GES 2: 345.

201 See Pan Zhiping, *Haohan guo yu xiyu zhengzhi* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006): 157–171. He defined this as *yihe*, peace negotiations. Newby regarded it as an “agreement, see Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 193–195. While Fletcher considered that the treaty was concluded later in 1835, recent research differs, see Fletcher, “Sino-Russian relations, 1800–62”: 378. According to analysis by Hamada on a document from Khoqand to the Qing (DG24/10/29), at least the Khoqand side regarded this event as conclusion of the “peace treaty,” see M. Hamada, “Pekin dai’ichi rekishi tōankan shozō kōkando kankei monjo kyū shu,” *Seinan Ajia kenkyū* 68 (2008): 93. Newby also analyzed the same document (Chinese translation), Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 213.

202 As for the etymology of this word, in addition to the previous discussion (Saguchi, “The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate”: 87; J. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” *The Cambridge History of China* (J.K. Fairbank ed.), vol. 10, part 1 (Cambridge, 1978): 84; Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 65; Hamada, “Pekin dai’ichi rekishi tōankan shozō kōkando kankei monjo kyū shu”), I have also covered the topic before, Noda, “Russo-Chinese Trade through Central Asia”: 171. A Chinese document tells “*Shangtou* is called as *hudaïda* by the Muslim language (*huiyu*),” JJD: 406002873 (XF2 (1853)/12/20, memorial of Deling). Thus, there is still the possibility for a Persian origin, but it is more likely that this word comes from Manchu. The following work concludes the Manchu origin, see T. Onuma et al., “Kokuritsu kokyū hakubutsuin shozō 1848nen kōkando monjo saikō,” *Tōhoku gakuin daigaku ronshū: Rekishi to bunka*, 49 (2013): 1–24.

203 The Chinese translation of the request reads, “As for the foreign Muslims entering [the Qing territory] out of the *karun*, we ask to establishment of *shangtou* and control of them through it,” see Pan, *Haohan guo yu xiyu zhengzhi*: 162. Other memorials also contain the

document, it was a request for the “control” (*fuqarālik*) of Muslim merchants who travelled back and forth to Xinjiang. This post was called “*aqsaqal*” in the Turkic language. A Kazakh scholar, Valikhanov, mentioned that the Khoqand Khanate “established the *aksakal* by concluding the treaty.”²⁰⁴ A Tatar imam, Qurbān ‘alī, also mentioned that “due to the rebellion of khojas in Kashgar, the khan of Ferghana [Khoqand] established an official capacity known by the title of *āqsaqāl*.”²⁰⁵ Previous research has highlighted this request from the Khoqand side as being of special significance. Here, however, I would prefer to focus on the fact that the request was made to the Qing more-or-less in the same way as the Khanate was required to protect the Khoqandi merchants in Western Siberia.

To give some background, Khoqandi communities had formed in towns of the Irtysh fortified line. For example, there was a community of Tashkenti and Khoqandi in Semipalatinsk, about whom it was commented in 1834 that they had conducted trade for forty years and had married locally. Since they, not being Russian subjects, were free from taxation, they were sometimes expelled by the local authorities.²⁰⁶ As for the *aqsaqal* in Semipalatinsk, Qurbān ‘alī states the following:

There was a conference (*maṣlahat*) to discuss whether Khoqandi subjects in Russian territory could also set up the *aqsaqal*. The *yarliq* [edict] on the *aqsaqal* position was first issued from the [Khoqand] khan side to

request by the Khoqand Khan regarding “establishment of *shangtōu*.” For example, DG12/2/22, memorial of Changling and others, *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian: Daoguang chaojuan*: 105. On the other hand, in the original (Chagatai-Turkic), the wording of request is different: “may you give [us] the right of control toward those who entered out of the karun” (*qarāvulnūy tašiden kirgān ḥalq ādamīlarnūy fuqarālikini ... bersājiz*), Pan, *Haohan guo yu xiayu zhengzhi*: 169. See also Hamada, “Pekin dai’ichi rekishi tōankan shozō kōkando kankei monjo kyū shu”: 93.

204 Ch.Ch. Valikhanov, “O sostoianii Altyshara ili shesti vostochnykh gorodov Kitaiskoi provintsii Nan-Lu (Maloi Bukharii) v 1858–1859 godakh,” in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Alma-Ata: Glav. red. Kazakhskoi sob. Entsiklopedii, 1985): 147 and 185–186.

205 THS: 100 and 366. See also A.J. Frank & M.A. Usmanov eds., *Materials for the Islamic History of Semipalatinsk: two manuscripts by Ahmad-Walī al-Qazānī and Qurbān’alī Khālīdī* (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 2001): 7. Such descriptions show that the establishment of *aqsaqal* was popular among the local Muslims.

206 Report to Department of foreign trade, 1.18.1834, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 178–178ob. This document refers to the issue of “Asiatic” merchants living in Petropavlovsk and Semipalatinsk.

Mirqurbanbai,²⁰⁷ the son of Muminbai in Semipalatinsk. The Russian side agreed with it.²⁰⁸

This event, described in historical materials that were compiled later, is related to a note from a Khoqand envoy to the Russian authorities.²⁰⁹ According to this note, although the Khoqandi subjects (*fuqarālarimīz*) in Semipalatinsk had not previously been tried by their own [legal] customs (*öz šariʿatlarimīz buyinča*), judgment in their own way now became possible due to the favor (*marḥamatlar*) of the Russians. This indicates that the position of *aqsaqal*, which controlled the Khoqandi merchants abroad, had been established. The term “fuqarā” seems to correspond to the “*fuqarālik*” of the Kashgar case discussed earlier. In Petropavlovsk, the Khoqand khan “appointed Kenjatai Baijanov as *aqsaqal* with the *yarliq* from 1821. This was subsequently approved by the Governor of Western Siberia.”²¹⁰ In short, the policies of Khoqand for Western Siberia and for Xinjiang had a common aim.

In this way, during the opportunity offered by the confused state of affairs in Xinjiang during the 1820s and 1830s, the trading sphere of the Khoqand Khanate widened to take over the trade connecting southern Xinjiang, Central Asia, and Western Siberia.²¹¹ The characteristic of the Khoqand’s policy was to set up the *aqsaqal* position in order to control the local communities and connect Western Siberia and southern Xinjiang in a way very different from the connecting role of the Kazakhs. In the north, however, due to Qing restrictions, the influence of Khoqand trade seems to have decreased. Thus, “Russian merchants” could find the room there for engaging in commerce.

4.2 *The Confused Situation on the Kazakh Steppe*

Next, the fate of the Kazakhs who had played an intermediary role in trade in this region should be considered. Remarkably, as the border between Russia and Qing became clear (see chapter 7), relations between the Qing and Kazakhs declined. Furthermore, the establishment of Russian administrative

207 He was dispatched to Russia in 1831. The following literature indicates his career as a diplomat based on such historical sources of the Khoqand Khanate like *Muntaḥab al-Tavārīḥ* and *Taʾrīḥ-i ʿĀlimqul-i Amīr-i laškar*, see Nakamura, “19 seiki kōhan kōkando=hankoku no kenro shisetsu to roshia no chūōajia seisaku”: 8.

208 THS: 366.

209 To Omsk provincial chief, De-sent-Loran, 4.28.1829, 1AOO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 756, l. 83 (document in Chagatai-Turkic).

210 Ziiaev, *Ekonomicheskie sviazi Srednei Azii s Sibiriu*: 118.

211 Further trade between Khoqand and Qing was researched in detail by Newby, see Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*: 214 and after.

Districts in the north and the offensive pressure of Khoqand in the south also affected Kazakh trade. In fact, Russia began to interfere in the Kazakh involvement in international trade. As mentioned before, Russia compelled the Kazakh sultans to protect caravans, and tried to restrict the movement of Kazakhs.²¹² As a result, the pillaging of caravans by Kazakhs was halted.²¹³

The famous revolt by Kenesari Kasimov from 1837 to 1847 brought about the biggest confusion, especially within the pasturelands of the Middle and Great Juz. It was inevitable that this revolt would have an influence on the trade by Kazakhs as, in the words of N. Balkashin, "it greatly influenced the trading activities between Western Siberia and Central Asia."²¹⁴ A Tatar merchant, Abdulbali, who visited Tarbagatai from Troitsk in 1845, mentioned that he did not consider going to Xinjiang until 1844 because the rebel army was robbing caravans.²¹⁵ Statistical materials show that imports and exports between Russia and "Kazakhstan" (including the western part of the Kazakh Steppe) decreased significantly during the period of 1833 to 1840. Instead, trade with other Central Asian khanates increased and exports to the Kazakhs increased again in the 1840s.²¹⁶

The Kazakh-Qing trade did continue. Liubimov, who entered northern Xinjiang in 1845, reported that Kazakhs still sold their livestock there.²¹⁷ Few sources exist on the extent to which Kazakhs brought livestock to Xinjiang in the nineteenth century. All that is known is a regulation setting the quantity of *huibu* (Muslim cloths) at almost 99,000 bolts.²¹⁸ This limit seems to have been in effect until at least 1849.²¹⁹ When we consider the cases of unofficial trade,

212 Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan -Kitai*: 65

213 Kasymbaev, *Goroda vostochnogo Kazakhstana v 1861–1917 gg.*: 32

214 N. Balkashin, "Torgovye dvizhenie mezhdz Zapadnoi Sibir'iu, Srednei Azieiu i Kitaiskimi vladeniiami," in V.P. Zinov'ev et al. ed., *Sibir' i Tsentral'naia Aziia: problemy regional'nykh svyazei*, vyp. 1 (Tomsk: Tomskii gos. Universitet, 1999): 25. He worked as an official in the head administrative office of Western Siberia (GUZS).

215 Abdul-Bali Abdul-Vagapov, "Rasskaz troitskogo 2-i gil'dii kuptsa": 372.

216 Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke*: 192 and 309.

217 Liubimov, "[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]": 303.

218 In addition to Muslim cloths, 740 bolts of silk fabrics were collected from Inner China, see *Yijiang jizai*, in *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian shiliao huiji*: 111.

219 Lin & Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi*: 445–450. According to the memorial document, 49,112 bolts of Muslim cloths and 10,000 bolts of cotton from Yarkand, 11,110 bolts of Muslim cloths from Kashgar, 38,832 bolts of Muslim cloths and 5,000 bolts of cotton from Khotan were collected to Ili in DG29, see imperially endorsed on XF1/2/11, memorial by Deling and Buyantai, NGDK: 169046. For silk shipments within Kazakh trade, see Millward, *Beyond the Pass*: 47.

actual turnover would be much more than what was regulated. Added to this, there was intermediate or transit trading by Khoqandi merchants. Finally, at the time of Liubimov, it became the norm for merchants with Russian subject status to conduct trade in Xinjiang.

One noteworthy reason for the rise of “Russian” merchants was that Kazakhs living near the Qing border began to submit to the Russian Empire. According to Liubimov’s account, while members of the Baijigit clan of the Kazakh had been regarded as pillagers in the past, two influential sultans of this clan, Sabek and Dulanbai, “showed an inclination to become subjects of Russia” during Liubimov’s time. Consequently, he reported that it was not as difficult to assure safety on the way to Xinjiang.²²⁰ These circumstances would also increase the possibility of trade in Xinjiang for the Russian Empire.

4.3 *Russia’s Goals*

The prospect that Russia would take over the commerce with Qing through Xinjiang was established among the authorities of Western Siberia as early as 1832, when the chief of the Siberian customs district commented that “Russia will gradually come to gain control over trade with the Qing which is currently being conducted by Asians, including nomads.”²²¹

The Russian central government began discussing the possibility of trade between Western Siberia and Xinjiang in 1842.²²² This reminds us that Rozhkova highlighted the development of Russian trade with Xinjiang through Semipalatinsk in the 1840s.²²³ To give a concrete example, a Russian merchant named Grigorii Zakharov, whom Liubimov accompanied to Xinjiang, bought tea at Tarbagatai as early as 1838 and 1839, and was so famous as the *aqalaqchi* leading the caravans that he was addressed at a *karun* by the nickname of “Gurgur.”²²⁴ That is to say, Liubimov’s visit to Xinjiang makes it clear that Russians were entering Qing territory openly.²²⁵ His report mentioned that the

220 Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul’dzhu v 1845*: 448

221 Report to Financial minister, 8.14.1832, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 48, l. 940b.

222 Shcheglov, *Khronologicheskii perechen’ vazhneishikh dannnykh iz istorii Sibiri*: 319–320. As the following document indicates, the expansion of England into the Qing including Xinjiang was noticed within the Russian authority, see report of Siberian customs district to director of Department of foreign trade, 1.14.1846, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 157, l. 17.

223 Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel’sstva na Srednem Vostoke*: 336.

224 Liubimov, “[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]”: 286 and 294.

225 According to the information in a note by Liubimov, a Councilor at Ili told, “it is Andijanis, not Russians, who are allowed to trade in Tarbagatai. So, let [Russian merchants] come to [the Qing] wearing Asiatic clothing.” See Liubimov, “[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]”: 289.

import of tea to Russia had become large-scale since 1839, and that caravans of "Russian" merchants became a regular occurrence by 1845. Such caravans came to Ili once in June and to Tarbagatai all summer.²²⁶ A Tatar merchant who entered Tarbagatai in the same year said, "I am both a subject of the Russian emperor and an ally of the Qing emperor," when he passed the Igrima *karun*. The same attitude was found at his meeting with the local councilor. He reported that he was allowed to trade since he was from Russia, which was an ally of the Qing.²²⁷ Consequently, restriction of the trade with Russia to Kyakhta, which the Qing Empire had previously insisted upon, had become meaningless by this time.

The tea traded in Xinjiang was produced in Fujian, and conveyed by merchants from the Shanxi region. One of them was an informant of Liubimov, *Dzhan-Dzhanguida*.²²⁸ Just as the Russian merchants began to visit Xinjiang regularly, the inner Chinese merchants were permitted to trade there, although they had been prohibited from doing so before.

Therefore, the time was ripe for direct dealings in Xinjiang between Russia and the Qing. Behind the Russian affirmative policy on trade, we have to consider the presence of English products in Kashgar,²²⁹ and the influence of England on the Central Asian markets as well.²³⁰ Lastly, in 1851, direct trading in Xinjiang by Russian merchants was officially recognized, a development which was closely related to political factors like the Russian invasion of the Kazakh Steppe. This relationship will be examined in the next chapter.

226 Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul'dzhu v 1845*: 314 and 326

227 Abdul-Bali Abdul-Vagapov, "Rasskaz troitskogo 2-i gil'dii kuptsa": 382

228 Liubimov, "[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova, 1845 goda]": 294 and 291. As for Shanxi merchants and their participation in the Russo-Qing trade in Kyakhta, see Shiotani, *Roshia mengyō hatten no keiki*: 156–161. The Chinese term *zhangguide* refers to a head clerk. Liubimov's report seems to have been used in the following research, Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke*: 337; A.N. Khokhlov, "Vneshniaia torgovlia Kitaia s 90-kh godov XVIII v. do 40-kh godov XIX v.," *Gosudarstvo i obshchestvo v Kitae* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978): 102.

229 Veselovskii, *Poezdka N.I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul'dzhu v 1845*: 343.

230 Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke*: 340. English products entered Bukhara after 1842 via Iran and Kandahar, see Nebol'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei": 216.

Conclusion

This chapter, which focuses on Russo-Qing trade with a special emphasis on the role of the Kazakhs, made clear the system that enabled the movements of caravans between Russia and the Qing through Xinjiang – movement which had been prohibited since the latter half of the eighteenth century.

Initially, because they had diplomatic relations with the Qing Empire, only Kazakhs and Khoqand were allowed to trade in Xinjiang. The two powers could act as intermediaries in the trade between Xinjiang and Western Siberia, and, in addition, could conduct transit trade themselves. Focusing on the role of the Kazakhs, in addition to the intermediation by the sultans, they participated in trade by way of pillage or the collection of tolls. Merchants from Western Siberia who illegally dispatched their caravans to Xinjiang, regardless of whether they were Muslim or non-Muslim, required the intermediation of Kazakhs in order to be secure on the way to and entering Xinjiang.

Second, in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the annexation of Tashkent, the power of the Khoqand Khanate was enhanced. This change suited Russian expectations in terms of commerce. Consequently, Khoqandi merchants, making use of the revolts in Xinjiang, expanded their trading activities, which connected southern Xinjiang, Central Asia, and Western Siberia. On the other hand, they began to lose their influence in trade in northern Xinjiang, and, instead, merchants from Russia tried to conduct direct trade there. For this, the Russian Empire had to bring Kazakh sultans within its territory; in other words, make them imperial subjects. Russia's purposes were realized with the establishment of the Russo-Qing commercial treaty of 1851 that will be discussed in the next chapter. By means of this treaty, trade by merchants from Russia in Ili and Tarbagatai was, at last, officially recognized.

Such changes in the structure of trade between Western Siberia and Xinjiang were intimately connected with the political changes in the region. The decline of the Kazakhs in commerce can only be explained by a combination of various factors like Russian expansion, the rise in power of Khoqand, and the confusion on the Kazakh Steppe. Importantly, Russia's expansion into the Kazakh Steppe, which concluded with the annexation of the steppe by the empire, was undertaken for the purpose of developing and controlling trade with the Qing as well.

It was the border of the Russian Empire that came to divide the two regions of Western Siberia and Xinjiang that were economically linked by the Kazakhs, Khoqandi merchants, and Russian Muslim merchants. In the eastern Kazakh region, one of the main focuses of this book, the Russian border became the

border with the Qing. Therefore, the next chapter will examine the establishment of the Russo-Qing border and the reaction of the Kazakhs to this event.²³¹

²³¹ Fletcher said that “the entire Russo-Sinkiang trade was, of course, officially in violation of Ch’ing law and the Kiakhta treaty. But Russia’s control of the Kazakhs had become so strong by the 1830s that the façade of a Ch’ing-Kazakh trade monopoly could no longer conceal the fact of Han Chinese-Russian commerce,” Fletcher, “Sino-Russian relations, 1800–62”: 329. However, the discussion contained in this chapter, as well as that of chapter 7, shows that the Russian-Qing trade in Xinjiang became open later than Fletcher had mentioned. Moreover, I consider it necessary to take into account the change in the hegemony of Khoqandis.

The Transformation of the Russian-Qing Relationship and the Dissolution of the ‘Kazakh Khanates’

Introduction

As described in chapter 3, with both empires laying claim to their subjection, the Kazakhs occupied an extremely vague position within Russian-Qing relations. However, as was shown in chapter 2, Russia sought to incorporate the Kazakhs and gradually transformed the borders of areas under its jurisdiction into national boundaries – which in turn became its border with the Qing Dynasty. This chapter will consider how both empires attempted to treat the Kazakhs, located between them, as these borders gradually solidified. Attention will also be paid to the ways in which the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans (members of the khan aristocracy) were able to continue acting within the Russia-Qing sphere following the abolition of the khan title by Russia. This analysis will serve to illustrate the process of division affecting the nomadic lands of the Kazakh Middle and Great Juz in the area near the Russian-Qing border. It will also show how the dismantling of the ‘Kazakh Khanates’ resulted in the loss of their eastern relations with the Qing.

1 Frontier Rule by the Two Empires: The Western Siberian Governor-General and the Ili Military Governor

1.1 *Russia's Western Siberian Governor-Generalship*

In order to understand Russian and Qing policies regarding the Kazakhs, it is necessary to first consider how each empire ruled its frontier areas. Regarding the Russian Empire, the sequence of events leading to the establishment of the Western Siberian Governor-Generalship and its administrative role has already been detailed in section three of chapter 2 above. How the new system of jurisdiction which was introduced into the pasturelands of the Middle Juz lead to the formation of new borders was also touched on at that time. For this reason, the emphasis here will be placed on Russia's military actions.

The defense of Western Siberia can be grasped most quickly by examining the fortified lines established in the early eighteenth century. The commercial

relationship between the Kazakhs and the cities on the Irtysh fortified line¹ (Omsk, Semipalatinsk, Ust' Kamenogorsk, etc.) was described in chapter 6. Districts within the Kazakh Steppe were later established by the regulations of 1822, but Russia's real purpose in creating areas of jurisdiction in the outer Districts of its borderlands (*pogranichnye vneshnie okruqa*)² was to facilitate the extension of the Siberian fortified lines even further south.³ Throughout this process, the Russians were conscious, not only of policy formation regarding the Kazakhs, but also of the boundary shared by the Qing with the Middle and Great Juz.

The two main components of the Russian military force deployed in Siberia were the Cossack Army of the Siberian Line (*Sibirskoe lineinoe kazach'e voisko*), which was formed in 1808, and the Siberian Independent Corps, which was formed in 1816. The Cossack Army was led by the commander of the Independent Corps (in other words, the Siberian Governor-General, and later, the Western Siberian Governor-General) and, once the position of Cossack Army commander came to be held by the chief of Omsk province, was eventually subsumed into the Independent Corps. Cossack troops were also stationed at the various District offices.⁴ Army units (*voennyi otriad*) were also sent to Kokpekti whose official District was established later than that of other areas.⁵

The military organization of the Siberian forces followed a hierarchical pattern similar to that of the administrative organizations already in place. While some evolution occurred, the basic structure as it existed until the 1850s can be grasped from fig. 15.

1.2 *The Establishment of Xinjiang and Ili Military Governor*⁶

Having destroyed both the Jungar regime and Amursana's band of rebels, which can be considered the last surviving Jungar power, the Qing Dynasty advanced into the Tarim basin and subjugated Kashgaria in 1759. These newly acquired lands of Jungaria and Kashgaria were combined into a new territory (named Xinjiang) and special administrative and military organizations were

1 Fortresses (*krepost'*) and posts (*forpost*) developed into the fortified cities.

2 The other category was the near-line district (*blizlineinye okruqa*).

3 See the 1822 Regulation, article no. 316.

4 Troops of 300 people were stationed at Karkarali and Kokchetau, M.K. Kozybaev et al. eds., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei v piati tomakh*, t. 3 (Almaty: Atamūra, 2000): 308.

5 Niukhalov, the Cossack lieutenant, was appointed chief.

6 Khafizova describes this as the viceroyship (*namestnichestvo*) of the Qing Empire, K.Sh. Khafizova, *Kitaiskaia diplomatiia v Tsentral'noi Azii (XIV – XIX vv.)* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1995): 115.




FIGURE 15 *Military units in Western Siberia*

created. The whole of Xinjiang was supervised (from 1762 (QL27)) by the so-called *Yili jiangjun* (Military Governor at Ili)⁷, who was stationed in the *Huiyuan-cheng* castle of Ili (or Kulja), the former capital of the Jungar. It is clear from later official definitions indicating that one duty of the Governor was to “control the outer vassalages” that Ili came to be the focal point of the Qing’s multi-ethnic rule within Xinjiang.⁸ Compared to the Russian governor-generalship which was located in Tobol’sk (a relatively interior region), Ili was close to the pasturelands of the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz. For this reason it can be considered to have fulfilled a role as the Qing’s advanced guard.⁹

Serving under the Ili Military Governor were the Councilor (*canzan dachen*) of Kashgar, who controlled the southern area of Xinjiang (Kashgaria), and the Councilors of Ili and Tarbagatai, who held jurisdiction over the northern area (Jungaria). The Kazakhs were dealt with by the various government officials and offices of the northern area and the *Niru* (Ch. *zuoling*, the company within the eight-banners system) of the Kazakhs was also incorporated into this orga-

7 *Zongtong yili deng chu jiangjun* in Chinese.

8 *Xinjiang Zhilüe*, vol. 5.

9 It also served as a defense against Russia, Guan Shouxin, *Qingdai xinjiang junfu zhidu yanjiu* (Urumqi: Xinjiang daxue chubanshe, 2002): 97. Edict of the Emperor Qianlong to Agui (QL32/10/25), a letter appointing the Governor, states that “Ili is in fact the pivot of Xinjiang, and its Governor (*jiangjun*) supervises the defense of all directions. Here, I appoint [Agui] as a Governor of Ili and other places (*zongguan yili dengchu jiangjun*),” NGDK: 080370. Manchu and Mongol bannermen, especially Mongol bannermen after the end of the Qianlong’s reign, were appointed as Ili Governors. See N. Murakami, “Kenryū 52 nen niokeru mōko kijin no iri shōgun ninyō no haikai: kenryū kōhan no hanbu tōchi niokeru kijin kanryō no jinji nikansuru ichikōsatsu,” *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 11 (2009): 55–85.

nization.¹⁰ Furthermore, the fortress of Tarbagatai was established in Uljar (within the modern day Republic of Kazakhstan) in the year 1764 (QL29) and was moved to a site in modern Tacheng in 1766 (QL31). The Qing Dynasty's rule of Xinjiang was characterized by a plural yet indirect rule, but, with regards to the northern areas, the Qing sent units from the Manchu bannermen and other minority populations from the northeast to settle the lands vacated following the collapse of the Jungar. The Qing also gave pasturelands to the Torghut and instituted the *Jasaǵ* system.¹¹

Upon examining affairs directly related to the Kazakhs, it becomes apparent that Kazakhs who crossed the *karun* (guard posts) line without permission were apprehended and an examination was conducted by an official known as the *Lishi tongzhi* through the *Yingwu-chu* (see fig. 16). This official was also responsible for inspecting articles of trade carried by the Kazakhs.¹² Within the apparatus of the Military Governor's Headquarters, patrols of the Kazakh periphery (pasturelands) and the sending of units each autumn to collect a tax paid in horses were undertaken by a department known as the *Yinfang*.¹³ Such units (usually comprising 300 troops) were mixed forces composed of Manchu as well as members of the Sibe (Ch. *Xibo*), Solon, Chahar, Oyirad populations.¹⁴

The march undertaken by these forces, known as the border patrol (Ch. *xunbian*), began in 1761 (QL26) and took the troops through the areas of the Chu and Talas Rivers and other areas west of Tarbagatai.¹⁵ The duties of the Ili Military Governor's Headquarters most related to the themes of this book were, first, the defense of the borders (through patrols as well as the *karun*

10 T. Onuma, "Lun qingdai weiyi de hasake niulu zhi bianshe ji qi yiyi," in Zhu Chengru ed. *Qingshi lunji: Qingzhu Wang Zhonghan jiaoshou jiushi huadan xueshu lunwenji* (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2003): 568–575. See also T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2014): 203. The Kazakhs who were organized into *Niru* units were called "inner subjects," *Qinding Daqing huidian*. JQ23 (1818), vol. 52: 33.

11 K. Kataoka, *Shinchō shinkyō tōchi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1991): 73.

12 *Yili wendang huichao* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 2004): 76–77.

13 *Yili wendang huichao*: 321.

14 *Yili wendang huichao*: 345. Russian documents also mentioned that the Qing troops which visited the Kazakh Steppe consisted of 300 people. For the garrison banners in Ili, see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 118–139.

15 Li Sheng, *Zhong'e yili jiaoshe* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1995): 11–12. See also T. Onuma, "19 seiki zenhan "seihoku henkyō" ni okeru shinchō no ryōiki to sono shūshuku," *Nairiku ajiashi kenkyū* 16 (2001): 61–76; Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 245–253.




FIGURE 16 Military and administrative units in Xinjiang¹⁶

which will be described next), second, the conducting of matters related to the traveling to Beijing for the imperial audience (*rujin*),¹⁷ and, finally, liaison duties such as the conducting of trade and diplomatic negotiations with foreign populations.

It is well known how the Qing constructed a defensive line consisting of *karun* guard posts to counter Russia's above-mentioned defense of the border with fortified lines. Regarding Ili, Qurbān 'alī wrote that "in response to the establishment of these two eastern towns [Ili and Tarbagatai], Russia came from the west and built the fortresses at Petropavlovsk and Semipalatinsk."¹⁸ This statement can be interpreted as awareness that the Qing *karun* line and the Russian fortified lines served a counteracting role towards one another. In fact, from their use of the words *karaul*, *piket*, or *redut* (meaning a small fortress, guardroom, or sentinel post) to refer to the Qing *karun*, it seems that the Russians understood the purpose of the Qing line to be the same as that of their own fortified lines.

Russia was also aware from an early stage that high Qing officials resided at Ili. Furthermore, they knew that Qing councilors were in Tarbagatai and

16 This is based on the figure in Guan Shouxin, *Qingdai xinjiang junfu zhidu yanjiu*: between 60 and 61.

17 A Russian source mentioned that Wali khan dispatched his son to Ili in 1800 in order to request permission for the tributary mission. The Military Governor at Ili replied that it would be impossible to give permission without instructions from the central government. This case serves as an example of how the Military Governor controlled missions seeking imperial audience; see I.G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1998): 227.

18 THS: 290. Nevertheless, in reality, Russian fortresses were constructed earlier than Qing guard posts.

Khobdo and that patrol troops were sent to Kazakh lands.¹⁹ A report from 1765, for example, notes that “a great many Qing troops, under the command of the Governor [*zhanzhun batyr*], are located along the Ili River.”²⁰

On the other hand, although negotiations²¹ (as described in chapter 3) were conducted with Russian soldiers of the Siberian fortified lines at an early stage, it is difficult to appraise the level of Qing awareness regarding Russian activities because of the Qing’s subsequent refusal to acknowledge the existence of Russian Districts within the Kazakh Steppe or to make mention of them in public documents.²² However, Khobdo was located within the western region of Outer Mongolia, which fell under the supervision of the Left Pacifier of the Frontier at Uliystai. This area was near the Russian border and had influence over a part of the Kazakhs. The patrols of the councilor at Khobdo frequently came into contact with the Russian military and negotiations were held between the two governments regarding crossings of the border by Kazakhs. These negotiations will also be considered below, but the difference in Qing policy in these areas compared with that of areas south of Tarbagatai has not been sufficiently examined and requires further attention in the future.

Considered from the point of view of civil administration systems, it can be said that the Torghut and other nomadic people of the northern areas of Xinjiang were governed using the *Jasaǵ* and *Niru* systems, while settled Turkic populations of the south were governed using the *Beg* system.²³ Such rule within Xinjiang, when considered within the entire Qing framework, can be seen as one aspect of the Lifanyuan’s control of the periphery areas and should therefore be interpreted in line with the situations in Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, and Tibet.

Attention should be drawn to the way in which the Qing perceived the Kazakhs within this framework of Xinjiang rule. As described in chapter 5, the Qing bestowed titles on Kazakh sultans. The *Jasaǵ* system (mentioned above and implemented within the northern areas) consisted of bestowing the titles of *wang* or *gong* on the Borjigid clan²⁴ but leaving the details of land manage-

19 J. Noda, “Roshin no hazama no kazafu hân koku: Surutan to shinchô no kankei o chûshin ni,” *Tôyô gaku* 87 (2) (2005): 36.

20 Report of Traunberg at the Yamyshev fort in 1765, AVPRI: f. 122/2, d. 14, l. 2340b.

21 In negotiations, Qing officials called Russian officials by the name of their posts such as *maior*, *kapitan*.

22 Qing patrols simply reported that there was nothing wrong in the Kazakhs’ pasturelands near Ili even in DG27 (1847). See DG27/9/29, memorial of Saingga, NGDK: 127049.

23 Kataoka, *Shinchô shinkyô tôchi kenkyû*: 60.

24 See H. Oka, “The Mongols and the Qing Dynasty: The North Asian Feature of Qing Rule over Mongolia,” in T. Yoshida & H. Oka eds., *Facets of Transformation of the Northeast Asian Countries* (Sendai: Center of Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University, 1998): 135.

ment and governance to them. The Kazakhs, however, were not included within this system. An edict regarding the conflict between Russian-citizen merchants and the Kazakhs that took place in 1808 (mentioned in chapter 2) compares the Kazakhs to the Torghut (among whom the *Jasaĭ* system was implemented) and states the following:

All of the pasturelands belonging to the clans of the Torghut are located within the *karun* and daily business is conducted peacefully. The conflict between Russia and the Kazakhs is carried out far from the *karun* line and no comparison can be made with the geographical position of the Torghut.²⁵

Fighting over trade is common among the outer barbarians [*waiyi*]. The imperial court should not become involved.²⁶

At this point in time, the Qing fully considered the Kazakhs to be a different race existing outside the empire – neither the bestowal of titles nor the collection of taxes by patrol²⁷ were indicative of an attempt to bring the Kazakhs into the empire.

The eventual effects of such Qing thought will be further examined in the next section, but first it will be helpful to outline the development of Qing thought regarding the Kazakhs during the previous Qianlong period. This should be considered in connection with the multi-lateral Qing ruling structure about which a large body of research has accumulated within Japan. What follows will be based partly on this body of work. As Takashi Okamoto recently demonstrated,²⁸ it is necessary to draw a distinction between the descriptions of the Kazakhs to be found in Chinese texts and those found within Manchu texts. In general, the Kazakhs were clearly categorized as being subject to the

25 JQ18/6/18 (*xinchou*), edict, RZSL vol. 270.

26 JQ18/6/26 (*gengshen*), edict, RZSL vol. 270. Later reference strictly distinguished the two groups, while the Kazakhs were previously regarded as “the Great ruler’s subjects (*Amba ejen i albatu*)” along with the Torghut, see QL38/10/29, edict to Iletu, QMJD vol. 10, no. 1726.

27 It was called *alim* in Turkic. One percent of livestock was collected from Kazakhs who entered the Qing territory in winter. This tax in line with that paid by the Kirghiz and Khoqand who came to the Inner territory of Xinjiang for trade and were also required to pay the tax (*alban*, in the text), see QL32/3/15, edict to Agui, QMJD vol. 7, no. 1041.

28 T. Okamoto, “Chūgoku ni okeru ‘ryōdo’ gainen no keisei,” in T. Okamoto ed., *Sōshuken no sekaishi: Tōzai ajia no kindai to honyaku gainen* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2015): 295–296. See also his “Qing China’s Foreign Relations and Their Modern Transformation,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 70 (1) (2012): 1–21.

Qing Empire. As mentioned at the end of chapter 3, descriptions within the *Xiyu Tuzhi* categorize the Kazakhs and other Central Asian powers as “vassals” (*fanshu*). Notably, this would seem to indicate that the defining emphasis was the type of relationship each power held with the Qing rather than on location alone. It should also be noted that Chinese texts always exhibit the Sino-centric logic, or *Hua-Yi* distinction, and this can occasionally be confusing when applied to the case of the Kazakhs.

For example, going back to the time of Ablai’s sending of a mission in 1757 (QL22), we have seen how the Emperor Qianlong originally regarded the Kazakhs as his direct “subjects” (*albatu*). In one Chinese text, this was described as the Kazakhs having come under the influence of the emperor’s “virtuous example” (*shengjiao*) in the same manner as the Annam and Ryukyu peoples.²⁹ Kazakh tributes, however, were not dealt with by the *Libu*, but by the *Laiyuan qingli si* of the *Lifanyuan*.³⁰ The “*Collected Statutes of the Qing (Qinding daqing huidian)*,” edited during the time of Qianlong, contains instructions to “refer to the clause about the *Lifanyuan* regarding matters related to the northwestern tributes,” yet, regarding the treatment of the Kazakhs, it seems that while such tributes were recognized, they came to be dealt with by the *Lifanyuan* for geographical reasons.³¹

Therefore, while Annam and others were categorized as ‘*shuguo*’, the Kazakhs must be recognized as distinct. Here, we can make use of another categorization known as ‘*wai fan*’ (outer feudatories). The term *wai fan* is basically synonymous with the word *fan bu* and is thought to have been used to designate non-Chinese areas that were nonetheless considered to be under the rule of the empire in some form. Such areas included Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (including Hami, Turfan, and the southern sedentary

29 QL22/7/17 (*dingmo*), edict, PDZFL (Ch.) *zhengbian*, vol. 41: 26. The Manchu version of the edict states in somewhat different terms “to treat them [the Kazakh] as subjects in the same manner as the Annam, Ryukyu, and Siam (... *esebe An nan, Liu kiu, Siyan mu i jergi gurun i adali, harangga obume ...*),” PDZFL (Ma.) *zhengbian*, vol. 41: 49b. Onuma had already pointed out that Qing official documents such as imperial edicts in Chinese should not refer to the ‘*ejen-albatu*’ relations of Mongol origin, see T. Onuma, “Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the ‘*ejen-albatu* Relationship’ in Central Asia,” in J. Noda & T. Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo: Dep. of Islamic Area Studies, University of Tokyo, 2010): 86–125.

30 Kataoka, *Shinchō shinkō tōchi kenkyū*: 32.

31 *Qinding daqing huidian* (Qianlong ed.), vol. 56.

Muslims).³² However, as we have already seen, once a relationship began to develop during the middle of the eighteenth century between the Qing and the Kazakhs (and other powers of Central Asia), the concept of “outer feudatory” came to be applied to these groups as well. The reason for this seems to be that, from the time of Qianlong to the early years of the Daoguang’s reign, the term ‘outer feudatory’ (*waifan*) was used to express a subjection-based relationship with the Qing, including that of the Kazakhs.³³ In terms of official definitions, the *Collected Statutes of the Qing* categorizes the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Andijan (Ch. *Anjiyan*) as “tribute-paying outer feudatories.”³⁴ Judging from regulations regarding the New Year’s court festival banquet (*chaohe*),³⁵ entitled Kazakh Chinggisid sultans were particularly high-ranking (next to the Mongol *wang-gong* princes).

Nevertheless, the categorization of the Kazakhs doesn’t perfectly correspond to ‘*waifan*’ or ‘*fanbu*.’ First of all, while *waifan* is usually expressed in Manchu as “*tulergi goro*,” the Kazakhs were not included within the category of “*tulergi goro*.”³⁶ Moreover, as can be seen from the fact that the word *fanbu* is not found within the edition of the *Collected Statutes of the Qing* compiled during the reign of the Emperor Qianlong, the idea itself must be the product of a later era.³⁷ One compilation that seems to have played a large role in the establishment of the *fanbu* principle is the *Huangchao Fanbu Yaolüe* of 1846

32 Some Chinese scholars pointed out that Kazakh affairs were not interfered in and no officials were appointed, which differs greatly from the case of the Muslims in Kashgaria who were categorized as *waifan*, see Qi Qingshun & Tian Weijiang, *Zhongguo lidai zhongyang wangchao zhili xinjiang zhengce yanjiu* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2004): 215. According to Oka’s discussion on *waifan*, “the adjective “outer”, indicating Mongols, was the counterpart of the “inner”, indicating the Manchu imperial family,” H. Oka, “The Mongols and the Qing Dynasty”: 136.

33 See K. Kataoka, “Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihan, chōkō koku no kankei,” *Komazawa shigaku* 52 (1998): 240–263. Such literature like *Yijiang huilan* also categorizes the Torghut, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz as *waifan*, *Yijiang huilan*, in *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian shiliao huiji* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1990): 81–82. See also L.J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: a political history of Qing relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860*. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005): 3; Chapter 5 of this book.

34 *Qinding daqing huidian* (QL ed.), vol. 80.

35 Kataoka, “Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihan, chōkō koku no kankei”: 242.

36 Interestingly, an imperial edict stated at the time of the death of Ablai that the Kazakhs couldn’t be compared with “inner *jasag* (*dorgi jasak*),” that is, Khalkha Mongols, Dorbets, and Torghut, see QL46/5 (leap month)/10, edict to Iletu, QMJD vol. 15, no. 2563. This means that the Qing’s policy clearly distinguished the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans from the *waifan* princes.

37 Kataoka, *Shinchō shinkyō tōchi kenkyū*: 35.

(DG26).³⁸ Within this volume as well, there is no clause relating to the Kazakhs. For such reasons, it would not be appropriate to consider the Kazakhs as having belonged to the *fanbu* category. As demonstrated by later attempts to hold onto territory during the Qing process of modernization, areas described by the term *fanbu* were those that both had a subjection-based relationship with the Qing and were located within territory to which Qing rule could actually be extended. The fact that the Kazakh Steppe was not considered to be within this area is unsurprising.³⁹

In fact, expressions used within eighteenth century Manchu memorials imply that the “groups” of Kazakhs were “*tulergi aiman*” (outer tribes),⁴⁰ even though this word was usually translated into Chinese as “*wai*fan.” Within this type of categorization, the emphasis is on the contrast with the inner territories of the empire (Ch. *neidi*, Ma. *dorgi ba*).⁴¹ One can also find imperial instructions indicating the difference between the inner and outer territories of the empire based on terms of administration.⁴²

Another important point is that the Kazakh pasturelands were not wholly located outside imperial territory. As we saw in chapter 4, following the subjugation of the Jungars, the Qing considered their own territory to extend as far as Balkhash Lake. As a result, not all of the Kazakhs, whose pasturelands included areas as far as the Caspian Sea, were located within the sphere of Qing spatial control. However, in terms of subjection-based relationships, the Kazakhs were considered to be definitely subject to the Qing. This was also influenced by the Qing *karun* system. Some of the Kazakhs were located

38 Lü Wenli, *Lishi shuxie yu fanbu zhengzhi: “Huangchao fanbu yaolüe” yanjiu* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2009).

39 See also T. Onuma, “Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century”: 117; Kataoka, “Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihān, chōkō koku no kankei”: 258.

40 Kazakhs were called as “*Enduringge ejen i tulergi aiman i albatu* (Divine Ruler's outer tribe subject),” see QL32 (1767), the memorial of Agui, Ili military governor, JMLZ: 2275–5/79–2222. See also J. Noda, “An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents,” in Noda & Onuma, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*: 131. Although the corresponding edict translated this phrase as *waiyi* (outer barbarian) in Chinese, this translation differs from the original. See GZSL vol.777 (QL32/1/18 (*guimo*), edict). For the same discussion, see Hua Li, “Jiaqing 4–5 nian hasake wangsei chengxi wenti yu qingting de duiying fangzhen,” in Gugong bowuyuan ed., *Gugong bowuyuan bashi huadan ji guoji qingshi xueshu yantaohui: lunwenji* (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2006): 190.

41 QL53/9/20, routine memorial (*tiben*) by Fucangga (*Fu Chang'an*), director of Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu*), NGDK: 55158.

42 QL54/3/26, edict to high-ranked officials in Xinjiang, QMJD vol. 21, no. 3712.

between the supposed 'border' (Ch. *jie*) of Qing territory and the *karun* defense line. This boundary zone was called "*kawai jienet*" by researchers such as Li Sheng and Onuma.⁴³ This location seems to be one cause for the vagueness of Kazakh relations with the Qing empire.

The crossing of the *karun* line by Kazakhs was frequently considered problematic by the Qing authorities and this seems to have also affected Qing perceptions of the Kazakhs. Much discussion on expelling the Kazakhs from the area within the *karun* lines can be found in historical documents.⁴⁴ However, it would have been extremely difficult to completely prohibit Kazakh crossings, and Qing policy came to accept temporary winter visits within the *karun* lines on condition that the nomads return west after the thaw. The Qing government even expected Kazakh sultans to send temporarily accommodated Kazakhs back to their original pasturelands⁴⁵.

Eventually, Qing conceptions of the Kazakhs evolved as follows: the term *waifan* gradually fell out of use and was replaced in Chinese documents by the term *waiyi* (outer barbarians).⁴⁶ As is well known, after the Jiaqing reign, Manchu documents also became less-used within the Qing court.

In addition to such concepts as *waifan* and *fanbu*, which should be considered official Qing designations, there were other words that express Qing

43 Li Sheng, "Qingdai xinjiang xunbian zhidu yanjiu," in Ma Dazheng & Wang Rong & Yang Lian eds. *Xiyu kaocha yu yanjiu* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994): 406–425; T. Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 199. I had also presented before the geographical location of Kazakh pasturelands within/out of Qing's territory, see Noda, "An Essay on the Titles of Kazakh Sultans in the Qing Archival Documents": 132; J. Noda, *Roshin teikoku to kazafu hankoku* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011): 233.

44 For the earliest example, see XMD vol. 46: 204 (QL25/7/8, memorial of Agui). See also Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 197. For the organization of a part of the Kazakhs into Niru units undertaken as a measure (*neifu* policy) to prevent Kazakh border crossings, see Onuma, "Lun qingdai weiyi de hasake niulu zhi bianshe ji qi yiyi."

45 QL50/12/2, edict to Khankhoja, QMJD vol. 18, no. 3884.

46 See the footnote no. 26 in this chapter. In *Qinding daqing huidian shili* compiled in JQ23 (1818), the word "*waiyi*" (frontier) was applied for mentioning the tributary of Kazakhs, *Qinding daqing huidian shili* (JQ ed.), vol. 747: 21. Thus, the difference between the category of Kazakhs and *waifan* in the narrow sense became more distinct. The *Qinding daqing huidian* edited during the Jiaqing reign doesn't mention the category of Kazakhs, merely stating that the Kazakhs were located out of the *karun*, see *Qinding daqing huidian* (JQ ed.), vol. 53: 18. For the change of the Qing's conception in the Qianlong era, see T. Onuma, "1770 nendai ni okeru shin-kazafu kankei: Tojiyuku shin no seihoku henkyō," *Toyoshi kenkyū* 69 (2) (2010).

awareness and image of such lands.⁴⁷ For this reason, the position of the Kazakhs has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Within the research of recent years, this position has been defined as “nominal tributary status⁴⁸” and “a nation on the fringes of the outer feudatories⁴⁹,” as well as by the term “nominal *fanbu*⁵⁰” which implies the characteristics of both *fanbu* and *shuguo* (subject country). At any rate, the trend is clearly to not simply refer to the Kazakhs as *waifan*.

In summary, the Kazakhs were geographically farther from Qing territory than such areas as Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, which can all be referred to as outer feudatories (*waifan*) in the strict sense. However, the Kazakhs can be included in a wider interpretation of “outer feudatories” as well as some sense of subjection, Kazakh tributes were recognized as having come from a vassal state (*fanshu*)⁵¹ that was loosely incorporated within the international order the Qing Dynasty sought to establish. The present author believes that one reason it is difficult to clearly define the status of the Kazakhs – as well as the Kirghiz – is that their nomadic lands were located both within and without territories claimed by the Qing.⁵² In addition, Kazakh ties to the Qing Dynasty gradually weakened. Takahiro Onuma has focused recent research on the Qing’s strengthening of their frontier rule during the 1770s. In particular, he defines the time that the Qing concept of “territorial principle” surpassed that of “personal principle” (both examples are Onuma’s own terminology) as the cessation in 1779 of its “submission (*neifu*)” policy which led to acceptance of nomadic travelling within the reaches of the *karun* line.⁵³ Onuma’s work

47 In *Xinjiang zhiliue* (1821), Kazakhs and Kirghiz were regarded as the Qing’s entourage (*pingfan*), see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 252. In terms of the type of trade, Kazakhs were categorized as “*hushi*” (see chapter 6).

48 T. Saguchi, *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1986): 434.

49 Kataoka, “Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihan, chōkō koku no kankei”: 256.

50 Zhang Yongjiang, *Qingdai fanbu yanjiu* (Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001): 155.

51 Cf. the categorization in *Xiyu tuzhi* presented in chapter 3.

52 As I indicated in the introduction, the Qing Empire regarded Lake Balkhash as being within its own territory. See also Map 10 and the footnote 43 of this chapter. It is remarkable that only a small minority of the Kazakhs were organized into *Niru* unit. It is also important that the Qing court highly valued relations with the ruling class (in the Kazakh case, Chinggisid sultans), see K. Sugiyama, *Daishin teikoku no keisei to hakkisei* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2015): 409–411.

53 T. Onuma, “1770 nendai ni okeru shin-kazafu kankei: Tojiyuku shin no seihoku henkyō”: 320 and 40 (English summary); Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 237–238. According to his explanation (p. 238), the Qing Empire put much emphasis on the territorial division by the *karun* lines. Nevertheless, I consider that, especially by the title bestowal system, the

should be interpreted as a clear disquisition on changes within Qing awareness during this period, but care must be taken to remember that the relationship between the Qing Dynasty and the Kazakhs lasted beyond this era. Furthermore, within later dealings with Russia, the Qing Dynasty was forced to clarify differences in 'jurisdiction over' the Kazakh pasturelands and the 'vassalage of' the Kazakhs.

The characteristics of foreign population governance exhibited by both empires that have been examined in this section are reflected not only within Russian and Qing frontier rule, but also within the responses made by each empire to Kazakh issues. For this reason, an understanding of this governance can help clarify the position the Kazakhs found themselves in during this period. In the next section, we will turn our attention to how changes within the Qing-Kazakh relationship led to instability within the Kazakh position and how this created complications regarding the treatment of the Kazakhs within the larger framework of Russian-Qing negotiations.

2 The Role of the Kazakh Steppe within Russian-Qing Relations

2.1 *Governmental Negotiations between Russia and the Qing Dynasty*

As we saw in chapter 3, even before the Kazakhs sent a mission to swear allegiance to the Qing, correspondence between Russia and the Qing regarding how to deal with the Jungars had begun from 1756. It was within this correspondence that the jurisdiction over the Kazakh pasturelands first became an issue due to Amursana, who called himself the head of the Jungars, taking refuge there. Russia insisted that the khan of the Small Juz had represented all of the Kazakhs when they swore allegiance to Russia and sent hostages. Therefore, it was Russia's position that Ablai and the others of the Middle Juz were also subject to Russia.⁵⁴ The Qing, on the other hand, confident that the Kazakhs were their own vassals, maintained to Russia that the basis of that relationship was not the sending of hostages or even the collection of taxes, but was instead "the bestowal of titles and the merciful giving of praise."⁵⁵ In addition, regard-

Qing's two parallel conceptions ('outer' in territory and 'inner', or close, from the viewpoint of subjection) regarding the Kazakhs continued to exist further in the Qing court. Thus, the following Russian factors must be carefully considered within research into changes within Qing-Kazakh relations.

54 JMLZ: 1677–012/48–1073 (2.17.1758). See also chapter 3, section three.

55 QL23/7/5 (7.30.1758), from *Lifanyuan* to Russian Senate, N.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomatičeskoe sobranie del mezhdru rossiiskim i kitaiskim gosudarstvami, s 1619 po 1792-i god (Kazan', 1882)*: 285.

ing the Kazakh-Russia connection, the Qing demonstrated awareness of the “double-dealing” nature of that relationship, but did nothing to actively interfere with it.⁵⁶

In the end, the vague nature of Kazakh subjection to both empires remained unchanged. However, it was clear that the Qing did consider such previously Jungar territories as the Ayaguz River and lands as far as the Balkhash Lake to have become Qing territory.⁵⁷ This further complicated matters because Kazakh nomadic lands were located within this area.

As we have seen so far, the Russians instituted the District system in western areas and the Qing managed their own fringe zones in the east through frontier patrols. Due to the close proximity of both activities, it was only inevitable that problems would eventually arise and necessitate negotiations between the two governments. Let us first examine the processes behind the two empires’ sharing of the border.

In 1805, the Russians seem to have interpreted the Kazakh-Qing border as follows. The nomadic lands of the Middle Juz were close to the Siberian fortified line so one stretch of the border extended from the Bukhtarma fortress along the Qing boundary (Ru. *granitsa*) as far as Tarbagatai. From there, the border extended west to Ili and the Borotala (*Bura-tala*) River. The Great Juz, located near the territories of Bukhara, Tashkent, and Khoqand, extended west from the Borotala (*Bura-tala*) River along the Qing boundary until the Balkhash Lake.⁵⁸ In other words, the Russians were always conscious of the fact that Qing territories lay just outside the Kazakh lands. Russian military reports from the period state that “the Bukhtarma fortress, the closest to the Qing border, is eighty *verst* [Russian unit of length] from the first of the Qing *karuns*.” The report also describes Kazakhs crossing into and traveling within Qing territory near the Zaisan Lake.⁵⁹ As Russia extended southward, the first contact between the two empires’ local garrisons took the form of trouble that occurred

56 T. Saguchi, *18–19 seiki higashi torukisutan shakai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 340. See also QL44 (1779)/11/1 (*xinsi*), edict, GZSL vol. 1094. The original version of the edict corresponds to the following, QL44/11/2, edict to Iletu, QMJD vol. 14, no. 2375. The edict in Manchu described the Kazakhs’ double-mind as “*juwedeme yabumbi*.” See also Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 239. As demonstrated in chapter 2, the Qing trusted the loyalty of the Kazakhs to some extent. However, when the Qing’s commander, Leshan, visited the pastureland of Ghubaidulla (chapter 5), he did report the Kazakhs’ double dealings with criticism, using the phrase: “*juwe ergide baita*,” see XMD vol. 245: 219.

57 Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov*: 59–60.

58 Lavrov to Golovkin, 8.25.1805, RKO XIX: 209.

59 Report of Pospelov, no later than Jan. 1805, RKO XIX: 859. 1 *verst* corresponds to about 1 kilometer.

within the Chinggistai *karun* (under the jurisdiction of Khobdo) when imperial guards (*shiwei*) were forced to deal with Russian citizens in 1798 (JQ3).⁶⁰ At the time of the incident of 1808 (JQ13) that has been touched on several times so far, the Qing as well reported that Russians were within seventy *li* of the summer *karun*, Qadasu (*Hadasu*) under the jurisdiction of Tarbagatai.⁶¹ It should be noted here that among the *karun* established by the Qing there were two types: the temporary summer *karun* and the permanent winter *karun*. The fact that the permanent winter *karun* were used as reference points during later demarcation of the border is well-known.⁶² However, at this point during the first half of the nineteenth century, it appears that neither the Russians nor the Qing had yet come to make any distinction between the two types of *karun* with reference to border issues.

Due to the short distances involved, and probably in relation to the incident of JQ13 mentioned above, the Russians were aware that the Qing had increased the number of troops stationed at the various *karun* in order to prevent Kazakhs from crossing the border and causing problems.⁶³

Regarding jurisdiction over the *karun*, it should be mentioned here that the *karun* dealt with in this book all fell under the control of either the Khobdo Councilor, the Tarbagatai Councilor, or the Ili Military Governor.⁶⁴ The *karun* controlled by the Khobdo Councilor were all those east of the Qoni-mailaqu *karun* located at the mouth of the Bukhtarma River. Tianshan was divided into northern and southern regions (the north region being the area located south of the Qoi-mailaqu *karun*, north of Tianshan, west of Barqul, and east of the Issyk-kul Lake) and the Tarbagatai Councilor controlled the area extending from the Qoi-mailaqu *karun* (on the opposite shore of the Irtysh River from Qoni-mailaqu) to the Sibetu (*Xibotu*) *karun* located 100 *li* from Tarbagatai. The Tarbagatai Councilor also held authority over the area from Bakht (Baqtu) to Aru-chindalan. All other *karun* to the south or west were placed under control of the Ili Military Governor. Using those controlled by the Tarbagatai Councilor as an example, it appears that *karun* were established every seventy or eighty *li* and from ten to twenty soldiers were stationed at each location.⁶⁵

60 Meng Xianzhang ed., *Zhong-Su maoyishi ziliao* (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi chubanshe, 1991): 197.


61 Citation of the memorial of Military Governor at Ili, see *Qingdai waijiao shiliao*, vol. of Jiaqing chao (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968) vol. 4: 13.

62 K. Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi* (Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1974): 234.

63 Glazenap to Foreign minister, Rumiantsev, 6.27.1808, RKO XIX: 736.

64 Baoyinchaoketu, *Qingdai beibu bianjiang kalun yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2005): 66–127.

65 *Ta'erbahatai shiyi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969), vol. 3.



MAP 10 Northern borders between Russia and the Qing and karun around them (Some karun are indicated by "+").⁶⁶

It took some time for the contact between officials of each empire to develop into actual diplomatic negotiations between their governments. Two examples from the 1820s will be examined below. The first example of negotiations, which took place in 1825 (DG5), concerned the building of houses by Russians within pasturelands of the Kazakh Great Juz located within the Qaratal basin of the Balkhash water system. The entire episode began when a Kazakh sultan informed a Qing patrol of the Russian activities.⁶⁷ The houses themselves had been built by troops sent by the Russians following a request by Siuk sultan of the Great Juz for the establishment of a District.⁶⁸

The Qing initially responded by holding internal debates during which the topic of jurisdiction over the Kazakh pasturelands became an issue. Qingshang, the Military governor at Ili, quoted the text of the earlier memorials to make

66 Based on the map in "Sha'e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi" bianxiezhu ed., *Sha'e qinlüe zhongguo xibei bianjiang shi* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979): between 128 and 129.

67 J. Noda, "Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan: 1831 nen ayaguzu kanku kaisetsu made," in Y. Shinmen ed., *Chūōajia niokeru kyōzoku ishiki to isuramu nikansuru rekishiteki kenkyū* (Hachioji, 2002): 119–133. This Ablai sultan (also called Kulan) was paying the alim tax to the Qing according to the information collected by Russia, IKR1 6: 229.

68 For background, see VPR 14: 179 (no later than 5.23.1825, Bronevskii to Siuk sultan).

the case that the location of the Russian houses was within the “frontier border” – in other words, within Qing territory.⁶⁹

In the year QL22 (1757), following the subjugation of the Jungar by our great soldiers, our dynasty pursued the rebel Amursana until he reached the borders of the Kazakhs. The khan of the Kazakhs immediately called him a vassal, and surrendered [to us]. The Kazakh border is located several thousand *li* to the northwest of Ili and they are bordered on the north by Russia. The boundaries newly demarcated by our dynasty at that time describe an area roughly the same as that vacated by the Jungars. *Obo* [stones used to depict boundary lines] were erected regularly to serve as our divine dynasty’s frontier border in Ayaguz, Lepsi, and Qaratal. Even though the Kazakhs are our subjects, [Qing rule] only consists of the “loose reign” (*Jimi*) system and we didn’t acquire even the smallest portion of their land.

Qingshang goes on to justify the reality of Kazakh nomadic travelling within the Qaratal area (considered Qing territory) by quoting Agui’s memorial of QL32 (1767) which can be found within GZSL. All that can be gathered from the text of Agui’s memorial is that the Kazakhs were permitted to travel within the Qing side of the *karun* line during winter, and that a horse payment of one percent was collected for this privilege.⁷⁰ Qingshang’s quotation, however, is somewhat different. First, he maintains that “Kazakh travels were not allowed farther inward than the Ayaguz River, but, by the grace of the emperor

69 Attached memorial of the edict dated DG5/10/13, *Xinjiang longdui zouyi*: 286–287. This memorial is not included in *Qindai waijiao shiliao* compiled earlier. *Xinjiang longdui zouyi* consists of the memorials and other documents related to *Lishi tongzhi* at Ili during the reign of Daoguang. Among them, a memorial in DG29 which will be mentioned later includes the summary containing this memorial. For the earlier simple report by Qingshang on this event, see XMD vol. 246: 396–397 (DG5/9/24).

70 QL32/1/18 (*guimo*), edict, GZSL vol. 777, or QL32/3/15 (*jimao*), GZSL vol. 780. Agui informed Kazakhs (addressed to Abulfeiz) of this policy as follows: “after the snowfall in winter, we permit you [Kazakhs] to live for a while in the north side of the Tarbagatai Mountain. When our *karun* are set at the original place, according to the precedent, we shall drive you out of our border (*jecen*),” see QL32/4/13, memorial of Agui, JMLZ: 2275–5/79–2212–2215 (XMD vol. 83: 317–324). In this memorial, Agui mentioned “*jecen i dolo nukutenjihe hasak*,” that is: “Kazakhs who traveled within the [Qing] border,” using the word ‘*jecen*’ as that means *karun* line. Such wording might lead to confusion on the concept of ‘border’ shown in the memorial of Qingshang. As is well-known, parts of *karun* were withdrawn to the east during the winter season.

Qianlong, lands including the Qaratal area were lent to the Kazakhs." Furthermore, it claimed that the Agui's memorial stated that a horse tax was demanded of the Kazakhs who travelled in the area beyond this *karun* line but still inside the Qing border. Whether Qingshang misunderstood the earlier text of the memorial or whether there were other, as yet undiscovered, memorials cannot be said determined at this time. It can, however, be said that during the 1820s this is the way earlier policies regarding the Kazakhs were understood in the Qing court.

Some Qing officials, like Sungyun (Ch. *Songyun*), the general of Uliyastai, were mindful of the Kazakh relationship to Russia,⁷¹ but more importance was given to such content of Qingshang's memorial as the idea that "the Qaratal area is in fact not Kazakh territory, but was conquered by the Qing Dynasty."⁷² On this basis, the Qaratal area and the Kazakhs were considered to be unrelated and the Qing instituted a policy of claiming that the Qaratal area was Qing territory when dealing with Russia. These ideas were sent to the Russian Senate by the *Lifanyuan* and negotiations developed between the two governments.⁷³

Russia sent a reply dated 10 May 1826.⁷⁴ Because there were no regulations regarding the Kazakhs within the Kyakhta treaty of 1728 (which formed the basis of Russian-Qing relations), Russia declared its opinion that the Kazakhs [in Qaratal] were independent, thereby refuting Qing claims. Russia did take pains to avoid a deterioration in its relationship with the Qing by evading responsibility with the statement that "a small number of our troops were sent last year to their pasturelands wholly in response to a petition by the Kazakh Great Juz for purposes of peaceful friendship."

Comparing the claims of both parties, it is clear that the Qing approached the issues of territorial control with a presupposition of Kazakh vassalage, while the Russians emphasized their denial of Kazakh subjection to the Qing. Having received the document from the Russian Senate mentioned above, the

71 DG5/10/10, *Xinjiang longdui zouyi*: 284. He also mentioned the Russian policy at the Ghubaidulla incident, see *Qingdai wajiao shiliao*, vol. of Daoguang chao (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968) vol. 2: 11–12.

72 *Xinjiang longdui zouyi*: 292.

73 For the draft version (10/7), XMD vol. 246: 415–418. For the last version (12/15), XMD vol. 247: 93–96. For instance, the latter omitted the phrase "*meni karun i tule uthai hasak i nuktehe ba*" put in the former.

74 The copy of the original plan of texts, 5.10.1826 (4/16), received on 6/13, RGVA: f. 846, op. 16, d. 884, ll. 1–3. For the translation produced by the Qing central government, see *Qingdai wajiao shiliao*, vol. of Daoguang chao vol. 2: 20–21. For a later version of the translation, see GES 2: 330–331.

Qing reacted strongly against the Russian statement that “the Kazakhs themselves desired the sending of Russian troops” and aggressively chastised the Kazakhs for repeatedly making reckless remarks.⁷⁵ Within a later memorial of the Military Governor at Ili, Deingga (Ch. *Deyinga*), it is stated⁷⁶ that the Kazakhs were cunning and that, although they were engaged in trade with the Andijanians, their words could not be trusted. The Qing authorities’ trust in the Kazakhs was already diminishing.

Seeking to maintain its relationship with the Qing, Russia removed the domiciles that had been built and the issue was largely downplayed. However, it should be noted that this first instance of conflict regarding border issues within the Kazakh Steppe did set a precedent for both nations when such troubles arose in the future.⁷⁷

The second example of negotiations between the Russians and the Qing concerned the issue of border crossings by the nomadic Kazakhs. In 1826, two hundred Kazakh families relocated from territory belonging to the Qing Dynasty into Russian lands, leading to a demand from the local Qing official for their deportation. The letter⁷⁸ which reached the Russian fortress at Bukhtarma from the northwestern fringe *karun* of Qoni-mailaqu focused on the fact that a part of the Kazakhs who paid taxes (*alban*) to the Qing emperor had relocated into the territory (*nutuǵ*) of the Russian emperor. According to Russia’s own investigations, these two hundred families had indeed been originally travelling nomadically within Qing territory and had paid taxes in Khobdo⁷⁹ (the city wherein resided the councilor with jurisdiction over the western area of Outer Mongolia). For these reasons, the Russians located the Kazakh families in question and initially gave instructions that they be deported to the Qing *karun*. However, at this time, Western Siberian Governor-General was unaware

75 DG6/6/13, edict to Canglin (Ch. *Changling*), *Qingdai wajiao shiliao*, vol. of Daoguang chao, vol. 2: 21–22.

76 DG6/10/15, JHLZ: 8045–10/593–3231.

77 Chen also analyzed this issue discussing the suzerainty of Qing over Kazakhs, while his analysis lacks the concept of the Russian side’s materials, Chen Weixin, *Qingdai duie wajiao liyi tizhi ji fanshu guishu jiaoshe 1644–1861* (Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2010): 344.

78 DG6 (1826)/5/13, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 449, l. 6. In Western Siberia at that time, there was no translator of the Manchu, so the negotiations between Russia and Qing were conducted in the Mongol language. In another case, a Mongol letter from the Qoni-mailaqu *karun* to the Bukhtarma fortress mentioned the Kazakhs belonging to Russia used the terminology “*qariyatu*” (to belong to), DG 12/5/20. IAOO: f.3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 323.

79 Instruction by Western Siberian Governor-General to the chief of Omsk province, 11.14.1826, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 449, l. 21.

of the content of the Senate's reply to the Qing dated 10 May 1826 that is mentioned above. In other words, he was unaware of the Russian government's position that "the Kazakh Steppe was independent and not subject to the Qing."⁸⁰ Upon receiving instructions from the Foreign minister, the local officials returned to insist that only negotiations conducted through Kyakhta were valid and refused to cooperate with the Qing at all by denying any knowledge of the location of Kazakhs that had crossed the border.

From the above examples, we can see that the local Russian officials in Western Siberia were initially willing to concede to Qing demands, but that, following the events related to example one, Russian policy began to change. In this way, Russia was shrewdly careful not to harm its relationship with the Qing during the 1820s – to the point that it refrained from strongly insisting on Kazakh subjection to the Russian Empire.

2.2 *Local Negotiations Related to the Establishment of Russian Districts*

Following the events described above, Russia continued to approach Qing territory. A new problem arose between the two empires when Russia attempted to establish the Ayaguz District and another district west of the Zaisan Lake in Kokpekti. A new round of negotiations was held at this time between such local officials and military personnel as those stationed at Xinjiang (Qing) and Western Siberia (Russia). Russian historical documents regarding these local negotiations do exist, but the documentation on the Qing side is poor. This probably reflects the fact that it was rare for negotiations taking place in local areas to be reported to the central Qing government.

The Ayaguz District was established on 9 Aug. 1826 with Sart sultan chosen to be the agha-sultan of the district. In effect, this was the establishment of a Russian district on territory claimed by the Qing as their own. I have partially written about the problems that arose at this time elsewhere,⁸¹ but will reexamine the issue here in combination with the problems related to the later establishment of the Kokpekti District.

Once again, the origins of the Kokpekti issue can be found in the building of domiciles in that area by the Russians. This project was undertaken in 1830 on

80 It is according to the later understanding by the Siberian committee, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, l. 53.

81 J. Noda, "Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan": 129–132. This paper considered the establishment of the Ayaguz District as the first step to make a Russian stronghold within Qing 'territory.' It also mentioned the conflict among Kazakh sultans for the post of Agha-sultan within the newly established Russian District.

orders of the Western Siberian Governor-General⁸² who was seeking to establish a District in Kokpekti. However, during frontier patrols in 1831, the commandant⁸³ of Tarbagatai discovered the buildings and troops on Qing territory in the Ayaguz and Kokpekti regions,⁸⁴ which led to negotiations between the Qing *galdai*⁸⁵ (a type of Qing official) and Nedorezov, the commander of the Cossack troops.

According to the report made by Nedorezov, the *galdai* asked about the reason for the presence of Russian troops in that area and also informed the Russians that Janbubek Khankhojin (Jankhoja), who had received the Qing title of *wang*, had complained about being expelled from his summer camp by the Russian military. In response, the Russians denied applying pressure to Jankhoja and countered that Russian troops had been moved “in order to restore peace to the *volost*’ of the Kazakhs who followed the Russian Emperor as well as to safeguard a peaceful life with no conflict to the Kazakhs who followed the government of the Qing Dynasty.”⁸⁶

During negotiations conducted by the official interpreter Kornirov in July of the same year, the Qing *galdai* in charge of the Bukon *karun* inquired whether the Russians intended to apply pressure to Jankhoja *wang*’s winter camp in the future. This inquiry was presumably made with the same intent as that of the Qing official mentioned above.⁸⁷ The Qing believed that “the region of the Kokpekti River basin belong[ed] to the Qing and must be considered the border of our nation.”⁸⁸ In addition, due to Jankhoja *wang*’s complaint regarding Russian pressure, the Qing made a request to Nedorezov that the Russians withdraw from the area of Kokpekti. Furthermore, it should be noted that

82 N. Konshin, “Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: VI.,” *Zapiski Semipalatinskogo Podotdela zapadno-sibirskogo otdela Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, vyp. 2 (Semipalatinsk, 1905): 3.

83 According to the Russian terminology, the commandant in Xinjiang was referred to as “*batyr-amban*.” For example, Borgos, who was appointed “*meyen-i amban*” (Ch. *lingdui dachen*), was referred to as a commandant of the Tarbagatai troops with the title of “*baturu*” when the treaty of Tarbagatai was concluded in 1864, P.E. Skachkov & V.S. Miasnikov eds., *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 1689–1916: ofitsial’nye dokumenty* (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi lit-ry, 1958): 46 and 49.

84 The Translator Kornirov to Gordeev, commander of Cossacks of Siberian fortified line, 5.30.1831, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, ll. 16–17.

85 It means the Manchu *gala-i da* (Ch. *yichang*).

86 For the negotiation of 5.30 when 6 *galdai* of the Qing came to the steppe, see copy of the report from Nedorezov to Niukhalov, 6.1.1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, ll. 135–136ob.

87 Niukhalov to De-sent-Loran, chief of Omsk province, 8.3.1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 178.

88 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, l. 190b.

Jankhoja was considered by Russian officials to be a sultan who “had not sworn allegiance to the Russian Emperor at the time of the establishment of the Ayaguz District and who had received the title of *wang* from the court of the Qing Dynasty.”⁸⁹

Nedorezov bought time by maintaining that he was unable to withdraw the troops from the area without orders from his superior officer. During this time the Western Siberian Governor-General inquired with the Siberian and Asiatic committees of the central government whether they should respond to these two Qing demands by yielding the territory as requested or by driving the Qing out by force. The deliberations outlined by both committees can be summed up in the following three points.⁹⁰

1. Regarding the necessity of establishing an Ayaguz District: In addition to the petition made by Sart himself, the defense of the area was an absolute necessity for Russia as well due to its location on the trade route with cities of the Qing Dynasty.
2. Regarding the position of Sart sultan: Although subject to Russia, Sart was simultaneously under the protection of the Qing government. This status was both a matter of convenience and related to his authority over commerce among the cities of Xinjiang. It was widely known within the Middle Juz that he had received the title of *gong*. While Russia had long turned a blind eye to this “dual-subjection” (*dvoedanstvo*), the Qing government seemed unaware of the situation.
3. Regarding the borders: Since 1825, the Qing had considered the Qaratal River to be the borderline (*pogranichnaia cherta*) between themselves and Russia,⁹¹ but they did not seem to consider the Ayaguz River to be a border. In addition, for its part, Russia had expressed its opinion that the area of Qaratal was not a part of Qing territory⁹² in 1826. Therefore, there must be some discrepancy in the understanding of the Lifanyuan – who had not responded and thus must be silently recognizing Russia's

89 Niukhalov to De-sent-Loran, 4.25.1832, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 745, l. 12.

90 Extract from the proceedings of Siberian and Asiatic Committees of 12.28.1831 and 1.14.1832, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, ll. 50–51.

91 TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, l. 50.

92 The Russian Senate stated to Lifanyuan that the Kazakhs were dependent on Russia as seen above. However, the Qing side understood this statement differently as follows: “the previously concluded treaty didn't discuss on which states [the Kazakhs] should belong to” (the Chinese translation of the statement of Russia), see *Qingdai wajiao shiliao*, vol. of Daoguang chao (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968) vol. 2: 20.

position – and the local officials who were currently demanding the removal of Russian troops.

The specific policies resulting from the above deliberations can be summarized in the following three points:

1. Official negotiations with the Qing government would not be entered into.
2. The troops in Kokpekti and Ayaguz would remain where they were without moving any closer to the Qing border.
3. Should the Qing attempt to forcefully remove the Russian forces, the local officers should avoid conflict while strongly insisting that they could not withdraw without official negotiations between the two governments.

Local negotiations continued following these internal policy decisions by the Russian government. In April 1832, the Qing *galdai* visited Niukhalov, the commander of the Cossack troops in Kokpekti under orders of the Ili councilor to “request the removal of Russian buildings.” Upon learning that the *galdai*’s visit was undertaken at the petition of Jankhoja, the Russian side maintained the following three points: first, that the party of Jankhoja had escaped from Russian control; second, that Niukhalov, leading the troops in turn, came to occupy the territory around Kokpekti in response to a petition made by Kazakhs under Russian protection; and, third, that it would be difficult for his troops to withdraw because they had already moved once during the previous year. By the time Russian government officials were subsequently sent to the *karun* on the Bukon River (in the east part of Kokpekti), the Qing attitude had softened to the point that they told the Russians that “Russian residency within the steppe will be recognized, but must be calm and peaceful. In addition, *Janbubek wang* (Jankhoja) should not be oppressed (*pritesnenie*).”⁹³

93 Niukhalov to chief of Omsk province, 4.30.1832, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 317. This kind of approval of the Qing authority regarding the Russian District is found in the document from Western Siberian Governor-General to Foreign Minister (11.1.1833), see IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, ll. 487–488. A Tashkenti informant mentioned in this document that “based on the peace alliance between the two empires, the Qing government won’t interfere with the stationing of Russian troops in the Kazakh Steppe if they are not concerned with Tarbagatai and Qing’s *karun*.” This implies that the above-mentioned policy really existed among the Qing officials.

Regarding the negotiations between Niukhalov and the Qing officials,⁹⁴ there is a passage within the THS titled “the account of Major Niukhalov (*mayur Nukuloḡning nuṭqi*)” that describes Niukhalov as behaving modestly during negotiations yet nonetheless insisting that the military was sent at the request of Central Asian merchants and refused to withdraw from the area.⁹⁵

It is known how the Qing Dynasty later used merchants to indirectly advise the Russians to withdraw. According to the report of a Tashkenti merchant who visited Tarbagatai, the Tarbagatai Councilor invited Tashkenti and Tatar merchants to a meeting and declared that “you are all Russian merchants. ... When you return [to Russia], you must tell the commander of the military to withdraw from the occupied lands before I [the Councilor] visit there next spring.”⁹⁶

On the Russian side, the Governor-General Vel’iaminov responded to these “threats” by reviewing the proceedings of the Siberian and Asiatic committees (9 Jan. 1832) and ordering an investigation into whether or not the Qing were amassing forces in Tarbagatai.⁹⁷ The Qing continued to demand withdrawal from the District and, when the Qing commandant conducted negotiations in 1833, he threatened that a disquieting situation would arise between the two nations should Qing demands not be met. However, Niukhalov, who developed a good relationship with the commandant during the negotiations, also reported that the commandant requested that Russia refuse to acknowledge the petition of Jankhoja – the original source of contention – so it is difficult to determine how serious the Qing were in their demands for withdrawal.⁹⁸

In the end, based on the deliberations of the Siberian and Asiatic committees described above, a new policy was decided within the Western Siberian Governor-Generalship to

94 According to the THS, an official was “*amban*.”

95 THS: 372–373. I found the translation of a related document delivered from Timofei (that is, Niukhalov) to *amban* of Tarbagatai (dated 8.21.1832). This document was written following the request of a Qing official who was unable to achieve the goal and rationalized himself with the statement of Niukhalov on his lacking the knowledge of where the Qing’s border was, see IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 338.

96 Niukhalov to chief of Omsk province, 12.20.1832, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 493. The same content is also found in the mentioning by a Tashkenti merchant who came from Tarbagatai to Kokpekti in 1832, Konshin, “Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: VI.”: 10.

97 1.16.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 415.

98 Niukhalov to chief of Omsk province, 9.5.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, ll. 490–492ob. The *amban*’s request for withdrawal is also found in the document from Ayaguz District to chief of Omsk province (9.26.1833), IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, ll. 531–532.

adamantly refuse to recognize Qing demands and, should they belligerently attempt to apply force, drive them back by force of arms.⁹⁹

This phrase is taken from instructions issued by the Commander of Siberian Independent Corps in 1833 and show how the Russians had ceased to make concessions to the Qing. Russian troops were not withdrawn and the Ayaguz District continued to exist as it was. Regarding Kokpekti as well, following the establishment of a Cossack village in 1836, a District was officially established in 1844 and the area came under direct Russian rule. Judging strictly from Russian sources, after these events, the Qing local officials confirmed that the peace treaty (the Kyakhta treaty) had been institutionalized between Russia and the Qing. In addition, the Qing recognized that the Russians were applying no pressure whatsoever to Qing frontier *karun* and eventually ceased coming to the Kokpekti area.¹⁰⁰

However, attention must be paid to the fact that the above content is only concerned with the northern (Tarbagatai border) area. It is necessary to make a distinction with the nomadic lands of the Great Juz around Semirech'e, which had become a problem since 1825. As mentioned above, this situation was further complicated by Russia's understanding that they had already expressed their interpretation that the Qaratal area was not Qing territory in the document from 1826.

Keeping this in mind, let us examine the problems related to a petition made by Siuk, a sultan of the Great Juz, that occurred around the year 1831. When Siuk re-petitioned in 1831 for the establishment of a District within the pasturelands of the Great Juz near the Qaratal River, the events of 1825 were referenced during the process of reporting this petition to the Governor-General. Specifically, the Russians remembered "dissatisfaction expressed by the Qing *Lifanyuan* when our inquiry commission stayed with this Juz in 1825."¹⁰¹

When the General Vel'iaminov made inquiries regarding this matter to the Foreign Minister Nessel'rode, he indicated anxiety over the potential for negative influences on Russian-Qing trade – specifically the suspension of transactions within Kyakhta. This anxiety was based on the General's awareness that "the Qing government considers the Qaratal and Aqsu rivers to flow within

99 Western Siberian Governor-General to chief of Omsk province, 11.1.1833, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, l. 121.

100 Niukhalov to chief of Omsk province, 7.15.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, ll. 485–486.

101 Chief of Omsk province to Western Siberian Governor-General, 3.4.1831, TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 543, l. 4.

Qing territory.”¹⁰² In response, Nessel’rode, judging that “the potential exists for a damaging of valuable Russian trade with the Qing [within Kyakhta],” gave instructions that some convenient excuse be found to deny Siuk’s petition.¹⁰³

During this period, Siuk sultan was also complaining to the Russians about attacks made by the Khoqand Khanate.¹⁰⁴ A work entitled *Relations between Kazakhs and Russia* (KRO), compiled during the Soviet era, makes mention of the sultan of the Great Juz seeking protection from Khoqand oppression, but contains no information regarding the conclusion of the matter.¹⁰⁵ A review of the actual instructions given by the Russian Foreign Minister shows that communications had already been related to the Qing government indicating that “Siuk was residing without the area of rule newly instituted among the Kazakhs,”¹⁰⁶ therefore care should be taken not to pursue additional maneuvers within the remote areas of the Kazakh Steppe and to avoid further negotiations with the *Lifanyuan* in Beijing. On the other hand, when referencing a visit (probably in 1832) by the Tarbagatai Councilor, the Foreign Minister Nessel’rode also urged that the resolutions reached by the Siberian and Asiatic committees during the end of 1831 and the beginning of 1832 be abided by.¹⁰⁷ A clear difference can here be seen between the policies regarding the northern (Tarbagatai) area and those regarding the southern area (from the Ayaguz River to the Ili River, or, in a narrow sense, Semirech’e).

Let us review what has become clear from the above discussion of Siuk sultan’s petition. Regarding Semirech’e to the south, Russia, fearing such a response from the Qing as that of 1825, came to be more careful regarding the Qing Dynasty in general. This can only be interpreted as an indication that the Russian Empire was continually conscious of the Qing presence – or in other words, the Kazakh-Qing relationship – on the other side of the Kazakhs Steppe. One reason that Russia took pains to maintain its relationship with the Qing

102 Vel’iaminov to Foreign minister Nessel’rode, 5.23.1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17677, ll. 20, 22ob.; KRO 2: 251.

103 9.18.1831, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17677, ll. 31–32; VPR 17: 483.

104 To chief of Omsk province, 7.5.1832, KRO 2: 262–263. Siuk complained on 5.18.1832 to the Ayaguz District about the request by the Qoshbegi in Tashkent for the payment of tax (*sakāt*), see IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17677, l. 62. Akimbek sultan also complained to the Qing about the oppression of Khoqand, see DG13/11/6, memorial of Teiśumboo (Ch. *Teyishunbao*), JJD: 066010.

105 Shoinbaev didn’t refer to Russia’s consideration on the Qing affairs, see T.Zh. Shoinbaev, *Dobrovol’noe vkhozhdenie kazakhskikh zemel’ v sostav Rossii* (Alma-Ata: Kazakhstan, 1982): 169–171.

106 I have not yet been able to locate the corresponding document (from Senate to Lifanyuan).

107 To Western Siberian Governor-General, 2.7.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17677, l. 78ob.

was to protect trade via Kyakhta. However, following the resolution of the crisis caused within the Kazakh Steppe by the revolt of Kenesari in 1846, Russia began a full-scale advance into the pasturelands of the Great Juz. As will be seen later regarding the discovery of Russian troops by the Qing military in 1849, Russia ceased to consider Qing opinion regarding Semirech'e during this process of advancement. Also, as was seen in chapter 6, negotiations concerning the opening of Xinjiang to Russian trade took place side by side with these events. Circumstances can be considered to have completely changed by some point around 1830. How the treatment of the Kazakhs further evolved within the context of these Russian-Qing diplomatic developments is a topic that will be delved into in section four below.

In this way, in keeping with the decisions of the Siberian committee, the Russians began to pursue a more aggressive policy in the northern areas from 1830 and also began to expand their influence among the Kazakhs.¹⁰⁸ Russia's method throughout these events were to avoid establishing any form of rule over the Kazakhs that would prompt a negative reaction from the Qing,¹⁰⁹ and, when problems with the Qing did arise, the Russians would produce Kazakh sultans to whom the "title" had been granted and insist during negotiations with the Qing on the excuse that any military advances had been undertaken at the request of these sultans.¹¹⁰ With regards to Russian-Qing relations in as yet unregulated Central Asian territories, the conduct of negotiations would sometimes be requested of the local offices.¹¹¹ From all of this it is possible to not only clearly see the nature of the two empires' policies, it is also possible to see the reason why the Kazakhs would eventually be forced to lose their relationship with the Qing Dynasty. In other words, Russian-Qing negotiations clarify how both empires perceived the borders and also bring into sharp relief the ways in which they sought to deal with their own connections to the Kazakh Khanates, which was currently in the process of dissolution.

108 For the details, see J. Noda, "Roshin kankei to kazafu sōgen: Teikoku shihai to gaikō no naka no chiiki ninshiki," in T. Uyama ed., *Kōza surabu yūrashia gaku*, vol. 2. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2008): 246–248.

109 J. Noda, "Roshin kankeijō no kazafusutan": 131.

110 For example, when the issue was raised regarding the Russian approach to the territory of the Great Juz, Ablai *gong* stood in the breach and was blamed by the Qing government.

111 For the discrepancies in the diplomatic policy between the Qing's central government and local authorities, S. Kawashima, *Chūgoku kindai gaikō no keisei* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2004): 29.

3 The Sultans in Transition

3.1 *Changes in Qing Policy during the 1830s*

As seen above, Qing perceptions of the area north of the Ili River included the opinion that Qing territory extended as far as the Balkhash Lake and Ayaguz River. Regarding the area south of the Ili River, the research of Li Sheng and Takahiro Onuma has shown that the Qing also considered their territory to include the Chu and Talas basins. Frontier patrols were dispatched to these areas. However, from 1832 to 1834, these patrols came to be carried out on a vastly reduced scale.¹¹² Li Sheng interprets this development as “a curtailment of defense policies”¹¹³ and Onuma as a “constriction of the northwestern borderlands.” Onuma also describes the institution of a nonintervention policy within the lands beyond the *karun* that is quite different from the situation seen in the latter half of the eighteenth century.¹¹⁴

As we have already seen in this chapter, however, within the northern areas controlled by Khobdo and Tarbagatai, an attitude of nonintervention within areas outside the *karun* became evident after the beginning of the nineteenth century, so it is necessary to make a distinction when considering the northern and southern situations. Teišumboo, the Military governor at Ili concerned with the defense of the area south of the Ili River, also had previous experience serving as the northern Military governor at Uliyastai overseeing the response to Kazakhs who invaded to the Uriankhai region. At that time he had advised the throne to expel the Kazakhs and establish a new *karun*.¹¹⁵ New border patrols in the regions of the Issyk-kul Lake, the Chu River, and the Talas River that were decided in 1835 (DG14/12) were also enacted at the suggestion of Teišumboo.¹¹⁶ When considering this sequence of events, it seems that the

112 Li, *Zhong'e yili jiaoshe*: 15–16; Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 263. A memorial mentioned that for thirty years no patrol had been dispatched due to the long distance to Bishkek, see DG12/9/29 (*renshen*), edict, XZSL vol. 220. The Ili Military Governor, Yulin, responding to this, memorialized that the patrol would not go as far as the Chu and Talas Rivers, but only as far as Lake Issyk-kul. For the patrol system in Xinjiang and reluctant policy of the Emperor Daoguang, see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 247–251.

113 Li, *Zhong'e yili jiaoshe*: 15.

114 Kazakhs were regarded as “the hedge (*fanli*) out of our *karun*,” see Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 266; DG13(1833)/10/28 (*yichou*), XZSL vol. 244.

115 DG2/6/17, *yifu* (record of deliberations) from Lifanyuan, JHLZ: 8272–54/605–1311–1312. In this document, the following topics were discussed: 1) to prevent Kazakhs from crossing the *karun* line into the Qing territory, 2) to establish four *karun* on the western border of Uriankhai for defense.

116 DG14/11/28, memorial of Teišumboo, *Xinjiang difang lishi ziliao xuanji* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987): 288. See also Onuma, *Shin to chūō ajia sōgen*: 267–268.

Qing Dynasty tightened their guard against the Khoqandis, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz in the south after having first experienced crossing of the borders in the north by the Kazakhs and Russians.¹¹⁷ It is clear from the *Daqing shilu* as well that the Qing came to more strictly oversee Kazakh crossing of the *karun* line within the northern frontier from the 1830s to the 1840s, leading to stronger perceptions regarding this border as described above in section three of chapter 2.

As has been seen so far, the Qing attitude and policy of nonintervention in events taking place beyond the *karun* line was adopted gradually. Even local officials, while strictly punishing Kazakhs who crossed over the *karun* line, ended up not interfering when Russia established Districts within the nomadic lands of the Kazakhs. One reason for this is that the Qing were devoting their energies to problems in the southwest related to the Khoqandis. It is also important to take into account how the Qing government renewed its perceptions regarding the northwestern frontier, which also led to changes in defense policy.¹¹⁸ Several contemporary arguments related to changes in policy toward the rule of Xinjiang that occurred during the reign of the Emperor Daoguang¹¹⁹ are known. Some, like that of Gong Zizhen, proceeded from the point of view that the Kazakhs and Kirghiz were part of the empire's territory,¹²⁰ but these do not seem to have influenced Qing policies regarding the Kazakhs. Regarding the role of Russia within these events, Wei Yuan did touch on Russia's foreign policies ranging from Central Asia to India within the *Shengwu Ji* (DG22 (1842)),¹²¹ but he failed to make a connection to Russia's expansion of rule within the Kazakh Steppe.

How the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans were able to act while sandwiched between the Qing (in possession of such perceptions as have been described above) and the Russians (who developed much more aggressive policies) will be the topic of the next subsection.

117 The Qing policy discussed here was closely related with the oppression of the Khoqand Khanate to the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, Pan Zhiping, *Zhongya haohanguo yu qingdai xinjiang* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1991): 148–150.

118 T. Motegi, “Chūka sekai no kōzōhendō to kaikakuron: kindai karano shiten,” in K. Mōri ed., *Gendai chūgoku no kōzōhendō 7 chūka sekai: aidentiti no saihen* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2001): 59–60.

119 Kataoka, *Shinchō shinkyō tōchi kenkyū*.

120 K. Enoki, “Shinkyō no kenshō: 20 seiki no chūōajia,” in *Enoki Kazuo chosaku shū 2* (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1992): 142.

121 Enoki, “Shinkyō no kenshō”: 212–213.

3.2 *Trends among the Kazakh Sultans*

The title of *khan* was abolished with the enactment of the 1822 Regulation. With this development came both petitions by some sultans for the establishment of Districts and open opposition by others to the expansion of Russian rule. As considered in chapter 5, Ghubaidulla sultan, who early on petitioned for the establishment of a Russian District, eventually ended up demanding abolition of the District and reinstatement of the khan title after failing to receive the “*han*” title from the Qing Dynasty. Ghubaidulla’s demands were not met.¹²² When he was apprehended by the Russian military, Qasim sultan (his uncle) protested this captivity¹²³ by arguing that “Ghubaidulla’s position as *khan* [*khanstvo*] was recognized when he succeeded my father Ablai and my older brother Wali.”¹²⁴ In addition, Qasim’s opposition to Russian rule was evident from his petitioning for such things as the abolition of the Kokchetau District. In fact, the resistance by Qasim’s children Sarjan and Kenesari – who even took upon himself the title of *khan* – constitute the greatest revolt against Russian rule to take place within the central to eastern areas of the Kazakh Steppe.

There were other sultans who chose not to follow Russia and relocated to Qing territories. For example, Jankhoja sultan mentioned earlier “did not pledge allegiance to the Russian Emperor at the time of the establishment of the Ayaguz District and received the title of *wang* from the Qing court.” Furthermore, Jankhoja was described by the Russians as “not within the District,” or in other words, not a follower of Russia.¹²⁵

Jankhoja’s younger brother Sibanqul, while having petitioned for the establishment of the District,¹²⁶ was defeated by Sart sultan in a conflict over the post of agha-sultan when the Ayaguz District was established. Sibanqul relocated to Qing territory during the winter of 1833.¹²⁷ Within Qing sources, Sibanqul is described as having received the title of *taiji*¹²⁸ and having engaged in raids against Russian and Khoqand caravans in the borderlands. Sibanqul

¹²² TsGA RK: f. 338, op. 1, d. 476, ll. 9–12.

¹²³ Document to Governor-General, Kaptsevich, 9.17.1824, KRO 2: 215.

¹²⁴ Document to the Orenburg Military Governor, 6.24.1825, MIPSK: 137.

¹²⁵ The Russian side replied in this way in the conversation with the Qing’s *batur amban*, see Ponomarev to Niukhalov, 6.4.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 476. It was mentioned that sons of Janbubek were at Tarbagatai.

¹²⁶ To Nikolai I, 1825, MIPSK: 129–135.

¹²⁷ Cossack lieutenant Kozlov to Niukhalov, 10.21.1833, IAOO: f. 3, op. 12, d. 17674, l. 543.

¹²⁸ DG18/12/25 (*renchen*), edict, XZSL vol. 317. Sibanqul (*hasake taiji suwanhuli*) and others were rewarded for their capturing the Kazakhs who raised a riot.

also threatened Kazakhs who followed Russia.¹²⁹ Although some sultans of the Middle Juz who relocated to Qing territory were suspected of treason by Russia during this time, it seems that Russia basically sought to appease Sibanqul.¹³⁰ Sibanqul's relationships with Russia and the Qing are described in detail in the Qurbān 'alī's work and Sibanqul is said to have complained to a Tarbagatai government official that "Russia [had] exerted pressure [*jabr*]." ¹³¹

It seems that Sibanqul's reasons for seeking the protection of the Qing Dynasty can be traced to attitudes of his that can be grasped from the following episode. Having been refused direct negotiations with the *amban* of Tarbagatai as well as exiled, Sibanqul pointed to his hat and declared to Qing officials that "this stone was given to me by your khan [the Qing Emperor].¹³² Based on the statutes [*lī*], in other words according to the law, it is your obligation to provide support and assistance to me."¹³³ This account seems to imply that the sultans considered their relationship to the Qing as including a guarantee of protection. Sibanqul, who subsequently went on to leave Qing territory, refused to be persuaded by the Russians and never gave up plundering. As a result, he was captured by troops dispatched from Kokpekti in July 1839¹³⁴ and the other sultans from his clansmen were relocated to Russian territory during the same period.

In contrast to the above, other petitions for protection were made to Russia by sultans who held pasturelands within Qing territory. One example is that of Beksultan who became the agha-sultan of the Ayaguz District. According to the Qurbān 'alī, Beksultan and his clan were pressured by the Russians "to

129 Copy of instruction from Ayaguz District to Maslasov, 2.5.1835, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1463, l. 3. The same document is reproduced in N. Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: V. K istorii Karkaralinskogo i Aiaguzskogo okrugov v 30-kh i 40-kh godakh XIX st.," *Zapiski Semipalatinskogo Podotdela zapadno-sibirskogo otdela Imperatorskogo Russkogo geogra-ficheskogo obshchestva*, vyp. 1 (Semipalatinsk, 1903): 40.

130 It was confirmed that Sibanqul left Russia not due to his hostility toward Russia but because of personal opposition to the other Chinggisid sultans, see document from Omsk provincial office to Western Siberian Governor-General, 10.13.1836, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1559, l. 36. Later, Sibanqul and his brother, Kushuk, sent to chief of Omsk province, Talyzin, so that they could come back to the previous land, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1559, ll. 49 and 50. For Sibanqul's letter, the translation of the letter from Talyzin to Sibanqul (7.30.1837) replied that he should keep peace, IAOO: f. 3, op. 1, d. 1559, l. 51.

131 THS: 468.

132 This indicates a hat decorated with stones given by the Qing court (*dingdai*). Sibanqul was given the double eyed peacock feather (*hualing*) in 1838. Fig. 17 shows the hat given by the Qing court.

133 THS: 450.

134 Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: V.: 40–50; THS: 467–468.

come to the Ayaguz District office and register in the official accounts if [he intended] to become a subject, or, [if he had no such intention,] to relocate into the Qing territory (*Hitāy*) beyond Uljar." However, when Beksultan complained to the Qing *amban*, he refused to listen to the Kazakh's claims. Also, when the Russians subsequently extended their influence into the area of Uljar and the Alakol Lake, several Kazakh clan subdivisions appealed for help to Beksultan-tore, who was travelling nomadically in the Alatau area of northern Ili. Due to the fact that Beksultan had "received the title of *gong* from the Qing," when Russia later crossed over Lake Alakol, Beksultan informed the *amban* at Tarbagatai of the Russian's arrival, but the *amban* made no response. Informed of this, the Russians were in the end able to claim that Beksultan was their own subject.¹³⁵ In reality, Beksultan actually did pledge allegiance as a Russian subject on 25 June 1839.¹³⁶ It is difficult to understand how the sultans perceived their relationships to Russia and the Qing, but, taken together, the examples of Sibanqul and the content of *Tavārīḡ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī* (the THS) at least demonstrate that the Qing failed to provide any protection from Russia to the Kazakhs in spite of the expectations that might have existed on the Kazakh side.

In later developments, Beksultan even went on to complain to Russia regarding the imposition by the Qing of a tax known as the *alim*.¹³⁷ A Turkic language report written by Beksultan in 1843 mentions the Qing demands for *alim* as follows:

A person from the Qing Dynasty (*Čürčūt*) came to our settlement (*aul*) ... [and] demanded that we pay the "*alum*."¹³⁸

135 THS: 373–374. In another text, Qurbān 'alī mentioned, "Beksultan was in the position of "khan," that is the agha-sultan of the Ayaguz District, see Qurbān-'Alī Khālidi, *An Islamic biographical dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe, 1770–1912*, ed. by A.J. Frank & M.A. Usmanov (Leiden: Brill, 2005): 19. While the commentary by Frank in this literature regarded him as a son of Jochi sultan, the THS mentioned that he was the son of Aghadai, son of Abulfeiz, THS: 460.

136 Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: VI.": 82–83.

137 Noda, "Roshin kankei to kazafu sōgen": 247–248. The Qing records also confirm that annual earnings of *alim* decreased little by little. When contrasting the number of heads, reported by Tarbagatai Councilor annually in spring, 620 head in QL44 (reported on QL45/4/6), 268 in QL60 (reported on 5/28), 210 in DG1 (reported on DG2/6/29), 91 in DG35 (reported on 5/25), see *Qingdai xiqian xinjiang chahaer menggu manwen dang'an chuanze*, Wu Yuanfeng et al. comp. (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2004): 211, 289, 387, 470.

138 TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 1497, l. 4. The original Mongol word "Churchut" means Manchus.

In response to Beksultan's inquiry regarding whether the Kazakhs should pay the *alim*, the Russian Frontier chief (*pogranichnyi nachal'nik*) Vishnevskii strictly stated that: "You should firmly deny them [the Qing]. Such payments should be made to the Russian government and you must avoid becoming their vassal."¹³⁹

Dulanbai sultan of the Middle Juz's Baijigit clan can serve as a final example.¹⁴⁰ In 1846, Dulanbai petitioned for the right to relocate to Russian territory based on the reasoning that "I must bring happiness (*yahşıliqlar*) to my people (*yürt-elimiz*)."¹⁴¹ Regarding this appeal, Vishnevskii reported to the General that "the Kazakhs of Baijigit have long been vassals of the Qing Dynasty, have paid tribute to the Qing, and have spent their summers and winters travelling within Qing territory – in other words, on the other side of the *karun*. The reason for Dulanbai's visit to Omsk was to request the great patronage of the Emperor for his people, and, through that patronage, to attain an enjoyment of friendly relations with the other nearby groups of the same ethnicity residing within and without Russian territory."¹⁴² In other words, Dulanbai had come to Omsk in order to settle disputes with the Kazakhs who were subject to Russia. At about the same time, Boteke sultan of the Quzai clan (which resided within Qing territory) also appeared in Omsk and requested to be made a subject of Russia.¹⁴³ However, their requests to enjoy the favors of the Russian Emperor, made while residing within Qing territory, were not recognized at this time.¹⁴⁴

Regarding Dulanbai, the official of the Foreign ministry Liubimov mentioned in chapter 6 left behind records stating that "Sabek and Dulanbai are completely dissatisfied with the Qing government. This is because the [Qing] government provides them no assistance and will not protect them in any way if there were to be trouble with Russia." This statement again proves both that the sultans residing nomadically in the areas of the Qing *karun* expected to

139 1.22.1844, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 1497, ll. 2–20b.

140 As early as in 1839, the elder brother of Dulanbai, Sabek planned to enter into relations with Russia, Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: V": 50. A Tatar merchant who visited the Dulanbai's pasture in the way to Tarbagatai in 1845 mentioned that Dulanbai had been in Beijing and was bestowed the post of *galadai* (Ma. *gala-i da*), Abdul-Bali Abdul-Vagapov, "Rasskaz troitskogo 2-i gil'dii kuptsa, Abdul-Bali Abdul-Vagapova Abu-Bakirova, o puteshestvii ego s tovarami iz Troitska v Chuguchak, i o prochem," *Geograficheskie isvestiia*, vyp. 2 (SPb, 1850): 380–381.

141 9.25.1846, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 1767, l. 30b.

142 2.8.1847, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 1767, l. 18.

143 Instruction of the Western Siberian Governor-General to the Ayaguz District, 12.14.1846, TsGA RK: f. 374, op. 1, d. 1767, l. 12.

144 Konshin, "Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia: VI": 50–55.

receive Qing protection and that those expectations were not met.¹⁴⁵ This section has shown how the role and status of the sultans was further diminished. In fact, they became impotent in the face of Russian pressure once the receiving of titles from the Qing Dynasty ceased to imply the assurance of Qing protection.

As we saw in chapter 5, the Qing Dynasty sought to confirm Kazakh subjection through the giving of titles. The Russians too, in spite of having abolished the title of *khan*, attempted to clarify Kazakh subjection by classifying the Kazakh clans led by the original khan aristocrats into units they referred to as *volost'*. For this reason, an analysis of which empire the sultans chose to be subject to greatly helps us to grasp the particulars of the expansion of Russian rule. Furthermore, the responses by both empires to the trends exhibited by these sultans who resided nomadically near the Russian-Qing border clearly delineates the differences in Russian and Qing policies.

4 Friction Regarding the Annexation of the Great Juz and Establishment of the 1851 Treaty of Commerce between Russia and the Qing Dynasty

As seen in the last section, the Qing endeavored to maintain the border by using the *karun* as base points even while pursuing an attitude of nonintervention when faced with pressure from Russia or the Khoqand and while also failing to respond to the expectations of the Kazakh sultans.

On the other hand, Russia incorporated the Kazakhs into the Districts of the empire and continued their southward expansion. During the rule of Nikolai I (r. 1825–55), the Russian government in general meddled within European revolutions as well as focusing on the Balkan and Middle East fronts. Within Western Siberia, Gorchakov was inaugurated as the Governor-General in 1836 (continuing in that position until 1850) and the plan for reforms he submitted led to the establishment of the 1838 reform discussed in chapter 2. The seat of government shifted south from Tobol'sk to Omsk enabling a greater diligence in watching over troubles within the Kazakh pasturelands and Central Asia in general – including Kazakhs' border troubles with the various khanates and the Qing.¹⁴⁶ The revolt of the Kazakh sultans led by Kenesari taking place at

145 N.I. Liubimov, "[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N.I. Liubimova 1845 goda]," in Valikhanov, Ch.Ch. *Sobranie sochinenii*, t. 4 (Alma-Ata, 1985): 304.

146 E.V. Bezikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika rossiiskoi imperii v stepnykh oblastakh Zapadnoi Sibiri v 20–60-kh gg. XIX v.* (Omsk: izd-vo Omskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 2005): 136.

this time involved not only the Kazakhs of Western Siberia but also those under the jurisdiction of Orenburg. In addition, Russia was forced to deal with the campaign against Khiva necessitating a great effort on Russia's part to suppress the insurgents in both theaters. A detailed examination of these events would be beyond the scope of the current work, but it should be noted that Russia's policies regarding Central Asia at this time were undertaken against the background of rivalry with Britain regarding the Ottoman Empire and also constituted a response to the British Empire's turning its attention to the area north of India.

During the time both before and after the settlement of the Kenesari revolt in 1846, the sultans of the Great Juz began to send petitions to the Russian government and swear allegiance as Russian subjects. Having attained this foothold into the pasturelands of the Great Juz, Russia advanced into Semirech'e and established the Kopal fortress in 1847. In the following year, Russia established the Commissary of the Great "Khorde" (*dolzhnost' pristava Bol'shoi ordy*), which acted under the Western Siberian Governor-General. A.E. Vrangeli' was chosen as the first Commissary. As a result, friction arose between Russia and the Qing due to the Qing's recognition of Semirech'e as its own territory. In this section we will examine how both empires dealt with this problem as well as the development of the Kazakh response.

4.1 *Tezek Sultan of the Great Juz*

In order to examine Russian-Qing friction regarding the Great Juz it is necessary to first turn our attention to the actions of Tezek sultan of the Alban clan. The initial Russian-Qing negotiations of 1848 (DG28/8) centered on the stealing of horses by Kazakhs from Mongols aligned with the Qing. The Military Governor at Ili, Saingga (Ch. *Sayinga*) memorialized¹⁴⁷ to the throne on DG29/9/26 (29 Oct. 1849) regarding circumstances on the frontier during a search made for the stolen horses. According to this memorial, the Qing troops met a man assumed to be a Baron Vrangeli' (written *Balan* in the Chinese sources) in the Qaratal area. After telling him that they "had come searching for the horses stolen by the Kazakhs,"¹⁴⁸ Vrangeli' responded to the Qing

147 Imperially endorsed on 11/17, *Xinjiang longdui zouyi*: 257–274. The date of memorialization seems 9/17, see *Xinjiang difang lishi ziliao xuanji*: 339.

148 QZEG (*Qingdai zhong'e guanxi dang'an shiliao xuanbian*, ser. 3, vol. 1): 9. Chen again discussed this event in terms of the violation of the suzerainty of the Qing, and considered Russia's view of the subjection of Kazakhs based only on Chinese sources, see Chen Weixin, *Qingdai duie waijiao liyi tizhi ji fanshu guishu jiaoshe 1644–1861*: 357–365.



FIGURE 17

Portrait of Tezek sultan (by Ch. Valikhanov). This portrait symbolizes his relations with the Qing dynasty. SOURCE: CH.CH. VALIKHANOV, *SOBRANIE SOCHINENII V PIATI TOMAKH*, T. 5 (ALMA-ATA : IZD-VO AN KAZSSR, 1972): 115.

*janggin*¹⁴⁹ that “[his (Russian) people] held the authority to collect taxes” from the Kazakhs. Vrangeli then refused to yield the way and repeatedly refused to listen to Qing persuasion. The memorial went on to recommend that the Russian Senate be requested to demand the withdrawal of Vrangeli. As a result, the Lifanyuan’s response was dated DG29/10/20 and sent to the Russian Senate.¹⁵⁰ At this time, the Ili Military Governor took precedence from the 1825 negotiations and assumed that the insistence of Vrangeli was true because it was reported this time by a Qing official rather than by the Kazakhs.¹⁵¹

Following these events, the official of Ili sent Tezek,¹⁵² who was given the title of *taiji*, to investigate the matter.¹⁵³ Returning in DG29/10, Tezek gave the innocuous report that “the Russians had withdrawn westward and the Kazakh nomadic lands [were] peaceful.” It should be noted here that while Tezek had received the Qing title of *taiji*, paid *alim* and was involved in the trade of livestock, he also had a relationship with the Russians at the same time.¹⁵⁴ Tezek was ordered by the Qing official to search for livestock that was unreturned by Vrangeli,¹⁵⁵ but, as made clear by a document dated 31 May 1850, Tezek himself turned the instruction from the Qing official over to the Russian side. After

149 *Janggin* (Ma.) means the military official.

150 Lifanyuan to Senate, *Xinjiang difang lishi ziliao xuanji*: 340–341. The Qing stated that the area such as Qaratal within the territory which the Qing Empire had subjugated.

151 Summarized on DG29/9/17 (According to the information in *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian: Daoguang chao juan* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1996): 480), *Xinjiang longdui zouyi*: 306.

152 *Tieseke* in Chinese texts.

153 DG29/12/27, memorial, *Xinjiang longdui zouyi*: 331.

154 For his biography, see K.Sh. Khafizova, “Sultan Tezek i ego vremia,” *Vestnik Universiteta “Kainar”* 1 (2002): 3–14.

155 TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 329, l. 14.

delivering the livestock to Ili, Tezek even traveled to the fortress at Kopal and reported that the Qing were happy to have received the return of the animals.¹⁵⁶

After this, the response of the Russian Senate finally arrived to the Qing.¹⁵⁷ Their answer was simply to confirm that Vrangeli had replied that “because the Kazakhs of this land were originally subjects of Russia, an investigation would be made by a Russian official.” The response continued on to merely state that the central government was informed that “one Russian-subject sultan of the Kazakhs would be dispatched, and [the livestock] would be delivered to Ili.” Because the sultan in question was none other than Tezek, the Qing no longer had any illusions regarding the depth of the Russian connection to the Great Juz. The letter from the Russian Senate also shifted responsibility to the Kazakhs by giving the usual explanation that “the Kopal fortress had been built in answer to the repeated insistence of the Kazakhs, who had desired the establishment of a [Russian] camp in this area.”

Learning of this, the Qing government ordered the next Ili Military Governor Išan (Ch. *Yishan*) and others to investigate whether or not the Kazakhs had been paying the *alim* to the Qing in recent years as well as to ascertain the whereabouts of Vrangeli.¹⁵⁸ As a result, Išan found that Tezek and Akimbek¹⁵⁹ were paying the *alim* tax and therefore that the relationship with the Qing was still intact. In addition, they gained information that Vrangeli was residing at a distance of over eighty *li* from the Qing border, so the problem was resolved without further escalation.¹⁶⁰

Išan's memorial ended by reporting that the Russians had made contact with Ili in order to confer regarding trade issues. In fact, at the same time as negotiations regarding the issue of the Great Juz's pasturelands, negotiations were also underway regarding Russian-Qing trade within the areas of Ili and Tarbagatai. As will be examined in more detail below, in contrast to the Russians who sought to establish transactions within three locations including Kashgar, the Qing refused to yield the point over their insistence that transactions be limited to two locations. One reason for this insistence of the Qing can be found in Išan's memorial of 20 Apr. 1851 which stated that:

156 Dated 5 July, TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 327, l. 3.

157 XF1/1/24 (Feb. 1851), Russian Senate to Lifanyuan, attached document of the edict to Išan on 2/15, QZEG (ser. 3, vol. 1): 5.

158 2/15, edict to Išan and Buyantai, QZEG (ser. 3, vol. 1): 4–5. (Dated 2/14, in *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao*, vol. 1: 130).

159 While Tezek was regarded as the younger brother of Akimbek *gong*, he was in fact the cousin of Akimbek.

160 6/20, memorial of Išan and other, QZEG (ser. 3, vol. 1): 8–11.

The foreign nation of Russia has been collecting taxes within Kazakh lands even more than in the past and is forcing hard labor on the people there. If they are allowed to solicit trade in Kashgar, the Russians will surely work the Kirghiz in the same fashion as the Kazakhs of southwestern Ili in addition to collecting taxes [from them] as well.¹⁶¹

A treaty of commerce was enacted in July of 1851, but, as can be ascertained from the memorial above, local Qing officials were keenly aware of Russia's strengthening its influence within the nomadic lands of the Kazakhs. Instructions given by the Western Siberian Governor-General on 15 Dec. clearly illustrate this point:

Qing sentiments are the same as ever and they still believe that the pasturelands of the Great Juz are subject to the Qing Empire. They see, on the other hand, that [Russian rule] is not merely nominal but has actively taken root ... If local forces of the Qing Dynasty are dispatched to this area [Qaratal], we can assert that "this is Russian territory."¹⁶²

In this way, the facts of Kazakh subjugation to the Russians and Russian control over the lands of the Kazakh Steppe, which at one time had been of a nominal nature (based on a personal swearing of allegiance), gradually came to be based upon a firmer foundation of real Russian rule. In other words, having already lost the title of *khan*, most of the Kazakh Chinggisid, who could also no longer rely on the assurances of Qing title, came to be incorporated within the Russian Empire along with their pasturelands. From 1822 onward, the sultans continued to lose their authority and were forced to become Russian subjects. These developments can be interpreted as the complete final dissolution of the Kazakh Khanates.

For its part, Russia continued its southern advance following these events and, following its establishment of the Kopal fortress in 1847, another fortress was built in Vernoe (currently Almaty) in 1854. This development led to the 1856 establishment of the Alatau District and a strengthening of Russian influence over the Kirghiz. Provisional regulations enacted between 1867 and 1868 completed the annexation of the Kazakh Steppe by Russia, leaving out only those Kazakhs who resided within Khoqand territory.

161 XF1/4/2, memorial of Išan, *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), vol.1: 147–148.

162 To Commissary of the Great "Khorde," Peremyshl'skii, TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 330, l. 7.

4.2 *The Treaty of 1851*

While the Russian-Qing negotiations described above regarding the pasturelands of the Great Juz were still in progress, the Lifanyuan suggested to the throne in DG30/4/3 (1850) that negotiations with Russia be held over trade in Xinjiang.¹⁶³ As a result, formal negotiations came to be held between the two countries regarding Russian-Qing trade in Ili and Tarbagatai alongside those being held about issues related to the Great Juz. It goes without saying that the treaty resulting from these negotiations would have great meaning for the Russian-Qing trade via the Kazakh Steppe that was detailed above in chapter 6. As touched on at the end of the last chapter, the initiative taken by merchants of Russian subject status grew almost in reverse proportion to the decline of the role in this trade played by the Kazakhs. This tendency achieved official recognition with the enactment of the 1851 treaty.

As we have seen, Russia had long desired the ability to conduct transactions directly between Western Siberia and Xinjiang. Another reason for this desire can be found in Russian concerns regarding the influence of Britain following the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanjing.¹⁶⁴ Another influencing factor was Russia's advance into the territory of the Great Juz that has been considered above. In fact, as mentioned in an 1847 report by the Russian Foreign Minister Nessel'rode, the Great Juz was brought under Russian rule in order to facilitate "trade with Western China, particularly Kashgar."¹⁶⁵ It is also a fact that instructions given by Nessel'rode in early 1848 to the Commissary of the Great "Khorde" clearly name trade as a topic to be addressed. The incorporation of the Great Juz into the Russian Empire cannot be seen as unrelated to the Russian government's desire for trade with Xinjiang.¹⁶⁶

As explained by N. Antonov, the investigation regarding Ili and Tarbagatai made by the Russian Foreign ministry's Liubimov in 1845 served as a turning point¹⁶⁷ and, after gathering the opinions of local Western Siberian officials, the Russian government began making proposals to the Qing Dynasty. It is an

163 *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), vol. 1: 6.

164 Chief of Siberian customs district to chief of Department of Foreign trade, Financial ministry, 1.19.1846, TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 157, l. 110b.

165 KRO 2: 335.

166 M.K. Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke so vtoroi chetverti XIX veka i russkaia burzhuaziia* (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1949): 335.

167 The report was submitted to Nessel'rode, May 1846, see N.K. Antonov, "K istorii zakliucheniia russko-kitaiskogo dogovora 1851 g. v Kul'dzhe," in *Dokumenty oprovergaiut: protiv fal'sifikatsii istorii russko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii* (Moscow: "Mysl'," 1982): 153. For keeping security in the trade routes, it was required to make subjects of the Kazakhs who were living near the Qing *karun* line, see Mi Zhenbo, *Qingdai xibei bianjing diqu zhonghe maoyi:*

interesting aspect of Russian-Qing relations that these negotiations were carried out via Russian Orthodox missions that were periodically dispatched by Russia.¹⁶⁸ Letters from the Russian Senate were delivered to the *Lifanyuan* by such missionaries in both 1847 and 1848. Specifically, Russia sought to establish trade within Ili, Tarbagatai, and Kashgar (the three cities of Xinjiang) in addition to Kyakhta. The *Lifanyuan* responded by first reasserting the standing prohibition on trade within the vicinity of the Qoni-mailaqu *karun* and continued by stressing adherence to the principle of not recognizing any trade conducted outside of Kyakhta.¹⁶⁹

However, after a military officer accompanying a newly dispatched mission (led by Palladius)¹⁷⁰ in DG29/12 (1850) made another attempt to persuade the *Lifanyuan*, serious consideration of the issue began to be held within the government of the Qing Dynasty.¹⁷¹ In DG29/12/15, a confidential (*miji*) imperial edict was sent to Xinjiang local high-ranking officials which acknowledged the reality that “it [was] hard to ignore the fact that Russia [was] secretly carrying out trade” and stated the opinion that “recent Russian documents clearly show Russia’s great desire for trade within the three cities including Ili and it would not be suitable to simply refuse and make a bigger issue out of the problem.” The edict also instructed the Ili Military Governor Saingga to make an investigation into local conditions.¹⁷²

The Ili Governor’s memorial made it clear that, among the three cities, Kashgar presented the most obstacles. Reasons given included the fact that

Cong daoguang chao dao xuantong chao (Tianjin: Tianjin shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2005): 44.

- 168 The leader of the mission, Polikarp was appointed to carry out the instructions, see Antonov, “K istorii zakliucheniiia russko-kitaiskogo dogovora 1851 g.”: 154. Antonov related the death of the Emperor Daoguang in 1850 (Feb.) to the rapid progress of the conclusion of the treaty, Antonov, “K istorii zakliucheniiia russko-kitaiskogo dogovora 1851 g.”: 157–158.
- 169 A document of *Lifanyuan* (n.d.), JJD: 077666. This document, confirming the Qing’s policy such as “not permitting Russia to trade in any other place than Kyakhta,” might be the base of the *Lifanyuan* memorial dated DG30/4/30.
- 170 His activities in Beijing regarding the Russo-Qing negotiations, see A.S. Ipatova, “Pekinskie pis'ma P. Tugarinova k N.I. Liubimovu (40-gody XIX v),” in *I ne raspalas' sviaz' vremen...: k 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia P.E. Skachkova* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 1993): 164–185.
- 171 For the secret memorial of *Lifanyuan* on DG29/12/25, see XF1/10/13, memorial of Išan and Buyantai, JJD: 406001383.
- 172 Edict to Saingga and Ili Councilor Išan, see *Jiaqing daoguang liangchao shangyu dang* (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000), vol. 54: 601. See also A. Haneda, “Iri tsūshō jōyaku no teiketsu to sono igi,” in *Wada hakushi koki kinen tōyōshi ronsō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1961).

Kashgar was in the most distant frontier zone and, considering that the British were advancing from the direction of India, the British might demand the same rights if trade with the Russians were to be recognized. In addition, anxiety was expressed that visitation by Muslims such as the Khoqand might lead to friction with the Orthodox Russians.¹⁷³ It goes without saying that such anxieties were closely related to the more general fear that has been described so far regarding the expansion of Russian rule. Consequently, the *Lifanyuan* decided to only recognize trade within the two cities (Ili and Tarbagatai) excluding Kashgar.¹⁷⁴ Finally, the *Lifanyuan*'s response to the Senate's correspondence of 8 Sep. 1850 suggested that a Russian delegation be sent to Ili the next spring in order to negotiate the text of the treaty.¹⁷⁵

The previously mentioned Russian-Qing negotiations regarding the pasturelands of the Great Juz were taking place at exactly this time. In fact, it is known from Russian sources that the *ukur-amban*¹⁷⁶ (supervisor-in-chief) of Ili crossed over the *karun* line into the pasturelands of the Great Juz with the intent of negotiating with Russia. When the Russian military officer Gutkovskii sent a letter to confirm the *amban*'s intentions, he received the following response:

I do indeed wish to proceed as far as the first guard post. In fact, the matter¹⁷⁷ with which I have been entrusted has been communicated by Beijing to Petersburg and I believe that a [Russian] official has already been dispatched from Petersburg by order of the Russian Emperor.¹⁷⁸

In other words, to the local Qing official it was taken for granted that the Russians had already advanced close to the *karun* line. Such an understanding

173 DG30/3/21 (May 1850), memorial of Saingga and others, *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao*, vol.1: 2–3 and 5–6.

174 4/3, the attached document to *yifu* of Lifanyuan, *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao*, vol.1: 7–8.

175 Antonov, “K istorii zakliucheniia russko-kitaiskogo dogovora 1851 g.”: 159. This corresponds to the document from Lifanyuan to Russian Senate on DG30/11/26, *Siguo xindang*, vol. 3 (Eguodang) (Nan'gang: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindai shi yanjiu suo, 1966): 16.

176 The Qing official, “*uheri da*” in Manchu. This is often mentioned in Russian literatures as *ukurdai* or *ukur-amban*.

177 This means the issue of Russians who resided in the Qaratal area.

178 The Qing *amban* additionally stated that, “this issue is beyond the jurisdiction of local officials,” see 9.7.1850, Gutkovskii to Governor-General, Gorchakov, TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 327, ll. 15–18. Gorchakov, in advance, ordered to keep the Qing officials away from the Kopal fortress, see instruction to Gutkovskii, 24 Jul., TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 327, l. 12.

was also shared by the Qing Dynasty's central offices because the *Lifanyuan* proposed to hold the treaty negotiations in Ili.

During 1851, Kovalevskii's group (who had arrived in Ili on 7 July) began negotiations, and the so-called "Treaty of Kulja"¹⁷⁹ was signed on 25 July (7/10 in the lunar calendar). The circumstances of the time were fully detailed in a memorial by Išan.¹⁸⁰ At the same time, Išan wrote to the Russians to give a final rejection of the proposal for trade in Kashgar based on the reasoning that trade would be difficult due to a scarcity of commodities in that area. No mention was made in this communication of the various qualms that had been discussed within the Qing government.¹⁸¹

The essential points of this treaty allowed for the opening of trade within two cities in northern Xinjiang and the establishment of a Russian consul (*kon-sul'*). A trade pavilion (*maoyi ting*), or mercantile house (*faktoriia*),¹⁸² was also to be opened where tariff-free trade could be conducted.¹⁸³ Akira Haneda interprets this as "essentially an extension of the Kyakhta Treaty"¹⁸⁴ and it can be said that the treaty took over elements of the Kyakhta system. However, it can also be said that this treaty served as the starting point for a series of negotiations between both governments regarding border demarcation within Xinjiang. Thus it held great political – more specifically "territorial" – meaning as well.

Following the enactment of the treaty, passports were issued to Russian merchants by the authorities in Western Siberia, allowing them to travel within Qing territory.¹⁸⁵ Russian interest in the economy of northern Xinjiang became based in its consulate and mercantile house. Regarding the results of this treaty, and even focusing only on the tea trade, reports exist that indicate Qing merchants came from Kyakhta to do trade in Xinjiang.¹⁸⁶ Serious consideration must be left for another study, but it is quite clear from this alone that trade

179 "Yili ta'erbahatai tongshang zhangcheng" in Chinese. "Torgovyi traktat dlia poddannyykh oboikh gosudarstv, koim otkrybaetsia torgovlia v Ili i Tarbagatae" in Russian.

180 XF1/7/23, memorial of Išan and others, QZEG (ser. 3, vol. 1): 12–14.

181 XF1/7/23, document from Ili Military Governor and Councilor to Russia, QZEG (ser. 3, vol. 1): 14–15.

182 Opinion of the chief of Semipalatinsk customs to Western Siberian Governor-General (12.14.1843) had already regarded that the establishment of the mercantile house in Tarbagatai would lead to the development of trade, see TsGA RK: f. 806, op. 1, d. 157, ll. 13–14ob.

183 Yoshida, *Kindai roshin kankei shi*: 217–218.

184 Haneda, "Iri tsūshō jōyaku no teiketsu to sono igi": 737.

185 For the example of 1860, see TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 372, l. 14.

186 The memorandum of the Russian merchant regarding the trade in Ili since 1851, 12.5.1853, IAOO: f. 3, op. 3, d. 3485, l. 5.

within Xinjiang took on a whole new aspect following the conclusion of the treaty.

It bears repeating that the desire to facilitate trade within Xinjiang directly influenced the background to Russia's annexation of the Great Juz. Expanding this interpretation further, we can see how Russia was also influenced by competition with Britain over territories in Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Qing Dynasty itself.¹⁸⁷

In this political sense, and in conjunction with Russia's advance into the pasturelands of the Great Juz, we can see how the old trade system was uprooted and the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Russian and Qing empires had entered a new era. The Russian-Qing border would soon come to be demarcated by post-1864 treaties and territories once claimed by the Qing, including a portion of the Kazakh nomadic lands, would fall into the possession of Russia.

Conclusion

Within this chapter, the position of the Kazakh Steppe within Russian-Qing negotiations has been considered through examples that clearly detail the circumstances of the Kazakhs during the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Both empires dispatched troops and attempted to rule foreign populations in similar ways within the frontier regions of Western Siberia and Xinjiang. However, as demonstrated by the specific examples given above, there were great differences in the treatment of the Kazakhs by each empire. We can see how Russia considered the Kazakhs to be their subjects from an early stage and took a series of specific measures designed to establish rule over them. On the other hand, to the Qing, the Kazakhs were eventually nothing but a foreign populace to be placed under 'control.' Thus, when pressured by Russia, the Qing not only yielded control of Kazakh lands, but can even be characterized as having actively given up territorial claims within the Kazakh Steppe in order to secure their other territories.

In this way, the Qing failed to live up to the expectations of the Kazakh sultans. For this reason, following the establishment of aggressive Russian policies by the Asiatic and Siberian Committees in 1831, Qing influence within the Kazakh Steppe was clearly lost. The boundaries that came into being as the Russians crossed over the Kazakh Steppe and approached Qing territory actually became the national border between the two empires. This further played

187 See Rozhkova, *Ekonomicheskaja politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva na Srednem Vostoke*.

a role in settling issues surrounding the subjection of the Kazakhs. Furthermore, as the border came to be visualized and the Russian and Qing empires simply came to directly border one another, the earlier role of the Kazakhs as mediators for Russian-Qing trade naturally disappeared.

Due to constraints within the historical record, it is extremely difficult to judge the degree to which the Kazakhs were subjectively aware of the differences in Russian and Qing policies. In addition, both the bi-lateral diplomacy of Ablai and Wali khan eras and subsequent revolts against the empires failed, resulting in a situation in which the sultans had no option but to choose subjection to one of the empires.

Even so, the border zones of the Russian and Qing empires within the Kazakh Steppe continued to be a dynamic area following the Tarbagatai Treaty of 1864 and, partly influenced by Muslim uprisings, border crossings were a daily occurrence. For example, Boteke sultan of the Middle Juz migrated into Russian lands from Qing territory in 1865¹⁸⁸ and returned again later. His descendants would later experience the occupation of Ili by the Russians and live in the same area up to the time of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911. Furthermore, it is well-known that many nomadic Kazakhs and Kirghiz escaped to the Chinese side during the large-scale Muslim uprisings of 1916.¹⁸⁹ Finally, as touched on in the introduction, it must be noted that movements across the border even occurred during the Soviet era – demonstrating the great kinesis characteristic of these lands.

188 Boteke moved into Russian territory and made a complaint about the Qing emperor (10.3.1865), see J. Noda, "The Qazaqs in the Muslim Rebellion in Xinjiang of 1864–65," *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, 5–1 (2006): 28–31. See also J. Noda, "Teikoku no kyōkai o koete: Roshin teikoku no kyōiki toshite no kazafu," *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 911 (2013): 10–18.

189 Kozybaev et al. eds., *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*: 649.

Conclusion

In this monograph, I have examined the international order of Central Eurasia between the first half of the eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century from the perspective of interrelations among the following three powers: the Kazakh Khanates, the Russian Empire, and the Qing Dynasty. Special emphasis was put on Kazakh-Qing relations. In particular, my research focused on two points: first, the role played by the Kazakh nomads in connecting the three regions of the eastern Kazakh steppe, Xinjiang, and Western Siberia; and, second, the influence Russo-Qing and Kazakh-Russian relations had on Kazakh-Qing relations.

It will be helpful to summarize here the general contents of the book's three main parts.

Prior to Part 1, in the introduction I considered the position of the Kazakh Khanates within Eurasian-wide international relations up to the early eighteenth century. I described a concept of common regional unity that was shared among the three areas of the Irtysh fortified line in Western Siberia, the eastern Kazakh Steppe, and northern Xinjiang.

Part 1 consists of the book's first two chapters. Chapter 1 examined historiography regarding the Kazakh Khanates. It turns out that historiography regarding the Kazakh Steppe within the Soviet Union and China was highly restricted by the circumstances of the period, such as the Soviet-Chinese border conflicts of the 1960s. This resulted in Soviet research turning a blind eye to the relations between the Kazakh Khanates and the Qing Empire, a fact well illustrated by the inadequate mention within Soviet sources of Kazakh "submission" to the Qing in 1757. It is my conclusion that the tripartite relationship between the Kazakhs, Russia, and the Qing must be reexamined in order to fully understand the history of the Kazakh Khanates during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is quite clear that Kazakh-Qing relations were continually influenced by the relationship between the Kazakhs and Russia. It is therefore significant to compare the relationships that existed on both sides.

In addition to the archival documents of both the Russian and Qing Empires, much light is shed on these matters by another source called the *Tavārīḥ-i Ḥamsa-yi Šarqī* (1910, THS), which was written by Qurbān 'Alī Ḥālidī, a Tatar mullah residing in Tarbagatai of northern Xinjiang. This work is particularly useful because of the original content it contains and also because the Muslim network of Islamic intellectuals and Muslim merchants Qurbān 'Alī Ḥālidī focuses on actually unifies the three areas discussed in the introduction. It also

corresponds to the sphere of migration and economic activity displayed by the Kazakh nomads.

In chapter 2, I outlined the Kazakh-Russian relationship as it existed from the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century, a period parallel to the development of Kazakh-Qing relations – the other main diplomatic endeavor of the Kazakhs. Through an examination of the differing conceptions of their relationship held by both the Kazakhs and the Russians, it becomes clear that Russia had always paid careful attention to the Qing-Kazakh connection when formulating its own policy regarding Kazakh affairs. This fact also confirms the utility of the tripartite scheme mentioned above.

The main objective of the Part 2 of the book (which begins with chapter 3 and continues through chapter 5) is to investigate the nature of Kazakh-Qing relations. For this purpose, I analyzed not only the beginnings of the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Qing, but also the Qing's particular interpretation of this relationship and, finally, the title-bestowal system which became the basis of relations between the two parties. Importantly, it became clear that the relationship of the Kazakh Khanates to the Qing Dynasty cannot be considered in isolation. Rather, it must be approached within the context of other Central-Eurasian international relations including those that existed between the Kazakhs and the Russian Empire.

In the Part 3 of the book (chapters six to seven), I examined the change in relations occurring between the Kazakh Khanates and both empires during the first half of the nineteenth century, in other words, changes in the Central Eurasian international order. Consequently, it was confirmed that the three geographic regions this book focuses on – the eastern Kazakh Steppe, Western Siberia, and northern Xinjiang – were closely interwoven both economically and politically. Within these three regions, the Kazakhs played various roles. However, once the process of Russian encroachment into the Kazakh Steppe began, the role of the Kazakh nomads became very restricted. Specifically, this book clearly demonstrates the process of Russia's eastern advance as well as how the two empires' sharing of a border led to the dissolution of the Kazakh Khanates.

Hereafter, I will chronologically summarize the findings of this book in more detail.

The history of the Kazakh Khanates described in this book begins in 1730, when Abulkhair khan of the Small Juz sent his envoy to Russia. Abulkhair and the other Chinggisid sultans of the Kazakhs took oaths of loyalty and requested Russian "subject status." However, the Kazakhs never considered these actions to be complete subordination to the Russian Empire. In this way there was a

gap in understanding regarding their relationship between the Kazakhs and the Russians.

As a background to the Kazakh khans' efforts to construct relations with Russia, the earlier history of the Jungars should be noted. The Jungars had originally fought continuously with the Qing. Later, they advanced into the Kazakh Steppe, and finally made contact with the Russians. As a result, negotiations regarding the Jungars were required between the Qing Dynasty and the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, the Kyakhta Treaty ratified by both empires in 1728 didn't extend to the regulation of Central Eurasian affairs. Thus, Russo-Qing negotiations regarding the Jungars were conducted unofficially.

As demonstrated in chapter 3, a proposal raised by the Qing mission by Toši, who visited Russia in 1731, played a crucial role in furthering Russo-Qing negotiations. This fact can be clearly seen in negotiations regarding issues related to the remaining Jungars, including Amursana, following the collapse of the Jungar regime in 1755.

Within discussions related to the repatriation of such Jungar refugees escaping into Russia as Amursana, the Toši's proposal of 1731 was reappraised by both the Russians and the Qing. This led to the issue of the subjection of the Southern Altai and Kazakhs becoming the focus of attention between Russia and the Qing, in spite of the fact that until then these powers had not been considered significant by either imperial side.

Upon investigating the diplomatic documents sent between Russia and the Qing Dynasty during the years of 1756 to 1758, it becomes clear that the Qing consistently asserted that the Jungars and Altai were their own subjects and that the Kazakhs as well had surrendered to the Qing in 1757. On the other hand, Russia used whatever was convenient from the Kyakhta Treaty and the Toši proposals in order to assert that independent Jungars and Altai under their rule had requested Russian subject status. They also insisted that the Kazakhs had long been Russian subjects. The assertions made by both sides remained adamantly opposed to one another. Consequently, the Kazakhs, in a way similar to the Altai, were regarded as subjects by both empires and to which empire they were in actuality subject remained vague. In other words, the Kazakh Khanates effectively became a buffer state from this point forward. Importantly, this fact also served as the grounds from which Russia and the Qing claimed jurisdiction over the Kazakhs in dealings with each other.

What was the Qing Empire's understanding regarding the Kazakh nomads who submitted to the dynasty during this process and who were recognized as possessing a relationships with the empire? We can clarify, to some extent, the actual circumstances of Kazakh nomadic society during this period from descriptions in Qing materials regarding both the Kazakhs' original clan

confederations (the three Juz) and the three “sections” (*bu*) of Qing classification (which were discussed in chapter 4). During the second half of the eighteenth century, relations between the Qing Empire and the Kazakhs of each Juz changed. These changes resulted in the shift within Qing materials regarding the concept of the three Kazakh sections. In the end, the three sections came to indicate the genealogical lineages of the Kazakh khan families. In fact, the Qing, in general, tried to understand Kazakh nomadic society according to the lineages of the Chinggisid sultans. This policy is directly connected with the Qing system of bestowing titles mentioned in chapter 5.

The titles bestowed by the Qing Dynasty on members of the Kazakh khan clan after 1757 (along with the succession ceremonies related to these titles) were of great significance in establishing the authority of the Kazakh Chinggisid sultans. The “khan” title in Kazakh society also played an important role in their relations with Russia. In fact, until the 1820s, the khan title was recognized by the Russian Empire. However, as in the case of conceptions regarding “subject status,” there were differences in perception between the Kazakhs and Russians regarding the meaning of that title. Regarding political affairs, Russia understood the intricacies in relationship between each Kazakh Juz and the Qing Dynasty and dealt accordingly in its own relations with the Juz. Regarding the Middle and Great Juz, which both maintained closer ties with the Qing Empire, the Russian Empire developed a more modest policy.

It was the clan of Ablai of the Middle Juz that most adeptly maintained two-sided relations with both empires. Ablai, sending his first mission in 1757 to “submit” to the Qing, received the *han* title from the Qing court and began to develop his “bi-lateral” diplomacy. Ablai’s eldest son Wali continued to implement his father’s policy. In addition to dispatching tributary missions and receiving Qing titles, trade was also a large component of the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Qing. The Kazakhs had already been trading along the Russian Irtysh fortified line. After the Kazakhs were permitted to enter Xinjiang for trade (along with the Khoqandis), they also began to act as intermediaries in the trade conducted between northwestern Qing regions and Western Siberia of the Russian Empire. Moreover, Russian subject merchants who were not permitted to trade in Xinjiang required the intermediation of the Kazakh sultans. It is worth noting here that Russia had interests in trade with the Qing through the fort of Bukhtarma on the Irtysh River (as shown in chapter 6).

The aforementioned roles played by the Kazakhs between the empires began to change greatly when new Russian administrative regulations were introduced into the territory of the Middle Juz Kazakhs in 1822. Thereafter, the Russian Empire established administrative Districts in Kazakh pasturelands

with an eye toward extending its influence as far as the Qing boundary running through the Kazakh Steppe. Development of such Russian administrative Districts in the Kazakh Steppe meant that the land of the Kazakhs was put under the jurisdiction of Russia. Consequently, Russian-subject Kazakhs came to be distinguished from those who followed the Qing or the Khoqand Khanate. Finally, the border of Western Siberia gradually became the border between the Russian and Qing empires.

Throughout this process, the titles conferred by the Qing increasingly lost their significance. As a typical example, Wali's son Ghubaidulla failed to succeed to the *han* title in 1824. Because Ghubaidulla took an oath of loyalty to the Russian emperor and was appointed to the official Russian post of Agha-sultan, he could in no way act in opposition to Russian laws. In the end, he was obliged to return the *han* title. Following Ghubaidulla's case, other Russian-subject Kazakh sultans tried to maintain relations with the Qing Empire. However, these actions also failed to meet with the 1822 Russian regulations.

The Russian side interpreted the Qing *han* title as equivalent to the traditional Kazakh title of khan. For this reason, the Russian authorities would not approve Ghubaidulla's succession to the title of *han* once the rank of khan had been abolished by their government. As a result, Qing influence was limited at the hands of Russian policy and Kazakh diplomacy in general began to be more and more restricted by the Russian Empire.

The role of the Kazakhs changed in commercial terms as well. During the early nineteenth century, the influence of Khoqandi merchants increased as intermediaries between Central Asia, Russia, and Xinjiang. However, in northern Xinjiang, these Khoqandi merchants lost their base of operations after the revolt by Jahangir Khoja in the 1820s. Russian-subject merchants in turn advanced into northern Xinjiang. This can be explained by the fact that even the Kazakh sultans residing near the Qing guard post (*karun*) lines, who guaranteed security for trade, fell within the sphere of Russian rule. These changes in the structure of trade are considered to be one factor in the decline of the role played by Kazakh nomads in connecting Western Siberia, the eastern Kazakh Steppe, and northern Xinjiang.

The standpoint of the Kazakhs since the 1820s can be demonstrated by comparative analysis into Russo-Qing negotiations regarding the Kazakh Steppe. Chapter 7 examines these negotiations regarding the Kazakhs by comparing the two empires' policies toward frontier administration. While the Kazakhs interpreted their own subjection to both empires in the vague manner presented in chapter 3, Russia tried to establish full rule over the Kazakhs step by step. Within Russo-Qing negotiations conducted by local officials in northern Xinjiang, Russia gradually showed its aggressive nature to the Qing Empire.

The Qing, on the other hand, decided not to interfere in the affairs of the Kazakhs residing beyond the *karun* line during the early nineteenth century. In fact, the Qing even failed to respond to a request by Kazakh sultans for protection. Thus, the influence of the Qing in the eastern Kazakh Steppe was distinctly lessened and, as a result, the border lines that came to be shared by Russia and the Qing ended up dividing Kazakh pasturelands. The policies of both empires regarding the Great Juz (situated further to the south) were equal to their previous policies regarding the Middle Juz. Russo-Qing negotiations for a commercial treaty around 1850 vividly show how Russian control had already reached the land of the Great Juz Kazakhs (or Semirech'e) by that time. The Qing government eventually had no choice but to accept these circumstances as fact.

The topics addressed in each chapter of this book clarify the development of international relations in Central Eurasia as briefly outlined above. Nevertheless, some problems still remain unsolved. As another factor in the triangle scheme presented in this book, the issue of the Torghut's returning to Xinjiang (1771) is worth noting. The Torghut who were originally settled in the Volga region (under Russian jurisdiction) moved to Xinjiang by way of the Kazakh Steppe. Kazakh interference at this time, as well as Russo-Qing diplomacy related to this issue, requires future comparative analysis.

The Kirghiz issue also requires comparative examination, although I will avoid referring to the history of the Kirghiz nomads in this book in order to avoid unnecessarily complicating the discussion. However, such a comparison of the Kazakh and Kirghiz cases would be important because the Kirghiz also maintained a two-sided relation with respects to both Russia and the Qing. In addition, most of the Kirghiz eventually fell under Russian rule following the Kazakhs.

In terms of chronology, this book covers events up to 1851. Even after 1864 when the Russo-Qing border in Xinjiang began to be demarcated by the Tarbagatai Treaty, the Kazakhs migrated across imperial borders as partly shown in chapter 7. Based on my analysis on the migration of the Kazakhs during the time of the Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang around 1864,¹ I feel it will be worthwhile to proceed with further research into the role played by the Kazakh nomads during the confused situation among the Russo-Qing boundaries – one example of which is the Russian occupation of Ili (1871).²

1 J. Noda, "The Qazaqs in the Muslim Rebellion in Xinjiang of 1864–65," *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, 5–1 (2006): 28–31.

2 See J. Noda, "Reconsidering the Ili Crisis: The Ili region under the Russian Rule (1871–1881)," in M. Watanabe & J. Kubota eds., *Reconceptualizing Cultural and Environmental Change in Central Asia: An Historical Perspective on the Future* (Kyoto: RIHN, 2010): 163–197.

In conclusion, I will briefly summarize the findings of this book.

Firstly, within the international relations of the Kazakh Khanates its relationship with the Qing Empire (after 1757) was always affected by its relationship with Russia. The Kazakh Chinggisid sultans, even while maintaining relations as Qing subjects through the title-bestowal system, demonstrated allegiance to Russia in order to attain advantageous conditions of one sort or another. The Russian Empire, faced with such a style of diplomacy on the part of the Kazakhs, gradually developed its own administration within the Kazakh Steppe, while always paying heed to the Qing Dynasty's influence over the Kazakhs. To the contrary, the Qing Empire lost interest in the Kazakh nomads little by little in spite of early enthusiasm on the part of the Qing court during the beginning of the relationship (chapters four and seven). Instead, a policy of nonintervention was instituted.

Secondly, within the process of Russian annexation of the Kazakh Khanates, especially with regards to the Middle and Great Juz, Russo-Qing relations played a significant role. Russian advances into the steppe were closely linked to desires for trade in Xinjiang – the northwestern area of the Qing. Russia was able to confirm that the Qing Empire lacked interest in the Kazakhs through various diplomatic negotiations via both central governments and local authorities. Based on such knowledge, the Russian Empire could confidently advance into the lands of the Kazakhs of the Middle and Great Juz.

It was previously difficult to examine the nature of Russo-Qing negotiations regarding Central Asia, mainly because of the Qing's policy not to officially recognize relations with Russia throughout all of Central Asia. That is, the Qing archival documents tend not to mention negotiations with the Russians in relation to Central Eurasian affairs. The comparative analysis of both Russian and Qing documents presented in this book enables us to grasp the nature of the two empires' diplomatic negotiations regarding the Kazakh Steppe.

Thirdly, the investigation into Kazakh-Qing relations on which this book puts particular emphasis clarifies the conception of the borders between the three nations of the Kazakhs, the Russians, and the Qing. In addition to illustrating each party's conceptions of the border or borderline, this book also shows the process by which the areas presented in the introduction – Western Siberia, the eastern Kazakh Steppe, and northern Xinjiang – were divided by establishment of the imperial borders. However, as shown in chapter 1, this division happened only in a political sense. We have to keep in mind that the commercial relations and ties of Islamic intellectuals among the three areas continued on unabated, albeit with some changes. This fact clarifies the necessity of examining the history of the Kazakh Khanates (located as it was between the two major empires) without limiting our perception to the modern border

lines. In other words, a principal result of this book is to bridge the east and west sides of Kazakh land beyond the imperial borders.

Lastly, the analysis of this book clarifies the unique nature of Kazakh subjection as reflected in the Russo-Qing negotiations. The Kazakhs' vague 'double subjection,' beginning in 1757, gradually led to a break in Qing influence while the Russian influence remained. At the same time, analysis regarding the two empires' negotiations between themselves leads to a comparative study of the frontier administrations of Russia and the Qing. When it comes to the subjection of the Kazakhs, Russia, much more than the Qing, began early on to consider its relations with its imperial subjects to be based not only on subject status, but also on a type of territorial, or spatial, subjugation. As a result, the eastern border that Russia shared with Xinjiang (and the border of Kazakh pasturelands) became more rigidly fixed.

In general, reconstruction of the history of the foreign affairs of the Kazakh Khanates using only the perspective of Kazakh-Russian relations leads to very restricted results. It has been confirmed by the arguments presented in this book that consideration must also be made from the perspective of Kazakh-Qing and even Russo-Qing negotiations as well. Each side of the triangle composed by the Kazakhs, Russia, and the Qing affects the relations between the other two sides.

The circumstances pertaining to the Kazakh Khanates during the middle of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century were much influenced by the completely different imperial orders of the Qing in the east and Russia in the west. Confronting this situation, the Kazakhs tried to conduct diplomacy with each empire in their own way. It was in 1851–1854 when an end was put to such an effort by the Kazakhs' in the form of annexation by Russia of large parts of Kazakh territory.

Although the two empires eventually came to officially demarcate their Central Asian borders, the boundary areas remained confused and unstable due to such disturbances as the Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang, Yaqub bek's revolt, and the occupation of the Ili district by Russia. As mentioned above, the Kazakh nomads of the time also repeatedly migrated and crossed over the borders. Therefore, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the historical development of Xinjiang and of Russian Central Asia should be seen as deeply connected to Russo-Qing diplomatic negotiations. It is my hope that the changes within the international relations of Central Eurasia up to the first half of the nineteenth century as demonstrated in this book will also become a base for further research into the subsequently turbulent times within the boundary regions of the two empires.

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- JMYD: *Junjichu manwen yuezhe dang* (Monthly Manchu language Memorials of Grand Council). First Historical Archives of China, Beijing.
- NGDK: *Neige daku dang'an* (Grand Secretariat Archives, Government Documents from the Ming and Qing Dynasties). Fu Sinian Library at the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei.
- RGVIA: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (Russian State Military Historical Archive), Moscow
- TsGA RK: Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (Central State Archives, Republic of Kazakhstan), Almaty.

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